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ABSTRACT 
Law, Time, and Sovereignty in Central Europe: 




This dissertation is a study of the codification of empire and its unexpected 
consequences. It returns to the constitutional history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — 
a subject whose heyday had passed by the late 1920s — to offer a new history of 
sovereignty in Central Europe. It argues that the imperatives of imperial constitutionalism 
spurred the creation a rich jurisprudence on the death, birth, and survival of states; and 
that this jurisprudence, in turn, outlived the imperial context of its formation and shaped 
the “new international order” in interwar Central Europe. “Law, Time, and Sovereignty” 
documents how contemporaries “thought themselves through” the transition from a 
dynastic Europe of two-bodied emperor-kings to the world of the League of Nations. 
The project of writing an imperial constitution, triggered by the revolutions of 
1848, forced jurists, politicians and others to articulate the genesis, logic, and evolution 
of imperial rule, generating in the process a bank or archive of imperial self-knowledge. 
Searching for the right language to describe imperial sovereignty entailed the creative 
translation of the structures and relationships of medieval composite monarchy into the 
conceptual molds of nineteenth-century legal thought. While the empire’s constituent 
principalities (especially Hungary and Bohemia) theoretically possessed autonomy, 
centuries of slow centralization from Vienna had rendered that legal independence 
immaterial. Seeking conceptual means to manage the paradox of states that existed in law 
but not in fact, legal scholars and regional claim-makers alike cultivated a language of 
“historical rights” to serve as a placeholder for the suspended sovereignty of these 
sleeping states, swallowed up but not dissolved in the python of empire. Remarkably, 
“historical rights” became a kind of Trojan horse that smuggled the specter of 
international law into the internal workings of imperial constitutional law: the line 
between the two orders grew porous long before the formal sovereign rupture of 1918. 
 Drawing on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal studies and government 
legislation as well as parliamentary debates and peace conference submissions, I thus 
show how imperial constitutional law — closely intertwined with the new academic 
discipline of constitutional law that emerged coterminously — provides an 
extraordinarily powerful vantage point from which to observe the construction of 
“modern” notions of statehood, rights, and sovereignty out of the raw materials of 
dynastic law. What is more, I reveal how the intellectual products of this constitutional 
tradition survived the empire’s dissolution in 1918: bodies of legal knowledge designed 
to capture and codify the fractured nature of imperial sovereignty eventually served as 
intellectual tools for managing its absence. When the empire collapsed under the pressure 
of four years of total war, a carefully cultivated discursive terrain lay waiting, well-
stocked with tropes, arguments, and claims concerning the pre-existing statehood of 
many of the empire’s component parts. At the Paris Peace Conference and beyond, 
claim-makers redeployed the rhetorical arsenal of imperial constitutional debate on the 
world stage, arguing for the survival of these historic polities and their rights over the 
rupture of imperial collapse. The interwar settlement in Central Europe, I contend, cannot 
be understood outside a broader sweep of legal ideas forged in the cradle of imperial law. 
In this way, my dissertation offers a new pre-history of the interwar international order 
(often narrated as a Central European “year zero”), as well as a history and post-history 
of the empire’s legal worlds. 
Sensitive throughout to the co-implication of political and epistemological 
questions, this dissertation is not only a history of sovereignty but also a history of 
knowledge about sovereignty. At its heart lies a preoccupation with the relationship 
between law and time. By tracking law’s “persons” and their survival through time — 
especially their talent for both reinvention and continuity, and their capacity to carry 
rights through history — it sketches a more anthropological portrait of the particular tools 
and logics by which legal thought sets itself in history and resists the effects of time’s 
passing. In offering a new account of the transfer of rights and their subjects between old 
world orders and new, “Law, Time and Sovereignty” doubles as a study of the temporal 
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The Imperial Life of States: 
Sovereignty, Time, and Legal Knowledge in Central Europe 
 
 
Prelude: Three Histories, Three Knowledge Projects 
 
History One 
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between law and time. Stated abstractly, it 
concerns law’s “persons” and their survival through time — especially their talent for 
both reinvention and continuity, and their capacity to carry rights through history. While 
each individual technical discussion treats these themes in miniature, collectively they 
offer a more anthropological portrait of the particular tools and logics by which legal 
thought sets itself in history and resists the effects of time’s passing.1 
The persons in question are, largely, states. But therein already lies half the story: 
a story about determining which “states” still lived and which were long lost to history. 
Demarcating the line between living states and dead ones, it turns out, was not always as 
easy as it should be. After all, what did it mean to pronounce on the birth and death of 
entities that were abstractions in the first place?2 This difficulty only appeared more acute 
																																																								
1 This anthropological portrait takes inspiration from the approach laid out by Paul Kahn in his book The 
Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
2 In the minds of the medieval jurists who forged these concepts, and to many subsequently, invisibility and 
immateriality formed a key virtue, rather than handicap, of group legal personality. Tracing the intellectual 
origins of the modern state to medieval theories of legal corporation, Ernst Kantorowicz argued that the 
juridical personification of communities, cities, and kingdoms in the Middle Ages did not resemble the 
more anthropomorphic personifications of classical antiquity, where the city was figured as a goddess with 
a visible body. Rather, the personifications of the jurists “were philosophical fictions belonging to the realm 
of speculation,” “actually deprived of their physical body” and “granted by legal thought only an invisible 
one. The invisible body, to be sure, was immortal and perpetual; yet it was immortal, not because it was the 
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where long periods of federation or imperial rule had divorced many of the material sides 
of statehood from the legal or theoretical ones, as we shall see. 
History Two 
Less abstractly, this dissertation is a study of the codification of empire and its 
unexpected consequences. Its setting is Central Europe in the last seven decades of 
Habsburg rule. It shows how the project of writing an imperial constitution — a project 
initiated by the revolutions of 1848 — forced its protagonists to pinpoint the empire’s 
legal genesis or geneses and articulate the logic of its rule, generating in the process a 
bank or archive of imperial self-knowledge. Searching for the right language to describe 
imperial sovereignty entailed the creative translation of structures and relationships that 
had been forged in the medieval and early modern periods into the conceptual moulds of 
nineteenth-century legal thought. The arc of these conceptual renovations has an ironic 
bent: I argue that the constitutional project provided many of the intellectual resources 
used to make sense of and regulate the empire’s dissolution. 
If in “version one” above I look towards a more cultural or impressionistic study 
of legal knowledge, here legal thought appears in a disciplinary guise. In the Habsburg 
Empire, the field of constitutional law and constitutional history emerged alongside, or 
even out of, the codification project begun in 1848. The reorganization of rule can be 
separated only artificially from a new body of scholarship about the same: the jurists of 
																																																								
body of a goddess, but precisely because it was invisible — the body of an immaterial being.” Ernst H. 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997 [1957]), 303-304. 
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this tradition constituted and called into being the legal world they were ostensibly 
studying.3  
History Three 
Alongside this history of legal time and this history of imperial constitutionalism lies a 
third history, one that traces the movement of rights between old world orders and new. It 
thinks backwards from the “new world order” of the interwar years with its particular 
constellation of new states, “self-determination,” and minorities treaties, and thinks 
forwards from the imperial jurisprudence developed to manage the rights and claims of 
the Habsburg Empire’s constituent parts. At the core of this history lies the conceptual 
traffic between legal worlds generally held apart from one another. It also plays with the 
timeline of transition between the two, showing how the chronology of ideas mixed 
imperial and international orders according to a pace and structure of its own. It is both a 
pre-history of the interwar international order, and a history and post-history of the 
empire’s legal worlds. One cannot fully understand much of the postwar settlement in 
Central Europe, I argue, without situating it within a broader sweep of legal ideas forged 
in the cradle of imperial law. 
This third story, then, has much to do with “our” knowledge, with the current 
historiography of rights and international order, and with anxieties around how we should 
place rights in history. It speaks to renewed interest in group rights and their relationship 
to sovereignty, be they minority rights, social rights, or the right to self-determination.4 If 
																																																								
3 For a recent account of law and knowledge production, and especially the way law produces “the facts” it 
then deems relevant to legal decision making, see Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common 
Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
4 The star of minority rights has risen alongside that of the League of Nations; see Mark Mazower, 
“Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe,” Daedalus 126, no. 2 (1997): 47-63; and for an 
overview, see Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 
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the story sketched here forms a modest contribution to the larger history of rights 
currently under construction, it has the advantage of exposing a space within which very 
different rights languages explicitly interacted. Imperial debates about who could be the 
subject of rights anchor us deep in the structural formations of European history via the 
aristocratic resurrection of ancestral rights against absolutism, the kind of discourse that 
Michel Foucault linked to the origins of historical discourse more generally,5 and via the 
broader history of European state formation as it was raked over and analyzed by 
different nineteenth-century actors and thinkers. They also catapult us forward to the de-
territorialized rights of ethnic collectives under interwar international law. In navigating 
and weighing these different idioms of entitlement, Habsburg imperial jurisprudence 
documents a “rights world” in transition. 
 
Historical Rights: Making and Re-Making Legal Order in Central Europe 
 
All three of these histories pivot on the notion of “historical rights.” Over the period in 
question, this multivalent marker of right performed hard work. It became a key sign 
under which a wide spectrum of jurists and politicians managed the conceptual 
transformations of late imperial rule and, ultimately, imperial collapse. They used it to 
construct threads of continuity with the past and create normative propositions about the 
																																																								
(2007): 1091-1117; as well as forthcoming work by Gil Rubin and Nathan Kurz. On social rights, see 
especially Malgorzata Mazurek and Paul Betts, “When Rights Were Social,” Humanity 3, no. 3 (2012): 
291-295 and the rest of the articles in that special issue. Among the rapidly-growing new literature on self-
determination, see Eric Weitz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the 
Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (2015): 462-
496; Bradley R. Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s,” 
Humanity 4, no. 2 (2013): 239-260; as well as forthcoming work by Thomas Meaney and Adom Getachew. 
5 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. 
David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 131-138, 165-174, 208-209 and passim. 
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future. Tracing its vocation in imperial and post-imperial legal debate reveals, as though 
in slow motion, the generation of legal meaning out of (and against) the “facts” of 
history. It provides us with a privileged vantage point from which to observe the 
conceptualization and reconceptualization of statehood and rights in an era when a range 
of new challenges — nationalism not least among them — contested the structure of 
both. 
When the question of a constitution seized the political agenda in the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the middle of the nineteenth century, representatives of the empire’s 
constituent “kingdoms and lands” used the language of “historical rights” to claim their 
traditional autonomy. They called for their old rights and prerogatives to feature centrally 
in the great juridical accounting project of the constitution. These old rights and 
prerogatives referred back to the original terms of each particular dynastic union: they 
marked out the autonomous domain preserved by local estates and diets when each 
territory (Hungary, say, or Bohemia, or Tyrol) was acquired by the Habsburg dynasty. 
These rights, tethered to an old aristocratic world of princely Herrschaft, were often half-
sunk in oblivion when the constitutional question came around, worn into the ground 
after centuries of slow centralization from Vienna. Their resurrection at the hour of 
codification was, necessarily, also a conceptual adaptation. The idiom of “historical 
rights” emerged as a means of translating the medieval/early modern logic and structure 
of composite monarchy into the vocabulary of nineteenth-century statehood, sovereignty, 
and constitutionalism.  
Strange things happened in the process of this conceptual adaptation. Put 
succinctly, the “historical rights” of the estates became the historical rights of states. 
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Traditional feudal prerogatives became the jurisdiction and public law of these former 
polities. And the Habsburg acquisition of the Holy Crown of St Stephen or the Crown of 
St Wenceslas in the early sixteenth century (for example) became Hungary and 
Bohemia’s respective loss of sovereignty, a sovereignty they had never formally 
renounced.6 Their “historical rights” tethered their current standing and residual rights to 
this former status as independent members of the family of nations. It became a 
placeholder for their sleeping sovereignty, their suspended international legal personality. 
“Historical rights,” remarkably, became a kind of Trojan horse that smuggled the specter 
of international law into the internal workings of imperial constitutional law.  
When the empire collapsed under the pressure of four years of total war, a 
carefully cultivated discursive terrain lay waiting, well-stocked with tropes, arguments, 
and claims concerning the pre-existing statehood of many of the empire’s component 
																																																								
6 This projection backwards of nineteenth-century understandings of statehood and sovereignty onto 
medieval polities that no doubt understood themselves quite differently, did not, of course, occur only in 
Habsburg constitutional law. Georg Jellinek observed in that in the constitution of the old German empire, 
the “territories” (Territorien) were not states, and dominion (Landeshoheit) was a complex of internally-
inconsistent components that blended together public and private law. “In the last period of the empire, 
however, the territories were declared by imperial jurists [Reichspublizisten] to be states,” subject to the 
general foundations of state and international law. Partially responsible for this transformation, he felt, was 
the “natural law theory of territories as states,” leading to a “process of the positivization [Positivierung] (if 
we can call it that) of natural law,” a process most visible during the course of revolutions. Georg Jellinek, 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Verlag von O. Häring, 1914), 345-347. For a recent study of 
related issues in the German empire, see Bardo Fassbender, Der offene Bundesstaat: Studien zu 
auswärtigen Gewalt und zur Völkerrechtssubjektivität bundesstaatlicher Teilstaaten in Europa (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2007). In the mid-twentieth century, Otto Brunner would become famous for his critique of 
the ahistorical nineteenth-century construction of the “sovereignty,” “statehood” and “public law” of the 
medieval Austrian Länder: the Middle Ages, he wrote, knew no concept of sovereignty in the modern 
sense: Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft: Grundlagen der Territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte 
Südostdeutschlands im Mittelalter (Baden bei Wien: Rudolf M. Rohrer, 1939), esp. 132-194. This debate 
continues to the present day. Fear of anachronism has cut both ways: if scholars like Brunner rejected the 
backward projection of a modern concept, others have resisted the idea that early modern polities lacked a 
conception of something like “the state” just because they did not conform to modern definitions. For a 
survey of approaches, see Susan Reynolds, “The Historiography of the Medieval State,” in Michael 
Bentley, ed., Companion to Historiography (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 117-138; and more 
generally, Stuart Airlie, Walter Pohl, and Helmut Reimitz, ed., Staat im frühen Mittelalter (Vienna: Verlag 
der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006). 
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parts. At the Paris Peace Conference and beyond, claim-makers redeployed the rhetorical 
arsenal of imperial constitutional debate on the world stage. Sleeping states really could 
(apparently) reawaken into the full light of international law. Many of the claims 
presented in Paris are in fact only explicable in light of the imperial debates that had 
shaped understandings of statehood — and state rights — in the region. The intellectual 
cartography of the settlement of 1919 owes much of its texture to the trials and 
tribulations of imperial constitutionalism. This debt has rarely featured in our histories of 
the “new world order.” In tracing these sinews between orders, this dissertation recovers 
both a submerged history of sovereignty and a history of submerged sovereignty. 
In sum, I argue that “historical rights” provided a means of translating the logic of 
medieval composite monarchy into nineteenth century constitutionalism, and then of 
translating the world of the imperial constitution into international law in the twentieth 
century. It thus offers extraordinary utility and power in analyzing the conceptual making 
and re-making of legal orders, documenting how contemporaries “thought themselves 
through” the transition from a dynastic Europe of two-bodied emperor-kings to the world 
of the League of Nations. 
 
Rights Subjects In and Against History  
The continuities — or claims about continuities — that lace through this history are not 
discursive alone. “Actual” legal goods or objects were at stake in both phases of 
conceptual renovation. Any claim about the survival of old rights depended upon a prior 
argument or assumption regarding the survival of the rights-subject to which such rights 
accrued. Historical rights were not a species of natural right, always again deducible in 
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the present from the rationality of the world. As a style of claim they fell between the 
timelessness of natural right and the flat presentism of positive law: they referenced old 
law, lapsed law, forgotten law, but actual historical law nonetheless.7 As a body of 
“subjective law” (in the sense of rights and other legal properties attached to a particular 
subject, rather than “objective law” valid uniformly for everyone),8 they depended upon 
the subject who “owned” such law: these rights could not, as such, float freely through 
time and space. They lived or died with the legal subject to which they were attached. 
The survival of the Kingdom of Bohemia as the Kingdom of Bohemia, of the 
																																																								
7 German historian (and erstwhile member of the NSDAP) Erwin Hölzle attempted to develop a typology 
of legal claims of this style in his 1954 essay “Historisches Recht.” One needed to distinguish between 
current or prevailing (geltende) positive law, he wrote, and elapsed (vergangenen) law, which originated in 
positive law but had been buried through the passing of long centuries. Appeals to this “old law” (altes 
Recht) often arose when current law appeared to violate it. How best to characterize this style of claim? 
Karl Mannheim had identified an “originary conservatism,” which Hölzle deemed too closely tied to the 
historical concepts of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Jurists like Karl Bergbohm and 
Georg Jellinek wrote of a “reactionary natural law,” while Friedrich Meinecke, more pertinently, had 
discussed a “historically-converted natural law” (historisch umgewandelten Naturrechts). These authors 
were right to highlight the affinity with natural law claims in the appeal to a primeval or foundational 
period, conceded Hölzle. Yet these terms, too, missed the mark, because “it is in fact an historical law that 
is reclaimed, not a law retrieved from reason, from nature.” Perhaps “revolutionary retrospection” — but 
then the claim did not proceed from revolution: that might just be its most radical result. It proceeded from 
law. And “reactionary” was ill-suited for a genre of legal claim that usually strove for freedom. Thus, “next 
to current state law [geltendes Staatsrecht] and eternal natural law, we must posit another ‘law,’ which is 
not retrieved from current validity [Geltung] or from reason, but from history.” “Historical law,” in his 
casting, “signified a past law, but nevertheless a law,” and it joined together a seemingly contradictory 
range of human drives: it comprised a “longing for the primitive, the archetype, the natural state — the 
historical aspect of natural law,” connected with a “golden age” and “an eschatology turned backward”, 
while at the same time, in sharp contrast, “the instinct for revolution.” Erwin Hölzle, “Historisches Recht,” 
in Heinrich Büttner, Otto Feger, and Bruno Meyer, ed., Aus Verfassungs- und Landesgeschichte: 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Theodor Mayer, vol. 1 (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1954), 
267, 268, 288. For the other discussions referenced here, see Karl Mannheim, “Das konservative Denken I: 
Soziologische Beiträge zum Werden des politisch-historischen Denkens in Deutschland,” Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 57, no. 1 (1927): 68-142, esp. 103-105 (also interesting for 
Mannheim’s discussion of the temporality and reflexivity of this tradition of thought); Karl Bergbohm, 
Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie: Kritische Abhandlung, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und 
Humblot, 1892), 174-175, note 3 (as carried over onto 175); Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 345; 
Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, vol. 2 (Munich and Berlin: Verlag von R. 
Oldenbourg, 1936), 373 (and see 367-374 more generally).  
8 The distinction between subjective and objective law was quite crucial in nineteenth-century German 
language jurisprudence.  
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Margraviate of Moravia as the Margraviate of Moravia (and so on) was a crucial 
precondition for the survival of their historical rights into the present.  
Accordingly, if Czech politicians in the 1860s wished to invoke the historical 
rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia, then they (or the Bohemian diet in which they met) 
needed to be the direct inheritor, legally speaking, of the Bohemian polity that had 
possessed those rights at the moment of imperial union in 1526. That corporate rights 
subject (an abstract or “fictional” legal person) needed to have survived centuries of 
imperial incorporation with its legal identity in tact, laboring as a rights-mule through the 
long ages of Habsburg rule. As might be expected, that continuity was contested: as one 
Austrian jurist claimed in 1905, “The Bohemian diet is in no way the legal successor 
[Rechtsnachfolger] of the old estates diet, […] it can in no way exercise rights that were 
owed to the Land estates of the past.” That legal subject (Rechtssubjekt), he asserted, had 
“fallen away”9 — taking old rights with it to the grave. Similarly, when Czech statesmen 
in 1919 claimed an historical right to the territory of the Kingdom of Bohemia, they 
presented Czechoslovakia as the juridical heir of the old kingdom, capable of carrying 
rights over the rupture of 1918. Such continuities had urgent implications not only for the 
transfer of rights into the new world order, but also for the transfer of duties, especially 
war debt. Habsburg law thus acquired a new vocation in the wake of imperial collapse, 
sending British peacemakers scurrying away to swap erudite memorandums on the legal 
status of the Kingdom of Bohemia and Czechoslovakia’s legal relationship to it, as 
chapter five recounts. 
																																																								
9 Josef Ulbrich, “Böhmen (Verfassungs u. Nationalitätenfrage),” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., 
Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd 
ed., vol. 1 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1905), 586-587. 
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This dissertation, then, is a study not only of legal orders but of the subjects that 
populate them. It examines the survival of these legal persons over time and, crucially, 
their capacity to migrate between orders, bringing their legal property (that is, their 
rights) with them. This theme provides particular purchase on law’s comportment 
towards time: by what legal lights do rights subjects outlive the worlds that produced 
them, the worlds in which they originally made sense? Law’s management of history is 
made all the more visible when abstract legal personalities ostensibly survive despite 
tectonic shifts in the structural and epistemological ground beneath them.10 How can a 
rights subject that was forged in the legal smithy of medieval Europe preserve the same 
legal identity into a world of constitutional empire, and then into a world of nation-states 
and international law? Clearly, such death-defying feats required intellectual work, and I 
track moments in which jurists and politicians labored to show the historical persistence 
of these abstract or “fictional” legal persons capable of carrying law and rights inter-
generationally. Of course, nothing pulled off the trick of transhistorical legal survival like 
a state.11 Small wonder that everyone claimed to be one. 
																																																								
10 In this sense, I am drawing on the methodological sensitivity, developed especially in the history of 
science, to the mutual implication of social and epistemic orders, and to the way particular political-
historical regimes produce their own subjects. In this dissertation, I try to transfer something of this 
sensibility to the study of law.  
11 Historians of the medieval period have tied the emergence of the conception of the state (in a form 
recognizable today) to the development of doctrines of legal continuity, that is, to the capacity of the 
institutional-legal shape of the state to persist inter-generationally through time — crucially, the “Idee eines 
Abstrktums als Rechtsträger.” In addition to Kantorowicz’s famous study, cited above, see also Helmut 
Beumann, “Zur Entwicklung transpersonaler Staatsvortellungen,” in Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für 
mittelalterliche Geschichte, ed., Das Königtum: Seine Geistigen und Rechtlichen Grundlagen 
(Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1973), 185-224; Laetitia Boehm, “Die Krone, Herrschaftszeichen 
monarchischer Gewalt, als Wegbereiterin transpersonalen Staatsdenkens,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 17, no. 1 (1969): 86-92; and see Walter Ullmann’s essay “The Delictal Responsibility of 
Medieval Corporations” in his collection, Scholarship and Politics in the Middle Ages: Collected Studies 
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 77-96. 
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We thereby find ourselves in something of a loop, following shifting historical 
understandings of legal abstractions that could (ostensibly) resist the transformative 
affects of history. I try to work through the loop rather than against it. If the pretence of 
these legal doctrines to escape history invites our historicization (an invitation I readily 
accept), then I am not looking to simply deflate that pretence, but also to explore how it 
worked on its own terms — that is, to explore the temporal life of states. 
 
Imperial Constitutions and Legal Pluralism: The Habsburg Monarchy in Imperial 
History 
 
In many ways, the project of writing a constitution for the Habsburg lands formed part of 
a much larger nineteenth-century story of imperial self-consciousness and codification — 
a story with global reach. If the continental empires acquired a new consciousness as 
empires (in Austria’s case, spurred by Napoleon) in this period, then empires the world 
over faced a range of different pressures to articulate, in legal terms, the logic of their 
rule. Imperial formations had all inherited patchwork tapestries of sub-polities and semi-
independent jurisdictions that were often protected and even fostered by imperial 
authorities; after all, “legal pluralism,” as we now call it, represented an entirely 
unremarkable feature of imperial rule, one that had facilitated flexibility and often gifted 
imperial rule its strength and longevity.12  
In the Habsburg Empire, this pluralism historically took the form of composite 
monarchy, a model, prevalent across Europe in the medieval and early modern periods, 
																																																								
12 For a succinct statement of this argument, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, “Rules of Law, 
Politics of Empire,” in Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross, eds., Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 
(New York: New York University Press, 2013), 279-293. 
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that preserved the political-legal independence of distinct polities even as they shared a 
common ruler.13 These polities usually retained their own legal institutions and customs, 
as they did in the Habsburg lands (particularly until the centralization projects of 
eighteenth-century enlightened absolutism).14 In the Ottoman Empire, too, local 
jurisdictions were for the most part left in peace, though the multi-faith character of the 
empire added an extra layer of complexity, with secular, Islamic, and customary law all 
operating through the magistrate (or “kadi”) courts, which themselves sat alongside the 
millet system.15 The “variegated legal landscapes” of the bluewater empires boasted a 
catalogue of “anomalous legal zones” that was broader still.16 
The push for constitutional codification (across the Ottoman, British, and 
Habsburg empires and beyond) naturally raised questions regarding the formal 
relationship of these various jurisdictions. Their ad-hoc or unstable coexistence 
crystallized out of the landscape of unseen, self-evident things and into a problem to be 
																																																								
13 See, for example, J. H. Elliot, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past & Present 137 (1992): 48-71; 
H. G. Koenigsberger, “Composite States, Representative Institutions and the American Revolution,” 
Historical Research 62, no. 148 (1989): 135-153; H. G. Koenigsberger, “Monarchies and Parliaments in 
Early Modern Europe: Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale,” Theory and Society 5, no. 2 
(1978): 191-217; Albert Kiralfy, “Independent Legal Systems under Common Dynastic Rule: The 
Examples of England and Hungary,” Journal of Legal History 11, no. 1 (1990): 118-128. For a more 
sociological analysis that analyzes such state forms in the context of European state building, see Thomas 
Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 19ff. 
14 This history is surveyed in more fulsome terms in the prologue that follows this introduction. 
15 See Karen Barkey, “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” Lauren Benton and Richard J. 
Ross, eds., Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 83-
107. 
16 See, especially, Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); as well as Mary Lewis, 




solved, or at least regulated. While constitutional projects often provoked imperial 
governments into bids for unambiguous legal hegemony,17 historians have also stressed 
the persistence of juridically differentiated rule. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper 
argued most prominently, legally homogenous (nation-) states did not become the norm 
in the sixteenth century (when European theorists thrashed out modern doctrines of 
sovereignty), nor in the nineteenth.18 Within this wider frame, the complex jurisdictional 
arrangement of the Habsburg Empire, long narrated as a manifestation of archaism or 
backwardness, in fact merely accords with global patterns.19 Moreover, by taking in this 
																																																								
17 As Lauren Benton has written, “Representations of imperial sovereignty as an overarching political and 
legal authority arranged in relation to an assortment of subordinate jurisdictions emerged within and 
influenced new constitutional projects.” Lauren Benton, “Introduction to AHR Forum: Law and Empire in 
Global Perspective,” American Historical Review 117 (2012): 1094. These codification projects played out 
in surprising ways. British imperial constitutional codification in India, for example, worked as a stimulus 
and model for codification in the metropole. See Elizabeth Kolsky, “Codification and the Rule of Colonial 
Difference: Criminal Procedure in British India,” Law and History Review 23, no. 3 (2005): 631-683. 
18 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 16-17 and passim. 
19 For reasons that would merit a study of their own, historians have had difficulty in thinking about the 
Habsburg Empire within a global world of empires, in both methodological and thematic terms. In recent 
decades, a handful of scholars have looked to internationalize the study of (post/) Habsburg Central Europe 
by drawing on the insights of a different strand of empire historiography and theory — that of 
postcolonialism. See, centrally, Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch and Moritz Csaky, ed., Habsburg 
Postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und Kollektives Gedächtnis (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2003); Clemens 
Ruthner, “Central Europe Goes Post-colonial: New Approaches to the Habsburg Empire Around 1900,” 
Cultural Studies 16, no. 6 (2002): 877-883. This literature, which never quite took off, was met with some 
skepticism from historians such as Pieter Judson and Tara Zahra who doubted the helpfulness of a 
conceptual toolbox of racialized “othering” and national hegemony in a state with citizenship, legal 
equality, and very fluid national identification — a skepticism which Edward Said himself shared. See 
Pieter Judson, “L’Autriche-Hongrie e´tait-elle un empire?,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales 63, no. 3 
(2008): 563-596; Tara Zahra, “Looking East: East Central European ‘Borderlands’ in German History and 
Historiography,” History Compass 3 (2005): 1-23; Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1993), xxii, see also xxiii. This dissertation suggests that a more intellectually fruitful way 
of internationalizing Habsburg history might instead draw from recent research on empire, imperial 
constitutions, and legal pluralism. The Habsburg empire may have had more in common with other empires 
in the domain of law — in the conscious and shifting management of different jurisdictions and residual 
legal orders — than in relation to other techniques of imperial rule. “Internationalizing” Habsburg history 
along a different track, Alison Frank has recently reminded us of the global presence of the Austrian navy 
and Austria’s implication in the international slave trade: Alison Frank, “The Children of the Desert and the 
Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the 
Nineteenth Century,” American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (2012): 410-444. New research interests in 
the history of science and history of the environment have opened their own paths to new histories of the 
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expanded picture of imperial rule rather than presuming the desirability (even necessity) 
of legal centralization from the outset, we make space for the proposition that the 
empire’s legal pluralism did not inexorably form a centrifugal force, and certainly was 
not incompatible with the empire’s “health” or robustness more generally.20 
At the same time, the idea of the legally-unified Einheitsstaat was itself in 
circulation, and featured prominently in Habsburg constitutional debates, arousing both 
desire and aversion among different constituencies. That is, we can distinguish the 
historian’s (often implicit) norms and categories from those of historical actors 
themselves, who invoked these terms in the service of particular arguments or 
comparisons. Like historians, contemporaries pondered the Habsburg Empire’s place 
within the international tableau of states and empires. Analogies to different aspects of 
the British Empire — especially Ireland — occurred with relative frequency. France 
routinely formed a point of contradistinction. As one Austrian politician wrote of the 
empire’s kingdoms and lands in 1861: “all strove with equal vigor against fusion into a 
uniform body politic, and nothing was more terrible to them than the governmental form 
of the imperial enemy, French centralization.”21 Jurists, for their part, developed abstract 
models. The prominent Austrian-German jurist Georg Jellinek held that in the “modern” 
state, as opposed to the feudal or patrimonial one, all public law power flowed juridically 
																																																								
empire that are not only “non-national” but often international or comparative in scope. See, for example, 
Deborah R. Coen, “Imperial Climatographies from Tyrol to Turkestan,” Osiris 26, no. 1 (2011): 45-65; 
Deborah R. Coen, The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to Richter (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
20 On the empire’s rising rather than declining robustness in the late nineteenth century, see particularly 
Gary B. Cohen, “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1867-1914,” Central European History 40 (2007): 241-278. 
21 Franz Schuselka, An Franz Deák (Vienna: Friedr. Förster & Brüder, 1861), 30. 
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from the state: no alternative or independent sources — such as the old rights of estates 
corporations — could formally survive annexation. If one state merged into another, then 
it stopped being a state altogether.22 Hans Kelsen would later teach that the “normal 
image of the state proceeds from the simple premise that all the norms that constitute the 
state order are valid in the same way for the whole state territory […] or are derived from 
one single authority, one single ‘force.’”23 Yet as Kelsen himself noted, states never 
conformed to these model types in reality.24  
Certainly, the Habsburg Empire did not, and the survival of its various historical 
jurisdictions provided plentiful material for the debates at the heart of this dissertation. In 
light of the global context, it becomes all the more intriguing to situate Habsburg 
constitutionalism on the spectrum between legal centralization and legal pluralism. Did 
the project of an imperial constitution lead to greater legal centralization, or its opposite? 
Was the empire coded into a closer union, or did constitutional drafters find new legal 
language to capture its historical-juridical variety? The answer is both — first 
consecutively, then coevally. Through the imposed constitution of March 1849, the 
imperial government enlisted the codification project in the service of a more legally 
centralized state. Yet the early 1860s brought compromise: seeking greater domestic 
support, Emperor Franz Josef enshrined the legal individuality of the empire’s different 
kingdoms and lands in the constitutional laws of 1860 and 1861. The Ausgleich, or 
Compromise of 1867 then turned the linear two-dimensionality of that spectrum on its 
																																																								
22 Georg Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Berlin: Verlag von O. Haering, 1882), 69. 
23 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1925), 163. 
24 Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 164. 
	
	 16	
head: while securing further legal centralization in the “Austrian” half of the monarchy 
(including a common imperial parliament and constitutional court), it simultaneously 
raised the other half of the empire to a fully sovereign state — a highly experimental 
reformulation of the problem of legal pluralism as a doubled or dual centralization. 
The Austrian jurist Franz Hauke offered an astute sketch of this movement 
between models in his contribution to the landmark 1905-1909 Austrian State Dictionary, 
a sprawling multi-volume compendium intended as the definitive handbook of Austrian 
public law. Tasked with writing the entry for “Constitutional History,” the law professor 
from Graz submitted that the whole path of constitutional development since 1848 had 
been structured by the opposition between “the legal form of the unitary state [der 
Rechtsform des Einheitsstaates] and that of a federation.” Even if the “idiosyncratic legal 
status” of the empire’s kingdoms and lands had been recognized, one would have to 
conclude that centralist tendencies maintained the upper hand. With one exception: “In 
contrast, the attempt to divest [literally, disrobe] the Lands of the Hungarian Crown of 
their state-like quality, to treat them as mere provinces of the monarchical state, has no 
doubt definitively failed.”25 Hungary would not be stripped of its “state-like qualities,” 
undressed from state to province, and indeed the whole project of dissolving states into 
provinces, of creating a single domain of public law, had met only with mixed success. 
Some sub-polities had preserved their “state-ness” far better than others. 
Of course, to talk of states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
begged the question of international law: if imperial law regulated relationships between 
																																																								
25 Franz Hauke, “Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., Österreichisches 
Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Vienna: 
Alfred Hölder, 1909), 723. 
	
	 17	
states, had it morphed into a breed of international law? The porous line between 
imperial-constitutional and international law became a tense battlefront in Austro-
Hungarian jurisprudence, as it did in other imperial formations.26 If Hungarian 
invocations of their international standing remained largely rhetorical — “referencing 
international law for style, not substance”27 — they nevertheless forced jurists and 
politicians to rearticulate and redefine the legal nature of this conglomerate monarchy 
within the horizons of twentieth century international order. 
 
The National Question, Differently 
Approaching late Habsburg history through the prism of legal organization reshuffles the 
historiographical deck in more ways than one. If it allows us to grasp the Danube 
Monarchy within a broader international history of empires, it also allows us to fit the rise 
of nationalism into a larger framework rather than pre-presume its status as the major 
metanarrative of the empire’s last decades, free-standing and inexorable, as so many 
historians have done. In political terms (putting aside other social or cultural questions), 
nationalism, first and foremost, constituted a challenge to the pre-existing legal and 
political structure of the empire. In the inaugural constitutional debates of 1848-1849, 
commentators identified three basic models or options: centralization, and two forms of 
federalism — one based on the extant (and multiethnic) kingdoms and lands, and another 
																																																								
26 On this porous line in other imperial settings, especially the status of the Indian princely states between 
constitutional and international law, see Lauren Benton, “From International Law to Imperial Constitutions: 
The Problem of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870-1900,” Law and History Review 26, no. 3 (2008): 595-619; 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 128. 
27 As Lauren Benton wrote of imperial constitutionalism in the British domain: Benton, “From International 
Law to Imperial Constitutions,” 619. 
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built around the ethnic-linguistic communities of the empire.28 The latter (revolutionary) 
model envisaged a wholesale restructuring of imperial order. Its advocates, like the 
Bohemian historian and politician Frantisek Palacký, declared “nations,” and not 
historical kingdoms and lands, to be the significant “members” of the imperial union, 
indeed to be the empire’s prime legal persons. Imperial constitutional law should bend to 
their shape and reflect their characteristics rather than those inherited from dynastic 
machinations in the deep past. 
As a challenge to imperial legal organization, nationalism largely failed, in 1848-
1849 and subsequently. Yet this failure proved generative, revealing many assumptions 
underpinning the workings of imperial law and sparking a jurisprudence of its own. 
While plans to territorially restructure the empire around nationality floundered, 
“nations” nevertheless featured in the emerging constitutional tradition. The right of 
ethnic groups (Volksstamm) to the preservation and cultivation of their language and 
culture was progressively enshrined in constitutional law. These provisions sparked 
widespread legal debate: who or what was the subject of such rights? Most jurists 
expressed great skepticism regarding the formal capacity of a “language” or an ethnicity 
to possess rights. And rights without subjects were meaningless: if no subject could step 
forward to defend such rights, they essentially did not exist in the first place. As against 
the legal amorphousness of nations, the historical principalities held and wielded rights 
with (comparative) conceptual ease. These debates thus rendered visible the symbiotic 
relationship between rights and their subjects, as well as the close conceptual affinity 
																																																								
28 In this sense, the federal idea did not itself possess fixed political content. On this point more broadly in 
the region’s history, see Holly Case, “The Strange Politics of Federative Ideas in East-Central Europe,” 
Journal of Modern History 85, no. 4 (2013): 833-866. 
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between having a state and having rights, and the corresponding difficulty of constructing 
group rights for collectivities that did not resemble states. This constellation of legal 
questions and projects stoked a highly creative late imperial jurisprudence on possible 
ways and means of consolidating dispersed national groups into legal personalities 
capable of bearing rights, despite the fact that they did not form integral territorial 
wholes. This constitutional jurisprudence of group rights (represented most prominently 
by the Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer) outlived the imperial context of its 
formation, spilling over into the minorities regime of the newborn League of Nations. 
Through the lens of imperial organization, we grasp (or grasp anew) that the 
challenge posed by nationalism was legal-epistemological as much as political. The 
attempt to ascribe rights and legal standing to ethnic groups represented a fundamental 
challenge to the structure and categories of constitutional law: it disputed the organization 
of legal knowledge itself. Nationally-minded jurists and politicians asserted that law 
should collect and adhere around different subjects, according to a different pattern — in 
short, that rights should work in a different way. They tried to conjure into being a new 
genre of rights subject, one that was neither individual, nor state, nor estate; to make 
other sorts of collectives not only visible in law, but protagonists in law. While the 
historical kingdoms and lands worked to retain their historical status as legal subjects, 
fending off arguments that they had been overtaken by history, their rivals in the game of 
imperial organization, the nations, struggled to attain legal subjecthood in the first place, 
rebelling against law’s prejudicial preference for the formations of the past. These 
parallel “movements” in rights history, streaking in opposite directions through the heart 
of constitutional law, became foundational problems for the post-imperial settlement in 
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central Europe: who or what escaped the burning house of empire to claim the prize of 
that most complete legal subjecthood, independent statehood? 
 
*  *  * 
This dissertation traces the broad arc of legal ideas and the politics of legal knowledge 
over eighty years. It largely creates its subject from scratch. Generally speaking, there are 
no studies (in English or German) of legal pluralism in the Habsburg Empire or of 
imperial law and time. Similarly, few works exist on the conceptual relationship between 
Habsburg constitutional law and the new order of the 1920s (at least not beyond the 
examination of a particular national case).29 Imperial constitutional history had its heyday 
during the empire’s last decades and into the 1920s, but has generally counted as old-
fashioned since the Second World War, as the national question drove research agendas 
on both sides of the Atlantic. I hope to show that new historiographical questions, 
especially regarding rights, reveal this legal field to be extremely fertile terrain. 
Unsurprisingly, there are countless technical studies in German of particular laws, and 
Gerald Stourzh has written more broad-ranging monographs, especially on the national 
question in imperial constitutional law.30 I look not only to integrate Habsburg 
																																																								
29 Börries Kuzmany in Vienna is currently at work on a general history of non-territorial personal autonomy 
in imperial law and beyond. Different work on the legal protection of minorities is cited in the Coda to part 
two. In contrast, the study of the Ottoman Empire and international law are exploding. See, for example, 
the symposium forthcoming in the Journal of the History of International Law in late 2015, edited by Umut 
Özsu and Thomas Skouteris, on international legal histories of the Ottoman Empire, including contributions 
by Davide Rodogno, Will Smiley, Berdal Aral, and Will Hanley. See also Aimee Genell’s 2013 Columbia 
University dissertation.  
30 See especially Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und 
Verwaltung Österreichs, 1848-1918 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1985). For studies of particular aspects of Austrian constitutional history (ranging from press law and 
notary law to civil and administrative procedure), as well as textbooks, see the work of contmporary 
scholars like Thomas Olechowski, Christian Neschwara, Ilse Reiter-Zatloukal, and Wilhelm Brauneder. 
	
	 21	
constitutional law into broader understandings of law and empire, but also to approach 
these subjects with much greater attention to their epistemological dimensions, that is, the 
conceptual structure of rights claims.31 
Needless to say, much falls by the wayside through this sort of wide-angled lens. 
Those looking for detailed legislative history, or for analyses the subtle shifts in 
ministerial policy, or for thorough biographical portraits, will be disappointed. 
Reconstructing the range of arguments on a given issue, I sometimes jump (no doubt too 
blithely) between decades. It is the wager of this dissertation that significant insights are 
also gained through this approach. Indeed, it is only through this broader lens that the 
three histories sketched at the opening of this introduction emerge into view. If I take 
methodological inspiration less from the Cambridge school than from the historical 
epistemologists, who are concerned with fields of possible positions more than individual 
actors, I have nonetheless tried to remain sensitive to moments that seem to require 
greater social contextualization (such as questions of class and party politics in the 
Bohemian case, covered in chapter three). 
Similarly, this history is, in crude terms, Vienna-centric, as a result of both 
linguistic limitations and the nature of my research questions. I reconstruct claims and 
arguments as they surfaced as part of a general imperial conversation. Czechs, 
Hungarians, and others had their own internal literatures on questions like “historical 
right”: their positions become an object of my concern as they are tabled as claims within 
																																																								
31 Johannes Feichtinger at the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften has recently published an 
enormous study (running over more than 600 pages) of what we could call Austrian epistemological 
history, and includes a number of jurists among his subjects. See Johannes Feichtinger, Wissenschaft als 
reflexives Projekt. Von Bolzano über Freud zu Kelsen: Österreichische Wissenschaftsgeschichte 1848-1938 
(Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010). 
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or intended as contributions to the larger, empire-wide debate. If this restriction makes 
the already voluminous material somewhat more manageable, it also speaks to a 
methodological conviction. To the extent that historians have written about “historical 
rights” and related matters, it has generally occurred within the frame of national history, 
narrated as part of the distinctiveness (or even genius) of a particular group. These 
histories have underplayed or even omitted the imperial context that shaped and 
conditioned these rights languages. After all, claims of historical right were designed for 
consumption in Vienna, and reflected the imperatives of an age of constitutional claim-
making and codification. 
The dissertation is organized into three parts, each comprising two chapters. The 
first explores the series of constitutions promulgated between 1848 and the Ausgleich of 
1867, when the empire settled into the constitutional shape it would hold until its 
collapse. It traces the temporal politics of fashioning a modern constitution out of the raw 
legal materials of a composite monarchy. The second studies the relationship between 
rights and their subject, tracing mutations of legal personality (both historic lands and 
nations) through to the empire’s dissolution. It argues that a particular rights culture 
developed in imperial jurisprudence that ritually distinguished between fact and law: such 
distinctions propped up claims to the almost metahistorical continuity of historical rights 
and their subjects over the long centuries of imperial rule. Part three traces these strands 
of imperial law into the new world order, following both historic states and historic rights 
as they migrated into a post-Habsburg age. Each part is introduced in more fulsome terms 
in separate introduction of its own. The prologue that follows this introduction initiates 
the reader into the field of Habsburg constitutional history, both historically and 
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historiographically, prying apart its particularly sticky tangle of methodological and 
epistemological questions.  
A Note on Vocabulary. The many translations in this dissertation — generally 
from tortured nineteenth-century German legal prose — have posed numerous 
challenges. Foremost among them is the term Staatsrecht, a keyword in this project. 
There is no English equivalent: it is more specific than public law (öffentliches Recht), 
and more general than constitutional law (Verfassungsrecht), though it sometimes 
doubles as a loose synonym for the latter. It is the law that regulates the fundamental 
legitimacy and nature of the state. To take one contemporary explication: in his 1883 
textbook, Joseph Ulbrich, a professor of public law at the German Karl-Ferdinands-
Universität (later Charles University) in Prague, defined Staatsrecht as “a part of public 
law”:  
Staatsrecht is thus the legal order [Rechtsordnung] of the state as a ruling 
polity [herrschenden Gemeinwesens]. As a legal discipline, Staatsrecht deals 
with the organization and life-functions of the state, and the limits of its power 
over against the subjects it governs.32 
 
In this basic sense, Staatsrecht was a genre or kind of law. The real difficulty arises 
through the nature of its use in Habsburg constitutional debate, and the double meaning 
of “Recht.” Firstly, in the nineteenth century, representatives of the historical kingdoms 
and lands began to speak of their traditional bodies of law — especially their medieval 
“estates constitutions” (ständische Verfassungen) — as their historical Staatsrecht. The 
																																																								
32 Joseph Ulbrich, Lehrbuch des Oesterreichischen Staatsrechts: Für den akademischen Gebrauch 
und die Bedürfnisse der Praxis (Berlin: Verlag von Theodor Hofmann, 1883), 1-2. For another 
contemporary explication from one of the characters in this dissertation, see Ludwig Gumplowicz, 
Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- und Handbuch 
(Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891), 8-9. 
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terminology itself thus housed a claim regarding the nature of the entity that possessed 
this law. To have Staatsrecht, to have constitutional law, implied the presence of a public 
law legal personality: it implied the presence of a state. Whatever the substantive point of 
the speech act in question, the terminology itself worked to construct and/or preserve the 
legal subject of this discourse.  
Secondly, and more importantly, when deployed as a weapon against Viennese 
centralization, the Recht in Staatsrecht toiled along the parallel paths of its double 
meaning: to possess this body of “public” law entailed, in the same moment, a right to the 
statehood or autonomy or standing it suggested, a right to the full restitution of that law. 
Staatsrecht was both state-law and state-rights: to have law was to have rights. Law was a 
collective attribute, an historical legacy, but it was also always a claim. In describing the 
past, it addressed the future. 
In depicting claims made in this idiom, English-language scholarship has usually 
referred to (for example) the Czech “state rights” program.33 If this translation captures 
the way in which Staatsrecht was deployed as a claim, it also obscures the original 
meaning of Staatsrecht: that is, as a category or genre of law. In so doing, it misses a 
crucial part of the story — the double meaning of Recht — and isolates “national” claims 
from the thick legal context in which such claims were steeped. It also obscures how 
integrally these claims of right were bound up in the politics of legal knowledge.  
																																																								
33 For example: Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “New States, Old Identities?: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Historical Understandings of Statehood,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 4 (2000): 619-650; Alfredo 
Laudiero, “Nineteenth-Century Bohemia in Contemporary Czechoslovak Historiography: Changing 
Views,” Slavonic and East European Review 68, no. 3 (1990): 476-497; Gary B. Cohen, “Recent Research 
on Czech Nation-Building,” Journal of Modern History 51, no. 4 (1979): 760-772. 
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As a result, I have often simply left Staatsrecht as Staatsrecht in my translations, 
especially in part two, where these issues are at their most sensitive. To translate it as 
either “state law” or “state rights” would be to strip half the meaning out the quotation. I 
ask readers to keep this duality in mind wherever I have preserved the German term. 
One other term deserves mention: Land/Länder. Länder was shorthand for the 
different historical principalities; after the Ausgleich, as is well knowm, the official name 
of the “Austrian” half of the monarchy was Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche 
und Länder — The Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Parliament (never 
was legal pluralism announced so clearly in a state name!). To translate Land as province 
would load the dice: within the frame of this imperial debate, “Provinz” was pejorative. If 
a Land had become a mere province, then Viennese centralization had prevailed. No one 
wanted to be a province. Neither state nor province, Land was conveniently more 
agnostic in the attribution of a clear status. Where other translations felt awkward or 





The History of Habsburg Imperial Sovereignty, and When Such a 
Thing Became Thinkable 
 
 
Das Recht mag ein Sollen-sein , so hat es dennoch Seins-Qualitäten. Es 
ist bald plump, bald hypokritisch, bald volkommen, bald krüppelhalft, 
bald menschlich, bald barbarisch, bald vernünftig, bald irrsinnig wie 
das Hexenrecht, bald weise, bald idiotisch wie die formale 
Beweistheorie und das Zensurrecht des Vormärz, bald alles zugleich.1 
 
In the Beginning — And Always Already at the End 
Secure in their rule across a sprawling continental empire, the Habsburg dynasty had 
never been much troubled by sporadic calls for an imperial constitution. Only the grave 
crisis of 1848 made the promulgation of a constitution appear both inevitable and urgent. 
To be sure, the preceding centuries were scattered with various dynastic agreements that 
served as fundamental laws (or Grundgesetze) of a certain sort, but the constitution 
demanded by the revolutionary students, liberals, nationalists, workers, and others in 
1848 represented something quite different. They sought a modern constitution, a single 
systematic codification of imperial rule. Henceforth, the difficulties of codifying imperial 
sovereignty into law absorbed the attention of a large and diverse cast of characters 
including ministers, newly-minted parliamentarians, journalists, and jurists. Before 
exploring their various debates and blueprints, it seems necessary to survey the history of 
Habsburg imperial sovereignty prior to 1848. In the event, the protagonists of that 
constitutional project thought so, too. What was, legally speaking, the imperial structure 
																																																								
1 Friedrich Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit: Eine Empirisch-realistische Studie (Vienna: Druck 
und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1925), 15. 
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that now required codification? Clearly, it was a hereditary monarchy, but beyond that, 
very little was certain. One could not call upon the local expert, sitting amid the 
accumulated knowledge of his field in some law faculty office, or consult the standard 
manuals, because that expert and those manuals did not, as such, exist.  
When revolution broke out across the Danube Monarchy, the empire’s 
constitutional law and its history were not part of university curricula; there were no 
professorships or standard works, no scholarly field of which to speak. This disciplinary 
vacuum only makes the transformation of subsequent decades all the more remarkable. 
By the early twentieth century, the empire’s universities (especially Vienna, but also new 
universities on the imperial “periphery” like Czernowitz) were hothouses of research and 
education in public law, with alumni ranging from Georg Jellinek and Eugon Ehrlich to 
Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht, and Alfred Verdross. Over that same period, the 
empire had raced through a series of constitutional orders at breakneck pace. The history 
and theory of constitutional law developed alongside the practical and political task of 
constitution writing. The scholarly field and its subject thus emerged and grew together in 
a tight, symbiotic relationship: ways of knowing were built into in the empire’s ways of 
being. 
Different iterations of imperial legal order and academic studies of the same 
folded intricately into one another, making the narratological challenges of recreating this 
world even sharper than usual. To narrate the pre-1848 history of imperial-constitutional 
law is always already to be writing the post-1848 history of constitutional law and legal 
scholarship, because the former is a product of the latter, and reflected its categories and 
imperatives. That legal history barely existed prior to 1848: its preconditions were not yet 
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in place. Only when the task of codification took hold of public life did the systematic 
reconstruction of the empire’s legal-constitutional history begin.2 The “object” requiring 
codification needed to be defined and sought out in the past — it needed to be 
constructed as a subject in both senses of the term. The resulting history of Habsburg 
imperial sovereignty, conceived and charted by jurists and politicians in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, is still largely ours today. If these authors suddenly became 
preoccupied with “the state” and its “sovereignty” where their forebears had other 
questions, concerns, and concepts, today we remain, in broad terms, in their world. To 
recount the historical “background” for nineteenth-century Austrian constitutional law is 
already to be writing, at one remove, the intellectual history of what follows. 
It is hard, then, to take an easy first step. Any small stride into the material 
immediately ties us into the story at multiple points simultaneously, like ripples that 
cannot be recalled or contained once even a single toe has touched the water. If we 
nominate 1806, or 1713, or 1526 as the appropriate legal “start date” for the Habsburg 
empire, we are already caught up in the terms of a late nineteenth-century juridical 
debate, and in making such a selection we prejudicially prefigure what follows; because, 
in constructing legal histories, these scholars and politicians were also making statements 
about current law. To choose a start date, or frame a dynastic agreement in a particular 
way, led to a particular understanding of the composition of the state, or the status of its 
component parts, or the standing of various bodies of customary law. Put differently: it 
was not simply that the “constitutional tradition” had to write its own pre-history as it 
																																																								
2 This was also true in Hungary: legal history was not taught as free-standing subject in Budapest prior to 
1848, though much of the material was included in other subjects. See Barna Mezey, “Rechtsgeschichte an 
der Juristischen Fakultät in Budapest,” Journal on European History of Law 1 (2011): 21-28. 
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went along. More significantly, writing the empire’s legal history was part and parcel of 
the task of codification: history needed to be sorted and sifted, historical laws categorized 
and examined for their ongoing normativity. In this way, the constitutions themselves 
form one common discourse or conversation together with the huge number of histories, 
commentaries, and analyses that were written over the last seven decades of Habsburg 
rule. In referring to the “constitutional tradition” in this context, I take this more 
expansive field of literary output — comprising formal legislation alongside a broader 
array of legal texts — as my subject. 
The problem of pre-figuration plays out in at least one further related (and 
intellectually very significant) way. The authors engaged in this constitutional tradition 
— politicians and scholars alike — were not only recovering, sorting, and codifying 
historical law, they were also translating it between historical eras (more explicitly, that 
is, than the more general translation required for all historical work). More accurately, 
codification required that translation. They needed to convert the intellectual forms of 
medieval and early modern law into recognizable proper “law” in the nineteenth century, 
law that was adapted to the demands of nineteenth-century constitutionalism. This 
conceptual labor — sometimes conscious, other times certainly unconscious — required 
great creativity. The rights of estates became the rights of states, princely Hoheit and 
Herrschaft became Souveränität, dynastic composite monarchies were stacked up 
according to the means and measures of the modern unified state. The writers thus 
worked between legal orders, and a major theme of the constitutional tradition 
(sometimes literally but usually more obliquely) comprised the transfer of legal “goods” 
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between those legal orders. How did legal “things”— most often: rights, and their 
subjects — move and survive (or not) between varying normative orders?  
As a result of these translations, the Wortschatz is a minefield of its own: the 
vocabulary is itself caught up in the transformation I am trying to track. If one of my 
protagonists, in reference to the medieval polity, referred to the “sovereign state” of 
Bohemia, my concern is not to crudely “debunk” the author’s ahistoricism in order to 
reveal a more “truthful” characterization (this is not a study of medieval law, after all, but 
rather of nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal discourses), yet, at the same time, I do 
want to make space for the creativity of that ahistoricism to be visible and part of the 
story. That is, I try to leave some distance around these words even as, inevitably, I have 
to use them myself — unavoidably afloat in the same loaded semantic sea. 
So, insofar as any historical introduction to this subject in particular is always 
already historiographical, I sketch here, in broad terms, the history of Habsburg imperial 
sovereignty and introduce the history of thinking about the same. 
 
The Professors Request a Chair  
In November 1849, the professorial council (Professorenkollegium) of the Faculty of 
Law at the University of Vienna wrote to Count von Thun-Hohenstein, the newly 
appointed minister for education and religion, requesting a number of new 
professorships, including a chair for constitutional law. In the decades preceding their 
request, no legal history and no positive constitutional law had been taught at all. 
Tellingly, the imperial constitutional law on the curriculum in the eighteenth century 
belonged to another empire — the Holy Roman one. After its dissolution in 1806, the few 
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fundamental laws that remained to the “Austrian” imperial state were not considered a 
“whole” requiring a special Lehrfach of their own.3 Legal history and imperial history 
dropped silently out of the Studienordnung in 1804 and 1810.4 One can scarcely speak of 
the academic study of Austrian constitutional or even public law prior to 1848: the few 
existing monographs that treated aspects of constitutional law could be counted on one 
hand.5 
To the extent that students were introduced to the legal shape of the state, it 
occurred through the prism of other disciplines, especially political economy and 
statistics, as well as natural law. Large statistical compendiums communicated state 
organization in concrete, apolitical terms; “the theory of averages” replaced any 
theoretical teachings on the state. This was Metternich’s Austria: critical scholarship was 
clearly prohibited, and so were study trips abroad. Government officials selected the 
textbooks, eighteenth-century texts remained in use into the 1840s, and foreign readings 
were banned.6 General questions concerning the origin and purpose of the state were 
addressed through the timeless, “rational” precepts of natural law, whose general tenor 
had shaped the great codification projects of Maria Theresa and her son Josef II in the 
eighteenth century. (Maria Theresa had appointed the University of Vienna’s first 
																																																								
3 Friedrich Engel-Jánosi, “Die Theorie vom Staat im deutschen Österreich, 1815-1848,” Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht 2 (1921): 360-361. 
4 Gerhard Oberkofler, Studien zur Geschichte der österreichischen Rechtswissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 1984), 408. 
5 Michael Stolleis, Public Law in Germany, 1800-1914 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), 
185-187; Oberkofler, Studien zur Geschichte der österreichischen Rechtswissenschaft, 395; Franz Zeilner, 
Verfassung, Verfassungsrecht und Lehre des Öffentlichen Rechts in Österreich bis 1848 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 57. 
6 Engel-Jánosi, “Die Theorie vom Staat im deutschen Österreich,” 360-362; Zeilner, Verfassung, 
Verfassungsrecht und Lehre des Öffentlichen Rechts, 51-53; Stolleis, Public Law in Germany, 185-187. 
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professor of natural law, Karl Anton von Martini, in 1754). Students learned that the 
legitimacy of the state lent upon an original social contract, and its worth lay in the 
preservation of law, security, and wellbeing over and against anarchy. Needless to say, 
these teachings remained far removed from any of the monarchy’s current affairs or 
concerns.7 One or two of the Romantics passed through: Friedrich Schlegel taught in 
Vienna to popular acclaim in the winter semester 1810/1811; Adam Müller, too, worked 
for a time in the service of the Austrian state. While their work extended beyond the 
precepts of natural law, it also failed to leave a lasting impact on the development of legal 
scholarship in the Habsburg Monarchy.8 
If there was no pre-existing field of constitutional law of which to speak, and even 
an ambiguous state subject (vis-à-vis the recent disappearance of the Holy Roman 
Empire), the reasoning of our petitioning law professors in 1849 only has a greater claim 
on our interest. How did they make out the case for a chair in constitutional law? What 
did they understand constitutional law to be? “We cannot believe,” wrote the professors 
boldly, that the minister for education could want a subject as important as Austrian 
constitutional law simply tacked on to the long-standing chair of administrative law, 
especially in Vienna, the very heart of the monarchy. The lectures in administrative law 
																																																								
7 Engel-Jánosi, “Die Theorie vom Staat im deutschen Österreich,” 362-367. Under the general sign of 
natural law, the eighteenth-century absolutist state embarked on broad codification projects aimed at 
rationalizing and standardizing law across the monarchy’s dispersed territories, including the domains of 
criminal law, civil law, and sections of administrative law (as part of a “Politischen Kodex”). Only 
constitutional law was left entirely untouched: it aroused great reservations, not least thanks to the French 
revolution. For a very brief overview, see Wilhelm Brauneder, “Naturrecht und Kodifikation,” in Wilhelm 
Brauneder, ed., Juristen in Oesterreich, 1200-1980 (Vienna: Verlag Norbert Orac, 1987), 58-63. For the 
development of these other areas of law into our period, see Werner Ogris, “Die Rechtsentwicklung in 
Cisleitanien, 1848- 1918,” in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie 
1848-1918, vol. 2., Verwaltung und Rechtswesen (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1975), 538-662.  
8 Engel-Jánosi, “Die Theorie vom Staat im deutschen Österreich,” 367-394. 
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themselves required a professor’s full attention, and constitutional law would be no less 
demanding. In support of this statement, they listed the different areas and sorts of law 
such a professor would need to cover. Constitutional law, they argued, “demands an 
independent and thoroughly exhaustive lecture course more urgently than ever” as a 
result of  
its historical foundations from the old-Austrian public law [Staatsrecht], from 
the former estates constitutions, from the imperial constitution of 4. March 
1949, from the particular diet constitutions of each constituent crownland (that 
are in part so highly diverse internally) and finally in the all-important vital 
relationship [Lebens-Beziehung] of Austria to Germany[.] 
 
The failure to establish a separate chair would be a “political mistake!,” they concluded   
emphatically.9    
Minister Thun rejected their proposal. By then the government was already 
drifting back towards absolutism, and its opinion of constitutional law remained low.10 
But in mapping the domain of constitutional law as they saw it, the professors revealed 
the constitutive process of that mapping. The “kitchen cabinet” of constitutional law 
proved large: they had identified plural bodies of law, but also law that belonged to 
different sorts of polities. There were, essentially, multiple constitutional laws in play. In 
																																																								
9 Oberkofler reproduces the whole memorandum, dated November 8, 1849 (sourced from the Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Akten des Ministeriums für Kultus und Unterricht): Oberkofler, Studien zur 
Geschichte der österreichischen Rechtswissenschaft, 128-143, here 141. 
10 But Thun did approve the appointment of Moritz von Stubenrauch (1811-1865) into a joint chair for 
administrative and constitutional law, so some constitutional law was taught at the University of Vienna 
from 1849. Oberkofler, Studien zur Geschichte der österreichischen Rechtswissenschaft, 123-124. 
Constitutional law became a formal part of the curriculum in 1850, but then the return to absolutism 
brushed it from the formal examination requirements already in 1852, with only the non-mandatory 
“Austrian Administrative and Financial Laws” examination partially servicing the field. The teaching of 
public law came into its own in 1860s. By 1872, “General and Austrian Constitutional Law” was a subject 




their list, the imposed constitution of March 1849, decreed from above and valid for the 
whole empire (Hungary included), coexisted alongside the estates constitutions of the 
varied crownlands (often customary), as well as legal relationships that reached beyond 
the state (with Germany). To sew them together — more: to claim all these as part of the 
empire’s constitution — marked a kind of intellectual empire-building of its own, a 
gathering up these bodies of law into a single display case of the empire’s legal identity. 
Defining the imperial state over and against polities below and above it was both 
a legal and an historical task. Did the Habsburg empire (as opposed to the dynasty) have 
a history of its own? The question did not seem as counterintuitive as it does now. In one 
of the key reformist pamphlets of Vormärz period, the liberal politician Viktor Franz von 
Adrian-Werburg wrote polemically of “Austria” as an imaginary name. It did not denote 
a people, land, or nation, but worked simply as a conventional designation for a complex 
of nationalities. One could not identify long centuries of common sympathy and 
sentiment. “The history of Austria is generally small and low on facts,” Adrian wrote. 
One could only speak of a distinct Austrian state for roughly the last 200 years (absorbed 
previously more into the history of the German empire), and even then, until the mid-
eighteenth century, it remained “more a history of the individual provinces, rather than of 
a unified state.”11 “Austria’s” facts largely belonged to someone else; it lacked a full 
quotient of “thingness,” that quality required to warrant a history (and a constitutional 
law) of one’s own. Or even, perhaps, a name. Finding a common designation under 
whose sign one could trace the development of the state through time proved challenging 
																																																								
11 (“Die Geschichte Österreichs ist überhaupt klein und arm an Thatsachen”). [Viktor Franz von Adrian-
Werburg], Oesterreich und dessen Zukunft, 3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1843), 9. The 
pamphlet was first published (anonymously) in 1841.  
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until the very end. In his early twentieth-century textbook of imperial legal history (and 
yes, there were many textbooks by that point), Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth (1841-
1932), a legal historian at the university in Graz, discussed the terminological difficulties. 
One had an “Austrian Empire” (Kaiserthum Österreich) only from 1804. Before then, 
one spoke of the lands under Habsburg rule as the House of Austria (Haus Österreich), or 
one spoke of the Hereditary Lands (Erbländen), or of Hereditary Kingdoms and Lands 
(Erbkönigreichen und Ländern), or, from 1712, of the Austrian Monarchy 
(österreichische Monarchie). No one spoke of an Austrian “state” before 1804.12  
Small wonder, then, that deciding when the history of the Austrian imperial state 
began, in a juridically meaningful sense, proved a challenge for the Austrian jurists of the 
late nineteenth century. When in history did the legal identity of the empire solidify into 
place? If the legal imaginary almost always presupposes a quasi-mythical “foundational 
time” (whether in the form of an original contract or divine mandate or revolution),13 the 
																																																								
12 Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth, Handbuch der österreichischen Reichsgeschichte: Geschichte der 
Staatsbildung, der Rechtsquellen und des öffentlichen Rechts, vol. 1, Österreichiche Reichsgeschichte des 
Mittelalters, 2nd. ed. (Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag, 1914), 3. In Robert Kann’s formulation, “A 
Habsburg Empire existed in fact but not in name throughout modern history, long before the proclamation 
of the Austrian empire of 1804.” Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), xi. Holding less tightly to formal names, it was the 
absolutist era of Josefinism that set about forming a robust, centralized state administration and also a homo 
austriacus — a general national subject of this overarching state — especially through the organs of army, 
education, and church, even if the context of such a project remained poorly defined. For this and a helpful 
overview of varying conceptions and projects to create a supranational Austrian citizenry, see Jiří Kořalka, 
Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa, 1815 -1914: Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der 
neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen Ländern (Vienna: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik; Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 27-37. The problem of naming the state 
continued into the late nineteenth century, less in connection to the “Austro-Hungarian” empire (as it had 
become in 1867) as a whole than with the non-Hungarian half. Rudolf von Herrnritt gave four alternative 
names (the “slash” approach to state designation!) in his 1909 textbook for school children: “Die 
‘österreichische Reichshälfte’ (Österreich, die im Reichsrate vertretene Königreiche und Länder, 
Zisleithanien).” Rudolf von Herrnritt, Abriss des Österreichischen Verfassungsrechtes für die Oberste 
Klasse der Mittelschulen (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, k. u. k. Hof- und Universitäts-Buchhändler, 1909), 7. 
13 See Michel van de Kerchove and François Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder, trans. Iain 
Stewart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 163-164. 
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“start date” of the Habsburg imperial state (and, relatedly, its sovereignty) constituted a 
sticky juridical conundrum, less for the lack of a suitable moment of genesis than their 
proliferation.   
 
Sovereign Start Dates 
In the narrowest and most precise sense, a distinct imperial Austrian state under the 
Habsburg dynasty dates only to the early nineteenth century. Its formal crystallization out 
of the legal opacity of the Holy Roman Empire — whose imperial crown the Habsburgs 
had worn for centuries — owed much to the political pressures of the broader European 
context. In a Patent of August 1804, Emperor Franz I inaugurated and adopted the title 
Emperor of Austria (Kaiser von Österreich). This act of monarchical refashioning (and 
consequent state remodeling) composed part of an imperial call and response: it formed a 
direct rejoinder to Napoleon’s declaration in May 1804 of himself as hereditary Emperor 
of the French, redolent as it was of the latter’s consolidation of power and continental 
ambitions. In this moment of self-assertion and self-realization, Franz I ostensibly traded 
the “empty dignity of the Roman empire” for the “reality of the Austrian empire.”14 Franz 
I held both imperial titles as a “double emperor” for two years before effecting the 
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire by abdicating its throne after the disastrous Battle 
of Austerlitz in 1806.15  
																																																								
14 Ernst Karl Winter, “Austria: Guilt and Virtue, I,” Social Research 7, no. 4 (1940): 485. 
15 On the dissolution, see in particular Wolfgang Burgdorf, Ein Weltbild verliert sein Welt: Der Untergang 
des Alten Reiches und die Generation 1806 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009). 
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The status of the 1804 and 1806 official proclamations remained murky. On the 
one hand, they represented the formal constitution and completion of the state. The 1804 
declaration, in the 1850 assessment of one Hungarian historian, formed the “keystone” 
(Schlussstein) that crowned and sealed the Austrian state structure.16 More fundamentally 
still, Joseph Ulbrich’s 1883 textbook of Austrian constitutional law would instruct its 
readers that the meaning of the 1806 act of state “lay in the attainment of full sovereignty 
for all areas [Gebietstheile] of the monarchy.”17 In this analysis, complete sovereignty 
remained an extremely recent acquisition, a property realized late and only in the formal 
liquidation of the Holy Roman Empire.18   
On the other hand, 1804 and 1806 changed very little in the legal nature of the 
monarchy. Ironically, perhaps, the proclamations perpetuated rather than dispelled the 
ambiguities of the empire’s structure and composition, and exercised virtually no impact 
on its constitutional law.19 The 1804 patent explicitly recognized that “all our kingdoms, 
																																																								
16 Johann Mailáth [János Nepomuck Jozsek Mailáth], Geschichte des österreichischen Kaiserstaates, vol. 5 
(Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1850), 249. 
17 Joseph Ulbrich, Lehrbuch des Oesterreichischen Staatsrechts: Für den akademischen Gebrauch und die 
Bedürfnisse der Praxis (Berlin: Verlag von Theodor Hofmann, 1883), 37. Emphasis in original. In his 
earlier work on the “legal nature” of the monarchy, Ulbrich had written that although the suzerainty of the 
Roman Empire had become a mere “apparitional silhouette” (einem wesenlosen Schattenbilde), the 
constitutional law of the empire had still influenced inner-Austrian and Bohemian constitutional law: 
“Rechtlich wurde daher die Souveränität des österreichischen Kaisers erst die durch Auflösung des 
deutschen Reiches hergestellt.” Josef Ulbrich, Die Rechtliche Natur der österreichisch- ungarischen 
Monarchie (Prague: Verlag von H. Dominicus, 1879), 38-39. 
18 Some historians are fond of identifying this belated formal announcement of the state as the paradoxical 
first act of its demise. See Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, xi. By contrast, more recent histories 
have emphasized the empire’s rising rather than declining robustness in the late nineteenth century. See 
Gary B. Cohen, “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1867-1914,” Central European History 40 (2007): 241-278 and, in a different vein, Alan Sked, 
The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1989). 
19 See Karl Hugelmann, Studien zum österreichischen Verfassungsrechte (Vienna: Manz’sche k. k. Hof-
Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1886), 3. 
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principalities and provinces” retained their “titles, constitutions, privileges and 
relationships” unchanged.20 Thus, if a state was officially created in these patents, in its 
own self-articulation it represented merely a codification or recognition of a pre-existing 
set of legal relationships, and did not rearrange the distribution of rights and powers, 
which pre-dated and existed independently of this formal announcement of sovereign 
authority. In keeping with law’s distrust of innovation, any novelty was swallowed or 
disguised: this was state formation via the re-statement of the status-quo. Innovation was 
shunted back and forward in time and out of the present: what came before, as well as 
what followed, left a far greater mark on the juridical shape of empire.  
Unsurprisingly, nineteenth-century jurists from those “kingdoms, principalities, 
and provinces” enthusiastically emphasized this point, namely that the formal 
announcement of imperial sovereignty had not damaged their autochthonous law and 
historical rights. Defending the legal status of the Bohemian lands, the jurist (and former 
teacher) Hugo Toman highlighted that the patent of 1804 had “no influence” on the 
constitutional standing of the kingdoms and lands. On the contrary, in affirming the 
continuity of the coronation laws, the patent could be interpreted as a renewed 
recognition of the “state individuality” (staatlichen Individualitäten) of the crowns of 
																																																								
20 Gesetze und Verfassungen im Justiz-Fache: Für die Deutschen Staaten der Oesterreichischen 
Monarchie, von dem Jahre 1804 bis 1811 (Vienna: Kaiserlich -königlichen Hof- und Staats-Druckerey, 
1816), 22. Karl Renner called it the “second codification of the imperial idea,” after the Pragmatic 
Sanction. Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-
Ungarischen Monarchie: Politische Studie über den Zusammenbruch der Privilegienparlamente und die 
Wahlreform in beiden Staaten, über die Reichsidee und ihre Zukunft (Vienna and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 
1906), 23.  
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Bohemia and Hungary. The creation of the imperial title gifted the empire an outward-
facing “symbol” of legal unity, while leaving the internal mosaic in place.21 
If the staged beginnings of 1804 and 1806 were declarative rather than 
constitutive, when did the legal web of the Habsburg Empire in fact take shape? The most 
significant legal landmark remained the so-called Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 concluded 
under Karl VI — the first constitutional articulation of the Austrian imperial idea. Here, 
too, the international context exerted a strong influence, with the “Turkish threat” driving 
the empire’s lands closer together. The Sanction, which came to be understood as a 
fundamental law (Staatsgrundgesetz), established two important principles: that the lands 
of the monarchy formed an indivisible whole, and that a new and uniform law of 
succession — crucially allowing for succession to pass also to female members of the 
dynasty — would be valid for all these lands. The son-less Karl thereby provided for the 
consequential accession of his daughter Maria Theresa to the crown in 1740. 
The Pragmatic Sanction drew the lands of the monarchy into a thicker and tighter 
union: it formed the legal foundation on which the Monarchy could emerge as a 
continental power. But did it create a single state? Probably not, though disagreement on 
the subject persisted and featured prominently in the constitutional debates of the late 
nineteenth century.22 Josef Redlich (1869-1936), perhaps the most important jurist of the 
late empire, termed the Sanction “the first positive formal affirmation of the Austrian-
																																																								
21 Hugo Toman, Das böhmische Staatsrecht und die Entwicklung der österreichischen Reichsidee vom 
Jahre 1527 bis 1848: Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Studie (Prague: J. G. Calve’sche k. k. Univers.-
Buchhandlung, 1872), 214. The language of “state individualities” is discussed at length in Chapter Three. 
22 Many jurists took the Pragmatic Sanction to be the tipping point between the original “personal union” 
and a more integrated “real union.” See, for example, Ulbrich, Die Rechtliche Natur der österreichisch-
ungarischen Monarchie, 31. Hungarian jurists generally contested this thesis. 
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Bohemian-Hungarian [tradition of] imperial thought.”23 The trifurcation was telling: there 
was more than one subject in play. After all, what subsequently gained the appearance of 
a unilateral and definitive act of sovereign will (that is, the Sanction), was in fact a 
complex of laws that involved contractual-style agreements between members of the 
royal house as well as between the king and the estates of the different lands and 
territories.24 It preserved the patchwork nature of the polity, acquiescing, for example, to 
the proposition that Hungary could not be ruled in the same way as the rest of the 
monarchy.25 Dramatizing such distinctions, special Hungarian laws (Laws I and II of 
1723) were required to implement the stipulations of the Pragmatic Sanction in Hungary. 
Moreover, the Pragmatic Sanction, like the decrees of 1804 and 1806, presented 
itself (alongside its particular innovations) as a confirmation of older rights and 
prerogatives. In the Hungarian implementing laws, the estates of the Hungarian kingdom 
formally “compensated” (erstatten) the monarch for the affirmation of their pre-existing 
“freedoms and prerogatives” (Vorrechte), and spoke of the maintenance of their “vested 
and other rights, freedoms, privileges, immunities, customs and prerogatives” 
(Prärogative).26 The Sanction thus also deferred to an older order of political rights that 
																																																								
23 Josef Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem: Geschichtliche Darstellung der inneren 
Politik der habsburgischen Monarchie von 1848 bis zum Untergang des Reiches, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Der Neue 
Geist Verlag, 1920), 6. In 1872, Hugo Toman would observe that the Pragmatic Sanction currently 
remained the one Staatsgrundgesetz whose legitimacy was uncontested in each and every land; it was thus 
recognized and upheld across the empire. Toman, Das böhmische Staatsrecht und die Entwicklung der 
österreichischen Reichsidee, 93. 
24 Ulbrich, Lehrbuch des Oesterreichischen Staatsrechts, 27. 
25 See Heinrich Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), 15. 
26 Gesetzartikel I v. J. 1722/23, reproduced in Edmund Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze 




continued to exist alongside the growing consolidation of power in Vienna.27 When did 
the empire acquire this pattern of rights and freedoms, this gallery of sovereign 
limitations? What kind of rights were they, apparently always already in existence and 
yet repeatedly in need of recognition and affirmation? 
Those rights pointed back to, and memorialized, a moment of imperial inception 
buried deep in the past. Josef Redlich thought the birth hour of the empire could be 
pinpointed as precisely as the hour of its death. August 29, 1526: the capricious drowning 
of a young king as he fled the victorious Ottoman army after the battle of Mohács. The 
death of Ludwig (Louis) II, of the Jagiello dynasty, bearer of the crown of the 
independent kingdom of Bohemia and of the Hungarian empire, and the last of his line, 
opened the way for the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand to be elected king of Bohemia and 
Hungary. The monarchy, which until that point possessed only the modest holdings of the 
alpine hereditary lands, thus grew suddenly and dramatically in size, thereby becoming, 
as the story goes, a continental power.28 The monarchy’s great power status was thus 
integrally tied to the incorporation of Bohemia and Hungary. As a result, the ambiguities 
of that union became the empire’s own, nestled at the heart of its legal and political 
architecture.  
																																																								
27 See, for example, Ernst Nagy’s account of the Pragmatic Sanction’s preservation of the Hungarian 
constitution: Ernst Nagy, “Ungarn: A. Staatsrecht,” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., 
Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd 
ed., vol. 4 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1909), 587. 
28 Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 1. Habsburg rule over Bohemia and Hungary 
did have precedents; on this and the unions of 1526 more broadly, see Ernst C. Hellbling, Österreichische 




And ambiguous it was: conceived as a defensive alliance amid the pressures of 
the Ottoman wars, the dynastic union of 1526 left many legal threads untied. It had the 
rough-hewn edges of the temporary, with the laws of succession clearly allowing for the 
crowns to once again pass to princes outside the Habsburg dynasty. As it happened, the 
arrangement stuck for almost four centuries, but the bare fact of duration obscures the 
uncertainty over its longevity and the post-Habsburg futures that continued to circulate as 
legal possibilities. Imperial law never entirely managed to close off those other futures, as 
we will see. As the Pragmatic Sanction most clearly attests, the union required ongoing 
renegotiation, reinterpretation, and reaffirmation. The rights, privileges, and prerogatives 
recognized there, and again in the 1804 patent, and that belonged to Hungary in particular 
but also to Bohemia and the other Länder of the empire, were the enduring reminders of 
the dynasty’s incomplete acquisition of “sovereignty.” They were the “native” rights and 
legal institutions that these smaller polities bought with them into the empire, laws that 
survived the original dynastic union. Imperial law, as manifest in these key acts of 
juridical state building, was thus not always “imperial” in origin. (For that reason, Alfons 
Huber’s 1895 textbook held that the history of imperial public law must begin even 
earlier than 1526, because at that point the legal structures of each individual Land had 
already taken shape).29 When the empire’s constitutional order exploded as a political 
question in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was precisely the untidy legal 
stitching of these unions (especially regarding Hungary) that came under severe juridical 
																																																								
29 Alfons Huber, Österreichische Reichsgeschichte: Geschichte der Staatsbildung und des öffentlichen 
Rechts (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1895), iii-iv. 
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pressure — the seams and hemlines of the empire that threatened to come apart. 
Sovereign foundations came back to bite.  
The main thrust of the legal history of empire as an empire might be understood 
as one long legal mediation on this (especially Hungarian and Bohemian) loss of 
independence, on this erasure of what we would now call international legal personality. 
The anachronism of such a concept is itself an important part of the story. If the actors of 
1526 (and subsequently) presumably possessed little of late nineteenth-century 
understandings of the international sphere, or of an international law in which states 
occupied a unique status, then many jurists and statesmen in the last decades of the 
empire came to recast these medieval monarchical transactions under the sign of a loss of 
state sovereignty. This dynastic chess game of crowns, hereditary rights, and princely 
marriages — Ferdinand’s marriage to Ludwig’s sister, which laid the groundwork for 
Ferdinand’s acquisition of the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns, had been mandated by 
the first Congress of Vienna in 1515 — was translated into a drama of states and 
international law, and utilized as a method of gaining purchase on the legal situation on 
the present. This history came to serve as the raw material for reflection on the death and 
birth of states. Could one maintain one’s state-ness within an empire? Without 
sovereignty? And remerge again into the international sphere? As late-imperial claim-
makers raked over the empire’s legal history, documenting the survival of the rights of 
this land and that, and reaching back to the moments prior to imperial sovereignty to 
ground their current claims, they projected backwards in time the conceptual structure of 





Once Were States: Forms of Imperial Formation 
At the heart of any account of imperial sovereignty and constitutional law, then, stood the 
status of this union and the legal nature of the empire’s varied constituent parts. The 
difficulty lay not only in translating the legal form of the composite monarchy into 
nineteenth century positive law, but also in ascertaining what had happened, legally 
speaking, to those constituent lands over the long centuries of their imperial 
incorporation. “It is correct that the Austrian crownlands once were states,” the Austrian 
jurist Josef Kunz would write in 1929, emphasizing the past tense. In his mind, by the 
nineteenth century they had sunk to the level of mere legal shells or symbols, “historical 
reminiscences.”30 Kunz’s opinion here was greatly influenced by his teacher Kelsen, 
whose “pure theory of law” intentionally dismissed as irrelevant everything outside the 
rational frame of positive law.31 Most jurists and claim-makers — and certainly those 
from the non-German lands — saw things differently, and more subtly.32 After all, had 
not old rights and titles been explicitly preserved in those Gundgesetze all the way along? 
Tasked with defining, in precise terms, the juridical fate of the former “states,” these late-
imperial legal minds turned their attention (as we must now, too) to the slow evolution of 
a unified imperial state. 
																																																								
30 (“Es ist richtig, daß die österreichsichen Kronländer einmal Staaten waren”). Josef L. Kunz, Die 
Staatenverbindungen, Handbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. 2, part 4 (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 
1929), 216-217. Emphasis in original. 
31 Kelsen had already made the same argument earlier: Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: 
Verlag von Julius Springer, 1925), 190-193.  
32 For a rebuttal of a view like Kunz’s, see for example Ulbrich, Die Rechtliche Natur der österreichisch-
ungarischen Monarchie, 62-64. 
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In 1916, the Austrian jurist Hans von Frisch, then a professor of law at the Franz 
Josef University in Czernowitz on the easternmost edge of the empire, reflected on the 
particularities of Austria-Hungary’s state formation. “The formation of large states 
through the thorough incorporation of smaller states or state-like entities,” he wrote, 
 
is a relatively simple and uninteresting process. How different though, if the 
individual life-guarantees [Lebensbestätigung] of the incorporated entities did 
not completely end with the incorporation, if the parts united in the integral 




History teaches us, he warned further, that smaller polities federated in this way always 
strive to regain their independence. That medieval state past, in Frisch’s assessment, held 
the key to current structures of political conflict and even prefigured the possible futures 
that loomed on the horizon.  
Frisch’s description of the empire’s formation essentially posited multiple 
statehoods suspended simultaneously within an imperial union: a compendium of 
statelets that, despite their amalgamation, never properly ceased being state-entities in 
their own right. This conglomeration of statehoods resulted from the Habsburgs’ 
particular style of empire-building. As the dynasty acquired different lands and polities, it 
kept to a general custom to leave unmolested their frontiers and political identity — to 
incorporate them as ready-made whole units. If this was especially true of Bohemia and 
Hungary, then it also applied to those lands acquired before 1526 (as well as 
																																																								
33 Hans von Frisch, [n. t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer im Gefüge der österreichischen 
Verfassung: Eine Rundfrage,” in Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, Heinrich 
Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, eds., Länderautonomie, Sonderheft of the Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1916), 31. 
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subsequently). Having originally taken over the duchy of Österreich in the thirteenth 
century, the Habsburgs accumulated a growing stable of hereditary possessions, 
incorporating Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Tyrol, Istria, and Triest in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, before Fiume in the fifteenth and Gorizia early in the sixteenth. All 
these lands retained their own identity, institutions, laws, and customs, Tyrol perhaps 
most of all.34 As the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary passed to the Habsburgs, and the 
latter’s dominion expanded further still, the “state” retained this basic historical anatomy 
through all its adventures in centralization and continental politics. In this way, Josef 
Redlich observed, “the individuality of the separate hereditary lands, as they had been 
formed by the coincidences of the territorial history of the Middle Ages, remained 
diligently preserved.”35 A particular cross-section of medieval history, embalmed in the 
oil of empire, defied the contingencies of its formation and held its shape.  
The “survival” of the lands was not a question of structure or form alone. These 
incorporations also entailed alliances of sorts with local elites who, despite episodes of 
(sometimes violent) resistance, were essentially bought in as partners in governance. In 
leaving traditional legal structures in place, the dynasty deferred to the regional authority 
of the custodians of those legal structures — that is, the estates.36 Large areas of “public” 
																																																								
34 On the gradual incorporation of these lands, see R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
1550-1700: An Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 158-162. The duchy of Austria predated 
the Habsburgs, first appearing in records around the turn of the first millennium. See Erich Zöllner, 
“Österreichbegriff und Österreichbewußtsein im Mittelalter,” in Eric Zöllner, ed., Volk, Land und Staat: 
Landesbewußtsein, Staatsidee und nationale Fragen in der Geschichte Österreichs (Vienna: 
Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984), 6 and passim. 
35 Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 20. 
36 The make up of the estates varied from land to land. It always included the nobility (which dominated), 
the clergy, and the towns; occasionally the peasants were also represented.  
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administration remained the prerogative of the estates, especially taxation and the 
judicature. Operating alongside Vienna’s endeavors, the estates oversaw a parallel system 
of government, with their representative bodies — the regional diets, or Landtage — 
playing a key role.37 Vienna relied on those structures; the estates’ rights regarding 
taxation in particular made Vienna financially dependent on their intermediary 
authority.38  
If the dynasty in fact encouraged the retention of regional identity and 
administration at different moments, then from the eighteenth century the relationship 
between these two tracks of government was nonetheless structured by Vienna’s drive 
towards a stronger, more centralized state. The Pragmatic Sanction, as noted, laid the 
legal foundations for a “Gesamtreich,” or an integrated state, yet remained a “thin-walled 
vessel” (in Redlich’s phrase), a weak juridical container based on the union of crowns 
and thus marred by the limitations of the dynastic Staatskunst of the period.39 It was the 
																																																								
37 There has been a recent revival of interest in the estates and their “intermediary authority” in the 
Habsburg Monarchy — a field that long lagged behind the enormous and innovative study of the French 
estates. There remains no comprehensive study of the interplay of “particular and universal administration” 
between the Thirty Years War and 1848: see Gerhard Ammerer, et al., “Die Stände in der 
Habsburgermonarchie: Eine Einleitung,” in Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfürsten?: Die 
Stände in der Habsburgermonarchie, ed. Gerhard Ammerer, William D. Godsey, Jr., Martin Scheutz, Peter 
Urbantisch, and Alfred Stefan Weiß (Vienna and Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 15 and passim. In 
addition to the large number of essays in the aforementioned volume, see Christine L. Mueller, The Styrian 
Estates, 1740-1848: A Century of Transition (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1987). Recent 
works have often stressed the continuity in the estate’s role in government, and resisted the teleological 
approach of an older literature that focused on ruptures of eighteenth-century absolutism and presumed a 
linear decline of provincial government.  
38 See P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740-1780, vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 297ff; William D. Godsey, “Habsburg Government and Intermediary Authority 
under Joseph II (1780-90): The Estates of Lower Austria in Comparative Perspective,” Central European 
History 46 (2014): 699-740. 
39 See Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 5, also for his memorable description of 
the Pragmatic Sanction as “das dünnwandige Gefäß.” As Redlich notes (page 25), it was only very 
gradually that the central government developed any sort of direct relationship with the people, as this had 
previously been mediated entirely by the nobility. 
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accession of the reformist Empress Maria Theresa to the crown in 1740 that would 
dramatically alter the balance of powers within the empire. Under her rule and that of her 
son Josef II, central government increased markedly in both pace and scope, aided by a 
growing army of educated civil servants with little invested in the rights of the estates.40 
Corporative structures and regional systems of control were placed under great pressure 
in the drive towards standardization and centralization, while the military, bureaucracy, 
and economy were thoroughly transformed.  
The reformers met mixed success: despite setbacks in fiscal reform, they 
implemented the first permanent universal tax in 1760s.41 Law received particular 
attention. They looked to tame the plethora of overlapping jurisdictions through the 
establishment of one uniform system of public law with enormous projects of 
codification in the civil and criminal domains. The new Codex Theresianus of 1766 tried 
to balance the modernizing policies of the government and the vested interests and rights 
of the estates, while criminal law underwent systematic reform under Josef II with the 
Allgemeines Gesetzbuch or Criminal Code of 1787.42  
For all such state development, this history cannot be narrated as the smooth rise 
and inevitable triumph of the modern, “enlightened” centralized state. The estates in fact 
grew stronger during the Seven Years War, undergoing a revival towards the end of 
																																																								
40 See Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 305-320 and passim. On the civil 
servants, often from lower backgrounds, see Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 21. 
41 See H. M. Scott, “Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-90,” in Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and 
Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe, ed. H. M. Scott (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1990), 154-159. For the tax, see Godsey, “Habsburg Government and Intermediary Authority,” 704. 
42 Scott, “Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy,” 159-160. For an overview of the reforms from the 




Maria Theresa’s reign.43 And after the varied reforms of this era of “enlightened 
absolutism” (reforms that had themselves often proceeded on the basis of each individual 
province), Vienna’s power still differed markedly from region to region, with local 
authorities sharing in the work of rule.44 The evolution of government, like the empire’s 
constitutional history, continued to take shape out of a series of compromises between 
these different seats of power. In 1905, the senior civil servant (Regierungsrat) and 
scholar of administrative law Carl Brockhausen weighed the deep significance of the 
historic Länder, “out of whose incomplete and not unchallenged amalgamation the state 
was formed”: 
 
[T]he existence of the state depends in no small measure on the question of 
whether the individual crownlands or their totality holds the power; in reality 
then every one of our varying constitutions was, if in the end the formal will 
of the state [Staatswille], nevertheless materially always a compromise 
between Land authority and state authority; and it is unknown who will carry 
forward the definitive victory.45 
 
Constitutional law formed an unfolding dialogue between the Länder and the imperial 
center — a restless one, one that rolled on without suggesting the shape of a definitive 
status quo. This multi-authored, dialogical legal order revealed the state to be less a free-
																																																								
43 See Ulbrich, Die Rechtliche Natur der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, 32-34; Dickson, Finance 
and Government, 329; Godsey, “Habsburg Government and Intermediary Authority,” 705. 
44 Scott, “Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy,” 148-149. 
45 Carl Brockhausen, Die österreichische Gemeindeordnung: Grundgedanken und Reformideen (Vienna: 
Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1905), 237.  
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standing thing than one always being made, and remade, in the noisy interplay of various 
claims and counter-claims.46 
Nowhere was this portrait more accurate than in Hungary. Its integration into the 
Habsburg body politic remained the prickliest state project. Hungary stood apart, and if 
Bohemia likewise constituted a special case, it could only dream of the constitutional 
aloofness maintained by Hungary. The historian R. W. J. Evans distinguished the mostly 
German-speaking “hereditary lands” from Bohemia and Hungary by classing the former 
as those under “direct sovereignty”47; various forms of indirectness continued to skewer 
sovereignty over the latter two. Small wonder, perhaps: both Hungary and Bohemia had 
formed established kingdoms for centuries prior to 1526. Though in both cases the native 
dynasty had died out in the fourteenth century, they had each elected a string of foreign 
kings and prospered under them. The initial association with the Habsburgs constituted a 
mere personal union — that is, a union that extended only as far as the shared person of 
the ruler, duly elected as King of Bohemia and King of Hungary in turn. No relationship 
existed between say, Bohemia, and any other land under the crown; the union consisted 
exclusively in the coincidence of the Emperor and the King of Bohemia within the same 
royal body. Under such circumstances, the independent “state-ness” of each kingdom was 
unambiguously preserved. If a clear legal consensus existed regarding the character of 
this initial union, disagreement raged over when (if ever) it became thicker and more 
permanent, and how such a claim could be substantiated in the first place. Did the 
																																																								
46 As James Sheehan has argued about European sovereignty in general: James Sheehan, “The Problem of 
Sovereignty in European History,” American Historical Review 111, no. 1 (2006): 4. 
47 Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 157. 
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transition (from, say, a personal to a real union) depend on particular formal legal 
characteristics, or on the material reality of rule, or on the projected longevity of its 
duration? 
Bohemia’s status and pretensions to statehood suffered a detrimental blow a 
century after falling under Habsburg sway. The nobility had quite successfully preserved 
their rights and the traditional administration of the kingdom until their disastrous defeat 
in the 1620 Battle of the White Mountain (where the Thirty Years War intersected with 
intra-imperial politics), which settled the power struggle in the monarchy’s favor. The 
defeat led to a consolidation of imperial powers, most notably in the Verneuerte 
Landesordnung of 1627. The highest officer in the land was henceforth to be his 
majesty’s representative; the emperor now nominated the highest officials, and state 
functionaries, who had previously sworn allegiance to the king and the “Commonwealth 
of Bohemia” (obec královstvi českého), now swore exclusively to the former. With the 
establishment of the Bohemian Hofkanzlei in Vienna in 1624, pacified Bohemia was 
essentially ruled from the imperial capital.48 Crucially, elective monarchy was abolished, 
meaning that the crown of Bohemia now became a hereditary one for the Habsburgs, 
enabling the suggestion that Bohemia thereby became a mere “hereditary land” like any 
of the other core German provinces.  
Naturally, the thesis was sharply resisted in Bohemia. After all, this reshuffling of 
powers had also left many of the traditional structures in tact. And the Verneuerte 
Landesordnung gaped with drafty holes through which to drive a wide spectrum of 
arguments: did the Habsburgs now possess the right to freely abrogate all privileges not 
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expressly confirmed? Or, as claim-makers in the nineteenth century would come to argue, 
were all privileges not definitively abrogated in fact affirmed?49 What was living and 
what was dead in the Bohemian state tradition could not be fixed with precision; but the 
wound of the 1620s was grave, and the lifelessness that followed both broad and deep. 
Hungary’s fate diverged sharply. It successfully resisted thoroughgoing 
incorporation into a unified state, retained a broad array of rights and institutions, and 
clung tenaciously to the assertion that it remained an individual and independent body 
politic. Hungary’s self-proclaimed special path through the trials of imperial sovereignty 
leant heavily on its so-called ancient constitution. This constitution was a body of 
customary, mostly unwritten laws that Hungarian noblemen had managed to preserve 
through the years of Ottoman occupation.50 Many of these laws and customs were 
famously collected and codified by the Hungarian scholar and statesman István 
Werbőczy and published in Vienna as Tripartitum Opus Iuris Consuetudinarii Inclyti 
Regni Hungariae in 1517, three years after Werbőczy had presented his compendium to 
the Hungarian diet.51 The constitution possessed a profound authority and almost mythic 
importance for Hungarian jurists and politicians, gifting their political ideology its 
structure and texture. At its heart lay a basic dualism between the crown and the ország 
(the “country” or “land,” in this case meaning the qualified community of nobles): the 
																																																								
49 See Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 198-200; Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und 
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king exercized rights vested in the crown, and the diet exercized rights vested in the 
ország. These “two distinct and largely separate repositories of right and authority” 
functioned “alongside each other in conflict and accommodation.” Both were required for 
proper lawmaking. This “structural dualism” was only exacerbated after the Habsburgs 
ascended to the Hungarian crown.52  
The Hungarian constitution encompassed an extensive domain of aristocratic 
social and economic privileges, including far-reaching authority over the peasantry, free 
power of taxation, and the inalienability of noble land holdings (often denoted through 
the old legal concept Avitizität). Its significance for law and administration was likewise 
fundamental, covering the diet’s right to participate in lawmaking (Gesetzgebung), the 
principle that customary laws could only be altered by their own (Hungarian) statute, and 
the preservation of the regional or county “constitutions” (Komitatsverfassung), which 
were administrative bodies with broad public functions.53 In the nineteenth century, a 
number of Hungarian jurists would argue that the constitution nurtured a body of public 
law long before most other legal traditions had even developed the concept of the state, 
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and this talent for constitutional life was celebrated as a foundational national attribute.54 
The Hungarian diet was called less frequently than most, but consistently behaved more 
defiantly, often rejecting the financial demands of the imperial government, and passing 
its own laws.55 Notwithstanding the Habsburgs’ repeated attempts to reduce Hungary to 
the status of the “other provinces,” it had its special standing affirmed in imperial law in 
1715, 1723 and 1741, and largely withstood Joseph II’s full-blooded attack on the 
Hungarian constitution.56  
The successful defense of local law and rights in Hungary earned admiration and 
envy across the Habsburg lands. Bohemians, as well as other observers, were wont to 
juxtapose Hungarian rights with Bohemian rightlessness. They contrasted the robustness 
of Hungarian autonomy with the pale and pallid version elsewhere, which received lip-
service but little more. František Palacký, Bohemian historian, politician, and the most 
important Czech leader of the mid-nineteenth century, reflected long and hard on the 
																																																								
54 Péter, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn,” 241. As Péter writes on the following page, “Die 
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but had little impact; the more rebellious Hungarian version, by contrast, was called only in 1741, 1751, 
and 1764. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 305; see also 287 for Maria 
Theresia’s concessions to Hungary. 
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Hungary,” in Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe, ed. H. 
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uneven strength and longevity of historical law within the empire.57 In the mid-1860s he 
looked back on the previous century and the legal consequences of Vienna’s push 
towards centralization and standardization. The imperial statesmen, he wrote, disregarded 
more and more “the historical rights of the Länder, already then known only as 
‘crownlands’”:  
 
Resistance rose against this everywhere, but it was only conducted decisively 
and forcefully in Hungary, as much with the death of Joseph II as later under 
Franz I; Hungary alone preserved, until the year 1848, through all the hostile 
efforts and through all adversity, its constitutional life and its autonomy in 
form and essence simultaneously, while in Bohemia and in the other lands 
usually only old forms, as well as some old titles and ceremonies though 
without significant meaning, were left in place.58 
 
Palacký’s analysis, admiring and rueful in turn, distinguished between the form of 
historical law and autonomy on the one hand, and its essence or meaning on the other. In 
Hungary alone were form and essence coterminous; in Bohemia and the other lands, 
forms had been drained of meaning: the trappings of sovereignty — the survival of a title 
here, the structure of a ceremony there — may have persisted, but the content had been 
flushed out. The value of that formal continuity would provoke great debate in empire’s 
last decades, and remain a feature of arguments about statehood into the new order of 
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1918-1919. The survival of forms and signs carried a weight of its own, even if the real 
prize comprised a true synchrony of form and essence.59	
Hungarian success should serve as a model for the establishment of different 
“government organisms” (Regierungsorganismen) in the other lands of the empire, 
instructed Palacký. Apart from some absurdities that one would like to avoid, “the core of 
Hungarian institutions is in itself so healthy and vital [lebenskräftig] that in my opinion 
one should cultivate it in the other Länder too; it contains within itself a life-fresh 
[lebensfrischen] seed of true Land autonomy,” and carried a great capacity for reform and 
improvement.60 Lebenskräftig, lebensfrisch — Hungarian rights lived, where others were 
dead or dying.  
 
An Empire at the Edge of Legal Thought: Law’s Typologies, Concepts, and 
Categories 
 
So historical law had survived unevenly across the face of the empire, even as the 
lawbooks brimmed with formally-existing historical rights. How was a jurist to code this 
landscape of decaying rights into positive law? In particular, how should one 
superimpose that most fundamental modern concept, the state, over this conglomerate 
imperial polity? What kind of “state” was the empire? Legally speaking, it seemed to 
require an adjective, and maybe even two. In his 1877 text Die Rechtliche Natur der 
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österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (which quickly became a very popular book 
title),61 the Austrian jurist Hermann Bidermann (1813-1892), who held chairs in Graz and 
Innsbruck, considered the question. On this subject, he conceded, only two things were 
certain: firstly, in the legal quality of the ruler, Austria-Hungary really was a monarchy, 
and secondly, that 
 
it is not a simple, unified but rather a plural, compound polity [ein 
mehrfaches, zusammengesetztes Gemeinwesen]. Everything else is doubtful or 
at least contested, in particular: how many states does it consist of? what are 
they called? what is their legal relationship to one another? do they together 
form a state-of-states or a federal state [Staatenstaat oder einen Bundesstaat]? 
or is their union is to be considered merely as a state confederation 
[Staatenbund], so that together they don’t form a state at all, but rather merely 
hang together in international law?62 
 
When applied to the old imperial polity at the heart of Europe, the category “state” 
splintered and darted off in a dozen different directions. If “state,” juridically speaking, 
was not a common designation for the monarchy prior to the nineteenth century, now 
Habsburg central Europe teemed with many of them. The imperial “state” attracted 
unusual adjectives: “zussamengesetzt” (literally, put-together or pieced-together) 
appeared more than once.63 While the concept “state” fit a little awkwardly with the 
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empire as a whole, it felt just as ungainly for the smaller polities held under the imperial 
crown. As Bidermann indicated, the concept of state carried with it the scent or 
suggestion of international law. If the kingdoms and lands were still states, did they 
“hang together” in constitutional or in international law? The project of codifying the 
empire into positive law thus quickly drew attention to the murky meeting point of 
constitutional and international law, applying pressure along the joints of different 
systems of legal thought. 
The situation was complicated further still by the fact that the kingdoms and lands 
differed dramatically: not only in material questions of size or economic power, but also 
in legal terms. Winding histories of dynastic acquisition meant that their juridical 
relationships to the imperial crown, as well as to each other, varied widely. Some of the 
kingdoms and lands were grouped together by their own supra-Land constitutional law. 
Three of the empire’s constituent components, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margraviate 
of Moravia, and the Duchy of Silesia together formed the “Lands of the Bohemian 
Crown,” a dynastic bond first established in the fourteenth century. With those legal 
bonds having slackened over the course of Habsburg rule, a central precept of 
Czech/Bohemian political platform in the nineteenth century involved the renewal of the 
“insoluble” union of the three lands. This claim lay at the heart of the so-called 
“Bohemian charter,” a pair of Prague petitions from March 1848 answered favorably by 
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the emperor (albeit under the duress of revolution), which kicked off the constitutional 
claim-making that would beleaguer the empire until its collapse.64  
Hungary’s juridical web proved more complex still, even after the “Compromise” 
of 1867 that constitutionally remodeled the monarchy into the dualist “Austro-
Hungarian” empire, establishing therewith two fully independent states on either side of 
the Leitha. As the French jurist Louis Le Fur and his collaborator Paul Posener wrote of 
the two “large states” of Austria-Hungary in 1902: “Both states in turn each form a 
higher entity of multiple states or provinces.”65 There were states within states within 
states. Since the sixteenth century, Hungary had its own composite monarchy of three 
“regna,” comprising Hungary proper, Transylvania, and Croatia (with Slavonia generally 
ruled under the same ban as the latter). Each possessed its own diet and customary law.66 
Hungary itself formed an empire of sorts, too, with these affiliated territories often 
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designated as subordinate “Nebenländer.” For that reason, the important Hungarian 
statesman Albert Apponyi (who would later head the Hungarian delegation to the Paris 
Peace Conference) reacted with “mingled feelings of annoyance and amusement” when 
William Gladstone, supporting the first Irish Home Rule Bill before the House of 
Commons, elaborated a “fanciful analogy,” to the effect that “There is an imperial 
parliament in Vienna, and a local one in Budapest.” Before the second Home Rule Bill 
had come around, Gladstone had better educated himself, noted Apponyi with 
satisfaction: for in fact there was an imperial parliament in Budapest, too, and a local one, 
with limited rights, in Zagreb.67 Hungary was not Austria’s Ireland; rather, Croatia was 
Hungary’s Ireland. Austria-Hungary’s fit in the puzzle of world empires ran a little awry, 
and to this day challenges any unthinking, unipolar conception of empire. Here each of 
the two sovereignties (Austrian and Hungarian) housed their own collection of quasi-
soverengties like two sets of Russian dolls joined at the hip. As the liberal politician 
Franz Schuselka wrote in 1861, “Austria is a crown of crowns, a throne of thrones, an 
empire of empires.”68 
By far the sharpest constitutional thorn in Hungary’s side was Croatia. An 
enormous legal literature accumulated on the question of Croatian “statehood.”69 From 
the Croatian side, it was legally unambiguous that Croatia “existed and should still exist 
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as an independent, autonomous state” - its “state rights, grounded in contract” were 
clearest of all those in the monarchy.70 Like other lands, its independence had been 
legally affirmed across the centuries since the Croatian crown was first taken up by a 
Hungarian king (Koloman) at the turn of the twelfth century.71 The thesis of Croatian 
statehood was bolstered by a separate “Compromise” concluded between Hungary and 
Croatia in 1868, which could be construed as a contract between two equal parties: if 
Hungary was a state, then Croatia must be, too. In his landmark 1911 history of the 
Hungarian constitution, Hungarian historian Henrik Marczali dismissed the argument, but 
was forced to define the essential characteristics of a state in the process. “As a juridical 
person, a state is unthinkable without a treasury and without the right to conduct 
international intercourse,” he instructed. “Can a state exist without citizens? The Croatian 
one would be it.”72 Far from having an international standing of its own, Croatia appeared 
as part of Hungary even as against Austria. True, in internal administrative and legislative 
spheres, Croatia did command a wide degree of provincial autonomy, Marczali conceded, 
a kind of self-government “that cannot be construed from theoretical definitions and that 
is only understandable through historical and political premises. Like every true historical 
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creation, it is a factum sui generis that is difficult to encase within general constitutional 
categories.”73  
In moments like these, late imperial authors consciously ran up against the limits 
of conventional legal thought, complaining of the difficulties of coding the empire into 
the standard categories. All such models shipwrecked on the shores of the Austro-
Hungarian empire. Marczali was not alone in asserting that one needed to reason 
historically to have any chance of making it onto firm legal ground. Indeed, the 
challenges and contradictions posed by the uneven contours of Habsburg sovereignty led 
many jurists to develop new typologies and categories altogether. One such creative 
response came from Georg Jellinek (1851-1911), who must count among the most 
famous public law jurists of the late nineteenth century. Born in Leipzig, Jellinek was still 
a small child when he moved with his family to Vienna, where his father worked as a 
rabbinic scholar. He studied in Vienna between 1867 and 1872 (with two years in Leipzig 
in the middle), and was appointed non-tenured (außerordentlicher) professor for 
Staatsrecht at the University of Vienna in 1883. He also taught international law, as the 
chair for the latter lay empty following the retirement of Leopolf Neumann that same 
year. In 1889, Heinrich Lammasch, a professor in Innsbruck (and future politician), was 
called to Vienna to take up a chair for criminal and international law. Despite having 
covered the area for six years, Jellinek had been overlooked. He wrote to the ministry in 
August 1889, stating that Lammasch’s appointment had made his position untenable, and 
left Austria for what became an illustrious career in Basel and Heidelberg. Antisemitism 
played a central role in the affair: according to the minister for education, Paul Gautsch 
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von Frankenthurn and his colleagues, international law was not a field that should be 
entrusted to a Jew.74 
This bitter departure notwithstanding, the Habsburg Empire featured in interesting 
ways in Jellinek’s expansive oeuvre. Writing in the last years of the nineteenth century, 
he argued that theory needed to respond to empirical realities: the foundational concepts 
of public law must be permanently re-evaluated as the world of states rolled onwards in 
endless transformation. Danger awaited if one attempted to grasp “the life of the present 
with the categories of the past.”75 A major weakness of current juridical thought lay in its 
insufficient conceptualization of an “inbetween level” (Zwischenstufe) between the 
“state,” on the one hand, and the “province,” on the other. There are political formations, 
he argued, that are subordinated under a state government, but that have not entirely 
“merged” with that state — “that are in fact not states themselves, but present the 
rudiments of a state.” He called these “state fragments” (Staatsfragmente).76 
Jellinek surveyed world order, sorting a wide variety of quasi-states and holding 
them against his freshly-coined concept of “state fragments.” The Austrian Länder fitted 
in perfectly. They formed part of a single Gesammtstaat, yet they had preserved a key 
element of their statehood in their ability to make law that was not subordinate to 
imperial law. This striking capacity, which stemmed from their historical status, 
contrasted greatly to Germany, where imperial law “broke” or overruled law made by the 
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Länder.77 In Austria, legislation passed by the diets of the lands represented a strange 
phenomenon, Jellinek recounted. It was incorrect to say that they were acts of provincial 
autonomy, because a province was not their subject. These laws were sanctioned by the 
emperor, publicized by the imperial government, and countersigned by the minister. Nor 
were they the result of powers delegated by the central authority, as “that would 
contradict the historical development of the monarchy from the ground up: the imperial 
legislator did not create the Land legislator, but rather the other way around.” These 
Landegesetze had a “double character: they are simultaneously acts of the empire and 
acts of the Land.” The Länder took part in the emperor’s legislative rights, and formed 
state organs on their own terms. The peculiarity of having state organs, without 
themselves amounting to states, meant that they fell neatly within “the category of state 
fragment.”78 
New categories of quasi-sovereignty like Jellinek’s keyword could bundle up and 
parcel out international order along unfamiliar lines. In his book on state fragments, the 
historic principalities of the Habsburg Empire found themselves collected under the same 
category heading as Australia and Canada. The latter settler colonies, too, had state 
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organs without being completely independent states in their own right.79 Jellinek’s 
typology contained finely grained distinctions. The Länder had lost their “existence in 
international law” — “the particularity of the state element of the Länder is lost when 
facing outward” — and for this reason they must be distinguished from “dependent 
states” (abhängige Länder) that had (or a could have) a “curtailed personality in 
international law.”80 All these borderline polities were thereby placed in a constitutional 
spectrum that opened out into international law.  
In 1914, the prominent French-German jurist Robert Redslob composed his own 
globe-spanning typology of incomplete sovereignty, likewise mapping the historical 
polities of Central Europe alongside other quasi-states the world over. His own favored 
category or measure was the moniker “dependent lands.” These marginal cases offered 
the scholar a powerful vantage point, a crack through which the very nature of the state 
could be discerned. He who grasps the nature of dependent lands, Redslob wrote, “also 
looks into the soul of states.”81 
Alsace-Lorraine represented a dependent land, so did Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Ottoman territory brought late under formal Austro-Hungarian sovereignty in 1908 after 
a long period of occupation. “However if we step into the double monarchy Austria-
Hungary, our gaze will be enthralled by other formations that appear as curiosities of 
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des Begriffs von der ursprünglichen Herrschergewalt: Zugleich eine staatsrechtliche und politische Studie 
über Elsaß-Lothringen, die österreichischen Königreiche und Länder, Kroatien-Slavonien, Bosnien-
Herzegowina, Finnland, Island, die Territorien der nordamerikanischen Union, Kanada, Australien, 
Südafrika (Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp., 1914), 1-2. 
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state theory.”82 He, too, assumed that any legal analysis of the case must proceed 
historically. Had “these old state formations” fallen victim to centralist strivings? “Do 
they still have their own life? Are they still independent organisms? Or have they all 
grown together into a new and singular organism?”83 The situation could be distinguished 
sharply from Alsace-Lorraine, where a pre-existing German empire extended its authority 
over the territory. Nothing of the sort occurred in Austria: “Austria never had an 
existence outside its Länder. It lives in its Länder and through its Länder.” As a result, it 
was not a matter of observing the unification of “a foreign body with a finished 
organism,” but rather to discern “the principle, the source of life of a finished 
organism.”84 Austria was an empire without a metropole, or an empire that did not exist 
as a state prior to its colonies, reversing the regular temporal sequence of empire-
building. Its very essence bespoke a sovereign plurality. If German rule in Alsace-
Lorraine was akin to a new wing being added on to a finished construction, Austria-
Hungary was built out of a number of different members from the beginning. If one 
wished to understand the nature of that union, the principle of their stability, then one had 
to “lay bare the internal parts that have grown invisible.”85 Austria-Hungary’s plurality 
was not out on external fringes of the state but deep within its bones, its subterranean 
legal structure no longer visible on the surface of the law.  
																																																								
82 (“Wenn wir aber in die Doppelmonarchie Österreich-Ungarn eintreten, so wird unser Blick noch durch 
andere Bildungen gefesselt, die als staatstheoretische Merkwürdigkeiten erscheinen”). Redslob, Abhängige 
Länder, 143. 
83 Redslob, Abhängige Länder, 155. 
84 Redslob, Abhängige Länder, 155. 
85 Redslob, Abhängige Länder, 156. 
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Like Jellinek, Redslob placed great emphasis on the fact that laws made by the 
Länder commanded an equal weight to imperial laws: Reichsrecht did not break 
Landesrecht. This equality differed markedly from other empires where different laws 
had different origins, and where one system overlaid the other hierarchically. For this 
reason, the Austrian lands could not be “dependent lands” because the latter played no 
part in the original authority and force of the state. In Austria, by contrast, “the state 
cannot be imagined without its territories. The state does not win its life force in a foreign 
sphere. It lives in the territories, through the territories. The original ruling force 
[Herrschergewalt] originates in the totality of the Länder.”86 They were provinces, but 
provinces “of a very idiosyncratic sort,” as their authority was not derived from the state 
but constitutive of the state: their power was as original as that of the imperial state as a 
whole, indeed, it was the same power. They thus demanded a category of their own. 
Redslob called them “ursprüngliche Staatenteile”— original state parts or particles. 
 
The Progress of Metaphors: Constitutional Jurisprudence as an Archeology of the 
Present 
 
Faced with an imperial polity that stubbornly resisted the applicability of simple 
categories like “state” and “province,” jurists set about naming and categorizing dozens 
of new legal species like botanists entering pristine wilderness. Biderman had decided on 
the concept of “state of states” (Staatenstaat), Ulbrich nominated “composite state body” 
(zusammengesetzter Staatskörper). The polities under the Habsburg umbrella, as we have 
seen, could be “state fragments,” or “original state particles,” or many other things 
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besides. The monarchy’s juridical particularities nagged away at the theoretical mind, 
goading it into finding an ever more apposite schema, and turning the jurisprudence of 
the empire into a productive legal workshop staffed by a growing band of sovereignty 
smithies.87  
Not everyone bought into this codification craze. The prominent late-imperial 
jurist Ludwig Gumplowicz, who we will encounter a number of times, doubted the 
fruitfulness of these quests for master concepts. A bullish if brilliant legal scholar of 
Polish-Jewish background, Gumplowicz (1838-1909) authored many of the key 
textbooks of Austrian constitutional and administrative law from his perch as professor of 
public law in Graz. “It is wasted effort,” he declared, “to want to box states into species 
and types like one does with plants and animals, and then to want to determine in which 
rubric the particular state belongs.” Austria, he observed skeptically, was an “adored 
object of such academic speculation.”88 The categorical impulse clutched at shadows: 
“This method is incorrect and purposeless for the reason that states are individual 
formations and, in the creation of the individualities, history repeats itself just as little as 
nature.” Austria’s current constitutional formation was the product of an idiosyncratic 
historical development that found expression in the Compromise laws of 1867. “This 
relationship,” he counseled, “cannot be depicted with a doctrinal term”; rather, it could 
																																																								
87 If we are accustomed to thinking of Austria-Hungary as a hothouse for the production of nationalism, it 
was also an energetic workshop for conceptions of dispersed or qualified sovereignty. On the range of 
different understandings of the monarchy as a workshop or laboratory, see Deborah R. Coen, “Climate and 
Circulation in Imperial Austria,” Journal of Modern History 82, no. 4 (2010): esp. 857. 
88 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- 
und Handbuch (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891), 48. 
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only be understood as a restive compromise between competing forces.89 If one began 
searching for the true “legal nature” of the monarchy, the project spiraled onwards ad 
infinitum: “in these things there is neither a court of appeal nor a mathematical proof.”90  
It was a project without an endpoint, a false methodology that had no reliable way 
of proofing its conclusions. One could arrive at understanding only by proceeding 
historically. In this latter point, many concurred: history stepped in where strict 
rationality or legal formality failed. Imperial codification could only result from historical 
reasoning. Heinrich Marczali, our historian of the Hungarian constitution, agreed: 
 
The making of our constitutional law — legally just as valid as any other — 
has not proceeded logically or rationally in any direction. It is the existing 
constitutional history [Es ist die bestehende Verfassungsgeschichte]. As such 
it can only be understood and explicated genetically [genetisch]. This 
perspective compelled me, the historian, to enter into the solution of this 
difficult task.91 
 
The Hungarian constitution required an archaeology of the present, a gathering together 
of the history that still lived on in the present, the history that was not expired or properly 
past. Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth described his methodology in a similar way in the 
preface to the first, 1896 edition of his textbook on imperial legal history. “My attention 
was always directed to taking up everything from the historical past that still lived on, in 
some form or another, in the present.”92  
																																																								
89 Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht, 49. 
90 Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht, 49 (note 47). 
91 Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht, iv. 
92 Luschin von Ebengreuth, Handbuch der österreichischen Reichsgeschichte, vol. 1, xiv. For another 




Clearly, this genealogical constitutionalism shared characteristics with the 
influential German historical school of law, not least in its critique of timeless natural and 
“rational” law.93 Yet references to the school’s proponents or precepts remained largely 
absent from the jurisprudence of the imperial constitution in Austria-Hungary. At least in 
part, this non-convergence stemmed perhaps from the awkward fit between the historical 
school’s emphasis on Volksgeist as the source and logic of law, on the one hand, and the 
nature of the Habsburg polity, on the other. If Bohemian claim-makers clung to the 
historic law of the Bohemian kingdom, for example, this law could not automatically be 
construed as the deep organic product of the “Czech” people (though Czechs would work 
hard to develop this association in the late nineteenth century). The historic kingdoms and 
lands were all emphatically multiethnic; even the aristocracy, the bearers of these legal 
traditions through much of history, had often been “destroyed” and replaced with a 
“resettled” elite, as in Bohemia after the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620.  
Rudolf Laun (1882-1975), a product of this world of Austro-Hungarian legal 
world and influential twentieth-century jurist (about whom we will also hear more later), 
would critique the historical school in precisely these terms in 1954. If he was skeptical 
about the explanatory power of the notion of Volksgeist in general (did Rousseau have a 
Swiss or a French Volksseele?), then the case of Austria-Hungary rendered the thesis 
entirely nonsensical. “In Austria, with its eight peoples [Völkern], was there one 
Volksseele or eight, or both at the same time? Did the German Austrians change their 
																																																								
93 See John E. Toews, Becoming Historical: Cultural Reformation and Public Memory in Early-Nineteenth 
Century Berlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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Volksseele when the German Confederation was dissolved in 1866?”94 And what about 
the Sudeten Germans? They were part of the German confederation until 1866, then 
“Germans” in Bohemia before being forcefully incorporated into the new Czechoslovak 
Republic in 1918; then, in 1939, they were unified with Hitler’s Germany on the basis of 
the national principle and with the agreement of the Western powers. In 1945, the 
Western powers deemed this unification impossible, but nevertheless, shortly thereafter, 
the Sudeten Germans were “violently expelled from their ancient Heimat that had 
become Czechoslovakian again,” most of them gaining citizenship in West Germany. 
“From 1866 until today, have these Sudeten Germans changed their Volksseele five 
times, or the[ir] membership of a larger German, Austria, Czechoslovakian, again 
German, again Czechoslovakian, again German Volksseele?”95 
In contrast to the historical law celebrated by Friedrich Carl von Savigny and his 
colleagues, the “historical law” and “historical rights” invoked in constitutional debate in 
the Danube Monarchy were not coded as the völkisch, organic products of a national or 
ethnic group. On the contrary, a codification of imperial order based around the historic 
Länder appeared (generally) as a rival to ethnically-based schemes for federalism, as we 
will see in the next chapter. In legal terms, the historical and the ethnic/national maps of 
the empire did not coincide. The game here revolved rather around making old 
feudal/estates law resemble the law of a state. Constitutional history traced the crooked 
																																																								
94 Rudolf Laun, “Naturrecht und Völkerrecht,” Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 4 (1954): 25. 
95 (“Haben nun diese Sudetendeutschen von 1866 bis heute fünfmal ihre Volksseele oder die Zugehörigkeit 
zu einer größeren, deutschen, österreichischen, tschechoslowakischen, nochmals deutschen, nochmals 




path of these quasi-sovereign political formations through time, rather than the 
development of human collective defined by race or ethnicity or culture. 
Faced with the empire’s welter of overlapping jurisdictions, scholars like 
Marczali invoked an historical method to make space for all those inconsistent features 
that frustrated general juridical categories. It was not the only response. On might decide 
instead to discard those contradictions — and the history that housed them — altogether. 
This radical “purification” of legal methodology represented Hans Kelsen’s departure. 
All “non-legal” material, as well as all irrationalities and inconsistencies, were to be 
expunged in new “scientific” and methodologically pure legal theory. History was 
irrelevant. Eric Voegelin (an erstwhile student of Kelsen’s) and others have tied this 
astringent pure theory of law back to older, authoritarian Austrian legal traditions of the 
Metternich era, with their “apolitical” focus on administrative law at the expense of the 
more political questions of constitutional law.96 To the extent that that lineage holds 
water, Kelsen closes the circle outlined in this prologue: from a complete absence of legal 
history in the Vormärz, Austrian constitutional law hurriedly wrote and rewrote its 
history over the empire’s last seven decades, only to have this path declared a dead end 
and to see history abandoned once more.  
Of course, not everyone turned with Kelsen. One could have the opposite 
response, and instead view those contradictions as an integral and inevitable part of the 
fabric of the law — characteristics that could not be washed away, even if one should 
																																																								
96 Eric Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 4, The Authroitarian State: An Essay on the 
Problem of the Austrian State, trans. Ruth Hein, ed. Gilbert Weiss (Columbia and London: University of 
Missouri Press, 1999), 189-206. Voegelin’s Der autoritäre Staat, essentially a critique of Kelsen, was first 
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wish it. This open-armed embrace of law’s vagaries characterized the scholarship of 
Friedrich Tezner (1856-1925), perhaps the most brilliant of all the late-imperial jurists, 
even if largely forgotten today. Born in Bohemia to Jewish parents, and educated in 
Vienna, Tezner’s remarkable and extensive body of scholarship in administrative and 
constitutional law never resulted in a proper professorship: it is possible that antisemitism 
played a role here too — certainly, Tezner changed his name from the original Tänzerles 
in 1882, sensing the latter to be a professional handicap.97 Attempts to elevate legal 
scholarship to a “legal geometry” or “legal mathematics” were often announced but 
actually attempted only in vain, he wrote in his programmatic 1925 work Rechtslogik und 
Rechtswirklichkeit. He looked instead to a legal method that studied law as it existed in 
the world, without artificially blocking out its inconsistencies (Ungereimtheiten). “The 
ambivalences that thereby arise are to be considered a correlate of the juridical character 
and not as a methodological error of the presenter.”98 Legal life teemed with occurrences 
that remained formally impossible according to legal logic, but that did not mean one 
could simply label them “metajuridical” and seal them out,99 banish them into an 
“external reality [außerordentliche Realität].”100 After all, was there ever a unified legal 
order, anywhere in the world, that had developed coherently? “Do we not see the highest 
humanitarian law [Menschlichkeitsrecht] encamped next to barbaric law?” Does not 
																																																								
97 See Friedrich Wilhelm Kremzow, “Friedrich Tezner: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der österreichischen 
Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft,” Acta Universitatum: Zeitschrift für Hochschulforschung, Kultur- und 
Geistesgeschichte 1, no. 2-3 (1971): 23-41. 
98 Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit, 17. 
99 Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit, 11. 
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altruism cross with egoism, and military regimentation with anarchy, everywhere in law? 
Was not every law the uneasy compromise between conflicting interests? “Do not 
entirely disparate legal theories enter the legal order over the course of centuries, without 
the old ones being fully liquidated when a new one is introduced?” In this “labyrinth of 
ideas,” constitutional law in particular pushed against the construction of any logical 
system. If all law should in theory be logical, Tezner asked, does it in fact stop being law 
if it carries internal contradictions?101 
No, the “path of so-called legal logic” was not that of formal logic, but rather a 
“meandering, contorted” one. “It takes its arguments where it finds there, and not from 
logic alone.”102 Turning Kelsen upside down, Tezner’s interests lay in illogical law— its 
possibility, its capacity for life, and its practical operation. A classic example of illogical 
law was the dualist Habsburg constitutional order of 1867, in which two states were one 
and one was two.103 Rather than trying to strip law of its fantasies, metaphors, and 
dogmas, Tezner’s approach to Austrian constitutional law dwelt precisely on its Bilde — 
its pictures and symbols — because constitutional history was itself metaphorical 
(Bildreich) and creative. “To think juridically,” he wrote, 
 
is to struggle for pictures of visualization [Veranschaulichungsbildern] 
because of the insufficiency of another expression of the legal idea, and the 
																																																								
101 Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit, 12. Already in a 1912 article, Tezner argued that Kelsen’s 
methodology would only make sense in states that had only ever been a Rechtsstaat, and that didn't have 
traces of other legal orders still in operation. Ironically, then, Tezner felt Kelsen’s theory was especially 
poorly adapted to understand the legal realities of Austria-Hungary. Friedrich Tezner, “Betrachtung über 
Kelsens Lehre vom Rechtssatz,” Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 28 (1912): 329-330. 
102 Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit, 22-23. As Tezner put it nicely: “Vielleicht ist das Verhältnis 
von Recht und Logik ein solches, das es nicht ausschließt, daß das Recht plannmäßig, in diesem Sinne 
logisch oder zielbewußt mit wiedersprechenden Vorstellungen arbeiten kann” (page 15).  
103 Friedrich Tezner, Rechtslogik und Rechtswirklichkeit, 16. 
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progress of jurisprudence exists in the progress of juridical plastics [Plastik]. 
How much legal language would be left over if the iconoclasm [Bildersturm] 
were unleashed against it?104  
 
 
Stripped of its allusions and images, legal language itself would fall apart. One needed to 
work with this literary or symbolic register if one wished to understand the development 
of legal thought, rather than against it. “Through and through, it is the product of creative 
imagination, of a desire for becoming [Werdelust] and transformation,” Tezner held, that 
the jurist converts contracts between estates and princes, and dynastic contracts, into 
constitutional law, or converts the dealings of powerful states and their contracts into the 
norms of international law.105 Legal thought moved forward by leapfrogging between 
metaphors; it cross-bred images to arrive at new ones.  
Clearly, Tezner himself was fond of metaphors (a charge I can hardly escape, 
either). Kelsen’s logical and “timeless” theory of law, he wrote bitingly, “comes from 
eternity and looks into eternity like a mute and uncomprehended sphinx in the sublime 
solitude of the desert.” By contrast, he turned his gaze to “the real, thoroughly inchoate, 
fragile, volatile, earthly law.”106 It may not come as a surprise that our path through the 
empire’s legal life will resemble Tezner’s more than Kelsen’s. Again, suitably, we’ve 
looped back on ourselves, because Kelsen and Tezner are not only the most interesting 
methodological thinkers of the Austrian constitutional tradition, they are also themselves 
characters in our story. 
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Introduction to Part One 
 
 
Legal sociology was born in the Bukovina. Eugen Ehrlich (1862-1922), a melancholic 
polyglot and loyal servant of the Habsburg Empire, taught law at the university in 
Czernowitz (today Cernovitsi in the Ukraine) and pioneered a sociological approach 
when many still deemed the latter unserious.1 Looking beyond state legislation to local 
and unofficial law, Ehrlich developed his influential notion of “living law” through the 
“direct observation of life” in the multi-ethnic, rural region of his birth. Born to a Jewish 
family but baptized Roman Catholic, he returned to teach in Czernowitz in 1896 after 
study in Vienna, and would remain there until his death from tuberculosis in 1922. 
Ehrlich’s open-minded, insatiable search for legal content across an expansive domain of 
social interaction led one English critic to term his work a “meglomaniac jurisprudence”: 
“Ehrlich found the greatest difficulty in setting any boundaries to his subject, and ended 
up by setting none whatever.”2 It also turned him into one of the earliest theorists of legal 
pluralism.  
As a feted keyword across a range of humanistic disciplines since the 1970s, legal 
pluralism has shown remarkable longevity. Not coincidentally, its intellectual attractions 
																																																								
1 Ehrlich’s 1913 work, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1913) made 
him famous. His work was translated early, see for example Eugen Ehrlich, “The Sociology of Law,” trans. 
Nathan Isaacs, Harvard Law Review 36, no. 2 (1922): 130-145. See generally Manfred Rehbinder, Die 
Begründung der Rechtssoziologie durch Eugen Ehrlich, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986); and 
Manfred Rehbinder, “Die Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakutät der Franz-Josephs-Universität in 
Czernowitz: Ihr Beitrag zur Erforschung des Rehcts in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft,” Anuarul 
Institutului de Istorie “George Baritiu” din Cluj Napoca 47 (2008): 199-217. On the skepticism of many 
jurists (including Hans Kelsen) regarding Ehrlich’s sociological method, see Roger Cotterrell, “Ehrlich at 
the Edge of Empire: Centres and Peripheries in Legal Studies,” in Marc Hertogh, ed., Living Law: 
Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 85-86. 
2 C. K. Allen, Law in the Making, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 32, quoted in Cotterrell, 
“Ehrlich at the Edge of Empire,” 86. 
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coincided with those of empire. As Sally Engle Merry, herself a pioneer in this area, 
recounted in a 1988 mini-history of the subfield, it developed largely through an interest 
in the imposition of Western legal systems onto indigenous cultures in the non-European 
world.3 Scholars such as Jean Comaroff, John Comaroff, B. de Sousa Santos, and Merry 
herself cultivated a rich line of research on colonialism and legal pluralism that shows 
little sign of losing its appeal.4 If scholars subsequently turned to consider legal pluralism 
in industrialized societies, Merry argued that the latter had become visible thanks to the 
theoretical apparatus and ethnographic method developed in the study of colonial 
situations — something like an intellectual boomerang effect. She cited Eugen Ehrlich’s 
research as an exception to the boomerang’s arc, an account of “nonstate forms of 
normative ordering” that was curiously indigenous to Europe.5 Though Ehrlich remained 
half-forgotten for large swathes the twentieth century, a sensitivity to the coexistence of 
disparate normative orders did not need to be “reintroduced” to this part of the world; in 
this case, it was already in place. 
In the years since Merry’s short history, Ehrlich’s work has enjoyed (or suffered) 
a widespread revival. His non-state-centric approach found an enthusiastic, if belated 
reception among those scholars now tilling new global frontiers in legal pluralism, 
																																																								
3 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review (1988): 874 and passim. 
4 See, for example, Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lauren Benton, “Historical Perspectives on Legal 
Pluralism,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3, no. 1 (2011): 57-69; and for one very recent example for 
this large field, Paolo Sartori, “Constructing Colonial Legality in Russian Central Asia: On Guardianship,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 2 (2014): 419-497. 
5 Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 873. 
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especially the law of the internet and the “new lex mercatoria” of the business world.6 
Heralds of an (ostensibly) postmodern, post-state law found in Ehrlich’s work a mirror 
for themselves. The title of one much-cited article, “Global Bukowina,” paints in 
miniature the contours of this more unexpected conceptual trajectory.7 It is all the more 
ironic, then, that the Habsburg Empire has (so far) featured nowhere in the literature on 
empire and legal pluralism.  
Part One of this dissertation explores the difficulties of codifying the Habsburg 
Empire’s varied and diverse legal landscape, the product of centuries of incremental 
development, into constitutional law. It demonstrates that the constitutional project 
encountered a series of temporal challenges that can be read like dialogues on the 
relationship between law and history. The legal pluralism of the Habsburg Empire, I 
argue, entailed a temporal pluralism in at least two senses. The first involved the 
construction of a non-synchronous and plural legal present. I show how constitutional 
debate between 1849 and 1861 gradually elaborated an understanding of the empire’s 
diverse legal norms and historical rights as stemming from different historical periods. In 
acknowledging this historical diversity, and gathering together these different bodies of 
law into the imperial constitution rather than trying to supersede them or collapse them 
into a more uniform structure, the empire’s constitutional order preserved this plurality as 
																																																								
6 For a sample of this exploding field, all drawing on Ehrlich, see David Nelken, “Eugen Ehrlich, Living 
Law, and Plural Legalities,” Theoretical Inquiries into Law 9 (2008): 443-471; Ralf Michaels, “The Re-
state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism,” 
Wayne Law Review 51 (2005): 1209-1259; Brian Z. Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal 
Pluralism,” Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 2 (2000): 296-321. 
7 Gunther Teubner, “Globale Bukowina: Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus,” 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 15 (1996): 255-290; and for an English version, Gunther Teubner, “Global 
Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,” in Gunther Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 3-28. 
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the present law of the empire. In this sense, I offer a new interpretation of the imperial 
constitution as an “archive” in which successive “versions” of the empire were collected 
and preserved. 
The empire’s legal pluralism involved a temporal pluralism in a second sense 
also, one concerned with the construction of the past and the future of imperial law. 
These two chapters argue that constitutional debate in general, and claims of historical 
right in particular, coded a set of temporal limitations or horizons into the frame of 
imperial law: they ritually remembered a point before Habsburg sovereignty, and made 
space for a non-Habsburg future. In drawing in and defining these temporal horizons, 
they set imperial sovereignty in time, puncturing any pretensions to abstraction or eternal 
immovability. The ongoing validity of historical bodies of law kept alive other “times” 
(in the past and future) that remained outside the frame of imperial law — times that 
could not be fully tamed or domesticated into imperial law. 
*  *  * 
In his 1918 work Die juristische Logik, composed as the empire was about to 
collapse around him, Eugen Ehrlich reflected on the myth of law’s smooth unity. “The 
notion of the unity of law,” he wrote, in whatever form it appears, relied on the buried 
assumption that all the different currents carried within the law possessed, somewhere in 
the secret mists of time, a common origin.8 “But the notion of the unity of law 
corresponds to nothing in reality. The law promulgated in legislation is the fissured, 
brittle work of mere mortals.” Whoever has worked on a long book, he wrote, knows that 
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it is impossible to compose it entirely free of contradictions, as one’s views changed in 
the process, “and the traces of abandoned trains of thought are overlooked and left in 
place.” This effect was only amplified in relation to wide-ranging laws on which many 
people had worked.9 
The book — or as I will call it, the archive — of Austro-Hungarian constitutional 
law not only had many authors, but was also shot through with the conceptual traces of 
older, half-abandoned modes, concepts, and convictions. The first thoroughgoing attempt 
to draft a constitution — at the Kremsier parliament in 1849 — involved a kind of 
gathering together and sorting of a mass of historical legal artifacts. Legal forms like the 
composite monarchy, the “historical rights” of the estates, and the laws of succession, 
were surveyed, weighed, and translated into a nineteenth-century legal worldview, even 
while transporting their diverse pasts into the stockpile of present law. With these pasts 
recorded and preserved in the archive of constitutional law, constitutional debate often 
unfolded as disagreements about what law was still living, and what law had already been 
drained of real normativity. The intellectual labor of imperial organization required its 
practitioners to always again distinguish the timely from the untimely, the fictional from 
the factual, the legitimate from the lapsed, the permanent from the provisional. The 
workshop of imperial order resembled a veritable zoo of (untimely) legal species: laws 
imposed, suspended, latent, unimplemented, unfinished, residual, mythic, vanished, 
revived, ritually performed, implicitly sanctioned, ignored. Writing and rewriting the 
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constitution entailed a constant reassessment of the “the temporal limits of the (legal) 
community.”10 
The archival nature of the emerging constitutional tradition in the Habsburg lands 
comes through especially strongly in its successive quality, its restive provisionality. Eric 
Voegelin — another child of this tradition, even if rarely remembered as such — drew 
out this aspect in his own study of Austrian constitutional history Der autoritäre Staat: 
Ein Versuch über das österreichische Staatsproblem, first published in 1936, and 
doubling as a biting critique of his teacher Hans Kelsen. “The constitutional laws are 
characterized by the typical phenomena of the provisional solution and the draft,” he 
observed.11 The very first attempt, the so-called Pillersdorf constitution (1848) was 
turned (against the intention of its ministerial framers) into an interim measure awaiting a 
new version drafted by the Kremsier parliament; but the landmark Kremsier draft (1849) 
was itself never implemented, while the imposed March constitution of 1849 only 
partially came into effect before the government adjourned all constitutional life in 
returning to absolutism in 1851. The October Diploma of 1860 barely became live law 
before the February Patent of 1861 succeeded it in part; all this prior to the 
“Compromise” of 1867 that piloted an alternative approach by splitting the problem (and 
the empire) in two.  
This restless history, Voegelin argued, showed that Austrian constitutional acts 
were “not unequivocal decrees” that settled issues and resolved power struggles, but 
																																																								
10 To adopt a phrase from Emmanuel Melissaris, “The Chronology of the Legal,” McGill Law Journal 50, 
no. 4 (2005): 855. 
11 Eric Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 4, The Authoritarian State: An Essay on the 
Problem of the Austrian State, trans. Ruth Hein, ed. Gilbert Weiss (Columbia and London: University of 
Missouri Press, 1999), 141. 
	
	 83	
rather a series of documents “that can be grouped together because of their typical, 
recurrent cyclical nature.”12 The cycles did not “repeat with total uniformity” because 
“each subsequent one has absorbed some of the substance of the preceding ones because 
of the accumulation of historical meaning.” This accumulative capacity, this amassing of 
historical meaning, meant that “the constitution” was always much broader, more porous, 
and less hermetic than we might otherwise expect, existing as part of a thicker literary 
field: 
Austrian constitutional history does not consist of individual constitutional 
acts, each standing by itself as a ruling decision binding for a longer or a 
shorter time, but of a series of documents in which an unsettled and uncertain 
situation becomes stabilized anew, and that is why it is impossible to say with 
certainty what the constitution of Austria was at any particular time.13 
 
Like a time capsule that recorded successive stills of the empire’s legal life, the 
constitutional archive held up multiple versions of imperial order simultaneously. This 
quality of successiveness was not only apparent in hindsight. In the middle of the first, 
heady cycle of constitutions (1848-1851), the prominent author and liberal politician 
Franz Schuselka penned a work under the part ironic, part accusatory title Das 
provisorische Österreich — “provisional Austria.” The frenetic activity of the current 
ministry, he wrote in 1850, attracted more and more ridicule with each passing day. So 
ran the jokes: 
 
Where then will the new Austria be made?, one asks. And the answer goes: It 
will be printed in the k. k. Court and State Publishing House! And in fact the 
occupation of our ministry is predominantly a literary one. It seems that this is 
also the reason one so severely suppresses the free press, so that the ministry 
																																																								
12 Voegelin, The Authoritarian State, 141. 
13 Voegelin, The Authoritarian State, 142. 
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need not fear competition for its writerly efforts. Since it has been at the helm, 
it has truly published a whole library of proposed, rejected, and re-proposed 
proposals.14 
 
Furthermore: the ministry falls in love in each of its works, sinks into theory, closes itself 
off from life and practical politics, “writes and writes by day and by night and believes 
with every printed page to have made a piece of world history.”15  
I term this restless writing and rewriting “imperial description,” understood both 
as a literary genre and a legal-political practice. As with practices of mapping in other 
colonial contexts, these different legal texts both described an order and created it, 
mooting “a model for” as much as “a model of” the empire they “purported to 
represent.”16 To write a constitution was to compose an intellectual map of the empire, 
and simultaneously to call that geography into being — to isolate and affirm one legal 
interpretation from many possible versions of the empire’s juridical past and present. As 
one version of the legal “truth” of the empire lost its plausibility, another was mooted. 
Taken as a sequence, we can read the constitutions and the debate they engendered as the 
diary the empire kept about itself, a meandering path towards self-knowledge: 
introspective, a little fickle, and remarkably creative. 
*  *  * 
Chapter One analyzes the series of constitutions promulgated and debated 
between 1848 and 1861, before the Ausgleich of 1867 re-set the game entirely. It opens 
																																																								
14 Franz Schuselka, Das provisorische Österreich (Leipzig: Grunow, 1850), 17. 
15 Schuselka, Das provisorische Österreich, 18. 
16 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1994), 130. 
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with the revolutions of 1848 and the beginning of constitutional life in the Habsburg 
Empire. It focuses especially on the production of the so-called Kremsier constitutional 
draft of 1849. Authored collaboratively by a constitutional committee of the newly-
elected imperial parliament, it remained the most remarkable and influential of all the 
imperial descriptions although it never became active law. The searching deliberations 
behind the Kremsier draft worked like an initial survey of the archive of constitutional 
order: flinging open the doors, the delegates began cataloguing all the relevant legal 
material, and debating its comparative worth. Among their problems was the lack of a 
historically-neutral place from which to “tell” or assess imperial law. How could one 
codify the empire’s history into law if one did not know where history started and where 
it stopped? The constitutional project seemed to require a vantage point outside the 
movement of history, a point at which the empire’s shifting legal diversity could be 
arrested and written down. While the imperial government attempted to definitively 
quash the empire’s legal pluralism with its neo-absolutist turn in the early 1850s, the 
return to constitutionalism in 1860 established the empire’s historical order of kingdoms 
and lands, with its temporal-legal pluralism, as the foundation of the imperial 
constitution. 
Chapter Two explores the empire’s “final” constitutional form, that established by 
the dualist “Compromise” of 1867. It focuses in particular on the difficulties of 
translating Hungary’s historical rights into a legal structure that made sense within the 
conceptual horizons of nineteenth-century law, and that provided for the continuation of 
the empire’s great power status. Hungary’s rights to its traditional autonomy mapped 
awkwardly onto contemporary distinctions between constitutional and international law. 
	
	 86	
Did the logic of composite monarchy, converted into contemporary parlance, entail two 
separate sovereignties? If so, how could two sovereignties contract with one another 
without moving out of the domain of imperial law and into the world of international 
law? The traditional laws of succession, meanwhile, ostensibly introduced a temporal 
limitation or qualification on imperial sovereignty. A lively set of legal debates wrangled 
over the juridical implications of these conceptual adaptions. The stakes were high: the 
Compromise laws afforded Hungarian statesmen ample room to argue that, in legal 
terms, no overarching empire existed at all.  
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The first imperial parliament of the Habsburg Monarchy assembled in Vienna on July 22, 
1848. The parliament’s task, in the words of Palacký (himself a delegate from Bohemia), 
amounted to “the final state formation [staatliche Konstituirung] of Austria, or the 
creation of a constitution.”1 The state would be completed by its people. This experiment 
at the popular authorship of imperial order was unprecedented and would prove unique: it 
remained, until the empire’s collapse, the only official, representative, and open-ended 
debate on the normative order of the empire.2 For that reason, the parliament’s 
deliberations hold a large claim on the interest of the historian of imperial sovereignty, 
even if they have not been read in this way before. The structure, logic, and nature of 
imperial rule needed to be ascertained, defended, challenged, and re-written — often 
from first principles. That the delegates laboriously reached a compromise and agreed to 
a constitutional draft despite huge regional and political differences, and that the imperial 
government nevertheless decided at the last moment to discard the draft and unilaterally 
impose its own version, has been narrated ruefully ever since as the road not taken — the 
one realistic chance to disarm the empire’s structural troubles (especially regarding the 
																																																								
1 František Palacký, Politisches Vermächtniss, 2nd ed. (Prague: Theodor Mourek, 1872), 15. 
2 The open-ended, frank and productive nature of the discussions had much to do with the fact that the 
government remained aloof from the proceedings (see Rudolf Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe [London: K. Paul, Trench, Truber, 1945], 168), allowing a truly open platform for debate. 
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national question) and set it on the path of peaceful longevity. The Kremsier Draft or 
Kremsier Proposal, at it is known, became the ubiquitous ghost law haunting all 
subsequent constitutional debates, lingering like Hamlet’s father as a compass and 
touchstone from the netherworld of deceased imperial futures. 
The path to this parliamentary experiment had been blazed by revolution. In the 
six months leading up to the parliamentary opening in July, political events had followed 
on each other’s heels at a dizzying pace. Inspired by developments in France, revolution 
broke out abruptly in March with students, workers and others gathering in the capital to 
press the case for emphatic liberal reform. Various goals and agendas coalesced: 
demands for national equality (Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten) blended with 
agitation for freedom of the press and a constitution, for civil liberties and legal equality. 
The weakness of the central government had been exacerbated by severe financial 
difficulties, and as unrest across a number of urban centers spiraled out of control, the 
whole empire appeared quite literally on the verge of collapse.3 Metternich’s head rolled 
immediately, but that seemed merely a sign of things to come. When an estates central 
																																																								
3 On unrest and reform movements leading up to and driving the revolution, see Pieter Judson, Exclusive 
Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848-
1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 25ff. In a helpful summary of the revolution’s 
major events, R. J. W. Evans argues that the revolutions were not only longer but also more disruptive in 
the Habsburg lands than in any other European state: R. J. W. Evans, “1848-1849 in the Habsburg 
Monarchy,” in The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction, ed. R. J. W. Evans and 
Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 181-206. For a thorough 
exploration of the social conditions and questions at the heart of the revolution, see Wolfgang Häusler, Von 
der Massenartmut zur Arbeiterbewegung: Demokratie und soziale Frage in der Wiener Revolution von 
1848 (Vienna and Munich: Jugend und Volk, 1979). Heinrich Reschauer provides a detailed account of the 
revolutionary “March days” in Das Jahr 1848: Geschichte der Wiener Revolution (Vienna: Verlag von R. 
v. Waldheim, 1872), while Anton Springer’s classic work extends beyond the capitals to cover the 
revolutionary movement in the regions and smaller cities as well: Geschichte Österreichs seit dem Wiener 
Frieden 1809, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Verlag von G. Hirzel, 1865), 135ff (and for regional developments, 
especially 365ff). On the development of the revolution in the Bohemian lands, see Stanley Z. Pech, The 
Czech Revolution of 1848 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969) and for the quite separate 
unfolding of the revolution in Hungary, see Istvan Deak, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the 
Hungarians, 1848-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 
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committee met in Vienna in early April, its assessment was grave. “The old is breaking 
apart from all sides,” observed the Viennese landholder Karl Ritter von Kleyle in the 
estates committee’s resolution, “external and internal threats proliferate simultaneously 
and immeasurably, the hour of decision has struck, and if the new order does not arise 
rapidly and vigorously [lebensfrisch], we will become victims of anarchy.”4 
This crisis inaugurated constitutional life in the Habsburg empire. “Constitution” 
was the “magic word” and “magic wand” on everyone’s lips, bundling together a broad 
(if vague) collection of aspirations.5 But what kind of constitution, what kind of “new 
order,” could juggle the uneven sovereign arrangements across the empire — especially 
the web of varying historic rights claims — as well as satisfy the demands for liberal 
reform, all the while asserting a strong centralized state? Disagreement and uncertainty 
raged. But most agreed that the piecemeal, accumulative nature of the empire’s legal 
order no longer sufficed. “There is no longer time,” declared Kleyle, “to advance in an 
organic development from municipal organization to the provincial estates and from there 
to the parliament; as Minerva sprang armed out of Jupiter’s head, so must the constitution 
																																																								
4 The estates central committee (ständische Zentralausschuß) met between April 10-17 and adopted 
Kleyle’s constitutional proposal as a resolution; it is reproduced as “Beilage V” in Karl Hugelmann, “Der 
ständische Zentralausschuß in Österreich im April 1848,” Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich 
12 (1913): 229. The agriculturalist Kleyle (1812-1859) was also very active in public life. His 
constitutional proposal was strongly liberal and German centralist, essentially advocating the independence 
of Hungary, Galicia and Lombardy-Venetia to leave a more emphatically German core (at the expense of 
other nationalities within the core lands). In addition to Hugelmann’s study, see Josef Redlich, Das 
Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem: Geschichtliche Darstellung der inneren Politik der 
habsburgischen Monarchie von 1848 bis zum Untergang des Reiches, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist 
Verlag, 1920),124ff. For the relationship between the traditional estates structure and the movement 
towards constitutionalism in 1848 (the calling of the estates worked as a trigger), see also Karl Hugelmann, 
“Die Entwicklung der Aprilverfassung von 1848,” Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich 17-18 
(1918-1919): 235-278. 
5 Hugo Hantsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Verlag Styria, 1952), 
343 (Zauberwort, Zauberstab). 
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stride into life.”6 The jolt of revolution made codification the urgent and existential task 
of the state.  
Historians, too, described the empire awakening out of the “organic” and gradual 
movement of history. Heinrich Friedjung (1851-1920), an important Austrian historian 
and journalist and student of Leopold von Ranke, would write in 1908 that “through the 
revolution of 1848, the life of the peoples and the state was awakened out of a torpor.”7 
With his characteristic pith, A. J. P. Taylor would remark similarly that the revolutions of 
1848 had “broken the natural ‘unconscious’ course of Austrian history.”8  
If, taking Taylor’s cue, the task of constitution writing represented a kind of 
historical psychoanalysis, the government’s initial attempt at codification smacked of 
denial. Attempting to regain the initiative, the government hurriedly promulgated the 
empire’s first formal constitution on April 25, 1848. Known as the “Pillersdorf 
Constitution,” it had been drafted hastily by the Minister of the Interior Franz von 
Pillersdorf using the constitutions of Baden and Belgium as models.9 Its portrait of the 
empire — decidedly centralist in structure, with only a limited role for the regional diets 
																																																								
6 Kleyle in “Beilage V” of Hugelmann, “Der ständische Zentralausschuß,” 229. 
7 Heinrich Friedjung, Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (Stuttgart und Berlin: J. G. Cotta’sche 
Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1908), v.  
8 A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-
Hungary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 78. 
9 Österreichische Verfassung vom 25. April 1848 (Politische Gesetzsammlung LXXVI, Nr. 49), text in 
Edmund Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterung, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Manzsche 
k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1911), 102-109. This centralist constitution did not 
apply to Hungary, affirming its separateness; the other lands were treated merely “provinces,” and denied 
participation in law making. On the Pillersdorf constitution, see Hugelmann, “Die Entwicklung der 
Aprilverfassung von 1848,” 235-278; Wolfgang Häusler, Von der Massenartmut zur Arbeiterbewegung: 
Demokratie und soziale Frage in der Wiener Revolution von 1848 (Vienna and Munich: Jugend und Volk, 
1979), 217ff.  
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— won scant approval. Despite assuring all Volksstämme, or ethnicities, of the 
inviolability of their language and nationality (§ 4), it did not quench the thirst for 
change. Dissatisfaction with its limited electoral laws led to their modification on May 8, 
but the following week, amid a radicalizing revolution, the constitution was repealed in 
its entirety, pending the creation of a new one.10 The Pillersdorf constitution had failed to 
recreate the empire in its image, failed to produce the subject of its discourse, and died a 
premature death as a result. Like a generic mail-order edition or package deal, it was not 
believable as a genuine legal articulation of this particular empire, appearing instead as 
what certain bureaucrats might have imagined a constitution to look like. Perhaps 
inevitably, this first attempt at imperial description suffered for a poor level of imperial 
self-knowledge. Its brief life notwithstanding, even the Pillersdorf constitution could not 
escape the honor, bestowed alternatively on so many Habsburg laws, of being identified 
as the legal “completion” of the state. In his compendium of constitutional law, the late-
imperial jurist Edmund Bernatzik described it as “unifying, for the first time, the western 
lands of the monarchy into a state.”11 
Pursuant to the drafting of a new constitution, an imperial parliament was elected 
on a strikingly broad basis approaching universal male suffrage — although, importantly, 
neither Hungary nor Lombardy-Venetia was invited to participate. The resulting 
parliament of the “core” Habsburg lands had a thick middle class foundation: of the 383 
																																																								
10 See Kaiserl. Proklamation vom 8 Mai 1848, PGS. Nr. 57, and Kaiserl. Proklamation vom 16 Mai 1848, 
PGS. Nr. 65, text of both proclamations reproduced in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 
110 and 111, respectively. See also Hugelmann. “Die Entwicklung der Aprilverfassung,” 271-277. 
11 Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 101. 
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possible deputies, around 60 were peasants, and a mere 40 were nobles.12 Here, for the 
first time, the peoples of Austria came face to face, with all the attendant structural 
questions of the monarchy clearly on display.13 The very fact of this gathering altered the 
legal landscape of the empire: in calling a parliament, the emperor seemingly conceded 
that he was not the only source of law, and that the people(s) may have a role in 
lawmaking.14 
This new legal opening was grasped by the delegates with both hands. The 
parliament elected a special 30-member constitutional committee, which in turn 
nominated two smaller subcommittees — one tasked with drafting an initial proposal on 
“fundamental citizen rights” (staatsbürgerlichen Grundrechte), and the other on the 
“constitution of the empire, the provinces, and municipalities” itself (Entwurf über die 
Verfassung des Reiches, der Provinzen und Gemeinden).15 The proposals would then be 
presented to the whole constitutional committee for debate. After the smaller committees 
began work in earnest in late 1848, their designs came up for full discussion only in 
January 1849. 
																																																								
12 Pech, The Czech Revolution of 1848, 167-168. At no point during the sitting of the parliament were there 
a full 383 delegates in attendance. 
13 Hantsch, Geschichte Österreichs, 352. 
14 On the ambiguous legal status of the new parliament viz. royal power, see Ronald Bacher, 
“Volkssouveränität oder monarchisches Prinzip?: Zur rechtlichen Grundlage des österreichischen 
Reichstages von 1848/49,” Innsbrucker Historische Studien 10/11 (1988): 201-222. 
15 For the deliberations concerning the fundamental rights, see Alfred von Fischel, Die Protokolle des 
Verfassungsausschusses über die Grundrechte: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des österreichischen Reichstags 
vom Jahre 1848 (Vienna and Leipzig: Gerlach und Wiedling, 1912). The first subcommittee’s proposal on 
fundamental rights came up for general debate by the whole parliament on January 4, 1849, leading almost 
immediately to an important dispute over the foundations of sovereignty. The draft began with the 
proposition that all sovereignty flowed from the people; Stadion (representing the ministry) immediately 
declared unacceptable to the government, holding rather that all sovereignty flowed from the hereditary 
monarchy. After great controversy, the statement was abandoned.  
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In the meantime, the pace of political change raced onwards. In October, 
revolution flared again in the capital and the government fled to Olomouc in Moravia. An 
imperial rescript of October 22 closed the parliament and called it to the small nearby 
town of Kremsier, where it could “devote itself exclusively, undisturbed and 
uninterrupted, to its great task — the composition of a constitution that accords with the 
interests of our states.”16 This enforced exile ruffled feathers: many deputies reached for 
maps and geographical handbooks to find the precise location of the provincial town, and 
grumbled at the prospect of months spent in this “farmers paradise.”17 The parliament 
reopened there on November 22: if it was to write the empire’s constitution, it would 
need to do so from the hinterlands of imperial order. 
The sovereign landscape underwent one further important change in December — 
this time in its human and symbolic geography. The abdication of the feeble-minded 
emperor Ferdinand I paved the way for the coronation of an 18 year-old archduke on 
December 2. Franz Joseph’s ascension ushered in a new era in more ways than one: 
acquired amid the violence of the revolution, he would part with the crown only upon his 
death amid the violence of the First World War. Simultaneous with his coronation, he 
issued an imperial patent than announced a new dawn for the empire in language 
saturated with time and timeliness. “Recognizing out of our own conviction,” declared 
the patent, “the necessity and high value of free and timely [zeitgemäßer] institutions, we 
																																																								
16 The Reskript is reproduced in W. A. Neumann and Eduard Alder von Meyer, Errinerung an Kremsier 
(Kremsier: Kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staats-Druckerei, 1849), 3. 
17 See Anton Springer, Geschichte Österreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Verlag von 
G. Hirzel, 1865), 587 (“Bauernparadiese”). Springer, himself involved in the revolution, wrote in its 
immediate aftermath that the move to Kremsier also intentionally isolated the young parliament. Anton 
Springer, Österreich nach der Revolution, 40. 
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confidently tread the path that should lead us to a salutary reconfiguration 
[Umgestaltung] and rejuvenation [Verjüngung] of the entire monarchy.”18 Here the 
renewal of the empire was tied directly to its arrangement: it would be reorganized into a 
new youth. Most striking to contemporaries was the patent’s announcement of the 
equality of the nationalities (Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten)19 as one of the 
foundational principles of the new order: on this basis, as well as on the legal equality of 
all citizens and the participation of the people’s representatives in the legislature, “the 
Fatherland will arise anew, in its former dimensions, but with rejuvenated strength, an 
unshakeable structure in the storms of time, a spacious residence [Wohnhaus] for the 
peoples [Stämme] of different tongues,” which had been united together under “the 
scepter of our fathers” for centuries.20 In the new emperor’s articulation, the state was 
thus unmovable yet in transition: it defied the storm of time, but remained unfinished and 
ripe for renewal. “Determined,” the patent continued, 
 
to preserve the splendor of the crown untarnished and the unified monarchy 
[Gesamtmonarchie] undiminished, but ready to share our rights with the 
representatives of our peoples, we trust that with God’s help, and the 
agreement of the peoples, we will succeed in uniting all the lands and 




18 Kaiserl. Patent vom 2. Dezember 1848 (RGBl. Nr. 1 ex 1849), text reproduced in Bernatzik, Die 
österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 113-114 (here 113).  
19 This phrase had been a central rallying cry of the revolution. See Gerald Stourzh, Die 
Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs, 1848-1918 (Vienna: 
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985). 
20 Kaiserl. Patent vom 2. Dezember 1848 (RGBl. Nr. 1 ex 1849), text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze, 113.  




The unification of the monarchy’s lands and peoples was not a completed fact: it was an 
ongoing project — one to which the new emperor rhetorically invited the participation of 
his peoples. This royal attempt to describe (and master) the present of the empire rested 
on a delicate balancing of its past and future. The difficulty of this temporal equation 
would be equally present as the parliament attempted its own multi-authored description 
of — and prescription for — the imperial order. 
The parliament’s deliberations are worth tracking in some detail because its 
members, like the emperor, had to work hard to find the right conceptual language to 
articulate the empire’s order — to codify the logic of laws and rights that had developed 
incrementally over time and that were often removed from their original meaning or 
purpose by centuries of customary practice. The delegates faced a deep “ambiguity 
regarding the nature of the empire,” according to one contemporary;22 it needed to be 
deciphered and rendered intelligible. They had few helpful models or manuals. (Unlike 
Pillersdorf, they did not view Baden or Belgium as terribly instructive). As the jurist 
Ludwig Gumplowicz reflected in 1889, the constitutional committee’s task was 
especially difficult “because, of the numerous constitutions created since the great French 
Revolution, none were suitable for such a complex of lands [Ländercomplex] like the 
Austrian.”23 
For this reason, the crisis of 1848-1849 and the project of reconstructing order 
required the description and re-description of the empire, understood as attempts to raise 
																																																								
22 Springer wrote that the delegates faced a deep “Unklarheit über die Natur des Reiches”, as well as a very 
broad spectrum of opinion. Springer, Geschichte Österreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden, 614.  
23 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Einleitung in das Staatsrecht (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1889), 208. 
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that order to the level of consciousness, to find and agree on concepts that captured 
political practice and legal intuition in abstract form.24 Begun in earnest in this 
revolutionary year, the constitutional tradition henceforth documented the empire’s 
ongoing, often circuitous efforts to understand itself.  
Pillersdorf’s initial description had been rebuffed by hard events and street 
politics; the emperor’s own attempt was more a promissory note or invitation than a 
comprehensive reckoning: the next two mooted descriptions were less public and 
revealed the wide gulf separating possible codifications. In the five-member 
parliamentary subcommittee entrusted with drafting an initial constitutional proposal, it 
was the Bohemian deputy (and leader of the Czech party) Palacký who took the initiative. 
He penned a bold — even visionary — federalist constitutional draft that re-imagined the 
constituent parts the empire, thereby entirely reconceptualizing the organization of 
political rights and jurisdiction. His draft washed away the historic lands or provinces and 
proposed in their stead a smaller number of larger units formed on the basis of ethnicity 
alone. These units would possess the lion’s share of political rights and functions, and 
would be unified more loosely under the limited authority of the imperial center. His plan 
squinted through the legal structure of imperial life and asserted the presence of a more 
fundamental structure — nations and nationalism — waiting to be coded into law. If his 
draft was a prescription for radical state surgery, it was also description of the empire’s 
																																																								
24 Anne Orford’s “In Praise of Description,” Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 609-625 offers 
methodological reflection on this approach as well as an example of an analogous process. Here Orford is 
interested in description as the activity of the scholar seeking to understand an emerging consensus through 
political practice: but description is also the activity of actors deploying new conceptual language (in her 
case, “responsibility to protect”) in order to arrest that political practice. The (unarticulated!) double 
meaning of her argument is reproduced in my own argument here. 
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underlying present reality, a reality that needed to be officially recognized if the empire 
was to survive. 
Murmurs of disquiet met Palacký’s proposal. The other members of the small 
constitutional subcommittee — Kajetan Mayer (from Moravia), Ferdinand Gobbi (from 
the Austrian Littoral or Küstenlande), Franciszek Smolka (from Galicia), and Joseph 
Goldmark (from Lower Austria) — were far from convinced of the wisdom (or the ease) 
of abolishing the historical lands in their entirety. Gobbi likewise prepared a draft, but 
neither his nor Palacký’s proposals could achieve a majority in the subcommittee. 
Seeking to break the deadlock, Mayer then prepared a version of his own: designed to 
synthesize the drafts, it nevertheless left much of the historic order in place. Palacký was 
not placated and modified his own draft to offer some concessions. But the gulf could not 
be bridged: in the end, the full constitutional committee was presented with these two 
different constitutional descriptions of imperial order, with Mayer’s version serving as 
the central basis for the debate. Proceedings opened in Kremsier on January 13, and the 
contest over the empire’s normative order began in earnest on January 22.25 
In 1908, Josef Redlich observed that the ensuing parliamentary debates 
represented one of the most important sources for the Austrian “state problem,” though 
they had been far from exhausted by historians — an assessment that remains true today. 
Reading the Kremsier debates, marveled Redlich,  
 
																																																								
25 Anton Springer, “Vorbericht,” in Anton Springer, ed., Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses im 
Österreichischen Reichstag 1848-1849 (Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1885), 3-8; Andreas Gottsmann, Der Reichstag 
von Kremsier und die Regierung Schwarzenberg: Die Verfassungsdiskussion des Jahres 1848 im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Reaktion und nationaler Frage (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik / 
München: Oldenbourg, 1995), 48-49; Paula Geist-Lányi, Das Nationalitätenproblem auf dem Reichstag zu 
Kremsier, 1848/1849: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nationalitäten in Österreich (Munich: Drei Masken 
Verlag, 1920), 144 and passim. 
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one is always again astonished — and not without sadness — how most of the 
problems that were raised, discussed and in large part solved in the 
constitutional proposal there stand before us in all freshness even today, how 
these 60-year-old thought paths and controversies remain in good part open 
questions even for us. And it is humbling to recognize how little we, in our 




The Kremsier conversations and exchanges form a foundational map of the constitutional 
“archive” — an initial searchlight down its corridors, revealing its basic organization, 
function, and logic. If, thanks to the government’s intervention, the Kremsier draft never 
became live law, it remained hugely influential “not as a source of law, but rather as a 
source of legal ideas”27 — a library or conceptual stockpile of imperial self-
understanding. Remarkable as the final constitutional draft proved to be, it is the 
dialogical nature of its production that records most dramatically the contested scaffolds 
of sovereignty structuring the imperial state. 
 
The Sovereignty Diaries: What We Know About the Empire 
 
January 22, 1849. Where does an imperial constitution begin? 
Kajetan Mayer (a Moravian on home ground in Kremsier) began proceedings 
tentatively, conscious that the discussion could easily grow ungovernable. He suggested 
that the delegates first agree on the division of legislative powers and prerogatives 
between the center and the parts. A neutral, technical question; function or capacity rather 
																																																								
26 Josef Redlich, “Die Originalprotokolle des Verfassungsausschusses im Kremsier Reichstag,” 
Österreichische Rundschau 17, (1908): 163. 
27 “Nicht als Rechstquelle, wohl aber als Quelle von Rechtsideen,” as the constitutional historian Franz 
Hauke phrased it in his text: “Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., 
Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd 
ed., vol. 4 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1909), 725. 
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than essence. Perhaps he was wary of opening with first principles. Out of this 
conversation, he explained, it might become clear how many individual parts to have, and 
what they should be.28 Optimism, or fear? Might a more circuitous route render the 
destination less challenging, through a kind of sideways crawl into constitutional life? 
The Bohemian delegate Adolf Maria Pinkas was not fooled for a moment. He declared 
the approach impossible. Surely, one must first determine the individual units of the 
empire, especially to know their size and scale, before power (Gewalt) can be rightfully 
distributed. For what constituent parts (Bestandtheile) is the constitution proposed? This 
was the first question. “These constituent parts will form a state-complex, and then it will 
be to decide how such a state-complex can stand as a whole.” One reasoned from the 
identity of the parts towards the imperial center: in this way, they could see what 
prerogatives would need to be conceded to the whole, and what could remain with the 
individual parts.29 The flowchart of imperial reasoning should begin in the provinces.  
That is: constitutional reasoning should begin with the bearers of rights, not the 
rights themselves. Suspended between Mayer’s cautious pragmatism and Pinkas’ 
certainty, the very first exchanges mapped the basic structure of an unstable dialectic 
between rights and their subjects, one that evolved steadily throughout the subsequent 
history of imperial constitutional debate. Which came first, in history and in principle? 
Chicken and egg; subject and object. According to Mayer: the rights and legal functions 
will reveal the nature of their bearers. According to Pinkas: only in knowing the identity 
																																																								
28 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses im Österreichischen Reichstag 1848-1849, ed. Anton Springer 
(Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1885), 12. 
29 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 13. 
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of a subject could one reason about its rights. By conceiving those rights as disembodied, 
as neutral functions of the law, Mayer attempted to diffuse the controversial politics of 
the imperial state structure. Pinkas scoffed: rights could not be uncoupled from their 
bearers — the latter was the very source of the former. In abstraction, rights were robbed 
of meaning. 
The field of principles was thereby blown wide open. How did rights and law 
relate to the identity of their bearers? National demands loomed large for all, sharpened 
by the ethnic dimension of the revolutionary violence in Hungary and elsewhere. Emil 
Vacano, a centralist from Upper Austria, reminded those assembled of law’s blindness to 
such questions: constitutional (staatsrechtliche) principles “do not depend on 
nationality.”30 Was this blindness still realistic? Mathias Kautschitsch, representing 
Carinthia and Carniola, preemptively warned those desiring to preserve the historic 
provinces that Croatia, Slavonia, and Serbia would not be satisfied with that; and that 
Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, and Germans and Italians (Welschen) did not want to 
stay together, either. But the picture was cloudy. Anton Goriup and Ferdinand Gobbi, 
both from the Austrian Littoral (Küstenland), declared the ethnographical principle, and 
the break up of the old provinces that it implied, to be impossible.31 Palacký, meanwhile, 
announced himself an absolute federalist, although he had reservations about the term, 
because a “federation” entailed the federation of sovereign states. “But one cannot talk of 
such a thing in Austria, because the provinces do not in themselves form sovereign 
																																																								
30 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 12. 
31 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 13, 14. 
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states.”32 With this first round of caveats already littering the terrain like mines, Mayer 
read aloud the proposed division of the empire from the first two sections of his draft, 
kicking off the list making that accompanies all constitution writing: 
	
1) Of the state territory and its division 
	
§ 1. The Austrian Empire is an indivisible constitutional hereditary monarchy 
formed out of the following independent crownlands. 
 
§ 2. These independent indivisible crownlands are: 
1. the Kingdom of Bohemia, 
2. the Kingdom of Galicia with the Bukovina, 
3. the Archduchy of Austia below the Enns, 
4. the Archduchy of Austria above the Enns without Innviertel, 
5. the Duchy of Salzburg including Innviertel, 
6. the Duchy of Styria, 
7. the Duchy of Carinthia, 
8. the Duchy of Carniola, 
9. the Duchy of Silesia, 
10. the Margravate of Moravia, 
11. the Princely County of Tyrol including Vorarlberg, 
12. the Austrian Littoral, 
13. the Kingdom of Dalmatia. 
 
 
Mayer coupled this recitation with the observation “that here one proceeded from the 
historical perspective, because every province has independent rights [selbstständige 
Rechte], that stand as sacrosanct.”33 Pinkas declared that this question would “decide the 
fate of the constitution construction [Constitutionswerks].”34 
Johann Kasper Ratz (from the principality of Vorarlberg within Tyrol, and 
formally representing the latter) tabled the first objection to Mayer’s list, and its contents 
																																																								
32 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 15. 
33 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 15-16. 
34 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 16. 
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were telling. He did not marshal the national against the historical but rather the historical 
against the historical. History showed, Ratz explained, that when the Vorarlberg 
possessed an independent constitution (selbstständige Verfassung) when it was 
transferred to Austria: it never belonged to Tyrol. This history demonstrated “that 
Vorarlberg thus has for itself the historical right to independence.”35 Simon Turco (also 
from Tyrol) received this reasoning warmly: the same logic, he argued, supported the 
independence of the principality of Trient (in southern Tyrol), as it was only attached to 
German Tyrol in 1814.36 As the atoms of the empire, the historical “lands” were not 
immune to their own centrifugal forces pushing for devolution into ever smaller historical 
particles. 
This debate unmasked the historical principle — and the system it supports — as 
untenable, asserted Rudolf Brestel, a delegate from Vienna (representing Lower Austria). 
It bred endless division: “only from the national standpoint can we solve this problem.” 
They should first fix upon the national as the highest principle.37 The Pole Florian 
Ziemialkowski deemed it impossible to hold strictly to either the historical or the national 
watermark in Austria; he sought a middle way for that reason.38  
Amid all the back and forth, already riddled with a kind of unraveling, Franz Hein 
lamented that if this discord continued, they would never reach an agreement, and a 
constitution would instead be imposed. He spoke in defense of the old historical 
																																																								
35 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 17. 
36 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 19. Turco stated further that those from Trient could only then 
be loyal Austrians, when they were granted independence (within the empire). 
37 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 19-20 (quotation on 19).  
38 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 20. 
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boundaries: many diverse relationships would be injured if the provinces were melted 
down; he opposed such “forced blending” (gewaltsame Verschmelzung). He suggested 
one method of taming the historical approach, to prevent it from spiraling off into the 
uncontrollable pluralism of the deep past: they should take the existing situation at the 
moment of the outbreak of revolution, “because without the revolution, the question 
would never have surfaced.”39 Perhaps one way of saving history was fixing its unfolding 
movement into a single status quo — saving its products by arresting its movement. 
History may be a constitutional virtue only in its own negation. 
 
January 23, 1849. The empire inside.  
Vacano (our Upper Austrian centralist) opened the second day with a grenade 
lobbed into the heart of the politics of representation. His comment was small, its 
implications explosive: for these questions of nationality, he opined, the Germans of 
Bohemia would need to be represented here in the committee, and they are not.40  
The Bohemians were quick to take offence. An incensed František Rieger could 
not agree with Vacano, not least for the mistrust he displayed, as if the Czechs of 
Bohemia would want to curtail the rights of their German compatriots. Were Vacano’s 
position to be adopted, he would insist on its application to the other provinces, too, as 
the “Bohemian” (Slavic/Czech-speaking) element in Moravia and Carinthia was not 
represented in the committee, either.41 An equally incensed Palacký raised the stakes: 
																																																								
39 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 21. 
40 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 21. 
41 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 21. 
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either Vacano’s proposal made no sense or it was a vote of no confidence 
(Mißtrauensvotum) against the Bohemians.42 
Mayer, in turn, was riled by Rieger: the latter’s defense was as provocative as the 
initial attack. Mayer could not accept Rieger’s assertion that the “Bohemian” element in 
Moravia was not represented, “because Moravia knows no Bohemian element, only a 
Moravian one!”43 Rieger, wryly: I will not get into the distinction between Czechs and 
Moravians, but I believe I know the “Moravian” language (he means Czech) better than 
my Moravian colleague Mayer. Mayer: I refuse to tolerate attacks on my Moravian 
“nationality”!44 
One swipe, two — if the exchange stepped quickly into the personal, it also 
mapped, with equal efficiency, the great difficulties of ascertaining who represented what 
or whom at this constitutional congress. The delegates had been elected on the basis of 
the historical lands, which had a very uneasy relationship to ethnic identity. The Czech 
national revival of the preceding decades — in which Palacký’s groundbreaking history 
of the Czechs played a central role45 — had not yet managed to fix a stable referent. This 
national revival was driven by the “Czech” Slavic population of Bohemia but ostensibly 
encompassed the Slavic populations of all the lands of the Bohemian crown — that is, 
Moravia and Silesia — as well as, perhaps (and portentously) the “Slovaks” of western 
																																																								
42 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 22. 
43 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 22. 
44 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 22. 
45 Franz [František] Palacký, Geschichte von Böhmen, 5 vols. (Prague: In Commission bei Kronberger und 
Weber, 1836ff). On the background to Palacký’s groundbreaking work, see his Zur böhmischen 
Geschichtschreibung: Actenmässige Aufschlüsse und Worte der Abwehr (Prague: Verlag von Friedrich 
Tempsky, 1871), 13ff. 
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Hungary. (The term “Bohemians” was often used to refer to this broader group of Czech-
speakers, as in Rieger’s statement above). But Czech nationalists had not yet succeeded 
in driving through this understanding of national affiliation: “Czech”/Slavic Moravians 
were wont to resist Bohemian overtures (and dominance) and stress their (pan-ethnic) 
identity as “Moravians.” This fluid equation was reflected in the awkward composition of 
the delegations: while Bohemia had sent three “Czechs” to the constitutional committee, 
and not a single German Bohemian (eliciting Vacano’s misgivings), all three Moravian 
representatives were (identified as) German.  
This fleeting, scrappy skirmish raised to the surface the structural quagmires of 
the constitutional project: what did it mean to speak for a Land, a (multi-ethnic) political 
unit in an era of national mobilization? Was (German) Mayer as “Moravian” as his Slavic 
neighbors back home? Did the “Czechs” of Bohemia represent Czech interests, or pan-
ethnic Bohemian ones? It was effectively a transliteration, and a personalization, of the 
disagreements of the previous day: there was very little neutral terrain on which to speak 
of or for the empire without prejudicially assuming who the true legal subjects, the actual 
units, of the empire really were: Länder or “nations”? The subject-position of each 
delegate, equivocating between different kinds of political identity, expressed the 
difficulty of writing the empire’s constitution: self-description was an unavoidable part of 
imperial description.  
Later that day, Kautschitsch rebuked his colleagues. These squabbles missed the 
point entirely: we are not here to represent our provinces, but the whole of Austria!46  
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January 24, 1849. Future empire: the dangerous dreams of history. 
Rieger looked to draw a line in the sand. The previous day, a host of delegates 
(Josef von Lasser, Josef Halter, Anton Laufenstein) had pressed the case of various 
historical principalities — often in contradictory interpretations, raking over long 
histories, pointing to periods and shades of independence. Salzburg wanted to be 
independent; Carinthia to be separate from Carniola. It never ended. At the same time, 
Palacký had presented his radical alternative: one should consider the health of the whole 
imperial polity, he argued, not merely the interests of the various lands; the strongest 
model consolidated the different ethnic groups into the largest possible units, federated 
under the crown. “A force is moving through the world,” he opined, “one calls it the 
world spirit”: this spirit found expression in the drive towards the equality of nations.47 
Rieger, firmly in Palacký’s corner, analyzed the difficulties. Granted, a consistent 
division of the imperial state on the basis of either history or nationality would not be 
possible down to the last detail. But the contradictions involved in various historical 
arguments were immense: 
 
In the assessment of particular desires for separation [Trennungsgelüste], 
either one stands on the historical ground [Boden] of Anno 1814 or not. If one 
stands on that, then for example Salzburg and Innviertel have no right to the 
claimed autonomy. But if one does not stand on that, but rather on older 
ground, why would one then deny those from south Tyrol or from Vorarlberg 




47 “Es geht ein Kraft durch die Welt, man nennt sie den Weltgeist.” Protokolle des Verfassungs-
Ausschusses, 26. 
48 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 29. 
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To determine the empire’s sub-polities on the basis of historic independence, one 
necessarily adopted a perspective from inside history itself: history afforded no neutral 
vantage point on the “conclusions” of its development. Different delegates effectively 
“stood” on different historical “grounds” — sedimentary layers archeologically 
documenting different legal domains. Boden and Grenze became features of time as well 
as space: territorial borders were simultaneously temporal ones. The difficulties of 
needing a “year zero” from which to think were not lost on the other delegates. Norbert 
Pfretzscher maintained that he did not want to “stand on historical ground, because in the 
end one does not know where history begins, and where it ends,”49 while the following 
day Scholl disputed the idea that you could take 1814 as the “normal-time” (die 
Normalzeit).50 By what lights could a new constitution tether itself in time? No, the 
historical approach made little sense to Rieger; he deemed the division of Austria on the 
basis of the old provinces “no longer in keeping with the times” (his term, zeitgemäß, was 
the same as the emperor’s).51 He affirmed his support for Palacký’s proposal.   
Franz Freiherr von Hein could scarcely believe his ears. A firm centralist (and 
future justice minister), he “awoke” over Rieger’s speech “as if out of a dream,” 
 
in which he [Hein] sees the emperor of Austria standing before him, who 
greatly wonders at the way some of the Herr Delegates as representatives of 
																																																								
49 “Er wolle sich übrigens gar nicht erst auf den historischen Boden stellen, denn man wisse am Ende nicht, 
wo die Historie anfange, und wo sie aufhöre — vielleicht bei Pilatus, der zu Folge einer alten Sage einmal 
in den Bodensee gesprungen sein soll?” When Josef Redlich uncovered the original Kremsier minutes in 
the early twentieth century, he identified a few short passages that were not included in Springer’s 
published 1885 edition of the Protokolle. This quotation, from the committee meeting of 24 January, is one 
such passage, reproduced in Redlich, “Die Originalprotokolle des Verfassungsausschusses im Kremsier 
Reichstag,” 175. 
50 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 36. 
51 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 30. 
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the crown want to vindicate [vindiciren] lands for him, that he otherwise 
already possessed, and wished to rip other lands apart, like Slovakia from 
Hungary — while still others sought to found great Palacky-ian or 




The delegates were behaving as sovereigns! Carving, dividing, rearranging, refounding; 
in Hein’s opinion, they had forgotten that these territories in fact constituted possessions 
of the emperor. The might and majesty of the latter loomed before Hein, casting a long 
shadow over the debates. Rieger desired that the provinces be made the same size, 
recounted Hein, as though a fat man had more rights than a thin one, a tall more than a 
short. In fact, this rhetoric of large groupings merely allowed certain provinces to 
swallow up smaller ones. (Again, a Moravian looked to unmask the imperialism lurking 
behind grand Bohemian plans). No, in Hein’s opinion, one must retain Austria’s 
provincial division, “and not lose oneself forwards or backwards in historical dreams.”53 
It was a clever rephrasing of the disagreement: as against the seeming unreality of 
various historical claims, Hein accused the Bohemians of an analogous fantasy: they 
were simply drunk on historical dreams of the future rather than those of the past. Both 
visions, stretching forwards and stretching backwards, were dangerously unreal: the only 
reliable ground was that of the present and the current provincial arrangement. Palacký’s 
plan was not an accurate description of empire as it stood: Palacký described a Future 
Empire, an empire over the horizon and out of sight. His draft did not accord temporally 
with imperial reality. In Hein’s own view, smaller national districts should be formed 
																																																								
52 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 32. 
53 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 32. Emphasis added. 
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within the existing provinces: the weight of nationality could be felt at the level of district 
assemblies instead.  
Brestel proposed an alterative mediation of principles: divide only those provinces 
that are nationally mixed — the rest can stand as history made them.54 Ratz, meanwhile, 
pined still for an independent Vorarlberg: he regretted that one was only interested in 
dividing provinces along national lines, thereby ignoring Voralberg’s 400 years of 
independence. There must be some method of remedying the situation, or else, having 
abolished the death penalty in the new code of fundamental rights, they would have 
simultaneously hung the whole of Voralberg!55 Rights to life and sentences of death 
affected individuals and principalities alike.  
Palacký confessed his sadness upon hearing all these views. It seemed a unified 
Austria would not emerge, at least not through the hands of the constitutional committee. 
He shook his head at the opinions of his colleagues: they appealed to “the historical 
terrain” in order to “cloak some separatist tendencies” and took “out of history only that 
which currently suit[ed]” them. He understood “the historical standpoint differently,” and 
chose to draw out the “living history.”56 Some history lived; other history had fallen 
behind life, its normative value expired. Like the “equality of nations,” the emancipation 
of the Slavs was a principle on the rise, and it would only rise further. The delegates must 
take cognizance of these developments if they desired to give Austria a constitution 
“which will suit the present as well as the future.” Otherwise, they presaged Austria’s 
																																																								
54 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 33. 
55 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 34. 
56 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 34. Emphasis added. 
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decline.57 Synchrony needed to be established with the future rather than the past: in 
failing to catch the step and pace of onward movement, their stumbling constitutional 
efforts announced Austria’s own fall out of history. The parliament should be a factory 
for constitutions of the future — future constitutions for the future empires lying on the 
cusp of coming into being.  
 
January 25, 1849. Dreaming now of Metternich, not the emperor. 
The tide of opinion was slipping from Palacký, hardening in opposition. He tried 
one last tactic, one last play to persuade. The separatist tendencies of all the small 
historical lands, he regretted, were playing out of Metternich’s “divide and rule” script. If 
the committee continued work in this fashion, it would “build a nice house for 
absolutism, but not for free people.”58 The constitution was a house whose structure and 
dimensions would shape the lives of those who lived within. The smaller the units, the 
greater the central government’s control, strangling the national autonomy of the peoples.  
Hein was “startled to attention” (aufgeschrekt) by Palacký’s bid to conquer 
(Eroberungsschuß).59 Palacký wanted big provinces to counterbalance the central 
administration; perhaps the former will be so big, he quipped, that no central 
administration will exist at all! A call broke out around the chamber: “That amounts to 
																																																								
57 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 35. 
58 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 37. 
59 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 38. 
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aspersion!” Hein did not want to suspect anyone, he insisted; he desired only that the 
central administration as well as the provinces be granted what it was owed.60 
A measured Eduard Cavalcabo felt that national, historical, and material interests 
should be taken into consideration (a catalogue of factors that would be repeated virtually 
verbatim in the debates of 1919). At home in Styria, he did not encounter much desire for 
separation from the Germans; social and family relationships would not allow for such a 
division. In his opinion, “the province is a picture of the monarchy in miniature. If one 
believes that the nations should be distinguished from one another in the provinces, then 
one demonstrates that the different nations are likewise unable to live next to one another 
in the monarchy.”61 The symbolic consequences of dividing the provinces along national 
lines snared the whole empire in their web: if the provinces were truly untimely, so, 
perhaps, was the empire itself. Thick threads of mutual implication knotted them 
together, for better or worse. 
Then it was Mayer’s turn to dream of Metternich, though his Metternich was 
different to Palacký’s, and his haunting worked for different ends. While Metternich’s 
ghost had “hovered over us” for the last four days of debate, mused Mayer, “the dragon’s 
teeth that Metternich sowed in Austria have born fruit.”62 It is the mistrust sown by 
absolutism that leads to such divergent paths: 
 
Metternich wanted to hold the Austrian family of peoples together with an 
iron fist, and thereby suppressed all provincial, all national life. He [Mayer] 
fears that in the end he must recognize that Metternich understood better, that 
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61 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 39. 
62 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 42. 
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Rather than crowning the victory of Metternich’s demise, was the Kremsier parliament in 
fact proving Metternich right? Bitter irony! These days of division chipped away at the 
premise of the whole project, at the popular authorship of the constitution, authorship by 
consensus. Perhaps a multi-authored imperial order remained out of reach. The proposed 
plans were weighed so low with practical difficulties, insisted Mayer. Kautschitsch and 
Palacký, he protested, 
 
want to create new land complexes, new state individualities; but to make a 
new individuality out of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, they must destroy 
existing individualities. Whether that is freedom, whether it would have been 
better if there had been no revolution, or whether one wouldn’t prefer to throw 




Was the destruction of these political-legal “individuals” to be the revolution’s 
achievement, did this demolition really signify progress? The language of state 
individualities, as the legal persons of the empire, and of the improbable chemistry of 
melting them down and conjuring new individualities as legal and political subjects — 
this vocabulary and this imaginary would recur with increasing frequency in the 
following decades, as the old provincial estates structure was re-articulated in the idiom 
of statehood. 	
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That improbable chemistry also had a human side, continued Mayer. One had 
created “artificial” divisions between the peoples of a province who spoke different 
languages, yet the general development of humankind meant that peoples who have 
grown together could no longer be divided. Germans and Slavs in Moravia could not be 
ripped apart: together they formed a mixed-people (Mischvolk), “simultaneously German 
and Slavic.”65 Dividing provinces ran counter to history’s course, as documented in a 
natural arc of ethnic intermingling. The right balance, he admitted, was hard to find. But 
he encouraged the delegates to return to the proposal of the subcommittee, which 
conceived smaller national districts within the historic provinces — a plan that took 
account of both history and nationality.66 
With four days of verbal bloodletting behind them, the delegates turned to vote. 
They had torn into and chewed up the empire, amassing a stockpile of descriptions, 
somewhere between a library and a wasteland of imperial order, a political arcade that 
stretched both into the future and across the deep past and which taken together formed a 
comprehensive cross-section of imperial opinion. But they needed to wrest from this 
catalogue of possible empires a single version. Palacký’s plan, which described a future 
empire in order to call it into being, won scant verification from his colleagues: his 
blueprint for a federation of nationalities received just seven of 28 votes — those of the 
Bohemian delegates plus a couple of others such as Turco from Tyrol and Krainz from 
Styria. Others shied away from his radicalism; they agreed with Mayer that the division 
of the empire on the basis of nationality was unviable. The delegates sought instead to 
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balance the historical and the national: the historic “lands” were affirmed as the empire’s 
major sub-units, the full “members” of the empire, but each of these would be 
apportioned into districts (Kreise) that would conform as closely as possible to the 
contours of national life.67  
Naturally enough, inconsistencies and conceptual loose ends remained. In one 
modification of the provincial structure, the constitutional committee voted (by 20 votes 
to 7) to separate “Welschtirol” (Italian Tyrol) from German Tyrol. In protest, the German 
Tyroleans did not return to the next meeting, threatening to seek their own constitution 
from his majesty. Brestel was shocked by this stupidity and this “treason.” But Hein 
showed more understanding: the German Tyroleans were wondering, he empathized, why 
their province must suffer the indignity of partition, when ethnically-mixed Bohemia and 
Galicia remained unmolested.68 
Inconsistencies aside, the majority’s position represented an extremely nimble 
legal solution to the empire’s structural quagmires. If the delegates proved reluctant to 
abolish the historic lands and their rights — that is, to override the old nomos — then 
they simultaneously gave constitutional recognition to the rise of the nationalities as an 
alternative understanding of the empire’s constituent parts. They preserved the continuity 
of the old lands but delineated new ethnic jurisdictional boundaries swimming beneath 
them. An empire of old states and an empire of nationalities, as descriptions of the empire 
at different historical moments, existed simultaneously on different constitutional levels, 
																																																								
67 See C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 
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piled atop one another and protected in public law. The Kremsier draft thus suggested 
that history could be accumulative rather than escalatory, stadial, or dialectic. The 
constitution, as written by the people’s representatives in 1849, formed an archive of 
living empires: amassing successive historical iterations in live law, it made the 
Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigens into precept of imperial order. 
 
Shadows of Sovereignty: If These are the Subjects, What are Their Rights? 
The lands and their sub-districts represented merely the first decision of the 
constitutional committee: the bones of the imperial structure still required the flesh of 
prerogatives and capacities — the subject Mayer had wanted to discuss on the first day. 
The determination of the rights of the regions proved equally revelatory of the texture and 
distribution of imperial sovereignty. Take the committee’s deliberations over the judicial 
system on January 30. On this subject, the delegates returned to Palacký’s plan and the 
broad jurisdictional domain it ascribed to the provinces (the Bohemians may have lost the 
fight over the identity of the lands themselves, but Palacký’s proposed distribution of 
rights between the center and the provinces remained a live option). In advocating for the 
judiciary to count among the prerogatives of the lands, Pinkas insisted that this plan did 
not amount to “separatist longings” (separatistische Gelüste): if anything was to be left to 
the lands, if anything depended on the trust of the people, surely it was the judiciary (die 
Justiz). If this ascription were not accepted, threatened Rieger, the Bohemians would 
appeal to the status granted to them by the “Bohemian charter” of April 1848, which 
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ostensibly reduced the relationship of Bohemia to the other lands of the empire as one of 
a mere personal union.69 
Other delegates were quick to allege the sovereign price of such plans. Vacano 
maintained that justice needed to be centralized, “otherwise we won’t have a state, but 
rather a conglomerate of republics.”70 Hein pursued the sovereign pretensions behind the 
Bohemian submissions yet more emphatically. “I cannot recover from the shock that 
different nations want a different justice [eine andere Gerechtigkeit],” he exclaimed. One 
aspect of the judicial system — the jury — would remain with the lands, but 
 
the laws must be the same everywhere, if we want to speak of a state; should 
justice be spoken in the name of the state or the provinces? The Bohemians 
may want to remain living in the fantasy that they form an independent 
kingdom, but they remain in fact only a province.71 
 
 
The rights of the lands reflected directly on the “stateness” of the empire as well as the 
“stateness” of the lands themselves; both kinds of “statehood” were differently fragile 
and in need of fortification. The Bohemians behaved as if their old statehood remained a 
present fact; Hein declared it illusory.  
The “stateness” of lands arose for fuller discussion on February 6. In debating the 
powers of the central government, the delegates returned to section one of the draft: “The 
Austrian Empire is an indivisible constitutional hereditary monarchy formed out of the 
following independent crownlands” (Das Kaiserthum Oesterreich ist eine untrennbare, 
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aus dem nachbeannten selbstständigen Krönländern bestehende constitutionelle 
Erbmonarchie). As the foundational and fundamental description of the empire, as the 
very first line of the projected constitution, the implications of each term in this sentence 
needed to be carefully considered and contained. Lasser argued that the designation 
“independent crownlands” itself “involved the concept of the sovereignty of the 
individual crownlands.” To guard against “conceptual confusion” (Begriffsverwirrung), 
he submitted that the word “independent” should be crossed out.72 Rieger disputed that 
construction of the phrase: such an interpretation was prevented by the prior word 
“indivisible,” “in that the concept of independence is thereby sufficiently constricted.”73 
One word worked upon the other to carefully balance and preserve imperial sovereignty.  
Krainz disliked the other half of the couplet. To his mind, the term “crownlands” 
depicted each land as a possession of the crown; it reminded him of the term “crown 
estates” (Krongüter). Hein suggested “imperial lands” (Reichsländer) rather than 
crownlands.74 Kautschitsch announced himself likewise against “crownlands,” because it 
evoked “the feudal nexus,” and also against “independent” as this could lead to 
interpretations dangerous for the unity of Austria.75 The original motion was carried, with 
imperial lands replacing crownlands, and “independent” struck out entirely.  
Yet suspicions of, and pretensions to, provincial “state-ness” could not be struck 
off with the simple amputation of the word “independent.” The issue gnawed away at the 
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deliberations over many jurisdictional issues. Section four spoke of the lands’ “right of 
self-government” (Selbstregierungsrecht): what precisely did this term entail, debated the 
delegates, did it mean the same as autonomy?76 At each step, the dictionary of 
sovereignty was carefully worked over. Forcefully advocating the position of the German 
centralists, intent on a robust central government, Hein declared “that he will not concede 
to a single province in Austria even a shadow of sovereignty. Sovereignty expresses itself 
in the administration and in the legislature; these must stay with the center.”77 
There remained an irony to the German centralist position, and its rejection of 
even slivers of sovereignty for the old historic individualities of the empire. They had 
resisted Palacký’s plan for a federation of large national groups because it would 
undermine a strong centralized government as well as officially recognize the Slav 
majority within the empire. So they voted for the retention of the historic lands, even 
while desiring a robust (German-dominated) central Government. While the provinces 
should have not a “shadow of sovereignty,” paling before the muscular center, the 
historical organization of the empire was itself structured around sovereign shadows, 
around the lingering legal markers of former independence.  
The logic of this structure and its rationale were consciously articulated by the 
Kremsier delegates: in affirming the historical structure of the empire, they needed to 
codify that which had developed incrementally over centuries, fixing history into clear 
legal propositions. It received perhaps its clearest formulation when the committee 
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looked to “apply” their decisions to the many petitions sent to the young parliament.78 
Scholl, for example, reported on the 35 petitions received from both Poles and 
Ruthenians advocating for and against the ethnic partition of Galicia. The constitutional 
committee had decided against a new division of the monarchy as a postulate of the 
constitution, he recounted, and instead decided to retain “the territorial apportionment 
according to the historical principle, that is, according to the contingencies of gradual 
acquisition.” This principle held 
 
that every land which constitutes an independent acquisition, and had to this 
point a certain individual life [Sonderleben], namely a particular estates 
constitution, should form an entity in the state in the future. The part of 
Galicia inhabited by the Ruthenes does not constitute an independent 
acquisition, never had an individual life in the Austria imperial state, never a 
particular estates constitution.79 	
 
 
If one possessed an organized legal and political life at the moment of imperial 
acquisition, if one formed a recognizable unit or entity at that moment, then that status 
carried over into ongoing rights within the empire: that independence was preserved even 
as it was lost. The Ruthenian nationality, though protected as a nationality in the new 
charter of fundamental rights, did not possess the historical prerequisites to acquire a 
political, territorial form within the imperial structure. The nature of the empire’s gradual 
accumulation of free-standing units would be preserved and projected forward in law: 
sovereign shadows marked out the right to be “visible” at this level of constitutional law.  
																																																								
78 On the petitions more broadly, see Otto Hörhan, “Die Petitionen an den Kremsierer Reichstag 1848/49” 
(PhD diss., University of Vienna, 1966). 
79 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 347. 
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In the final draft, the German centralists, too, needed to compromise. A range of 
jurisdictional prerogatives — pertaining to broad social and economic domains as well as 
police administration — were apportioned to the lands, while the national districts were 
to preside over education and determine the language used in schooling, meaning that 
ethnic minorities would be insulated from potentially hostile majorities at the provincial 
level regarding cultural questions.80 This careful balance of interests and rights came 
together in a formal constitutional draft that was unanimously accepted by the 
constitutional committee on March 2, 1849. But the hard-won compromise turned into a 
very different kind of historical precipice to that envisioned by the delegates.  
 
Collapsing Pluralism: The Legal Ambitions of Neo-Absolutism 
In late February, the constitutional committee had worked ever more quickly as 
rumors circulated and fears grew about the possibility of government intervention. The 
parliament and its constitution-drafting powers had been conceded at moments of acute 
imperial weakness; now the new emperor, his bold new ministry, and the forces of 
reaction were on the offensive with the imperial army’s victories in insurrectionary 
Hungary consolidating the government’s position and bolstering its confidence one battle 
at a time. Sensing the shifting political equation, and having finally agreed on the draft, 
the constitutional committee hurriedly scheduled a plenary session of the parliament to 
endorse the text so that the new constitution could be proclaimed by March 15, the 
anniversary of the revolution. But they were too late: the army’s victory in Kápolna 
definitively tipped the balance, and the government seized the moment. 
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Late on March 6, Count Franz Stadion, the minister of the interior, informed the 
leaders of the parliament that the emperor intended to promulgate a constitution of his 
own. The shock and fierce protest of the delegates proved impassioned and fruitless in 
equal measure — though their fervor shook even Stadion. Chastened, he wrangled a safe 
escape for the more radical delegates, thus saving them from arrest when imperial troops 
occupied the parliament the following morning.81 The parliament’s fate had already been 
sealed. Three imperial decrees appeared alongside the troops on March 7 — an imperial 
manifest, a patent of political rights, and an imposed constitution (we will consider the 
first before the third); all three bore the emperor’s signature and the date March 4. The 
manifest summarily dissolved the parliament, repudiating the very idea that the people 
had a role in shaping the empire’s fundamental laws, and ensuring that the historic 
meeting fizzed out abruptly and ingloriously, leaving immense confusion and resentment 
in its wake. 
The revolution must be closed, announced the manifest, constructing a narrative 
that signed the parliament as the author of disorder rather than of law. The 
reestablishment of proper order required a unified monarchy whose constituent parts 
were tightly woven together (engeren Verbindung ihrer Bestandteile).82 The first imperial 
parliament had been entrusted with the great task of preparing a constitution for a portion 
of the monarchy, but unfortunately expectations had not been fulfilled. The parliament 
had squandered its time on “reflections from the domain of theory” that contradicted the 
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real relationships of the monarchy and undermined the return to order and legality.83 In 
the meantime, military progress in Hungary had brought the goal of a unified monarchy 
ever closer; the people expected a constitution that would encompass the whole empire 
(that is, one that applied to Hungary, too). “Thereby the work of the constitution has 
stepped beyond the capacity of this meeting.”84  
The imperial manifest thus asserted that the draft constitution authored by the 
Kremsier parliament was already out of date, lagging behind the new imperial present. 
The empire needed one constitution for all its lands: without representatives from or 
jurisdiction over Hungary, the parliament had been superseded. The notion of explicitly 
subsuming Hungary under imperial law, of making it an object of Vienna’s power like 
any other, marked a radical new development. The imperial constitution promulgated at 
the same time as the manifest represented the first occasion on which “Austrian” law was 
imposed on Hungary; until then, Hungarians had been remarkably successful at resisting 
such impositions and preserving “indigenous” law.85 The manifest thus represented an 
explicit repudiation of the basic legal pluralism that had underwritten the imperial legal 
structure to that point: now the empire was ostensibly to constitute a single legal space, as 
constructed under the auspices of a single constitution. The previous constitutional 
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“descriptions” of the empire — the Pillersdorf Constitution and the Kremsier Draft — 
had both listed the different lands for which the constitution was valid or applicable, 
Bohemia, Styria, and so on: they contained no statement identifying the sum of these 
lands as constituting the state territory (Staatsgebiet) of the Austrian Empire (after all, 
Hungary was not among them). Instead, they implicitly acknowledged that there were in 
fact multiple state territories: the jurisdiction of the constitution, on the one hand, and the 
presumed domain of the emperor’s sovereignty, on the other, had not been coterminous 
legal spaces.86 The imposed constitution of March 1849, in contrast, asserted the 
alignment of these legal markers of state and sovereignty. 
The so-called “March constitution” or “imposed constitution” (oktroyierte 
Verfassung) proclaimed one free, indivisible, and indissoluble constitutional Austrian 
Hereditary Monarchy with a central imperial parliament and central administration and a 
high imperial court, codifying the ambitions of German centralism.87 Franz Stadion and 
his colleague Alexander von Bach, then minister of justice, had in fact begun work on it 
in secret already in January.88 Their text was influenced by the Kremsier debates, and 
they appropriated many of the parliament’s provisions. But the main thrust of the 
document comprised an unmistakable reassertion of the powers of the central 
government. Domains like education and the church, which the Kremsier parliament had 
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assigned to the provinces or districts, were returned to the central administration, the 
democratic provisions were watered down, and the emperor’s absolute veto right 
reinstated. Stadion had little patience for the historical rights of the historical Länder, and 
had originally intended to abolish the latter altogether: he favored a division of the 
monarchy into districts, in the style of the French departments, to undercut the 
particularist politics of the lands.89 In the end, he was persuaded to leave the historical 
lands in place, but they were emptied of all real political and legal significance. Crucially, 
section 77 announced that new constitutions would be written for each of the lands, and 
that their old estates constitutions — the repository and symbol of their historical rights 
— were hereby rendered inoperative.90 The Kremsier draft had made the historical lands 
the foundation of imperial order: stripped of this status in the March constitution, the 
lands gave way to the districts as the empire’s significant sub-units. In the representative 
assessment of Arnold Luschen von Ebengreuth’s 1899 textbook of constitutional law, the 
imposed constitution asserted legal equality and a centralized bureaucracy through a 
“total break with the old, historical, special status [Sonderstellung] and particular 
constitutions [Sonderverfassungen] of the individual territorial parts [Landestheile].”91 
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This was war on the maze of historical jurisdictions. After all the possibilities and careful 
equations mooted in Kremsier, sovereignty was gathered back up hungrily by the central 
imperial government. 
As it happened, the imperial constitution of March 1849 represented just the first 
step in a more total return to centralist absolutism. The March provisions remained only 
partially implemented: many of the Länder constitutions, for example, were drafted but 
never put into effect, joining the Kremsier proposal in the growing library of 
unimplemented constitutional laws.92 The shaky status the March constitution grew more 
pronounced with a series of cabinet directives in August 1851, before the authoritarian 
Silvester or “New Years” Patent of December 1851 definitively repealed it from the law 
books. The New Years Patent ushered in a decade of absolute rule and centralized the 
empire more emphatically than ever before.93 Across a range of fronts, imperial law-
making looked to replace the monarchy’s former legal pluralism with one uniform and 
consistent legal zone.94 This centralization and homogenization went hand in hand with 
great experimentation in “rational” government.  
																																																								
92 Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 41. 
93 On Austrian neoabsolutism, see especially Harm-Hinrich Brandt, Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus: 
Staatsfinanzen und Politik, 1848-1860, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978). 
94 Take, for example, citizenship laws. A imperial Patent from June 18, 1850, implementing parts of the 
March constitution, established one uniform Reichsbürgerrecht: §10 deemed “alle Gesetze, welche auf eine 
verschiedene Beurtheilung der Angehörigen verschiedener Kronländer Bezug haben, außer Kraft sesetzt.” 
Until this point, Hungarian and Translyvanian subjects, living in other lands of the empire, didn’t always 
come under the jurisdiction of the crownlands of their residence. See Moritz von Stubenrauch, Die 
Jurisdictionsnorm (die Vorschrift über den Wirkungskreis und die Zuständigkeit der Gerichte in 
bürgerlichen Rechtssachen) vom 18. Juni 1850 für die Kronländer Österreich under und ob der Enns, 
Salzburg, Steiermark, Kärnthen, Krain, Görz und Gradiska, Istrien, Triest, Tirol und Voralberg, Böhmen, 
Mähren und Schlesien (Vienna: Beck’s Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1851), 32 and passim. 
	
	 126	
If older accounts framed the 1950s as a period of backward-looking reaction, 
more recent scholarship has recovered the decade as one of widespread innovation and 
progress, especially in the administrative and technocratic sectors. This rationalization of 
rule bore fruits of economic growth and social progress (including the proper end of 
peasant subjection), as well as dynamic development in agriculture, industry, finance, 
communications, and urban planning (the latter most famously in Vienna’s 
Ringstrasse).95  
At the same, questions that had dominated the revolutionary years — especially 
the two-fold challenge to imperial sovereignty: the historic rights of the provinces and the 
political claims of nationalist movements — were swept off the agenda. As the liberal 
politician and author Joseph von Helfert would observe in 1873, the New Years Patent 
led to “an actual standstill of public law between 1851 and 1860.”96  
  
Facts and Theories: Old Rights and Legal Knowledge in the Wake of Neo-
Absolutism 
 
In the constitutional interlude of the 1850s, a range of public figures tried to sort through 
the conceptual fall out of the government’s actions, raking over historical rights, current 
“facts,” and the relationship of both to legal norms. Could the government simply 
unilaterally dissolve the empire’s historical legal pluralism? Or was historical law in fact 
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robust enough to survive the storm neo-absolutism on a deeper level, as though hidden 
away in hibernation? The situation directed politicans and scholars to a series of 
fundamental questions concerning the real status of historical rights, and whether the 
empire had its own unique, “natural” or immovable constitutional structure that the 
government could only ignore at its own risk.  
Hungarian politicians like Pál Somssich (1811-1888) observed the scale of the 
government’s repudiation of pre-existing structures of legality with incredulity. The 
ministry’s policy since the revolution entailed 
 
a total disregard of the historical rights [des geschichtlichen Rechtes], a 
complete abolition of all contracts, guarantee decrees [Versicherungsdekrete] 
and laws, and so on, upon which the unified monarchy as well as the status of 
the individual provinces and in particular that of the Kingdom of Hungary was 
founded for centuries until now; in one word, a tabula rasa, upon which one 
wants to build anew a unitary unified monarchy [einheitliche 
Gesammtmonarchie] from the ground up.97  
 
Throwing the baby of all historical rights out with the bathwater of constitutionalism 
seemed a dangerous overreaction: after all, the historic rights of the lands leant on the 
same feudal-dynastic structures of legitimacy as the rights of the monarchy. In a famous 
analysis of the empire’s predicament, the Hungarian reformer, statesman, and author 
Baron József Eötvös (1813-1871) pushed this line of argument even further.98 He 
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maintained that the division or dissolution of the historical provinces would lead to “the 
confusion of all moral concepts.”99  
 
All the legal concepts of the people in the Austrian Monarchy are founded on 
historical right, and it would take a long time to destroy the traces of these legal 
concepts in a state where even those who have historical right against them 
appeal to it as well[.]100 
 
 
Historical rights were not a simple legal principle among other legal principles, but rather 
the basic source from which all subsequent legal reasoning flowed, the fixed point against 
which one could assess other questions of right and wrong. The time-defying qualities of 
these traditional rights underwrote the legal imaginary of the empire: they served as the 
conditions of possibility for moral order and legal reasoning more broadly.  
For all that, Eötvös remained cautious of claims voiced in the language of 
historical rights that in fact extended beyond the latter’s legitimate parameters. “In the 
name of the historical rights of the individual provinces” claims had been tabled that “in 
fact stood in opposition to the historical rights — that is, to the historical development of 
the peoples, and could only be justified if one wants to ignore all that has happened in the 
last three hundred years.”101 In his understanding, the normative force of historical rights 
did not reach back beyond the advent of Habsburg sovereignty — they could not 
circumnavigate three hundred years of Viennese rule. Therein lay the rub: historical 
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rights may point to the former independence of the provinces, but they also encompassed 
historical development since that independence was lost. Historical rights, in Eötvös’ 
assessment, could not split sovereignty: their vocation extended only to the preservation 
of certain traditional spheres of autonomy within the imperial state: “that circle of free 
activity which the absolute government of the pre-March period had left open to the 
individual provinces.” Historical rights thus invoked “types of independence,” genres of 
non-sovereign statehood, that “did not disturb the unity of the monarchy.”102 History’s 
norms survived but were curtailed by the course of history itself. In advocating the 
retention of the historical structure of the empire, the liberal politician Franz Schuselka 
argued in similar terms: the imperial government should endorse the future life of these 
historical units only to the boundaries of their actual historical normativity and no further. 
The historical structure must be “recognized and retained, but also only to the extent that 
it is an historical factum and not the speculation of separatist dreamers.”103 That 
historically-given federalism had the tendency to slip over into historical myth and 
threaten the empire’s integrity with separatist fantasies. Policing the line between 
historical fact and historical fiction was itself the work of imperial survival.  
At the same time, various critiques of Palacký’s national-federal proposals 
circulated, too, along with alternative invocations of fact and fictionality. Schuselka 
himself argued that “Austria can sustain neither a Palacký-ian federative system nor a 
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for a state like the Austrian empire that, lacking both an homogenous population and natural borders, must 
be considered “solely as a product of history,” everything that weakened “respect for historical right” was 
not “a means to fortify the state” but rather “a mere element of dissolution.” The empire stood and fell 
alongside the autonomy of its lands. József Eötvös, Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit Oesterreichs 
(Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1859), 78. 
103 Franz Schuselka, Das provisorische Österreich (Leipzig: Grunow, 1850), 34. 
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Bach-ian centralization. Both systems are doctrinaire artificialities built in the air.” Try as 
they might, the ethnic federation of the Bohemians and the aggressive centralization of 
the government both failed to capture the empire’s true reality: they remained dogmatic 
fantasies.104 In 1850, the historian and politician Josef Alexander von Helfert (1820-
1910) — later an authority on the history of the revolution and serving at the time as 
under state secretary in the ministry of education — penned an open letter to Palacký. He 
recounted that, prior to Palacký’s national-federal proposals, he had presumed the two 
men shared a common conviction that Austria “cannot become a Switzerland with its 
sovereign cantons, cannot become an ancient Greece with its independent territories.”105 
The radical dispersal of sovereignty prefigured in Palacký’s proposals had therefore 
shocked him. He argued that there were only two ways to implement such a federation of 
ethnicities. Either one organized a “general migration of peoples [Völkerwanderung] 
within the territory of the monarchy” until everyone was collected into nationally 
homogenous groups — that is, a wholesale transfer of populations. Or one effected a 
“fragmentation of Austria not into seven nationality groups [Nationalitäts-Gruppen], but 
rather into a countless mass of nationality mini-groups [Nationalitäts-Grüppchen].”106 If 
the latter, Palacký was essentially advocating a return to the chaos of the Holy Roman 
Empire, in which the state was divided into myriad small units of endless variation.107 Far 
																																																								
104 (“Oesterreich kann weder ein Palacky’sches Föderativ-System, noch die Bach’sche Centralisation 
ertragen. Beide Systeme sind doktrinäre, in die Luft gebaute Künsteleien[sic]”). Schuselka, Das 
Provisorische Österreich, 34-35. 
105 Josef Alexander Helfert, Oesterreich und die Nationalitäten: Ein offenes Wort an Herrn Franz Palacky 
(Vienna: Carl Gerold & Sohn, 1850), 8. 
106 Helfert, Oesterreich und die Nationalitäten, 19. 
107 Helfert, Oesterreich und die Nationalitäten, 19. 
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from sovereign progress, the Bohemian’s plan marked a step backwards, a return to the 
legal heterogeneity of the past. If this proposal were enacted, Palacký would also be the 
man responsible for the partition of Bohemia! What price was he willing to pay for this 
so-called “equality of the nationalities”? Palacký was playing with fire. “State structures 
are not just houses of cards [Kartenhäuse], that one constructs, and if they don’t suit you, 
blow them down again, to bring them into other forms.”108  
 The Bohemians themselves offered their own frustrated critique of the 
conceptual-legal dissaray sown by the government’s actions. A mere fortnight after the 
parliament was dissolved in 1849, the Bohemian delegates dispatched a memorandum in 
protest that honed in directly on the government’s understanding of the relationship 
between law and the “facts” of imperial rule. Likely authored primarily by Palacký and 
dated March 21, the Denkschrift ridiculed the government’s ostensible reasons for 
dissolving the parliament, analyzing their implications for the nature of imperial law 
itself. The manifest of March 4 (promulgated March 7), we recall, had disapprovingly 
cited the parliament’s focus on “reflections from the domain of theory” that had 
contradicted the “actual” (thatsächlichen) relationships of the monarchy, and worked 
against the restablishment of an “ordered legal state of affairs [geordneten Rechtszustand] 
in the state.” “It must be a very peculiar ‘legal state of affairs’ that cannot tolerate 
‘reflections from the domain of theory’!”, bristled the Bohemians: “Most likely a state of 
affairs that was deduced not so much from the theory of ‘law’ than from ‘facts’ 
																																																								
108 Helfert, Oesterreich und die Nationalitäten, 36. 
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[Thatsachen].”109 And with observations such as these, the ministry overrode a 
constitutive parliament! 
 
If “facts” in this way are stamped as the absolute sources of law, and if the 
government from the outset wants to reserve for itself [the ability] to 
determine in a biased way the meaning of these facts: then we ask whether a 




To the Bohemian delegates, the relationship between “facts” and law posited by the 
government was deeply spurious: the government’s appeal to a law that innocently 
reflected neutral “facts” hardly disguised their unilateral engineering of precisely that 
factual order. Far from defining and establishing an “ordered legal state of affairs,” the 
government instead made a regular legal order impossible, collapsing the latter under the 
primacy of “facts” of their own authorship. The constitutional conflicts had forced the 
government to articulate the assumptions of its rule, implicitly presenting a theory of law 
and its relationship to material relations of rule: the Bohemians engaged them at precisely 
this level, debating the legitimate construction of legal knowledge.111 
																																																								
109 Denkschrift der böhmischen Abgeordneten über die von ihnen auf dem constituirenden Reichstag zu 
Wien und Kremsier befolgten politischen Grundsätze (1849), reproduced in Franz Palacký, Gedenkblätter: 
Auswahl von Denkschriften, Aufsätzen und Briefen aus den letzten fünfzig Jahren, als Beitrag zur 
Zeitgeschichte (Prague: F. Tempsky, 1874), 189-205, here at 204. 
110 From the Denkschrift in Palacký, Gedenkblätter, 204. 
111 Fascinatingly, the Bohemian delegates also felt it necessary to defend their use of the term “federation” 
in their proposals at Kremsier. They denied that their federative model claimed “full sovereignty” for the 
various parts of the union, and insisted that “the word ‘federation’ certainly had in our mouths a specific 
narrow sense”: they only used it because “no suitable expression could be found” for “that state 
relationship” that they sought to depict: “[S]o hatte das Wort ‘Föderation’ in unserem Munde allerdings 
einen eigenthümlichen beschränkteren Sinn, und wurde nur gebraucht, weil für dasjenige staatliche 
Verhältniss, das wir damit bezeichnen wollten, kein passenderer Ausdruck zu finden war.” From the 
Denkschrift in Palacký, Gedenkblätter, 193. 
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 The Bohemian delegates tied this behavior into a longer history of the 
government’s unilateral abrogation of legitimate rights. The ministry had, regrettably, 
made its views on sovereignty perfectly clear, wrote the Bohemians. In so adamantly 
rejecting the proposition that all authority (Staatsgewalt) proceeded from the people, the 
ministry demonstrated that it “still sought the origin of the state in physical force, and 
that, for example, it views the well-aimed canon balls of the 1620 Battle of the White 
Mountain as a more sacred source of sovereignty than the good will of millions of free 
citizens.”112 The government was still acting in accordance with the unlawful 
prerogatives that the dynasty claimed after its defeat of of the Bohemian estates in 1620: 
those seventeenth-century skirmishes, conscripted into a new narrative role, retained a 
legal presence as an ongoing fount of sovereignty. The meaningful “present” of the 
constitutional struggles of 1848-50 spanned centuries, with a singular long struggle over 
sovereignty tying early modern wars into the springtime of the peoples. 
 
Returning to the Historical Order: The Legal Implications of Temporal Pluralism 
This knot of unresolved legal equations and suppositions lay waiting in the wings when 
the absolutist system unraveled on the battlefields of northern Italy in 1859. Crushing 
military defeats at the hands of French and Piedmontese-Sardinian forces, which 
culminated in the loss of Lombardy, and severe budgetary troubles, compounded growing 
																																																								
112 From the Denkschrift in Palacký, Gedenkblätter, 199-200. The explicit rejection of this principle 
occurred, as mentioned above, in the debate about the “fundamental rights” on January 4, where Stadion 
declared the proposition unacceptable to the government.  
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agitation for a more participatory form of government and drove a very reluctant Franz 
Josef back towards the constitutional fold in search of greater domestic support.113  
The new constitutional age began tentatively with some murmurs off stage. 
Looking to gently exploit the monarchy’s vulnerability, a group of Hungarian “old 
conservatives” started lobbying the foreign minister, Count Rechberg, and other members 
of the government in July 1859. Warning of volatile sentiment in Hungary, they argued 
that absolutism and bureaucratic centralism needed to be wound back, and a new path 
into constitutional life chartered.114 In mid-August, the Hungarian magnate Count Emil 
Dessewffy presented a memorandum to Rechberg that spoke of the “historical 
foundations” of true “legality” as against the legal confusion of absolutism. What secure 
route could the empire take back towards constitutionalism? Dessewffy argued that the 
transition must be effected through an “historical-legal state empire” (historisch-
rechtliche Staatsreich).115 The Hungarians referred back to the Pragmatic Sanction, and 
wrote of the moral impossibility of absolutism, even its illusory quality.116  
The emperor met with his trusted advisors over the same period. He reluctantly 
agreed to “enlarge” the small imperial council with a broader group of notables and 
																																																								
113 On Emperor Franz Josef’s deep ambivalence about any kind of constitution, see Fritz Fellner’s 
important article, “Das ‘Februarpatent’ von 1861: Entstehung und Bedeutung,” Mitteilungen des Instituts 
für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 63 (1955): 549-551. 
114 See Stefan Malfèr, “Einleitung,” Die Protokolle des Österreichischen Ministerrates, 1848-1867, 
Abteilung IV, Das Ministerium Rechberg, vol. 1, 19. Mai 1859-2/3 März 1860 (Vienna: öbv & hpt, 2003), 
xxxvi. 
115 Dessewffy to Rechberg, August 14, 1859, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter, HHStA), 
Nachlaß Rechberg, Karton 527, Mappe Ungarn, fol. 1078ff.   




representatives from the lands, on the premise it would remain purely consultative.117 
Announced in March 1860, the strengthened imperial council (verstärkter Reichsrat) met 
between May and September of the same year, and quickly exceded its formally narrow 
prerogatives connected to the budgetary crisis.118 Zooming out to survey the predicament 
of the empire more generally, a majority submission or report, speaheaded by the 
Hungarian aristocrat Antal Szécsen and tabled in September 1860, argued forcefully that 
the empire’s foundations could only be properly fortified through recognition of the 
historical lands and a return to their historic laws and institutions, especially their diets — 
that is, a return to the empire’s historical-legal pluralism. “For a number of years,” 
Szécsen declared, “the true character of the monarchy was misrecognized.” In the 
competition for the best legal description of the empire, the architects of absolutism had 
gotten it wrong. No “theoritcal conception,” he argued, could replace the particular 
character given through “nature, history, and those relationships ripened with time.”119 
Future prosperity depended on a firm tethering to “the true and the actual character of the 
Austrian Monarchy.”120 The Länder possessed a unique historical individuality, and this 
																																																								
117 For a susinct overview of the unfolding of these events, see Stefan Malfèr, “Der Kampf um eine 
Verfassung 1859-1861,” in Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus als Verfassungs- und 
Verwaltungsproblem: Diskussionen über einen strittigen Epochenbegriff, ed. Harm-Hinrich Brandt 
(Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2014), 425-447. 
118 The patent of March 5 enlarged the Reichsrat to include “ausserordentliche” members, with 36 new 
members representing the historical lands among them (6 from Hungary, 3 from Bohemia, and so on). 
These members were appointed by the emperor, but represented the whole monarchy. While it had no right 
of initiative, the “Verstärkten Reichsrat” quickly became a platform for pressing the claims of the lands, 
precipitating the more dramatic constitutional concessions of October of the same year. For the March 
patent, see Kais. Patent vom 5. Marz 1860, RGBl. Nr. 56, text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze, 217-220. 
119 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, nach den stenographischen 
Berichten, vol. 2 (Vienna: Verlag von Friedrich Manz, 1860), 45-46. 
120 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 46. 
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“pluralism,” in the words of Bohemian noble Heinrich Jaroslav Clam-Martinic, to the 
extent that it articulated a “unity in multiplicity,” bespoke the “foundational character of 
the monarchy.”121 
The majority’s arguments, which set the course of the empire’s return to 
constitutionalism, are discussed further in Chapter Three, but it was those who disagreed 
with Szécsen and Clam Martinic that most strikingly brought out the temporal 
implications of the majority blueprint. A passionate minority submission was read before 
the enlarged Imperial Council on September 22, 1860, by none other than Franz von 
Hein, the articulate centralist we encountered knee-deep in the conceptual tussles of the 
Kremsier parliament. Szécsen’s majority report, Hein recounted, made the participation 
of the Länder in the functions of government dependant upon the resurrection of 
historical institutions (especially the estates diets). Yet “these institutions have very 
different natures, according to the different time periods [Zeitabschnitten] out of which 
they are called up,” and some had hardly survived or were no longer fit for life. These 
discrepancies would create a profoundly uneven legal landscape in which equality 
between the lands was impossible.122 Clam-Martinic responded that the historical 
institutions would be adapted to the times, not imported from the past in frozen form,123 
but Hein was not placated. 
																																																								
121 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 68. 
122 (“[…] aber solche Institutionen sehr verschiedener Natur sind, je nach den verschiedenen 
Zeitabschnitten, aus welchen sie hergeholt werden”). Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten 
Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 41-42. 
123 Clam-Martinic’s resoning is itself extremely interesting. Just as much as he was against the “völlige 
Verkennung und Verleugnung der Geschichte,” and the desire to begin “eine neue Zeitrechnung” with the 
catastrophe of 1848, he was equally against attempts “irgend einen der Geschichte verfallenen Zeitpunkt 
festhalten, abgelebte Institutionen aus der Vergangenheit herbeiholen zu wollen,” as the minority votum 
charged. “Ich kann nicht zugeben, daß zwölf Jahre — das Werk von Jahrhunderten rein hinweggefegt 
	
	 137	
The empire’s legal pluralism, according to Hein’s warning, would be a sort of 
historical pluralism, with institutions from different centuries, shaped by wildly varying 
assumtions, all revived simultaneously into the empire’s present. Different historical eras 
would structure legal arrangements in different parts of the polity, making imperial law a 
kind of achronological display cabinet for the empire’s history — not unlike a legal 
equivalent of the sixteenth-century painting of the Alexanderschlacht with which 
Reinhart Kosselleck opens his famous collection Futures Past, where the whole Battle of 
Issus unfolds in achronologically in the expansive present of a single picture.124 In 
deferring so emphatically to the historical individuality of the lands, and connecting it to 
“autonomy in administration and internal legislation,” the majority report threatened to 
disperse emperor’s sovereignty, Hein argued. For if  
 
one speaks of the historical-political individualities, which are accorded 
complete autonomy in administration and international legislation, 
gentlemen!, then one speaks of “empires,” of “states,” not of “crownlands”; 
“states in states,” “parallel states,” “Austria would be a state confederation” 
and the sovereign would actually become a sovereign in every land.125 
 
It was not only that the different regional institutions stemmed from different 
Zeitabschnitten: in the majority’s vision, the empire’s legal life would be subject to 
history’s fluid instability. “I do not want to finger any wounds ungently, but even in 
Hungary there are points in time from which one would not necessarily like to call up the 
																																																								
haben, — ich will aber auch der Vergangenheit nicht die Macht, noch auch das Recht zugestehen, die 
Gegenwart zu verdrängen.” Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 71. 
124 See Reinhart Kosselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 9ff. Albrecht Altdorfer’s Die Alexanderschlacht (1529) is 
reproduced as a frontispiece in the book. 
125 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 74.  
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historical institutions,” Hein cautioned. Even the Hungarians, surely, could not present 
history as an undifferentiated juridical virtue. “In the other lands, one might want to reach 
back to institutions lying far back in history, and everywhere where one asks and listens 
one will receive different answers, someone will want to go far back in history, someone 
else less far.” This would frustrate equality in principle and practice.126 Where, amid the 
constant movement of time could one fix history into clear legal principles? On the 
contary, “the point of departure of the minority [report] was the present, the complete 
power of His Majesty and the existing institutions of the present.”127 
 
Amassing the Archive of Constitutional law: “Historical Legal Consciousness” 
Becomes Positive Law 
 
Hein’s warning notwithstanding, the Imperial Council’s majority report carried the day 
and fundamentally shaped the emperor’s next move. The following month, Franz Josef 
formally bought the decade of neo-absolutism to a close with a series of new fundamental 
laws. In this conciliatory re-writing of imperial order, the historical legal architecture of 
the state was formally (if belatedly) affirmed and codified in positive constitutional law. 
If the new order possessed some canonical attributes of “liberal” nineteenth-
century constitutionalism — including a parliament and, in the first place, a constitution 
— the laws of 1860 and 1861 also firmly re-established the “rights and the standing of 
																																																								
126 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 76. 
127 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 79. 
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the individual kingdoms and lands.”128 Gone was the attempt to dissolve the state’s legal 
“lumpiness” into the smooth, timeless and placeless homogeneity of neo-absolutist 
sovereignty. In the imperial manifest of October 20, 1860, Franz Josef spoke of 
connecting the “memories, legal views, and legal claims of my lands and peoples” with 
the needs of the monarchy, just as Eötvös and Szécsen had counseled.129  
That connection was articulated even more clearly in the imperial diploma 
(known as the October Diploma) on the “regulation of the internal public law 
relationships of the monarchy,” promulgated the same day. “[I]t is our princely obligation 
to protect the predominance of the Austrian Monarchy,” declared the diploma, and to 
guarantee its security by way of unambiguous, established legal arrangements 
(unzweideutig feststehender Rechtszustände) and peaceful cooperation. “Only such 
institutions and legal arrangements,” it continued, 
 
which accord simultaneously with the historical legal consciousness 
[geschichtlichen Rechtsbewußtsein], the existing differences of our kingdoms 
and lands, and the needs of their indivisible and inseparable union, can 
vouchsafe these pledges in full measure.130 
 
 
Austria’s great power status was to be preserved by a formal resurrection of a state 
structure that reflected the historical “consciousness” and historical difference of the 
																																																								
128 Kais. Manifest vom 20. Oktober 1860, RGBl. Nr. 225, reproduced in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze, 222-223.  
129 Kais. Manifest vom 20. Oktober 1860, RGBl. Nr. 225, reproduced in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze, 222-223. 
130 Kais. Diplom vom 20. Oktober 1860, RGBl. Nr. 226, zur Reglung der inneren staatsrechtlichen 
Verhältnisse der Monarchie, reproduced in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 228. The 
diploma also established a 100-member parliament (Reichsrat), and announced that, henceforth, 
government and lawmaking would be conducted only with the involvement of the parliament and the diets 
of the lands. 
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various principalities. Crucially, the diploma acknowledged the legislative rights of the 
diets of the kingdoms and lands: henceforth, they could make law in their own right. The 
Reichsrat was enlarged again, this time into a proper imperial parliament.131 Another law 
of the same day explicitly called the historical Hungarian constitution “back to life.”132 If 
the residual prerogatives of the empire’s historic lands now became formal (if unspecific 
and open-ended) constitutional law, advocates of historical rights naturally understood 
the “concessions” of 1860/1861 not as the creation of something new but as the 
continuation of that which had existed before, and that in fact “legally had never ceased 
to exist.”133 Franz Joseph’s decade of absolutism had failed to affect or override the 
deeper, autochtonous legality of the empire’s kingdoms and lands — or so Bohemian and 
Hungarian statesmen claimed. In Heinrich Marczali’s words, the October Diploma 
“recognized Hungary’s historical rights.”134   
The “Febuary patent” that followed soon thereafter in 1861 has been narrated as 
both a beginning and an end. Heralded as the final introduction of “proper” 
constitutional-parliamentary life (it established a robust bicameral system), it also 
represented the last attempt at a constitution for the whole of the empire, a mid-
																																																								
131 See Franz Hauke, “Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., Österreichisches 
Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (Vienna: 
Alfred Hölder, 1909), 728. 
132 (“die verfassungsmäßigen Institutionen Meines Königreiches Ungarn wieder ins Leben rufe…”). Ah. 
Handschreiben vom 20. Oktober 1860 an den zum ungarischen Hofkanzler ernannten Freiherrn v. Vay, 
reproduced in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 230-232 (here 231).	 
133 In Helfert’s assessment, “Die Vertheidiger des einheimischen Landrechts” understood the throne’s 
concessions here not as a new formation, but rather as “der Weiterführung dessen, was früher und in seinen 
ersten Anfängen seit langen Jahrhunderten zu Recht bestanden und von Rechtswegen zu bestehen nie 
aufgehört hate [sic].” Helfert, Die Böhmische Frage in ihrer jüngsten Phase, 21. 
134 Heinrich Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), 24. 
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nineteenth century project that definitively expired with the Ausgleich of 1867, when 
Hungary emphatically asserted its independence from “Austrian” law.135 While 
technically an implementation of the 1860 October Diploma, this new 1861 constitution 
had a more centralist bent.136 It watered down the broad prerogatives granted to the lands 
the previous year and tied the non-Hungarian lands into a tighter union, though their 
autonomy remained substantial. If the regional diets had presided over expansive 
jurisdictions in the October Diploma, the imperial parliament gained at their expense in 
the February Patent.137 Perhaps an echo of Hein’s reservations sounded in the Patent’s 
preface, which spoke of bringing the historical order of the kingdoms and lands into 
alignment with the present: the “rights and freedoms of the loyal estates” were to be 
“developed and remodelled according to the relationships and needs of the present.”138 
Especially striking was the patent’s pluralist understanding of the sources of 
imperial public law. It enumerated the different genres of law that now composed the 
empire’s constitutional order, not unlike the law professors had done when they requested 
																																																								
135 It established a House of Lords alongside a Lower House of 343 members elected from the diets of the 
historical lands. Wilhelm Brauneder is sceptical of the proposition that the Habsburg Empire thereby 
entered the club of constitutional states, pointing to the lack of a bill of basic rights, ministerial 
responsibility, and so on. Wilhelm Brauneder, “Irrtümer der Rechtsgeschichte — Rechtsgeschichte der 
Irrtümer,” in Thomas Olechowski, Christian Neschwara and Alina Lengauer, eds., Grundlagen der 
österreichischen Rechtskultur: Festschrift für Werner Ogris zum 75. Geburtstag (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 
2010), 44. As Brauneder notes, 46 constitutional laws were in fact issued on that day, making the 
designation of this “Grundgesetzkonvolut” under the title of “patent” somewhat curious (page 43).  
136 On the relationship of the October Diploma and the February Patent, see Hans Kelsen, Österreichisches 
Staatsrecht: Ein Grundriss Entwicklungsgeschichtlich Dargestellt (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), 13-14 
and Fellner’s rebuttal: Fellner, “Das ‘Februarpatent’ von 1861,” 555-556. 
137 See Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 793ff, Fellner, “Das ‘Februarpatent’ von 
1861,” 561. 
138 (For Cisleitania): “finden Wir, um die Rechte und Freiheiten der getreuen Stände dieser Königreiche 
und Länder nach den Verhältnissen und Bedürfnissen der Gegenwart zu entwickeln, umzubilden, und mit 
den Interessen der Gesammtmonarchie in Einklang zu bringen.” 
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a chair for constitutional law in 1849. Section VI spoke of the “fundaments of the public 
law relationships of our empire” being determined “partly through the pre-existing basic 
laws, partly through that which has been called back to life, partly through the means of 
the constitution made by the new basic laws.”139 In his annotated 1911 compendium of 
the constitutional laws of the “Austrian” empire, influential Viennese jurist Edmund 
Bernatzik (1854-1919) decoded these three different designations. The first (“pre-existing 
basic laws”) denoted, especially, the Pragmatic Sanction and the more recent October 
Diploma, while the second referred to Hungarian Staatsrecht, officially called back to 
life, and the third invoked the collection of basic laws of which the patent itself formed a 
part — that is, the constitutional laws of 1861.140  
The new constitution thus wove itself into a legal tapestry that comprised early 
eighteenth-century dynastic contracts as well as bodies of law (the ancient Hungarian 
constitution) that were not of imperial origin, and that could seemingly slumber awhile 
before being re-awoken into official legitimacy. The “new” constitution thereby amassed 
and codified laws from different phases of the empire’s history — as well as the empire’s 
pre-history. Rather than write the empire’s constitution from scratch, it worked as the 
final clasp around a diverse gallery of laws and norms.141 The constitution archived the 
empire’s life. 
																																																								
139 (“Nachdem teils durch die vorausgängigen Grundgesetze, teils durch die wieder ins Leben gerufenen, 
teils durch die mittelst der neuen Grundgesetze geschaffenen Verfassungen das Fundament der 
staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse Unseres Reiches festgestellt, […]”). Kais. Patent vom. 26. Februar 1861, 
RGBl. Nr. 20, text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 255-259, here 258. 
140 Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 258. 
141 Thus Fellner described the February Patent as “nur der letzte Schritt”, and Kelsen termed it “ein 
Mantelgesetz”: Fellner, “Das ‘Februarpatent’ von 1861,” 556; Kelsen, Österreichisches Staatsrecht, 14. 
Likewise parsing the different sorts of law listed in the February Patent, the Austrian jurist Wenzel 
Lustkandl would observe “Die Gesammtheit der so aufgezählten Grundgesetze bildet den Inbegriff unserer 
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*  *  * 
 After thirteen years of constitutional wrangling, the empire had settled (at least for 
a moment) into a constitution that reflected the idiosyncracies of its gradual development 
and, crucially, one that worked in and through history in striking ways. The constitutional 
laws of 1860/1861 set imperial sovereignty in time. They acknowledged the lingering 
legitimacy of other legal orders that could not be subsumed or contained by the emperor’s 
law- and state-making capacities. In formally deferring to bodies of law that pre-dated the 
empire’s existence, they made visible law’s origins: non-imperial legal pasts were a valid 
part of imperial law, just like non-imperial futures, as we will see in the next chapter. The 
horizon of imperial law, in order words, made conceptual space for the possibility of its 
own non-existence. It did not close doors to history by projecting a veneer of eternal 
immovability; rather, it set itself among legal orders in a profoundly historical way. 
 What is more, it seemingly acknowledged that the empire did not occupy a 
singular legal present. In his path-breaking 1983 account of anthropology’s founding 
assumptions, Johannes Fabian famously argued that the discipline of anthropology more 
or less explicitly held that “relationships between parts of the world […] can be 
understood as temporal relations” and that “dispersal in space reflects directly […] 
sequence in Time.”142 This temporal pluralism was sequential and hierarchical, and as a 
result, time functioned as an ideological weapon at the service of European colonialism 
																																																								
Reichsverfassung.” Wenzel Lustkandl, Das Wesen der österreichischen Reichsverfassung: Ein 
akademische Antrittsrede (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1864), 4. For another analysis of the Austro-
Hungarian constitution as the amalgamation of these different kinds of law, see: Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das 
Oesterreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- und Handbuch (Vienna: 
Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891), 23. 
142 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 11-12.  
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by creating distance between the anthropologist/observer and the “primitive” subject. He 
thus decried the “denial of coevalness,” by which he meant “a persistent and systematic 
tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the 
producer of anthropological discourse.”143 Europeans had not shared their time, thereby 
inciting a new battle cry for current activism: “The radical contemporaneity of mankind 
is a project.”144 
If Fabian was right and temporal pluralism served as a legitimating force for 
European colonial rule in the non-European world, then it becomes all the more 
interesting to consider the different ways temporal pluralism figured in other (here: 
continental) imperial formations.145 As we have seen, those involved in constitutional 
debate in the Habsburg Empire explicitly discussed the “indigenous” law of various parts 
of the empire as tied to different time periods, yet these temporal discrepancies were not 
necessarily hierarchical and certainly not sequential. Rather than a stigma or distancing 
device, historical law represented autonomy and individuality within the imperial 
																																																								
143 Fabian, Time and the Other, 31. 
144 Fabian, Time and the Other, xi. Fabian’s book was a war cry: “It takes imagination and courage to 
picture what would happen to the West (and to anthropology) if its temporal fortress were suddenly 
invaded by the Time of its Other,” 35.  
145 The Soviet Union forms a striking comparison in both directions. The Soviets of course inherited the 
Marxist timeline of development, and Lenin held that different ethnohistorical units corresponded to 
different socioeconomic periodizations - primitive, feudal, capitalist, and so on - and thus possessed 
different stages of national development. As a result, any political analysis must thus be built upon a close 
examination the specific historical “moment” in which the community existed, and the task of building a 
strong, coeval state out of temporally disparate units constituted a crucial challenge. Mixing cultural 
evolutionism with the Marxist theory of history, Soviet policymakers embraced a program of what historian 
Francine Hirsch has called “state sponsored evolutionism.” They attempted to hurry certain communities 
along the timeline by increasing the tempo of historical development in a game of historical catch-up. See 
Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 28, 44-52, 62, 86; and more generally, Terry Martin, Affirmative Action 
Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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structure, while coevallness was tied to the imposition of a homogenous neo-absolutist 
order, reversing the values of Fabian’s schema. According to the constitution(s) of 
1860/1861, imperial law did not possess a singular or uniform present: rather, it 
enshrined a robust legal pluralism built around the nonsynchrony of the empire’s 
normative order. 
And yet, a focus on imperial law might impede our comprehension of a more 
entangled history of these different accounts of imperial temporal pluralism. If we step 
one pace to the left or the right and move beyond the premises of constitutional law itself, 
we might find that the literature on time and colonialism in the non-European world 
resonates in the spaces that law forgot. Because the Danube Monarchy, too, had its own 
“people without history” — that is, those who had never had a polity of their own, who 
had no historical Staatsrecht to invoke, and who thus remained invisible in the empire’s 
constitutional order (Slovenes, Slovaks, Ukrainians and others). Within the frame of 
imperial law, one had to have law in the first place in order to benefit from legal 
pluralism. “Historical rights” were not a universalist genre of “rights talk” available to 
all: with the precedent of independent “statehood” as a pre-requisite, these “non-historic 
peoples” had no such right to have rights. They were denied a share in “history,” a share 
in the present, not unlike the colonial peoples in Fabian’s account and many other studies 
of time and colonialism since.146  
																																																								
146 See Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); 
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These parallels are not comparisons plucked cold from space: the intellectual 
genealogies of these literatures in fact have key points of intersection. It was Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels who, in the midst of the 1848-1849 revolutions in the Habsburg 
lands, first branded the non-German and non-Hungarian nationalities of the empire as 
“non-historical peoples” (Geschichtslosen Völker), frustrated with their alliance with the 
dynasty against revolutionary forces in Hungary and elsewhere. Engels famously spoke 
of the “South-Slavs” as “nothing but the residual fragments of peoples.” They were cut 
out of the arc of historical development: where Germans and Magyars had “assumed the 
historical initiative” in 1848 (“as during the past thousand years already”), the Southern 
Slavs had for a thousand years “been taken in tow.”147 This rhetoric tied the “non-
historical peoples” of East-Central Europe to the colonial peoples in the non-European 
world. As Marx wrote of India, in a passage that would remain a key point of departure in 
postcolonial studies: 
 
the whole of her [India] past history, if it be anything, is the history of the 
successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at 
least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the 
																																																								
147 Friedrich Engels, “The Magyar Struggle,” Neue Rheinische Zeitung, no. 194, January 13, 1849, in Karl 
Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, trans. Richard Dixon and others, vol. 8 (New York: International 
Publishers, 1975-), 235, 236. Emphasis in original. Without having the space here to elaborate more fully 
on this subject, Marx and Engels judged these national groups to be without or even “against” history 
because they had been unable to maintain a representative political class; having failed to develop a 
bourgeoisie, they were feudal “remnants” and thus necessarily reactionary and counter-revolutionary (and 
they included Czechs in this analysis). Within this frame, Croats allied with the dynasty against Hungary 
not because of any rational (and understandable) political calculation (that is, fear of magyarization), but 
because of their innately “reactionary” nature. See Roman Rosdolsky, Engels and the “Nonhistoric” 
Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848, trans. and ed. John-Paul Himka (Glasgow: 
Critique Books, 1986). Because of its utility in distinguishing the divergent class histories of the region’s 
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historical” nations; see for example Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History, ed. Peter L. 
Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 41-42; John-Paul Himka, Socialism 
in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890) 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 4-5. 
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successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that 
unresisting and unchanging society.148  
 
The imperial constitution may have coded the diverse pasts of historical law into a 
pluralistic legal present, but it remained blind to those who had no historical rights to 
codify in the first place. 
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The Mathematics of Late-Imperial Sovereignty: 
Finding the Line Between Imperial and International Law 
 
 
The imperial descriptions of 1860-1861 remained on the lawbooks but failed to hold a 
restive empire in place.1 Emperor Franz Josef suspended the February Patent in 1865; the 
protesting Hungarians never turned up at the imperial parliament, anyway. They rejected 
the notion that any common parliament could have jurisdiction over Hungary, and 
insisted on the full constitutional independence they took as legitimate historical right. 
Talks with Hungarian leaders aimed at some sort of reconciliation were already underway 
in 1866 when military defeat again shifted the balance of powers. Prussia’s dramatic 
victory over the Habsburg Empire in Königgratz/Sadová, a shock to many in the latter 
polity, represented a new nadir and increased the pressure on Franz Josef for a new 
internal settlement. The last “version” of the empire’s legal order, articulated in 1867 and 
debated ever since, would prove the most experimental. That experiment, I argue, 
invoved a particular sort of old-new legal futurism. While Chapter One traced the trials of 
codifying historical rights vis-à-vis the plural historical pasts they raised to the surface, 
Chapter Two explores the legal challenge of historical rights vis-à-vis the projected 
futures they smuggled into the present of imperial law. 
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Through the Ausgleich, or Compromise, of 1867, Hungary’s historical rights 
“came true.” As the historian Louis Eisenmann phrased it in his classic 1904 analysis, the 
Ausgleich turned the “legal fiction” of Hungary’s sovereignty “into a reality.”2 Claims of 
historical right had always relied on a particular anticipatory disposition towards the 
future: the logic of historical rights foregrounded a permanent legal readiness for 
reactivation, the persistent possibility of sovereignty. Hungary’s success in 1867 made 
that disposition seem more reasonable than ever (it certainly aroused great expectations 
among Czech politicians). This chapter surveys the difficulties of translating Hungary’s 
historical rights, and the world of composite monarchies from whence they sprang, into 
nineteenth-century understandings of the distinction between international and 
constitutional law. 
The Ausgleich featured juridical curiosities at every level. Chief among them was 
its legislative “location.” It was not proclaimed by the emperor as its constitutional 
predecessors had been. The first and foundational legislative articulation of the Ausgleich 
appeared as a “Law 1867: XII” of the Hungarian parliament, passed by the latter on 
March 30, 1867.3 The contours and tenor of the agreement had been thrashed out in a 
series of negotiations between the emperor, the foreign minister Friedrich Ferdinand 
Beust, and the Hungarian statesmen Ferenc Deák and Gyula Andrássy.4 The emperor had 
																																																								
2 Louis Eisenmann, Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867: Étude sur le Dualisme (Paris: Société 
Nouvelle de Librarie et d’Édition, 1904), 639. 
3 XII Gesetzartikel 1867, text in Edmund Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit 
Erläuterung, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1911), 329-
350. See also Zolger’s rendering, that places the Hungarian and German texts side by side, with extensive 
annotation (including some 50 pages on §69 alone): Ivan Žolger, Der staatsrechtliche Ausgleich zwischen 
Österreich und Ungarn (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1911), 43-297. 
4 Unlike Lajos Kossuth, the popular hero of 1848 then living in exile, who vehemently opposed the 
Ausgleich, both Deák (1803-1876) and Andrássy (1823-1890) thought a compromise with the dynasty was 
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invited Andrássy to form a Hungarian cabinet in February, and Deák’s slick diplomacy 
convinced the Hungarian parliament to accept the negotiated terms; they were sanctioned 
by the emperor in June, and consecrated the same month in Budapest through the 
coronation of he and his wife empress Elisabeth as king and queen of Hungary. Only 
belatedly, on December 21, 1867, was an equivalent law enacted by the imperial 
parliament in Vienna.5 The empire’s constitutional arrangement thus reached the imperial 
capitol after a delay of some six months, law traveling “inwards” rather than circulating 
outwards.  
For all its modern features, the Ausgleich thus unfolded according to the very 
traditional logic of an agreement not between “Austria” and “Hungary” but between the 
monarch and the Hungarian parliament, between the crown and the ország. The Austrian 
legal historian Hans Lentze placed the Ausgleich at “the end of an epoch of European 
constitutional history, the time of the union of estates states [Ständestaaten].” The dualist 
settlement represented “the last interesting attempt” to transfer these traditional estates 
formations into the world of the second half of the nineteenth century.6 To be sure, this 
																																																								
necessary, favoring a sober realism over more freewheeling promises that could have lead to another 
revolution. Perched between great powers, Hungary needed Austria, they felt, just as Austria needed 
Hungary. See Leslie C. Tihany, “The Austro-Hungarian Compromise, 1867-1918: A Half Century of 
Diagnosis; Fifty Years of Post-Mortem,” Central European History 2, no. 2 (1969): 116-119; Heinrich 
[Henrik] Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), 24. Andrássy would 
serve as Hungarian Prime Minister between 1867 and 1871, and as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister from 
1871 to 1879. 
5 Gesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, RGBl. Nr. 146, text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterung, 439-451. 
6 Hans Lentze, “Die Ständischen Grundlagen des Dualismus” in Andor Csizmadia, ed., Die Freiheitsrechte 
und die Staatstheorien im Zeitalter des Dualismus: Materialien der VII. Ungarisch-tschechoslowakischen 
Rechtshistorikerkonferenz in Pécs (23-25 September, 1965) (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1966), 88. 
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legal syncretism produced “juridical monstrosities,” in Hermann Bidermann’s phrase.7 
When the imperial parliament opened in May 1867, tasked with considering the 
settlement with Hungary, its competence to do so was mired in complication and 
uncertainty. If the imperial parliament was assembled in the sense of the 1861 February 
patent, then it was formally an expanded parliament that included Hungary: it could 
hardly then conclude an agreement with Hungary, because that would entail negotiating 
with an entity whose interests it had been called to represent — that is, it would be 
dealing with itself.8 The logic of dynastic personal unions tangled awkwardly with that of 
parliamentary constitutionalism, something like the chaotic temporal pluralism that Franz 
von Hein had feared.  
Despite its myriad technical infelicities, the Ausgleich marked a bold and striking 
reformulation of imperial rule, one that straddled the line between description and 
creation. From a Hungarian perspective, it merely recounted the historical statehood and 
Staatsrecht Hungary had never properly lost, even as its novel expression in imperial-
constitutional law entailed an experimental departure. As is well known, the 1867 
agreement created a “dual” monarchy, taking the logic of a composite monarchy and 
fitting it out with the institutional requirements and organs of a modern state. Henceforth, 
two separate and coequal states were joined together solely through three joint ministries: 
one for foreign affairs, a second for war, a third for finances for war and foreign affairs. 
The joint ministries were not responsible to any comprehensive imperial forum but rather 
																																																								
7 (“juristische Ungeheuerlichkeit”). Hermann Bidermann, Die Rechtliche Natur der österreichisch-
ungarischen Monarchie (Vienna: K. k. Hofbuchdruckerei Carl Fromme, 1877), 44. 
8 See also See Franz Hauke, “Verfassungsgeschichte,” in Ernst Mischler and Josef Ulbrich, eds., 
Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch: Handbuch des gesamten österreichischen öffentlichen Rechtes, 2nd 
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to “delegations” dispatched regularly from the “Austrian” and the Hungarian parliaments 
respectively; they met alternatively in Vienna and Budapest. Alongside these joint 
ministries, a field of “matters of joint interest,” comprising mostly economic concerns 
such as state debt, customs, and interstate commerce, was to be administered in tandem 
on the basis of agreements renegotiated every ten years.  
“We did not merely want to guarantee that the Hungarian state would have its 
autonomy in certain affairs, and that this autonomy would not be injured” reflected Gyula 
Andrássy on the Ausgleich, “but rather also that it remained sovereign, in other words, we 
wanted to guarantee that its will would not be subject to the will of a higher state.”9 The 
negotiators lacked any pre-existing model or vocabulary for a balancing act of this sort. 
They sought much more than the internal autonomy maintained by the states of the 
United States, for example. “For that reason we had to take refuge in an original 
conception. A foreign prototype was not at our disposal, because that which we wanted 
— the completely secured union of the power of two sovereign states — had never 
succeeded anywhere.” They would not tolerate “the dimming of our sovereignty even in 
the domain of theory.” These characteristics lent dualism “its originality and chief 
interest in the field of constitutional [staatsrechtlichen] theory.”10 Double-headed 
sovereignty of this sort had neither precedent nor parallel.  
If the range of constitutional options in 1848-1849 spanned between poles of 
centralism and federalism, the settlement of 1867 re-imagined this set of options, creating 
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Duncker & Humblot, 1897), 184-185. 
10 Andrássy, Ungarns Ausgleich mit Österreich, 185. 
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two centralized states at once (or, in the words of Hungarian jurist Gábor Máthé, a 
“doubly-centralized state”).11 Naturally, this reform dealt a hard blow to the monarchy’s 
Slavs, especially Poles and Czechs, who complained that their historical rights were just 
as valid as the Hungarian equivalent, so why had the latter alone received such grandiose 
affirmation?12 In shutting the Slavs out of government, Palacký foresaw dualism as the 
birthday of Pan-Slavism.13 They now feared unchecked germanization in the Austrian 
half of the dual monarchy, while Slovaks, Rumanians and others feared (and suffered) 
Magyarization in the Hungarian half. The two imperial halves diverged at this point in 
the treatment of national groups: a new constitution for the Austrian half — dubbed the 
“December constitution” in keeping with the calendric eponyms of its predecessors — 
explicitly provided for the equality of ethnic groups and their right to the cultivation of 
their language and culture.14 
																																																								
11 Gábor Máthé, “Gesamtmonarchie oder selbstständiger ungarischer Staat?: Gedanken zur Diskussion 
Lustkandl-Deák,” in Barna Mezey, ed., Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich 1867 (Budapest: 
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14 See Gerlad Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung 
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Dissent from figures like Lajos Kossuth notwithstanding,15 dualism had 
apparently left Hungary as the sovereign master of its own destiny.16 According to Gyula 
Szekfü’s classic 1918 work The Hungarian State, the Ausgleich formed “the logical 
consequence of the historical impossibility” of ruling Hungary centrally from Vienna.17 It 
worked as a hinge or pivot in longer history of the death and birth of states: “the currently 
existing dualism, on the basis of the parity of both states, means nothing less from 
Hungary than the direct continuation of its individual statehood as it had existed before 
1526.”18 1867, apparently, reversed the logic of 1526: having entered the empire in the 
sixteenth century, the Hungarian state now emerged on the other side, unruffled and 
ready to resume sovereign life where it had left off. Yet a Habsburg still wore the Holy 
Crown of St. Stephen, and his dominion still stretched across Central Europe. What new 
and peculiar sovereign mathematics could square the equation of two complete 
sovereignties housed inside a single polity? 
 
The (Original) Two State Solution: An Empire in International Law? 
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What is a “dual” state? The familiarity of the designation “Dual Monarchy” can numb us 
to the contrivance of the concept itself. In this “German-Magyar double-state,”19 was 
sovereignty doubled, or divided? How could Austria-Hungary denote two sovereignties, 
and yet still somehow only one? Unsurprisingly, the nature of this hybrid Gesamtstaat — 
“that was a duality and simultaneously a unity”20 — inspired heated juridical polemics on 
both sides of the Leitha. “The Dualist theory,” wrote R. W. Seton-Watson, “is almost as 
theological as the doctrine of the Trinity.”21	
Hungarian jurists and statesmen were of one mind in their insistence that 
Hungary’s sovereignty was fully-formed, non-derived, and perfectly complete. As the 
Hungarian professor of public law Ernő Nagy stated succinctly, “the connection of 
Hungary with Austria is that of two sovereign states.” This sovereignty maintained 
Hungary’s former status as a “free land, subjected to no other empire or people.”22 His 
colleague Győző Concha, originally a politics professor but appointed to the Budapest 
law faculty in 1892, agreed.23 The aristocratic statesman Albert Apponyi was at the 
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center of a series of terse exchanges with Austrian jurists over the nature of Hungary’s 
post-1867 sovereignty. Apponyi led the Independence Party that remained formally 
opposed to the Ausgleich (maintaining that Hungary deserved more): 24 there were 
certainly more moderate views than his, but he also spoke for a large constituency, and 
did so with great lucidity. Parallel to Nagy, Apponyi argued that Hungary’s independence 
was not an innovation of the 1860s but an expression of the status that Hungary had never 
legally forfeited. Had anything changed in 1867? Yes: “the previously merely ideal-
juridical separation of the two state sovereignties was […] actually carried out.”25 
Historical rights were cashed in: Hungary’s theoretical-legal statehood became the real 
thing. 
Distinguishing the legal contours of these two sovereignties required a number of 
subtle distinctions. “Some parts of state sovereignty are exercised in a community with 
another state, the Austrian Empire,” the Hungarian historian Heinrich Marczali 
explained. “The identity of the monarch of both states produced this relationship; but it 
also ensures that the community does not injure Hungary’s sovereignty.” 26 The shared 
identity of the emperor-king kept the two states together as it kept them apart. Particular 
portions of sovereignty were exercised in common, but apparently never bled into each 
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other. Small linguistic distinctions bore the burden of this finely-grained sovereignty. 
Some economic laws, for example, were said to apply not “two state-territories” but to 
the “territories of the two states.”27  
Other sovereign attributes more clearly testified to the presence of two 
sovereignties. There existed no citizens of Austria-Hungary, only citizens of each state 
respectively. The citizens of one were not recognized as citizens of the other.28 
International relations thus took on a remarkable intimacy. Citizens of the Austrian half 
of the empire appeared as “foreigners” under Hungarian constitutional law, Marczali 
instructed.29 Different juridical commentaries emphasized contrasting details. The entry 
for “Ausländer” in the landmark compendium Austrian State Dictionary, for example, 
treated the subject of foreigners a little more equivocally. “Foreigners” or “aliens” were 
those without citizenship in the specified territory, explained its author Georg Pražák. In 
the first paragraph of the entry, Pražák cut right to the true test case, the status of 
Hungarian citizens. Because a unified citizenship law existed for the kingdoms and lands 
represented in the imperial parliament (that is, the “Austrian” half of the empire),  
 
even members of the lands of St. Stephen’s crown are to be handled according 
to the authoritative provisions for foreigners, insofar as the opposite is not 
explicitly mandated or [unless] it relates to a concern which is to be seen as 
common to both imperial halves in the sense of the Hungarian Ausgleich.30 
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Yes, Hungarian citizens were ostensibly aliens, but only in the negative space around a 
law to the contrary, as though by strict logical inference rather than legal certainty. And 
perhaps, Pražák suggested, if a question of citizenship arose in within the domain of one 
of the joint ministries — those jurisdictional spaces where the two states were unified — 
maybe there they would not be foreigners. According to this line of thinking, a Hungarian 
citizen might be an alien when engaging in one activity, but not if engaging in another. 
The borders of sovereign jurisdiction were thus relative rather than absolute, and the line 
between the inside and outside of the state fell into a dual-hue grey zone.  
If Hungarian citizens were legal foreigners in the Austrian half of the empire, and 
vice versa, had imperial constitutional law in fact become international law? Many 
Hungarian commentators thought so. Andrássy argued that the settlement of 1867, as a 
contract between two sovereign states, possessed an international character.31 The 
Ausgleich simply fulfilled the practical requirements of “external solidarity,” wrote 
Apponyi.32 The band that bound the two states, he continued, had an “international law 
nature.” No common “state will” and no common public-constitutional law (Staatsrecht) 
spanned across the two. Any reference to the “constitutional” nature of the union would 
be “fundamentally false” and built on air. If at all, then it could only be considered 
constitutional in the sense that the juridical foundations and consequences of the 
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connection were incorporated into the Staatsrecht of each state, which distinguished the 
union from a mere alliance.33 
This line of argument led directly to the notion that Hungary possessed its own 
legal personality in international law. Hungary’s “own personality in international law,” 
its international capacity in all areas not regulated by the union, came out ever more 
clearly over time, Apponyi argued in 1911, as opportunities had arisen where Hungary’s 
real legal character could be displayed.34 Already in 1865, Deák had argued that the 
Hungarian king possessed international status.35 Later in the century and especially after 
the turn into the twentieth, the Hungarian government took pains to perform an 
international standing, appearing as a signatory to a number of international agreements, 
including the 1902 international sugar agreements and the renewed World Postal Union 
treaty of 1906.36 
Unsurprisingly, the broad contours of this thesis were disputed by Austrian jurists. 
In his 1899 work Der österreichische Kaisertitel, das ungarische Staatsrecht und die 
ungarische Publicistik, Friedrich Tezner systematically worked through the recurring 
Hungarian arguments, including the proposition that the connection between Hungary 
and the rest of the lands held by Franz Josef existed only in international rather than in 
																																																								
33 Apponyi, Die rechtliche Natur der Beziehung zwischen Österreich und Ungarn, 57. 
34 Apponyi, Die rechtliche Natur der Beziehung zwischen Österreich und Ungarn, 58. 
35 Franz von Deák, Ein Beitrag zum ungarischen Staatsrecht: Bemerkungen über Wenzel Lustkandl’s 
“Ungarisch-österreichisches Staatsrecht”; Vom Standpunkte der Geschichte des ungarischen Staatsrechts 
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36 See Jiří Kořalka, “The Czech Question in International Relations at the Beginning of the 20th Century,” 
Slavonic and East European Review 48, no. 111 (1970): 249-250. 
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constitutional law.37 According to common consensus, Tezner reported, the subjects of 
international law did not include individuals, neither the organs of states, nor peoples, but 
rather states alone. “Thus international law leaves untouched the individual states in their 
internal character, in their organism.”38 “Legal relations in international law are an 
imperial monopoly,” he concluded.39 
He elaborated further in a 1909 work. “The essence of the Ausgleich,” he 
explained, was that “the emperor abandoned all claims to centralization that had been 
made in the earlier constitutions except for the external unity of the monarchy or its 
personality in international law and the preservation of the army.”40 That singular face 
presented to the world of international law was virtually all that the emperor had salvaged 
of the centralization attempts expressed in the previous constitutions. That was why the 
Ausgleich committed Hungary to the preservation of the monarchy and stated that the 
lands of the monarchy constituted a “unitary holding” (einheitliche Besitz). This principle 
was then articulated in more “modern” terms in section 8, holding that, “as against 
foreign countries or third states,” they formed “the equivalent of one empire, one 
sovereign domain, one state territory, without distinction between commercial and other 
interests.”41 Contemporary Hungarian jurisprudence, Tezner wrote, looked to dispossess 
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the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of its legal foundations by interpreting the Pragmatic 
Sanction and the Ausgleich as Hungarian laws that can be legally changed without 
Austrian participation — elective, factual (tatsächlich) bonds without legal duties. The 
“Hungarian theory” effectively led to the “invalidity of all state contracts that were 
concluded in the name of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a party.”42 They might 
constitute two states internally, but Tezner was adamant that in the eyes of others they 
must appear as a singular subject. 
In a 1910 text titled On the Question of the Legal Nature of the Austro-Hungarian 
Unified Monarchy: A Contribution to the Critique of the Magyar Interpretation of the 
Ausgleich of 1867, the Austrian historian Harold Steinacker (1875-1965), who would end 
up with a chair in Innsbruck, placed Hungarian claims of internationality in context. 
Since the Hungarian Declaration of Independence of 1847, he recounted, the Hungarians 
had sought an arrangement structured around the two-ness of the empire both internally 
and externally, so that, according to Deák, the hereditary lands could be called to war 
without it concerning Hungary. Anton von Schmerling, the interior minister between 
1860 and 1865, had broken this intransigence. Deák’s compromise position entailed 
external unity and internal duality.43 Dualism was to place two constitutional states 
alongside one another in a relationship of parity. After all, the unity of army and foreign 
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affairs formed the prerequisite of any Grossmachtpolitik, let alone the theory of 
international law and the praxis of international politics.44  
To be sure, conceded Steinacker, even non-Hungarian jurists defined the legal 
nature of the monarchy very differently. This variety arose not because the legal nature of 
the empire was difficult but, rather, because it was unsolvable. The Ausgleich was 
intended as a legal form through which a particular political idea might continually 
actualize itself — closer to a political invitation than an endpoint. As a juridical 
proposition, it borrowed liberally from different legal systems. In ensuring the 
“preservation of the empire,” the Ausgleich pronounced that there existed one state, and 
this fact led to the unified treatment of military and foreign affairs. “But these 
constitutional, imperial-unified [reichseinheitlichen] elements are arranged in a 
relationship in international law that leaves both states sovereign. All real power is with 
them and the empire’s conditions of existence depend on their unification.”45 
The sovereignty of the two imperial halves, Steinacker continued, showed itself 
most sharply in relation to the economic provisions. The foundational mistake of the 
Ausgleich was that it provided no mechanism to force an agreement (and, indeed, the 
common financial arrangements sank the state into constitutional crisis every ten years as 
they came up for their scheduled renegotiation). “The international law elements were 
intended as a shield for Hungary; against Deak’s will they have become a sword that 
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successfully attacks the remainder of imperial unity left [in place] by Deak.”46 As a 
result, the empire hovered in a state of suspense that was neither tolerable nor resolvable. 
  
The Ausgleich is thus conceived as part international, part constitutional law 
and therefore a unified juridical construction is not accessible without 
violence [ohne Gewaltsamkeit]. What applies to theory, applies also to praxis. 
The constitutional and international law elements are plainly incompatible; 
one must yield to the other. 47 
 
An intellectually coherent account of the empire’s legal order, Steinacker argued, 
remained beyond reach. Suspended between international and constitutional law, the 
order of 1867 institutionalized the ambiguity of historical rights that had half translated 
the traditional autonomy of the estates into full sovereign statehood. 
The laws of 1867, we could say, included two legal descriptions of the empire. 
One tried to update the dynastic logic of a composite monarchy and historical rights 
while shielding the results from contemporary understandings of the relationship between 
domestic and international law. The other deemed this doublethink untenable: one could 
not talk of free-standing sovereignty in the late nineteenth century without summoning 
the specter of international law. Both these descriptions of the empire were 
simultaneously valid. Each was accurate in some sense, yet they contradicted one 
another, with one portrait corroding the “truth” of the other. The legal structure of the 
“dual” state involved holding “dual” versions of its order in mind at the same time. 
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If we can describe the dual monarchy’s legal pluralism as a sort of temporal 
pluralism, this characterization can only partially capture the movement behind each of 
those designations. Historical legal forms were consciously adapted and updated, leaving 
them somewhere between timely and untimely, while the legal pluralism of the two states 
was also, ostensibly, a unity, though the line between the two was unstable. As Tezner 
had observed, no legal order evolved in clear and rational lines: they were always strewn 
about with fallacies, contradictions, and fantasies. In the case of Austria-Hungary, those 
contradictions and jagged lines recorded its historical evolution with particular clarity. In 
the time capsule of imperial law, old concepts survived but were simultaneously written 
over many times with newer versions, each with their own imagined pasts and own 
projected futures. 
 
The Arithmetic of Witches: Translating A Common Empire 
If one believed that the empire’s new “constitutional” order in fact resided in 
international law, then a second, and more radical proposition followed close on its heels, 
namely, that no “third” state formation “above” the two states existed at all. This view, as 
well as its rebuttal, came to turn, in no small measure, on the meaning and translation of a 
single term. 
Part of the difficulty stemmed from the legislative form of the Ausgleich. As 
discussed above, it comprised Act XII of the Hungarian parliament from May 1867, and 
another passed by the Austrian imperial parliament on December 21, 1867. The formal 
relationship of the two laws remained unclear. More significantly, one differed quite 
substantially from the other. The Hungarian law was much longer, containing elaborate 
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exegetical discussions of constitutional theory and Hungarian history, taking care to 
refute alternative constructions along the way. The shorter law passed in Vienna, by 
contrast, appeared in standard legislative prose, sparse, colorless, low on detail.48 To cap 
it off, they were, of course, in different languages. In his long 1911 study of the 
Ausgleich, the Slovene jurist Ivan Žolger (1867-1925), who would later represent 
Yugoslavia as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, asserted that one could 
hardly present a sound analysis of the Ausgleich without a detailed understanding — 
legal, historical, and linguistic — of both laws.49 
The Austrian law denoted the shared domains like war and foreign affairs as 
“gemeinsam,” or “common.” In Austria, as the Austrian jurist Edmund Bernatzik 
explained, “gemeinsam” was understood as unified or unitary (einheitlich): one spoke of 
gemeinesamen ministers and ambassadors as organs of a unitary polity otherwise known 
as the empire, that appeared alone and in the singular in foreign affairs, even if its legal 
existence was confined to those particular competences.50 In Hungary, that crucial word 
was construed very differently. These “gemeinsamen” ministries and organs signified no 
more than union of two equally empowered states: the word did not suggest the existence 
of a unified polity as distinguished from the two. In this sense, on the basis of the May 
Ausgleich law, they disputed the continued existence of the “Reich” altogether.51  
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The trials of translation played their part in this tangle of willful 
misunderstandings. The Hungarian law (which, after all, preceded the Austrian one), used 
a word, “együttes,” that had no direct German equivalent. Arguments about the empire’s 
legal existence came to turn on its tortured translation. The Hungarian law, in Bernatzik’s 
rendering, spoke of the “defense and preservation of common security with the unified 
(‘együttes’) force of a common and mutual obligation, which springs directly from the 
Pragmatic Sanction.”52 Együttes was an adjective formed from the stem word együtt, 
meaning “together” or “with each other” (mitsammen, beisammen, miteinander). As 
Bernatzik noted, “an adjective ‘togetherly’ [‘mitsammenig’] or similar does not exist in 
the German language.”53 It was generally translated as gemeinsam, but the latter had a 
different Hungarian correlate, közös, with a different meaning. Žolger offered two 
alternative translations, one that used an awkward conglomerate (“occurring through 
together-force”: Zusammen-Kraft zu geschehende),54 and another for which he simply 
generated a new adjective, so that the obligation happened through “togetherly force” 
																																																								
52 “Diesem ausdrücklich ausgesprochenen Prinzipe [referring to the provisions of the PS] zufolge ist die 
Verteidigung und Aufrechthaltung der gemeinsamen Sicherheit mit vereinigten (‘együttes’) Kräften eine 
gemeinsame und wechselseitige Verpflichtung, welche direct aus der pragmatischen Sanktion entspringt.” 
XII Gesetzartikel 1867, text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 331. 
53 Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 332 (note 7). 
54 Žolger, Der staatsrechtliche Ausgleich zwischen Österreich und Ungarn, 59. The whole passage then 
read: “Diesem ausdrücklich ausgesprochenen Prinzipe zufolge ist die mit Zusammen-Kraft zu geschehende 
Verteidigung und Aufrechterhaltung der gemeinsamen Sicherheit eine solche gemeinsame und 
wechselseitige Verpflichtung, welche direct aus der pragmatischen Sanktion entspringt.” For his remarks 
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(mit zusammeniger Kraft).55 “This translation may be exact,” Bernatzik smirked, “but it is 
not German.”56 
As neither law “trumped” the other, this single untranslatable word balooned into 
a great incommensurability at the heart of imperial law. In the Austrian construction, 
gemeinsam implied that the two sovereign states fused into a common entity; in the 
Hungarian, együttes denoted no more than the force of two separate sovereign states 
working alongside one another. The distinction was subtle, but its implications dramatic. 
Did the word “gemeinsam” serve as the placeholder for a supra-dualist imperial state, a 
state body over the top of the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary, a legal 
space in which the two melted together? There was precious little else in the Ausgleich 
laws that documented the existence of a “third” state of this sort. Or did it rather testify 
against the existence of this “third” state? Apponyi was characteristically strident on the 
question. Any argument that produced the term “gemeinsam” as evidence of a common, 
singular state rested on a foundational logical error. Conceptually, he argued, 
“Gemeinsamkeit indicates multiplicity, not unity; one cannot have something in common 
[gemeinsam] with oneself, at least two belong there; accordingly, common affairs are not 
imperial affairs, because an empire cannot have common affairs with itself.”57 
Gemeinsamkeit, Apponyi continued, was the category through which the laws of 
1867 reconciled Hungary’s full sovereignty with the Länder-confederation created by the 
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Pragmatic Sanction. This reconciliation may not have been executed elegantly, but that 
remained a political question and not a legal one.58 Everyone now poured over the 
awkward wording, he reported. Had this “labyrinth of laborious and contradictory 
constructions,” he asked incredulously, simultaneously preserved Hungary’s full 
sovereignty and “indirectly” created “a higher juridical entity standing over this 
sovereignty”? Far from it. The construction of “an empire” out of the common 
institutions of 1867 was “a conceptual impossibility.”59 
Apponyi surveyed the imperial structure in support of his argument. His evidence 
included the “fragmentary character” and lack of independence of the common organs 
and functions: “there is no autonomous imperial competence and no autonomous imperial 
organism”; there were no “affairs” that were comprehensively common, and there was 
nothing resembling a common legislature. “An empire without legislative capacity! Now 
that is certainly awkward,” he teased — especially as a legislature formed the highest 
public competence from which everything else flowed. An “empire” built on these 
foundations, he observed, would constitute a very curious juridical unit — one that 
remained dependent on the highest powers of its subordinate units.60 There existed no 
legal community above the two states, Apponyi concluded emphatically. What was more, 
“all this is not destroyed now, rather, it had never existed, except in the speculations of 
the greater-Austrian academic line.”61 In Apponyi’s account, “the empire” amounted to 
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little more than a centuries-long juridical dream, now finally exposed as such. Or, in 
Szekfü’s terms, it was a shadow finally chased away. The Ausgleich laws had been so 
careful in preserving two distinct sovereignties that the respective delegations (meeting 
periodically to agree on financial matters) were not even allowed to debate together, 
“banishing the shadow of a central parliament standing above the Hungarian and Austrian 
parliaments.”62 
Unsurprisingly, Apponyi’s provocations incited increasingly frustrated responses. 
One wartime screed, written by the unknown Paul von Fazekas, expressed deep 
exasperation with Apponyi’s exposition of “gemeinsam”: 
 
When for example Count Apponyi, the epicist of constitutional politics, says 
that “Gemeinsamkeit indicates multiplicity, not unity”; “one cannot have 
something in common with oneself, at least two belong there”; “common 
affairs are thus not imperial affairs, because an empire cannot have common 
affairs with itself,” then it is a witch’s arithmetic [Hexeneinmaleins], which I 
characterize with the formula 1+1 = 1+1, that according to the sophism of our 
constitutional jurist may never become the new unit “two.”63 
 
 
In Apponyi’s faulty arithmetic, the equation was never actually converted: the “answer” 
simply restated the original values.64 Only a constitutional jurist, Fazekas complained, 
could argue that Gemeinsamkeit suggested multiplicity rather than unity, a facetious word 
game that more closely resembled a witch’s trick or spell than responsible jurisprudence. 
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In his own exegesis of the term, Gemeinsamkeit possessed a kind of inbuilt story or 
progression; it testified to a development over time: 
 
Because Gemeinsamkeit was once a multiplicity. Since it became 
Gemeinsamkeit, it has naturally become a unity there where the 
Gemeinsamkeit is, and gemeinsame affairs are affairs neither of Austria nor 
Hungary, but rather those of the empire, or, if the word suits better, of the 
monarchy.65 
 
In its own way, the term Gemeinsam documented the progressive formation of the 
empire. The unity had been a multiplicity, but that plurality lay in the past: the 
designation Gemeinsamkeit declared that process to be over: a new unity had come into 
existence over the top of that historical diversity. If Fazekas criticized the pedantic and 
solipsistic reasoning of the jurists, he too participated in this word game or logic puzzle 
of imperial law.  
How could the empire’s existence or non-existence, legally speaking, come to rest 
on the shoulders of a single term, broad as its discursive domain turned out to be? In his 
1877 study of the legal nature of the dual monarchy, the Austrian jurist Hermann 
Bidermann (whom we met earlier) argued that the legal categorization of the empire 
turned on the question of whether or not there was an independent, overarching, 
paramount “central power” (Centralgewalt): more specifically, had such a thing existed 
before 1848, and if so, how was it affected, firstly, by the events of that year, and 
secondly, by the laws of 1867? After many pages of laborious exposition, Bidermann 
thought he had demonstrated the historical existence (also in law) of a central power of 
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this sort.66 So what of the situation following the Ausgleich? In all the most important 
competencies, such as the direction and organization of the army, diplomatic capacity, 
the ability to declare war, and so forth, a central state power still existed, he argued. But 
somehow that central power, despite all those capacities, had been issued (ausgegeben) as 
if newly founded, as if such a thing had not existed before, or as if it had legally lapsed. 
“Astonished the legal historian asks how the latter happened — and with amazement he 
hears the denial through which the true origin of the current central power and the 
continuity of its legal efficacy are contested.”67 In outlining the limited common 
ministries, the Ausgleich laws had somehow allowed the interpretation that joint organs 
of this sort were thereby created in law for the first time. As Bidermann continued, “from 
the Hungarian side, it is never once admitted that one thereby had something to do with a 
central power, and one advances the slogan “dualism” as justification for this.”68 
Two years later, another Austrian jurist, Josef Ulbrich, would contest 
Bidermann’s identification of a central power: it appeared nowhere in the Ausgleich laws, 
and surely the very essence of such a power would involve its rule over subject-citizens 
and over a specific territory, yet “Austria-Hungary” had neither citizens nor territory of 
its own.69 But Bidermann’s analysis had sharply pinpointed continuity as the real nub of 
the dispute, Ulbrich conceded. If one simply began with the Ausgleich laws, as though 
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they occurred atop a juridical tabula rasa, then legally speaking there was no central 
imperial state in existence. To many Austrian jurists, however, it seemed an obvious 
presumption that whatever the empire was, its legal identity continued over the cusp of 
1867. Intuition and common sense alike understood its existence to be pre-presumed: it 
did not need to be made out from first principles in the Ausgleich laws.  
This continuity thesis formed Tezner’s main line of attack against Hungarian 
portrayals of the non-existing empire. Neither words nor empires could take their 
meaning from a single instance: one had to consider the broader arc of their development. 
In the whole history of these questions, Tezner argued, “gemeinsam” always entailed the 
thicker constitutional bond of the state union (Staatenverbindung); it had never meant a 
connection merely in international law.70 The empire’s legal history formed a continuum: 
nothing of the union of 1804 had been undone. Within the general sweep of this legal 
history, it was clear that “the year 1867 had called forth no change in the legal 
subjectivity, in the state personality of the monarchy, testified a thousand times over, 
either in the domains of private or international law.”71 “The fog of the Hungarian 
constitutional formulas,” Tezner wrote stridently in 1909, can obscure the Kaiserstaat 
standing behind them just as little “as the veil of Turkish sovereignty has cloaked 
Austrian sovereignty in the occupied lands.”72 The fiction of a non-existing Habsburg 
empire found its analogue in Turkey’s fictional sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 
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where Tezner stood, no clever trick or illusion had power enough to disappear the empire. 
That was a step too far, even for the sharpest Hexeneinmaleins. 
 
The Two-Body Problem: Codifying the King’s Personalities 
The Ausgleich brought an older legal logic of the composite monarchy face to face with 
institutional demands and expectations of nineteenth-century great-power status. But it 
was far from the only conceptual renovation causing controversy in late nineteenth-
century jurisprudence. Its correlate concept, that of a shared or “foreign” monarch, also 
fit awkwardly with “modern” understandings of sovereignty and international legal 
personality. The Ausgleich refocused attention on the legal implications of the fact that 
Franz Josef was Emperor of Austria as well as King of Hungary (and King of Bohemia, 
and so on and so forth), but the debate’s implications were broader (and began earlier) 
than the vagaries of dualism. 
Pity the poor, self-respecting nineteenth-century jurist compelled to codify, for the 
purposes of a “modern” text book of constitutional law, the metaphysical mysticisms 
implied by the presence of multiple “sovereign personalities” 
(Herrscherpersonönlichkeiten) within the one physical body. Josef Ulbrich attempted a 
common sense approach. “The Emperor and King carries in his person two separate 
sovereign personalities; but this separation touches only on a juridical abstraction because 
physically only one bearer of the state powers [Staatsgewalten] exists.”73 Such questions 
appeared most pressing around the “will” of the state, a beloved theme of German-
language jurisprudence of the period. Because the emperor-king embodied both 
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personalities simultaneously, the congruence of the will (here, Willensrichtung) of both 
states was “factually possible,” if not “legally necessary,” “in as much as the monarch 
wants the same as emperor as he wanted as king, and vice versa.”74 For Ludwig 
Gumplowicz, the physical coterminousness of the emperor-king furnished supporting 
evidence for the common ministries of the dualist state. In his 1891 textbook, he 
informed students that “the common monarch can clearly never be in the position to wage 
war against himself; because the emperor of Austria and the king of Hungary are one 
person.” As a result, the state’s capacities regarding war and military affairs must clearly 
be arranged on a common foundation.75 Similarly, foreign affairs and representation 
abroad must proceed on a common footing, as the emperor of Austria and the king of 
Hungary could hardly negotiate on a different basis without detrimental effects for the 
monarchy.76 
The subject acquired its sharpest edge around the question of international legal 
personality. Did the king of Hungary have an international standing? Could “his” 
sovereignty be pried out from behind that of the emperor of Austria on the international 
stage, given both were housed in the one body? There were precedents: in May 1809, 
Napoleon had tried to wedge the two personalities apart in an appeal to the Hungarians. 
“It is the Emperor of Austria, not the King of Hungary, who has declared war on me. 
According to your institutions, he cannot do this without your assent. […] Hungary! The 
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moment has come to obtain your independence once more!”77 Indeed, much turned on the 
status of the 1804 proclamation of the new title, “Emperor of Austria.” Did this swallow 
up any residual international capacity attached to the other titles? Karl Renner articulated 
the view of many in Cisleithania in his 1906 description of the effects of 1804: “the King 
of Hungary disappeared under the Emperor of Austria in international law.”78 
Predictably enough, many Hungarian statesmen saw things differently. In 
asserting the international rights of the Hungarian king, Ferenc von Deák deemed it 
merely a matter of practical convenience that these capacities were exercised in tandem 
with those of the emperor of Austria.79 In 1908, a Hungarian consul who had served 
many years in Germany, Count Theodor Zichy, set out to educate German readers about 
the legal structure of the dual monarchy in an article in the Deutsche Rundschau. Having 
taken a crisp tour through the different fundamental laws, he summarized their collective 
meaning in a programmatic list of legal principles. No prizes for guessing precept number 
one: Hungary constituted an independent sovereign state. Numbers two and three turned 
to the body of the king: 
 
2. The Emperor of Austria is simultaneously also the King of Hungary, but he 
is not it because he is Emperor of Austria, but rather because the Hungarian 
nation determined that the particular ruler of the Austrian hereditary lands 
should simultaneously be King of Hungary. 
 
																																																								
77 Quoted at length in Paul von Somssich, Das legitime Recht Ungarns und seines Königs (Vienna: Jasper, 
Hügel & Manz, 1850), 13. 
78 (“der König von Ungarn unter dem Kaiser von Österreich völkerrechtlich verschwinde”). Rudolf 
Springer [Karl Renner], Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie: 
Politische Studie über den Zusammenbruch der Privilegienparlamente und die Wahlreform in beiden 
Staaten, über die Reichsidee und ihre Zukunft (Vienna and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1906), 23. 
79 Deák, Ein Beitrag zum ungarischen Staatsrecht, 190. 
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3. The sovereignty in Hungary is not identical with the sovereignty in Austria, 
only the bearer of both crowns is the same physical person. The rights of the 
king of Hungary and those of the emperor of Austria have a different origin, 
they are not fused together, but rather separated from one another.80 
 
 
Sovereignty’s qualities varied across the dual monarchy. Not only did the rights of the 
king differ from those of the emperor, but these rights sprang from alternative sources: 
their force and normativity threaded back to different points of origin. In this way, the 
emperor-king carried the empire’s historical legal pluralism in his person. As evidence of 
the aloofness of the different personalities, Zichy reminded his readers of the multiple 
designations attached to each sovereign: Emperor Karl VI, for example, was King of 
Hungary Karl III. Karl’s rule, in other words, was tallied according to distinct sovereign 
lines, and those numbers marked out the different incarnations of his 
Herrscherpersönlichkeit. 
Friedrich Tezner found Zichy’s theses provocative enough to pen a rebuttal that 
appeared in the same journal the following year. Their disagreements, he reported, 
formed part of the great “controversy over the legal nature of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy.” Impatient with the “constitutional catechism” offered by Zichy, Tezner tried 
to force a reality check: how is it explicable, he asked, “that the full sovereignty claimed 
by Hungarians for Hungary never appeared externally under the rule of the House of 
Austria and that Hungary played no role as a state until the year 1867?”81 If one could not 
see it from the outside, could Hungarian sovereignty really be said to exist? Prior to 1867, 
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Hungary formed no more than an autonomous province, Tezner argued. Among 
numerous points of disagreement, he responded to Zichy’s invocation of the different 
numerical designations of emperors and kings. Dismissing Zichy’s argument that the 
1804 imperial title did not also apply to Hungary, Tezner recounted how Emperor 
Ferdinand was designated the fifth Hungarian (and the fifth Bohemian) king of that name, 
with both these titles preceded by his new designation as the first emperor of Austria of 
that name. This sequence preserved hereditary succession in the Länder while 
distinguishing the imperial title as an all-encompassing (zussamenfassende) one. 
Strikingly, Tezner then mapped these designations onto the structure of 
international law. The imperial title, he argued, was a title at the level of international law 
(völkerrechtlicher Rangtitel), one designed for international dealings, modeled on the 
French and Russian equivalents.82 As Ferdinand I (of Austria), the monarch possessed an 
international standing or personality. As Ferdinand V (of Hungary or Bohemia), his status 
pertained to internal dealing within his realm only. “The addition King of Bohemia etc. 
and apostolic King of Hungary,” Tezner instructed, “is then grammatically an appositon 
to Emperor of Austria.” The latter represented a “covering or main title.”83 In Tezner’s 
telling, the line between international and constitutional law threaded between the 
different numbers that followed the monarch’s name.  
These creative conversions of medieval/early-modern dynastic practice into 
nineteenth-century public law played out across many fronts. In the elaborate controversy 
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over Croatian “statehood,” for example, a great deal came to turn on the nature of the 
Hungarian acquisition of the Croatian crown. Had Croatia voluntarily elected the 
Hungarian King Koloman to the throne? Or had he taken the crown as booty after having 
conquered Croatia in battle, letting himself be crowned king of Croatia purely as a 
magnanimous concession? If the former, Croatia entered a personal union with Hungary 
with its “statehood” and rights in tact (meaning it was formally still a state in the present). 
If the latter, then Croatia’s legal distinctness — its personality, we could say — was 
extinguished already in the eleventh century. Through Koloman’s election, and his 
solemn swearing of the coronation oath, Croatia and Dalmatia “preserved their 
individuality, their own territory and their autonomy under Koloman and his successors,” 
wrote the Croatian writer and translator Ivan Andrović in his 1904 study of the 
question.84 Crucial evidence for the survival of this status, Andrović maintained, was that 
Croatia had often raised kings to the throne and crowned them irrespective of whether 
Hungary had done so. They crowned Vladislav in 1203, a year before he was crowned 
Hungarian king; Karl Robert became the Croatian king in 1301, and the Hungarian one 
only eight years later — and so on.85 These divergent chronologies of kings evinced the 
survival of a separate Croatian corporate legal identity. Here, too, the logic of dynastic 
personal unions was conscripted into early-twentieth century arguments about the ability 
of states to preserve their legal personality under imperial rule.86  
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Bloodlines, Hereditary Time, and Horizons of the Legally Possible: Sovereignty as a 
“Future Conditional” 
 
Surprisingly enough, hereditary kingship in fact became a rich feeding ground for the 
late-imperial legal imagination. As a store of concepts and connections, it proved useful 
not only for debating the start dates of states, but also their projected endpoints. 
Bloodlines reached back into the past and, presumably, forward into the future. In 
Habsburg Central Europe, the particular, qualified structure of their “future tense” 
emerged as a key offensive weapon in arguments concerning the imperfection of imperial 
sovereignty. 
In 1861, after Emperor Franz Josef had issued the February patent, Ferenc von 
Deák gave a famous speech before the newly-called Hungarian Landtag in which he laid 
out Hungarian objections to the emperor’s pan-imperial constitution and parliament. In 
his rousing defense of Hungary’s historical rights to constitutional autonomy, he traced 
the legal history of Hungary’s rule by the Habsburgs, characterizing the relationship as a 
mere personal union (in the sense that they shared a monarch but nothing more). 
Hungary’s laws carried no trace of thicker amalgamation. The Pragmatic Sanction itself 
proved as much, Deák argued. (The 1723 Pragmatic Sanction, we recall, established a 
common law of succession for all of the Habsburg lands, and crucially enabled the crown 
to pass also down the female line). If the Pragmatic Sanction had not been concluded, 
then upon the subsequent death of Karl III in 1740 and the extinction of the male line, 
Hungary would have been legally free to choose its own king once more, in which case 
																																																								




the monarchy would not appear in its current form.87 This counterfactual showed the 
conceptual proximity of Hungary’s independent international status, ever ready to be 
triggered once more. Furthermore, Deák continued, if in the future the female Habsburg 
line also died out, then the prerogative to elect the king of its choice would again revert 
back to Hungary, demonstrating that the only thing binding Hungary into a common state 
with the hereditary lands was the identity of the dynasty. The legal ties were no thicker 
than that. Deák contrasted this anemic legal bond to that between England, Ireland, and 
Scotland, which would not expire if the dynasty died out, because they existed in a real 
union rather than a personal one.88  
In this way, Deák deduced the juridical attributes of the current imperial state 
from its horizon of legal possibilities. Its own law contained levers and triggers that, 
under certain circumstances, could enable the kingdoms and lands to take up an 
independent life once more. These doors and windows in imperial law revealed much 
about the texture of imperial state in the present: they revealed it to be a narrow dynastic 
union only, hedged about with conditions and qualifications.  
Two years later, the young legal scholar Wenzel Lustkandl (1832-1906) published 
perhaps the first academic study of the legal nature of the Habsburg Empire, and 
responded directly to Deák’s statements. Born in Bohemia, Lustkandl had studied law in 
Prague and at the time was just finishing his habilitation at the University of Vienna. His 
text, Das ungarisch-österreichische Staatsrecht: Zur Lösung der Verfassungsfrage, 
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historisch-dogmatisch dargestellt, was aimed explicitly at solving the monarchy’s 
constitutional problems — Hungary’s refusal to participate in the new imperial 
parliament not least among them. The Hungarian protests had no legal foundation, he 
argued: the empire had long formed a thick and centralized real union, and Hungary a 
simple province within it. Some might object, as Deák had done, to this characterization 
of the empire as a real union, because if the law of succession expired — that is, if the 
Habsburg line died out — Hungary would have the right to call upon the most ancient of 
privileges, the right of estates to elect their king, so that even the personal union might 
fall away.89 Indeed, Lustkandl conceded, article two of the Pragmatic Sanction provided 
for the reversion to Hungary’s right of election, and named the three particular Habsburg 
lines capable of inheriting the crown. Nevertheless, Lustkandl would not endorse the 
Hungarian interpretation so quickly.  
This right of election represented one of Hungary’s most fundamental historical 
rights. What was its real substance, Lustkandl asked? In a kind of faux-deference to 
Hungary’s historical rights, he went digging through old Hungarian laws on succession, 
and latched upon one from 1485: the right of election, it stated, was only triggered when 
no further members of the royal family existed anywhere. Using this old law to expand 
the right of succession beyond the limitations specified in the Pragmatic Sanction, 
Lustkandl twisted the Hungarian right into a dead letter. “Therefore what Deák claims on 
the contrary about the technical letter of the law, even if it were true, has absolutely no 
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meaning.”90 The death of every Habsburg descendant everywhere in the world was 
unimaginable: as a result, the Hungarian right was so hypothetical as to be devoid of all 
legal significance. Lustkandl worked to close those doors and windows in imperial law. 
Such rights could not be invoked to corrode the completeness of imperial sovereignty in 
the present. The future of which they spoke, mired in conditional clauses, was mythical 
only. 
Two years later still, in 1865, Deák responded in turn to Lustkandl. The Pragmatic 
Sanction was perfectly clear, he wrote, in anointing only the descendants of Leopold I as 
hereditary heirs to the Hungarian crown. Lustkandl’s introduction of extraneous material 
and artificial arguments could hardly obscure this fact. If those particular bloodlines died 
out, Hungary’s Wahlrecht clearly “stepped back into life.”91 Hungary had always elected 
its kings, and the Hungarian coronation oath (taken by almost all Habsburg kings) and 
Pragmatic Sanction explicitly affirmed this right, despite Lustkandl’s floundering 
attempts to paint all this as “mere empty word pageantry, play and deception.”92 In this 
way, Deák sketched a domain of legally possible futures: mechanisms existed through 
which Hungary could regain its independence without rupturing the surface of the law. In 
fact, imperial law itself contained and preserved those mechanisms. The timeline or scale 
of this projected independence had the proportions of a bloodline: at the end of the royal 
bloodline stood a reemergence into sovereignty and international law. That future 
possibility, in turn, qualified the nature of imperial sovereignty in the present, setting it in 
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time both forwards and backwards. Thanks to the logic of hereditary kingship and 
Hungary’s historical rights, Habsburg rule was temporally qualified or injured: it 
extended into the future only under particular circumstances. As such, present imperial 
sovereignty languished in the shadow of the future. 
Quite quickly, the legal implications of dynastic bloodlines emerged as a favored 
theme in Habsburg constitutional debate. In the Bohemian lands, too, a coterie of legal 
cartographers popped up, ready and willing to map the temporal frontiers of imperial 
sovereignty. In 1861, there was a prize announcement (Preisausschreibung) inviting 
submissions on the question: what would happen to the Bohemian lands if the Habsburg 
dynasty died out?93 (This Ausschreibung in fact was what first provoked the lawyer Hugo 
Toman to write about Bohemian historical rights: his influential 1872 monograph, Das 
böhmische Staatsrecht und die Entwicklung der österreichischen Reichsidee, will be 
discussed further in the next chapter). In an era of constitutional codification, that 
conditional future suddenly seemed very important. In August 1868, 81 delegates from 
the Bohemian diet signed a declaration in protest against the Ausgleich. It became one of 
the most significant articulations of Bohemian historical rights. Here, too, the laws of 
succession were invoked as evidence of the preservation of Bohemian statehood. The 
Bohemian lands were legally unified with the dynasty for as long as it lasted, but had 
retained “their independence and their particular historical and constitutional 
individuality.” In the case of the extinction of the ruling house, they had always preserved 
“the free and unlimited” right to elect their own king once more, “without consideration 
																																																								
93 Helmut Slapnicka, “Der Weg der tschechischen Rechtswissenschaft von Wien nach Moskau,” Der 
Donauraum 2, no. 1 (1957): 190. 
	
	 184	
of the other lands of the Austrian house,” “and in this way to form an independent state 
once more.”94 Karel Kramář — an important Czech leader in the last decades of the 
empire and later first Czechoslovak prime minister — also emphasized the laws of 
succession in his classic 1896 study Das böhmische Staatsrecht. A central feature of 
Bohemian state law was the right of the representatives of the three lands of the 
Bohemian crown “to freely elect a new king in the case of the dying out of the 
dynasty.”95 Independent statehood formed a “future conditional” tense in imperial law, 
lying waiting on the horizon of legal possibility.  
That future conditional tense remained significant until the end of the empire’s 
life. It trailed the projected rule of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Different Hungarian and 
Austrian interpretations of the Pragmatic Sanction may have led to a constitutional crisis 
over his succession: according to some constructions, any children born of his unequal 
marriage to Sophie Chotek may have been entitled to the crown in Hungary but not in 
Austria.96 The laws of succession outlived the empire itself: at that clearinghouse of 
sovereign claims, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the Hungarian delegation took care to 
educate the Allied peacemakers on the finer points of the Pragmatic Sanction. “[T]his 
law,” they explained,  
 
maintains the rights and character of an elective kingship, for it restricts the 
right of succession to the descendants of the daughters of Charles III., Joseph I 
and Leopold I, kings of Hungary, respectively, in the order given here. In the 
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event of the extinction of the said branches of the House of Habsburg the right 
of electing a king was to revert unimpaired to the nation.97 
 
The seeming archaism of special royal bloodlines possessed an exigency that may have 
been puzzling to outsiders. For the Hungarian delegation, it clearly communicated 
Hungarian readiness for sovereign statehood, and the legality of their claims.  
More broadly, this technical, legalistic futurism was a mode of describing the 
qualified nature of imperial sovereignty. The fact that there was a “natural,” entirely legal 
way in which the empire could “end” (as against a revolution or another sort of 
Rechtsbruch) worked like a crack or chink that recast the whole edifice. The fabric of 
imperial law not only preserved the legal shape of the historic lands (thereby 
documenting its past), but also safeguarded their chance to be sovereign states once more 
(a speculative account of the future). The law of succession, enshrining the historical 
rights of the kingdoms and lands, contained its own map back to international legal life. 
Somewhat ironically, it was the project of codifying imperial rule itself, of translating this 
dynastic state structure into constitutional form, which had led to this careful parsing of 
the theoretical conditions attached to imperial sovereignty, its jagged edges, its frontiers 
in time. Describing the empire’s legal life had entailed describing the possible means of 
its legal death: this mortality became an inbuilt feature of imperial law. 
At the Paris Peace Conference, this tradition of temporally-limited sovereignty 
crossed paths with another, though they likely passed one another unnoticed. If regimes 
of rule had inbuilt legal provisions for their expiration, did this projected limitation 
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impair the quality of sovereignty in the present? Precisely the same juridical question 
danced around the League’s mandate system that was thrashed out in broad terms at the 
Peace Conference. As with Habsburg rule in central Europe, commentators on the 
mandate system were divided as to whether a legally foreclosed end to imperial rule 
denoted anything significant about the nature of imperial sovereignty, especially when 
the distant nature of that possible endpoint rendered it a largely hypothetical proposition. 
Hypothetical or not, these foreshortened legal horizons aroused controversy precisely 
because they drew attention to the frontiers of the state in time, when, as Hans Kelsen 
observed, we are generally far more sensitive to the state’s frontiers in space. That 
temporal frontier remained unfamiliar, and conceptually inchoate, because states 
appeared on the world stage “with the claim to be valid forever.”98 
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The Art of Having Rights 
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Introduction to Part Two 
 
 
As self-determination emerged as a major concept — and major problem — in 
international order in the interwar years, jurists dwelt at length on the juridical 
conundrums it raised. How, from a formal point of view, could a non-state subject 
possess a right in international law to become a state before it was one? That is, how 
could it possess the international legal personality required to have this right, when it was 
by definition complaining of the lack of an international personality?1 An “international 
right to self-determination” seemed to imply that a “nation” might have some kind of 
embryonic legal personality — a legal subjecthood to which the right could affix — 
distinct from that of the sovereign state in which it dwelt: a portentous, and potentially 
revolutionary, idea. Within the terms of this debate, the relationship between the right and 
its bearer did not always function as we may presume, with the presence of the latter 
leading to an assertion of the former. Rather, rights talk itself seemed to juridically 
conjure the subject of its discourse. In other words, the possible existence of the right 
suggested in turn the existence of a subject who could own it.  
In interwar jurisprudence, the debate on the legal personality of “nations” as 
opposed to states was stoked further by the League of Nations’ minority protection 
regime. The minorities treaties themselves had cautiously recognized the rights only of 
“nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities”: they disaggregated the 
rights so that they belonged to individuals rather than to “minorities” understood 
collectively as juridical wholes. (Some minority rights advocates argued that League’s 
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oversight regime de facto recognized minorities collectively, regardless of the formal 
wording of the laws). Here, too, the framers of the League’s treaties had sought to avoid 
precisely the process by which an affirmed right might conjure into existence a new legal 
subject to wield it. The thinking behind this wording was obvious: if minorities as such 
possessed legal personality, then they looked ever more like proto-states, and represented 
a far more threatening disruption to the legal structure of the state. Individual rights were 
never as threatening or politically powerful as group ones, as those subsequently 
disappointed by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights knew only too well.2  
In short, across a number of fronts, group legal personality beyond the state — in 
public law as opposed to private law corporations and associations — emerged in the 
1920s as a major concern of international order whose significance would only grow in 
the post-World War Two era of decolonization and state succession. If Central Europe 
was the key stage of those arguments in the interwar years, it was not set only by the 
collapse of the empire and the dissemination of Wilson’s vision for the region. On the 
contrary, the vagaries of collective rights without sovereignty formed an old and weary 
subject in the Habsburg lands. The conceptual universe of the empire’s constitutional law 
segued with remarkable ease into the jurisprudence of the new settlement in Europe, as 
its legal persons (and would-be legal persons) migrated from one supra-national order to 
another. If the early twentieth-century contributions of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer to the 
conceptualization of rights-without-statehood are hardly obscure, the broader debate in 
which the two Austro-Marxists intervened has slipped from view, as Austro-Hungarian 
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imperial law in general has fallen out of historiographical favor. Renner and Bauer in fact 
represent merely one late moment in a rich jurisprudence of rights and legal persons that 
had been at the middle of imperial politics for decades. 
Part two of this dissertation recovers a deeper history of the capacity to have 
rights. How did jurists and claim-makers understand the ability of human collectives to 
possess and preserve rights? These debates have a bifurcated structure in imperial Central 
Europe. Firstly, as nationalism had exploded onto the political stage in 1848 at the same 
moment as the push for an imperial constitution, the codification of imperial order was, 
from the beginning, interwoven with different attempts to theorize and assert the rights of 
“nationalities.” How could dispersed nationalities form singular legal persons that were 
capable of having rights? Most jurists remained highly skeptical of the possibility of 
constructing new legal subjects along these lines. Secondly, and centrally, these proposals 
were inextricably bound up with an alternative order of legal subjects already populating 
the imperial constitution — that of the historic kingdoms and lands. Asserting the rights 
of nationalities was always a challenge to the current distribution of law and rights. And 
crucially, the kingdoms and lands were themselves engaged in a tense struggle over the 
capacity to have, defend, and preserve rights within the imperial structure.  
This struggle has a great theoretical claim on our interest because of the 
ambiguous position of the Länder between state and non-state subjects. Their “historical 
rights” were the rights of former states, or of what remained of those states. These rights 
thus existed in a curious relationship to their subject: the rights were tethered to the 
previous status of their subject, to an historical “self,” and invoked the conflicts and 
contracts of an earlier historical period whose ongoing legal relevance was far from 
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uncontested. Such a claim worked in stark contrast to “liberal” or “natural law” rights 
(ostensibly the idiom of national claims) that took their cues from present circumstances. 
The construction of historical rights claims thus relied on a range of propositions about 
the relationship between rights and time, between law and history. By what metric did 
time corrode rights? By what logic or mechanism were rights forfeited or lost? What was 
the relationship between the survival of rights and the survival of their subject? Could 
states stripped of their rights and sovereignty nevertheless preserve themselves as legal 
subjects of some kind? If so, what was the right legal name for such entities? 
The structure and construction of legal subjectivity itself thus lies at the heart of 
these two chapters. They analyze the readiness for rights as an historical condition — that 
is, as a phenomenon possessed of a winding history, but also an intellectual transaction 
that reflected and assumed particular ways of being in time and moving through it. Part 
Two, “The Art of Having Rights,” examines the (public law) “selves” of imperial law, 
their assertions of historical life, and their disavowal of historical death. Claims of 
historical right only made intellectual sense if the legal identity to whom the rights 
originally accrued (in the sixteenth century, say) was the selfsame legal identity who 
invoked them in the present: the bundle of rights could not have stayed afloat in time if 
the subject that owned them, that carried them, disappeared at any point in history. 
Accordingly, to make out the case for the uninterrupted continuity of juridical 
subjectivity, claim-makers reimagined the estates-based polities of the past as the proto-




Crucially, they also needed to show that this legal self had not been mortally 
wounded either by incorporation into the Habsburg Monarchy or by the dynasty’s 
centralizing reforms over the centuries. Swallowed up by the python of empire, these 
juridical persons (arguably) lived on inside the belly of the beast, undigested and distinct, 
capable of some sort of autonomous life. At certain points, it might appear as though all 
that remained of these polities was their legal personality: they existed in name more than 
anything else, in law rather than “fact.” If recent interest in paper states or “failed” states 
has focused especially on the postcolony in Africa,3 it can be easy to forget that modern 
European history is likewise littered with juridical states, clutching only at a life in law. I 
hope this chapter is suggestive of the broader range of possible genealogies and genres of 
paper statehood.   
The evolving project of an imperial constitution required new vocabularies to 
conceptualize the residual rights and personality of these paper states. Chapter Three 
examines the emergence, in constitutional debate and jurisprudence, of the notion of 
historical Individualität as a sort of generic, placeholder legal subjectivity, marking the 
spot where the self had been. It then explores different facets of the dense mutual 
implication of rights and their subject, using Czech invocations of Bohemian historical 
rights as a foil. Because traditional Bohemian law was “weaker” than the Hungarian 
equivalent, and because the social referent (in both class and ethnic terms) of these rights 
remained ambiguous, the Czech case exposes with particular sharpness the conceptual 
labor required to make out claims of historical right. Czech politicians and scholars 
																																																								
3 See, for example, Makau wa Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry,” 
Michigan Journal of International Law 16 (1994-1995): 1113-1176. 
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worked hard to show the survival of Bohemia as Bohemia, alongside the survival of 
Bohemian rights. These two transactions, I argue, proved to be largely coterminous. 
Chapter Four shifts gears, stepping back to offer a more panoptic and theoretical 
discussion of the temporal politics involved in historical rights claims more generally 
over the last six decades of Habsburg rule. I show how the paper statehood of the 
historical lands, devoid of the desired degree of materiality, drove Bohemian and 
Hungarian scholars and statesmen (in particular) to elaborate a particular mode of 
reasoning about their rights — what we might call the argumentative style of juridical 
statehood. This “imperial rights culture” fed off a fundamental epistemological 
distinction between “law” and “fact.” Legal survival, apparently, did not require factual 
survival. As I will show more clearly in Chapters Five and Six, this mode of reasoning 
about rights and statehood outlived the empire that had served as the initial impetus for 
its development. 
In exploring the mechanics of wedging law away from facts, I pay particular 
attention the mythic side of law, mapping specific, historically contingent lines between 
the real and unreal. Legal fictions abounded. In tracking the stories that law tells about its 
own operation (especially regarding its capacity to resist the effects of time’s passing), I 
draw on more anthropologically-inflected work concerned with the fantastical as a key 
component of the social world of historical actors, and therefore worthy of serious study. 
It is not only peasant cultures in the borderlands of Eastern Europe or colonial societies in 
Kampala that are populated with ghosts, miracles, vampires, and other iterations of the 
“unreal.”4 Law, too, has its fantasy world, just like economics or any other discipline. 
																																																								
4 Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2004); Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and Colonial History in 
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This chapter resurrects the mythic world of having and keeping rights in late imperial 
Austria. 
To begin with, though, Chapter Three opens with the question of the legal status 
of nations/nationalities in imperial constitutional law. This question helpfully illustrates 
how the emergence of the constitutional project dragged the problems of legal personality 
to the center of imperial political life. If the historical lands needed to demonstrate that 
old rights had been kept alive, then nationalities needed to show that they could be 
refashioned into legal subjects in the first place. Spurred by the project of imperial 
codification, these two stories unfolded in parallel, and both revealed contrasting sides of 
the symbiotic relationship between rights and their bearers. A substantial Coda 
subsequently traces the question of nations as rights-bearing subjects as it rolled out of 
imperial law and into the “new” jurisprudence of international minority rights in interwar 
Central Europe. 
																																																								
Central Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000). As Kate Brown writes of 
Soviet authorities, trying to make order of the kresy: “They needed a population that answered not to the 
needs of spirits but to the spirit of modernity.” As she observes, they privileged their own abstractions — 
class, nationality, kulaks, spies — to make sense of their world, using “the boundary between truth and 
fantasy as a way to excommunicate some forms of the imaginary and ordain others” (76, 65, respectively; 







Juridical Survival Beyond Sovereignty: 




New Rights In Search of New Rights-Subjects 
As the foundational Kremsier debates had made all too clear, the codification of rights in 
an imperial constitution could not be separated from the problem of the legal subjects to 
whom such rights accrued. Who or what were the juridical units that came together to 
form the imperial polity? The messy entanglement of new liberal assumptions, 
nationalism, and old feudal state structures turned the ostensibly simple act of identifying 
the legal subjects around whom a constitution could be built into a charged and 
complicated exercise. To name the empire’s legal persons — before even considering the 
extent of their entitlement or relative importance — was itself a highly political act. As a 
result, all subsequent constitutional debate unfolded on at least two levels simultaneously: 
it was preoccupied with the nature of rights and prerogatives in the imperial legal order, 
but also the very structural or juridical-epistemological possibility of having rights in the 
first place.  
Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten! National equality of rights! So ran the 
nationalist slogan of 1848. It expressed the aspiration that the empire’s new constitutional 
order would involve recognition of the “rights” of the empire’s “nationalities” — a claim 
as powerful as it was legally amorphous. How would such rights work? Who would be 
their subject? The great proponent of national federation, František Palacký considered 
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the problem at length. His first concern upon being elected to the parliament in 1848, he 
later reflected, had been the national equality of rights. Beginning in his famous letter to 
the Frankfurt parliament of April 1848, he had interpreted “each of the peoples [Völker], 
in the genetic meaning of the word, as particular personalities [besondere 
Persönlichkeiten],” with the right of association (Associationsrecht) as their primary 
means of protection. “The ideas already existed; all difficulties concerned simply the 
embodiment [Verkörperung] and grouping of these into concrete and organic wholes.”1 
How were fluid and dispersed “peoples” to be solidified into singular subjects? The 
consolidation of “peoples” into fixed units, capable of appearing within constitutional 
law, was a problem that would persistently haunt the jurisprudence of empire — and 
indeed that of the international minority protection that governed the new states that 
replaced the empire in 1918. 
Palacký’s thinking on the subject was characteristically articulate. In 1866, he 
ruminated on the “reality” of national groups as distinct from states.  
 
Is each nation, in its totality, a moral and legal person, or not?2 I think that at 
least among thinkers there can exist no controversy about that. Nations such 
as, for example, Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians, Germans and so on are 
genuine realities, are particular and dynamic wholes, of which each possesses 
its own particular consciousness, its will, its own interests and therefore also 
duties; in brief, they are real moral and legal persons.3 
 
																																																								
1 “Die Ideen waren ziemlich früh vorhanden; alle Schwierigkeiten drehten sich nur um die Verkörperung 
und Grupirung [sic] derselben zu einem konkreten und organischen Ganzen.” František Palacký, 
Politisches Vermächtniss, 2nd ed. (Prague: Theodor Mourek, 1872), 15. 
2 In nineteenth-century jurisprudence, “moral person” was a synonym for “legal person” or “fictional 
person,” that is, a legal subject that was not a “natural” or physical person. 
3 František Palacký, Oesterreichs Staatsidee (Prague: J. L. Kober, 1866), 14. 
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No one would deny, he felt, that Germans who lived in Austria, Prussia, Russia, and 
France had their own common national interests and friendly understanding, even as their 
respective governments may rage against one another. If Palacký foreshadowed the 
irredentism of the interwar years, he also hinted at a necessary fluidity or overlap 
between imperial and international law in Central Europe.  
 
That the theory of international rights in the above described sense of the 
different ethnicities has not yet been developed, must obviously be attributed 
to the circumstance that scholars working on these rights, Englishmen, 
Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Italians, and Germans, live in such lands in which the 
concepts “nation” and “state” more or less coincide.4 
 
He mused that the intellectual energy of his countrymen had been caught up elsewhere — 
in Slavic philology and the exact sciences. Had they turned their minds to nationalism 
and legal theory instead, he speculated, there would be a far more developed 
jurisprudence on the international rights of nationalities — rights that transcended 
sovereignty and attached to human groups rather than state borders. As viewed from the 
multiethnic polities of central Europe, international law would (and should) look quite 
different. As the century drew to a close and even more so after the empire collapsed, 
Central European jurists would develop precisely such a nuanced jurisprudence of 
international rights. 
In the meantime, the question of nationalities as “moral and legal persons” was 
enough of a challenge even within the bounds of imperial law. In the heat of revolution, 
the slogan of Palacký and many others — of the “national equality of rights” — had 
found its way into positive law. As we remember, Franz Josef used the phrase in his 
																																																								
4 Palacký, Oesterreichs Staatsidee, 14. 
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Thronbesteigungsmanifest as he rose to the throne in December 1848.5 But the 
government’s imposed constitution of March 1849 — the constitution that superseded the 
Kremsier Draft — had retreated from this formulation, and instead declared, in section 5, 
that “All ethnicities possess equal rights and each ethnicity has an inviolable right to the 
preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language [Alle Völksstamme sind 
gleichberechtigt und jeder Volkstamm hat ein unverletzliches Recht auf Wahrung und 
Pflege seiner Nationalität und Sprache].” 
The legal meaning of this provision engendered much controversy. Did it 
establish “ethnicities” as legal subjects capable of possessing rights? Many jurists 
expressed a high degree of skepticism. Ludwig Gumplowicz’s critique was unforgiving. 
Gumplowicz, we recall, taught public law at the University of Graz and authored key 
textbooks for Habsburg constitutional law; a scholar of broad interests, he is remembered 
as a foundational figure also in the history of sociology. In his sociological work, 
Gumplowicz had focused on the primordial and instinctual formation of human groups 
and the inevitable struggle between them. When it came to public law, however, he found 
the posited existence of ethnic groups to be entirely nebulous. What was a Volkstamm?, 
he asked incredulously. No piece of legislation in Austria (or elsewhere, for that matter) 
defined “ethnicity.” The constitution did not enumerate the ethnicities of the empire, 
which would presumably be a prerequisite for their rights to be made equal. Nowhere 
could one find an example of an ethnicity existing as “the bearer of rights,” and still less 
was one able to construct one’s own theory of how such an indefinite “ethnicity” might 
																																																								
5 Kaiserl. Patent vom 2. Dezember 1848 (RGBl. Nr. 1 ex 1849), text in Edmund Bernatzik, Die 
österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterung, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und 
Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1911), 113. 
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be made into a rights-bearing subject.6 “We know well from the legal sciences how a 
corporation or an association can be a bearer of rights and exercise them, too: yet an 
ethnicity is neither an association nor a corporation, nor in general a ‘moral person’ in the 
sense of legal science.”7 Section 5 presented a legal riddle, Gumplowicz concluded, 
without providing any means for its solution. And the text only became more cryptic 
when it spoke further of the right of ethnicities to preserve their language and 
“nationality” (Nationalität). Can a mere ethnicity possess a nationality, he wondered? It 
was an empty provision with no identifiable legal content: it remained at most a 
proclamation.8  
In his subsequent textbook on Austrian constitutional law, he repeated his 
criticisms in relation to the 1867 constitution, which again declared that all ethnicities 
were equal and possessed the inviolable right to cultivate their language and nationality 
(section 19). He classed this provision as a mere general principle that could never be 
implemented without further legislative elaboration: “‘ethnicities’ are neither physical 
nor juridical persons, and therefore as such can never assert what ever rights.”9 
Gumplowicz’s critique was echoed by many of his colleagues in the field of public law. 
In his monograph on juridical persons in public law, Edmund Bernatzik argued that 
nationalities could not form legal persons because they did not have the necessary unified 
																																																								
6 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das Recht der Nationalitäten und Sprachen in Oesterreich-Ungarn (Innsbruck: 
Verlag der Wagner’schen Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1879), 101. 
7 Gumplowicz, Das Recht der Nationalitäten, 101.  
8 Gumplowicz, Das Recht der Nationalitäten, 103, 105. 
9 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- 
und Handbuch (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891), 29. 
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and organized will. Faced with the constitution’s vague formulation, he maintained, one 
must immediately ask “who then is the subject of such a celebrated, ‘inviolable’ right, if 
it cannot be the nationality as such?”10 He offered no solution to the problem.    
So the newly announced rights were in need of a subject. They populated 
constitutional law like ghosts: disembodied legal signs without “persons” to carry them. 
Subjective rights without a legal person behind them were “unthinkable,” wrote Rudolf 
von Herrnritt in his classic 1899 study Nationalität und Recht, as he too puzzled over 
section 19.11 Georg Jellinek could only blame the drafting. “This article has a very 
unlegal style [unjuristisch stilisirt],” Jellinek complained in 1892, “in that ethnicities that 
do not possess personality and languages that could never become legal subjects are 
granted ‘rights.’” Further legislative elaboration was required “to designate the legal 
subjects who are to be granted an entitlement in this area.”12 Adolf Exner, a scholar of 
Roman law and Rudolf von Ihering’s successor at (and future rector of) the University of 
Vienna, spoke on the subject at the Wiener Juristische Gesellschaft in 1892. “If one 
examines article 19, the absence of a legal subject is already apparent. Ethnicities are not 
juridical persons; in the first instance it is not even possible to objectively determine who 
belongs to an ethnicity.”13 Its “true nature,” he argued, was that of a “promissory law 
																																																								
10 Edmund Bernatzik, Die jurisrische Persönlichkeit der Behörden; Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Theorie der 
juristischen Personen (Freiburg: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1890), 100, note 
259. 
11 Rudolf von Herrnritt, Nationalität und Recht: dargestellt nach der österreichischen und ausländischen 
Gesetzgebung (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1899), 51-53. 
12 Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (Freiburg: Akademische 
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1892), 94. 
13 Adolf Exner, “Subjective Rechte aus Artikel 19 des Staatsgrundgesetzes über die allgemeinen Rechte der 
Staatsbürger,” Juristische Blätter 49 (1892): 583. The Exners were a family dynasty well-represented 
across an astounding array of intellectual and scientific endeavors in late imperial Austria. See Deborah 
Coen’s wonderfully rich reconstruction of their modes of research, living, and reasoning Vienna in the Age 
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[Verheißungsgesetzes].” The word “inviolable” already pointed one in that direction. 
“Every right can be violated. But if it says in the state fundamental law that a right is 
inviolable, then that is a self-limitation of the state will [des Staatswillens], not a 
guarantee of individuals against a legal injury.”14 The state was speaking to itself, not 
ascribing rights to others. Exner’s solution to the spectre of rights without subjects was to 
“discover” that the rights themselves did not exist in the first place: article 19 in fact 
housed the duties of the state rather than the rights of nations. 
  Given his conviction that nationalism could not serve as the internal organizing 
principle of the empire, it is hardly surprising the Hungarian statesman and reformer 
József	Eötvös shared the skepticism of these scholars regarding the notion of ethnicities 
as rights-bearers. Thinking in more political terms, he juxtaposed the idea of the nation as 
legal subject with that of the individual on the one hand, and of the state on the other. It 
was beyond controversy, he argued, that each person, like all nationalities, had the right 
to a free and unimpeded development.  
 
It is the right that one cannot deny to an independent individuality 
[selbstatändigen Individualität], regardless of whether it is a physical or a 
moral person, and as long as a people [ein Volk] appears to us as a self-
contained whole (as an independent individuality), no doubt can reign over the 




of Uncertainty: Science, Liberalism, and Private Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), esp. 
135-146 on Adolf Exner’s career and style of reasoning. See also Hans Hoyer, “Adolf Exner, 1841-1894,” 
in Wilhelm Brauneder, ed., Juristen in Oesterreich, 1200-1980 (Vienna: Verlag Norbert Orac, 1987), 205-
208. 
14 Exner, “Subjective Rechte aus Artikel 19 des Staatsgrundgesetzes,” 584. 
15 N. N. [József Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in Oesterreich (Pest: Hartleben’s 
Verlag, 1850), 35. 
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But his concession turned out to be an empty one, because the course of events had meant 
that in Europe one could “scarcely find a people that had preserved itself as an 
independent individuality.” States, argued Eötvös, had stepped in to replace peoples: 
“only in them does one find again all the qualifications of an individuum.”16 States 
excelled at the art of having rights: to ape a state, to reproduce its organized and singular 
unity, now exceeded a nation’s capability. 
The legal formlessness of nations would not be a problem, continued Eötvös, if all 
that was meant by national rights (nationaller Berechtigung) was the protection of the 
personal freedom of each particular person against any form of coercion. Rights in this 
guise were clearly compatible with the life of the state. Something altogether different, 
however, was meant by national rights in the current constitutional ferment: “the 
individuum, for whom one wants to guarantee certain rights, is not the individual citizen, 
but rather the particular nationality.” “Because each right can only be claimed through a 
personality, be it a physical or a moral one,” the concept of national rights could only be 
implemented practically if those whose rights one wanted to guarantee were constituted 
as a particular individuality. And wherever concepts of state and nation were not 
identical, this must lead to the full-blown destruction of states, warned Eötvös. Virtually 
no state could survive the rise of new juridical units that gathered together co-nationals 
over and around sovereign borders.17 
The aspiration to make nations into collective legal subjects was understood as a 
challenge not only to the empire as a whole, but to the other state-like persons it housed: 
																																																								
16 [Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 35. 
17 [Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 36-37. 
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those of the kingdoms and lands. One of the earliest proposals for a re-ordering of the 
empire along national lines came from a Rumanian delegation collectively representing 
Rumanians living across provincial frontiers in Transylvania, Hungary, the Banat, and the 
Bukovina. In February and March 1849, as debate raged in the Kremsier parliament, the 
Rumanian delegation submitted memoranda to the emperor and to the imperial 
government. The latter, dated March 5, laid out a detailed plan for “the amalgamation of 
all Rumanians of the Austrian monarchy into a single independent nation, under the 
Austrian scepter, as an integral component of the unified monarchy.”18 While stressing 
their loyalty to the monarchy, they sought an “independent national administration” so 
that they might exercise the right to free national development, as guaranteed by the 
crown.19 This independence would pertain only to internal administration as against the 
other nations of the monarchy. No nation should be subordinate to another. This principle 
meant that the realization of the national equality of rights would be possible only if  
 
each particular nation is left to group itself into a single centre over and 
against the remaining nations, roughly in the method of the ecclesiastical 
organization for the members of different confessions, without consideration 
of the previous provincial division, and without great consideration for 
territory in general.20 
 
Genuine equality of national rights required the old provincial borders to be dissolved, 
the logic of minorities and majorities superseded and, portentously, territory itself to fade 
																																																								
18 The memorandum is reproduced as Beilage 15 in Eugen Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen 
und Ungarn: Eine politische Denkschrift (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1895), 177-181 (here 177). 
19 Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, 181. 
20 Brote, Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, 179. 
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in importance. The tyranny of geography would no longer prevent a dispersed and 
intermingled population from appearing as a single administrative unit. This non-
territorial model of national rights, inspired by the associational logic of confessional 
communities, would draw worldwide attention when it became part of the Austro-Marxist 
platform half a century later. But the radical reconceptualization of jurisdiction it entailed 
— with law attaching fluidly to human subjects, rather than to territory — had entered the 
bloodstream of imperial debate already in the first period of constitutional 
experimentation, and come from the eastern margins of the empire at that. Hardly 
surprising, perhaps: as Eötvös once remarked, perhaps no other people had more to gain 
from the national division of the empire than the Rumanians.21 
If the Rumanian memorandum understood the dislocation of law from territory as 
progressive and liberatory, Eötvös, for his part, embedded such ideas in an alternative 
historical narrative. His analysis of the situation was not unlike that of the Rumanian 
delegation: as the boundaries between language groups were far from distinct, he argued 
that monarchy could only be divided up according to nationality if this was undertaken 
“not on the basis of territory, but rather on that of the population,” with “each particular 
municipality exercising their political rights not in community with their neighbors, but 
with their kinsfolk [Stammesgenossen].”22 But rather than emplot these proposals as a 
higher stage of legal evolution or as a sophisticated response to a complicated problem, 
Eötvös reversed the historical signs: forsaking territory represented a significant 
regression. He likened such ideas to the great migration of peoples (Völkerwanderung) of 
																																																								
21 [Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 100. 
22 [Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 83. 
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late antiquity and the early middle ages, after which, for a time, one followed the 
principle that the inhabitants of a land “should each be subjected to their own laws 
according to the diversity of their ancestry.”23 Not only private law, but also the 
participation of individuals in public offices was determined by this principle. Eötvös 
deemed the full implementation of such a system impossible in today’s world. His 
analogy invoked the archaism of the pre-modern, a chaotic juridical primitivism of the 
sort now highlighted by those who seek to establish the conceptual affinity of pre-modern 
and post-modern law.24 For Eötvös in 1850, there was no post-modern jurisdictional 
pluralism on the horizon: the hegemonic model of a territorial state stretched off 
unendingly into the future. 
 
Juridical Individuality 
Gumplowicz, we recall, complained that the rights of the empire’s ethnicities could 
hardly be guaranteed if these ethnicities were not even enumerated in the constitution. 
Being named, being listed, surely formed the most basic step in the journey toward 
rights-bearing subjecthood. Gumplowicz contrasted this namelessness with the list that 
the constitution did include: that of the kingdoms and lands that comprised the monarchy. 
As we know, the contents of that list had been the first and highly contentious topic for 
the Kremsier constitutional committee. So what kind of subjects or units were these listed 
“Länder”? 
																																																								
23 [Eötvös], Über die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, 82. 
24 See, for example, Gunther Teubner, “Globale Bukowina: Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen 
Rechtspluralismus,” Rechtshistorisches Journal 15 (1996): 255-290; Michael Stolleis, “Vormodernes und 




Here the difficulties of imperial description were at their most acute. The lands 
were commonplaces of the empire, the basic furniture of the imperial structure, the kinds 
of objects obvious enough to have escaped much conceptual interrogation. Until now: 
codifying the empire into constitutional law naturally required their status and nature to 
be sorted into legal categories and catalogued according to current legal typologies. 
Everyone knew what they had been: hundreds of years ago, they had been states of 
different sorts. What language would now step in where statehood had been? 
In the Kremsier draft, the delegates had settled on the terminology of “imperial 
lands” that were understood to possess some degree of independence or self-
government.25 They had also referred to “crownlands,” “hereditary lands,” “individual 
lands,” “historical lands,” and mere “provinces” in the course of their discussion; one 
formulation dubbed them “independent acquisitions” (selbstständiger Erwerb) with a 
“particular life” (Sonderleben) of their own.26 These terms represented political 
descriptions more than legal categorizations; they appeared less compelling as a general 
shorthand for the legal standing of polities that ranged so dramatically in size, strength, 
and history — especially if one wanted to refer also to Hungary (which had not been 
included in the Kremsier draft).  
The more abstract and technical language of legal “personalities” crept into 
circulation, if only on the margins. At Kremsier, the German liberal Franz von Hein, for 
																																																								
25 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses im Österreichischen Reichstag 1848-1849, ed. Anton Springer 
(Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1885), 117ff. 
26 For the latter: Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 347. 
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example, had referred to the lands as “persons” (Personen) on January 22;27 later, on 
February 6, amid a discussion about whether the lands would be equal in status despite 
their different proportions, Mayer had argued that just as the equal rights 
(Gleichberechtigung) of nationalities had been proclaimed, so too should there be equal 
rights for the provinces: “If one has first recognized the provinces as persons in their 
autonomy, then one must grant them equal rights.”28 Meanwhile, Moritz von 
Stubenrauch, the only professor teaching constitutional law at the University of Vienna at 
the time, discussed “juridical persons” in his 1851 commentary on the laws of 1850. The 
concept of juridical persons, he wrote, included associations as well as the diets of the 
individual crownlands.29  
But the formal terminology of moral and legal persons, with its background in 
Roman private law and its connection to corporations and associations, never really took 
hold as a standard description of these once-were-states.30 After all, the question of 
whether states themselves should be understood as juridical persons still aroused some 
controversy in German-language jurisprudence; other organic or patrimonial models of 
																																																								
27 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 21. 
28 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 122. 
29 Moritz von Stubenrauch, Die Jurisdictionsnorm (die Vorschrift über den Wirkungskreis und die 
Zuständigkeit der Gerichte in bürgerlichen Rechtssachen) vom 18. Juni 1850 für die Kronländer 
Österreich under und ob der Enns, Salzburg, Steiermark, Kärnthen, Krain, Görz und Gradiska, Istrien, 
Triest, Tirol und Voralberg, Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (Vienna: Beck’s Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 
1851), 68. 
30 But see Robert Redslob’s discussion “Sind die österreichischen Länder Körperschäften?” in Robert 
Redslob, Abhängige Länder: Eine Analyse des Begriffs von der ursprünglichen Herrschergewalt: Zugleich 
eine staatsrechtliche und politische Studie über Elsaß-Lothringen, die österreichischen Königreiche und 
Länder, Kroatien-Slavonien, Bosnien-Herzegowina, Finnland, Island, die Territorien der 




the state remained attractive to many. Most prominently, Savigny maintained that the 
language of juridical persons should be reserved for private law only, to preserve 
conceptual clarity (despite the fact that the Romans themselves had clearly used them in 
“public law” contexts).31 Many others saw things differently, including Austrian jurists 
such as Joseph Winiwarter,32 in the earlier nineteenth century, and our constitutional law 
expert Edmund Bernatzik, in the later nineteenth century.33 Jellinek, at that point still 
teaching at the University of Vienna, appeared to change his mind over the course of the 
1880s. In an 1882 text he judged juridical personhood to be a “dangerous private law 
analogy,”34 while a mere five years later asserted that “the recognition [Erfassung] of the 
state as a person is the foundation and corner stone of Staatsrecht.”35	By the late 
																																																								
31 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, vol. 2 (Berlin: Veit und Comp., 
1840), 236-241. 
32 See Joseph Winiwarter, Das Personen-Recht nach dem Oesterreichischen allgemeinen bürgerl. 
Gesetzbuche, systematisch dargestellt und erläutert (Vienna: J. G. Ritters v. Mösle sel. Witwe, 1831), 132. 
33 Bernatzik, Die jurisrische Persönlichkeit der Behörden. Bernatzik had an interesting explanation for the 
reluctance to apply the term to public law, arguing that such a division suited the absolutist state, which 
understood itself as an incommensurable mass with a complete and unexamined hegemony over public law, 
essentially tolerating associations only as property subjects (Vermögenssubjecte) (see page 18). He cited 
Hugo Preuß approvingly: “An der Grenze des Privatrechtes endet für diese Anschauung die Sphäre der 
Persönlichkeit und es beginnt der Bannkreis eines anderen Centralbegriffes, der Souverainetät.” Hugo 
Preuss, Gemeinde, Staat, Reich als Gebietskörperschaften: Versuch eine deutschen Staatskonstruktion auf 
Grundlage der Genossenschaftstheorie (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1889), 148.  
34 Georg Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Berlin: Verlag von O. Haering, 1882), 179-180. 
35 Georg Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung: Staatsrechtliche Untersuchungen auf Rechtsgeschichtlicher und 
Rechtsvergleichender Grundlage (Freiburg: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1887), 
195. Jellinek simultaneously tried to demystify the concept, by arguing that a legal person was no more 
fictional than a physical person: “Die Person ist kein Naturwesen, sondern eine Abstraktion. Sie ist nicht 
identisch mit physischer Individualität.” “Durch das Dasein selbstständiger Willensorgane, wird auch die 
Collektiveinheit zu einer Person. Es findet damit keine Hypostasirung, keine Fingirung, kein mystischer 
Vorgang statt, sondern nur eine Anwending der Kategorie derselben teleologischen Betrachtungsweise, die 
under ganzes praktisches Denken beherrscht. Die juristische Person ist keine Schöpfung der juristischen 
Construktion, sondern eine Bildung des zweckbewussten menschlichen Handelns und Denkens. […] So 
besitzt denn der Staat für unsere praktische Erkenntniss Persönlichkeit.” 193, 194. 
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nineteenth century, the interpretation of states as juridical persons had more clearly 
trounced its rivals.36 
What emerged in the years after Kremsier was a kind of surrogate language of 
legal personality, one that also featured prominently in discussions of nationalities as 
legal persons: that of “individuums” and “individualities.” This terminology became a 
convenient way of signaling the legal distinctness of the historical lands, their collective 
unity as singular subjects, and the continuity of that status over time, closely mimicking 
the rhetorical and juridical effect of the vocabulary of personality and its operation of 
legal “thingification.” Yet it carried less baggage than “personality,” and it was less 
precise, features that lent it great utility. Under the sign of “individualities,” for example, 
nationalities and historical lands could be discursively paired as rivals. Mayer had 
complained already at Kremsier that Palacký and others wanted to “create new land 
complexes, new state individualities” that folded along national lines: “but to make a new 
individuality out of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, they must destroy existing 
individualities.”37  
By the late 1850s, the invocation of the historical “individuality” of the lands had 
moved to the epicenter of constitutional debate. It spawned an offshoot — “historical-
political individuality” — that defied its clunky inelegance to become a keyword in the 
dictionary of imperial self-understanding. This unlikely phrase in fact bore a substantial 
																																																								
36 See, for example, Otto Mayer, Die juristische Person und ihre Verwertbarkeit im öffentlichen Recht 
(Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1908). On this debate more generally, see Michael Stolleis, Public 
Law in Germany, 1800-1914 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), 65-66, 344-345, as well as 
Frederic William Maitland’s classic introduction to Germanic Genossenschaftsrecht: “Translator’s 
Introduction,” in Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), vii-xlv . 
37 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 42. 
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intellectual burden in the empire’s hesitant return to constitutionalism. As we know, 
military defeat and fiscal crisis had led the emperor, in March 1860, to summon an 
“enlarged imperial council” (verstärkten Reichsrat) in pursuit of greater domestic support 
and cooperation — with unexpected consequences. The pre-existing Reichsrat had been a 
small advisory council of twelve appointed members; now the emperor personally 
selected additional notables from the church, military, civil service, as well as 38 
representatives from the lands (including six from Hungary and three from Bohemia), 
with a clear majority of feudal aristocrats the unsurprising result.38  
While the enlarged Reichsrat (which met between May and September 1860) 
marked the small first step in the dismantling of the neo-absolutist state, its status 
remained precarious. Those summoned — present at the invitation of the emperor, and 
lacking an electoral mandate of any sort — studiously avoided behavior that might cause 
the emperor to dissolve the assembly. They sidestepped the term “constitution,” and 
chose their words carefully.39 In this context, the fact that the majority submission 
(Majoritätsantrag) hinged on the recognition of the so-called “historical-political 
individuality” of the lands was hardly an accident. 
The majority submission had been masterminded by the conservative Hungarian 
statesman and aristocrat Antal Szécsen (1819-1896). Szécsen, with diplomatic service 
behind him and a strong record of loyalty to the dynasty, had long acted as a crucial path 
																																																								
38 Kais. Patent vom 5. Marz 1860, RGBl. Nr. 56, text in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen 
Verfassungsgesetze, 217-220. 
39 See Stefan Malfèr, “Der Kampf um eine Verfassung 1859-1861,” Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus 
als Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsproblem: Diskussionen über einen strittigen Epochenbegriff, ed. Harm-
Hinrich Brandt (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2014), 428-429; Thomas Olechowski, “Das Oktoberdiplom 1860: 
Ende des Neoabsolutismus und Wiederaufstehung des Föderalismus in Österreich,” Jogtörténeti 
Tanulmányok 10 (2010): 150-152. 
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of communication between Hungarian political elites and the dynasty.40 The tact and 
amenity of his conceptualization of the empire’s constitutional predicament proved 
decisive in 1860. During the Reichsrat’s summer recess, a committee of 21 Reichsrat 
members prepared a report on the Staatsvoranschlag, whose final shape clung closely to 
Szécsen’s proposals. The report, which had won majority approval in the committee 
(driven by Szécsen’s alliance with the Czech and Polish aristocrats), was then read before 
a plenary meeting of the Reichsrat on September 22, 1860. “The strengthening and sound 
development of the monarchy,” declared Reichsrat majority submission, “demands the 
recognition of the historical-political individuality of each of the lands.” This recognition, 
in turn, involved reinstating the political-legal institutions and jurisdiction of the lands: 
the report spoke of their “autonomy in administration and inner legislation.” Only by 
associating this individuality and autonomy with the needs of the monarchy as a whole 
could the latter’s internal health and robustness be renewed.41  
What the submission said was as significant as what it did not. No mention was 
made of constitutions, Staatsrecht, historical rights, sovereignty, or independence. 
Therein lay the great utility, and the political genius, of Szécsen’s phrasing. The term 
“historical-political individuality” invoked the world of those concepts: it stood in for the 
																																																								
40 Well connected at court, Szécsen had taken pains in 1849 to stress his loyalty to the Habsburgs, and 
defended the Czarist intervention. In his conservataive agenda, “historical-political individuality” worked 
against the centralist absolutism he opposed, but also against a more bourgeous form of constitutionalism 
(and of course against any sort of national self-determination). See György Szabad, Hungarian Political 
Trends between the Revolution and the Compromise (1848-1867) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977), 
39ff, 82; and Josef Redlich, Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem: Geschichtliche Darstellung 
der inneren Politik der habsburgischen Monarchie von 1848 bis zum Untergang des Reiches, vol. 1 
(Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1920), 500-547. 
41 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, nach den stenographischen 
Berichten, vol. 2 (Vienna: Verlag von Friedrich Manz, 1860), 40. 
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historical independence and discreteness of the lands, nodding obliquely to their erstwhile 
statehood and the impossibility of dissolving them into provinces. It summarized a whole 
semantic field, yet it did so without mention of any of the most inflammatory keywords, 
digesting the residual independence of the lands into a form palatable to the dynasty. It 
worked as a linguistic Trojan horse out of which the historic lands could officially 
reemerge into the legal structure of the empire. Small wonder that the historian Stefan 
Malfèr	described the term “historical-political individuality” as “a magic word full of 
secrets.”42  
Szécsen did not rely on suggestiveness alone. Equally striking from a juridical 
perspective was his careful explication of the concept of historical-political individuality: 
he sought to construct a general legal category that could summarize the idiosyncratic 
legal identity of each of the lands. In a long speech before the Reichsrat elaborating the 
majority position, Szécsen conceded that “this concept of historical-political 
individuality, which is mentioned here, has received diverse interpretations from different 
corners.”43 If one asked what was understood by historical-political individuality in the 
Austrian monarchy, then the answer proved straightforward, he argued. 
 
The historical-political individuality of the different lands is just the 
expression and summary of the whole national, historical, and political 
development and life-activity [Lebensthätigkeit] of the different parts of the 
monarchy, it is the concept according to which there is not only a Kingdom of 
Hungary rather than a Departement of the Donau and Tisza or of the 
Carpathians, but also no Departement Troppau or Salzburg, but instead a Land 
																																																								
42 (“geheimnissvolles Zauberwort”). Malfèr, “Der Kampf um eine Verfassung 1859-1861,” 429. 
43 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 46-47. 
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of Salzburg and Silesia; not a Departement of the Moldau and of the Adriatic 
Sea, but rather a City of Triest; a Land — a Kingdom of Bohemia.44 
 
With the standardized and history-less French départements as the counter-model, 
historical-political individuality was the sign under which each of the lands retained its 
former legal identity. Conceptually, it made room for Bohemia to remain a “kingdom” 
without anyone mentioning statehood or sovereignty. According to Szécsen’s 
interpretation, then, the kingdoms and lands preserved the genre of legal personality of 
the period of their independence. As “individualities,” states could live on inside the 
empire, could survive juridically as state-like creatures despite being shorn of 
sovereignty. The contemporary legal standing of these non-state states institutionalized 
the memory of their former life.  
Such overt Hungarian authorship and advocacy understandably gave rise to the 
impression that the majority report essentially reflected Hungary’s position and view of 
the empire. Szécsen worked to dilute that association. “The feeling of historical-political 
individuality is present, even if in various gradations, in all lands of the monarchy: 
ignoring it does not mean it is eliminated,” he declared.45 The leader of the Czech feudal 
nobility, Heinrich Jaroslaw (Jindřich Jaroslav hrabě) Clam-Martinic, another key 
advocate of the term and the majority’s report, emphasized the point in his own speech on 
the same day: “The consciousness of historical-political individuality, and attachment to 
the same, is not exclusively the property of Hungary; this feeling and consciousness 
																																																								
44 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 47. 
45 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 47. 
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belongs to all Austrian lands, the largest as much as the smallest.”46 He defended its airy 
generality and lack of detail: the very sense of the report was not to posit “one singularly-
true theory for all lands” or to “devise uniform provisions, but rather much more to 
advocate the fullest consideration of the diversity of the relationships, perspectives, 
wishes, and needs of each particular land.”47 Historical-political individuality, according 
to these aristocrats, was a general theory that wasn’t: it simply made and held the space in 
which each mini-polity could articulate its unique legal particularity. 
The majority submission won the approval of the Reichsrat plenary (34 votes to 
16) on September 27, 1860, driven by the dominant coalition of the Hungarian old 
conservatives and the Bohemian high nobility. The emperor’s October Diploma, 
promulgated the following month, turned the Reichsrat’s sentiments into positive 
constitutional law: acknowledging the legal diversity of the lands and reinstating their 
legislative powers, it established historical legal title as the foundation of the state.48 
Szécsen’s influence was obvious.49   
																																																								
46 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 63. 
47 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, vol. 2, 68. 
48 Kais. Diplom vom 20. Oktober 1860, RGBl. Nr. 226, zur Reglung der inneren staatsrechtlichen 
Verhältnisse der Monarchie, in Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 223-227. 
49 Olechowski, “Das Oktoberdiplom 1860,” 157. See also Ludwig Gumplowicz, Einleitung in das 
Staatsrecht (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1889), 217-218; Franz Hauke, “Verfassungsgeschichte,” in 
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The phrase “historical-political individuality” thus became a fixture of 
constitutional jurisprudence even if it did not formally appear in the October Diploma or 
subsequent constitutions. When Ludwig Gumplowicz attempted a systematic account of 
Austrian Staatsrecht for a textbook in 1891, he included a section under that title, noting 
the term’s curious relationship to positive constitutional law.  
 
The concept of “historical-political individuality” is in fact foreign to written 
Austro-Hungarian constitutional law [Staatsrecht], yet because it has emerged 
out of history, reflecting factual relationships, positive constitutional law must 
in some parts accommodate this concept, it must accept these facts for the 
organization of the empire.50  
 
In this account, the phrase stood in for the whole evolution of the Habsburg imperial 
polity, signifying the historical “facts” that law could not ignore. Befitting the genre of 
the textbook, Gumplowicz attempted his own definition. Historical-political 
individuality, he wrote, “lays claim on and incorporates a special staastrechtliche 
standing in the state,” and arose from centuries-long relationships “between a complex of 
lands and a state organization.” It was narrower than the concept “Staatsvolk,” but 
broader than that of ethnicity or nationality: “Multiple nationalities can reside in the 
domain of a historical-political individuality, but one and the same nationality can also 
fall in multiple historical-political individualities.”51 In distinguishing historical-political 
individuality from both ethnicity and the concept of the state’s citizenry (Staatsvolk) in 
																																																								
50 Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht, 77. Interestingly, “accept” in the last sentence becomes 
“recognize” in the book’s second edition of 1902: Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht 
(Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht): Ein Lehr- und Handbuch (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- 
und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1902), 71. 
51 Gumplowicz, Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht, 77. 
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general, Gumplowicz’s definition captured the ambiguity of these group legal subjects 
that were neither “proper” states nor nations. 
What is more, Gumplowicz’s comparative definition hinted at the temporal 
predicament of the historic individualities. Their legal standing was propped up neither 
by sovereignty nor some sort of ethnic-cultural homogeneity: that is, their life as 
collective legal units was not tethered to an attribute existing in the present. Whatever 
individuality, whatever subjecthood they possessed could only be made out through an 
appeal to history. And not just any history: it had to be surviving history, legally-relevant 
history; history that was, in some sense, not entirely past, despite its diminished presence 
on the surface of the present. As a result, the mysterious and highly contestable quality of 
“historical continuity” became a prized commodity in the post-1860 imperial marketplace 
of rights. 
 
Spinning Estates into States: The Mutually Constitutive Relationship of Rights and 
their Subject 
 
Czech appeals to Bohemia’s historical rights expose the conceptual labor involved in 
claims of this sort with particular sharpness, and for a number of reasons. Historical 
claims based on the continued legitimacy traditional Staatsrecht were at the heart of 
Czech constitutional claim-making, just as they were for the Hungarians. But arguing for 
Bohemian law and rights was a much tougher undertaking: in contrast to Hungary’s 
resolute constitutional aloofness through the centuries, one could easily construct a 
plausible argument that Bohemia and its rights had barely survived into the present day. 
Without much material evidence to carry the burdens of argument, Czech claim-makers 
had to work hard and be highly creative to make out their legal claims to historical right. 
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This intellectual work reveals the tight, mutually constitutive relationship between rights 
and their subject: they needed to show the survival of Bohemia as Bohemia, but also the 
survival of Bohemian rights. These two questions proved to be largely coterminous. In 
the course of this “rights work,” feudal privileges and prerogatives became “public law,” 
and the historical kingdom of Bohemia became a sovereign state. 
The mutual dependence of rights and their subject was clearly on display in a 
string of formal constitutional protests issued by the Bohemian and Moravian diets in the 
wake of the February Patent of 1861. No sooner had the October Diploma recognized the 
individuality of the historical lands, resurrected their diets, and granted them significant 
latitude over their own lawmaking, than the February Patent imperiled their legal 
discreteness anew. As we know, the Patent ostensibly enacted the Diploma, but in fact it 
rocked the weight of legislative power away from the lands and back towards the central 
parliament. Crucially, it foreshadowed dualism through a new distinction between the full 
parliament that included representatives from Hungary, and a “narrower” parliament 
(engerer Reichsrat) that involved the representatives from the non-Hungarian lands only. 
This narrower parliament was now to command a far-reaching jurisdiction over the 
Western half of the monarchy, displacing much of the legislative significance of the diets 
of the non-Hungarian lands.52 This new dispensation meant that Tyroleans (for example) 
in the parliament would have a say in the “internal” affairs of Bohemia, and vice versa. 
The dilution of the legal separateness of the lands explicitly contradicted the principle 
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that they formed a common polity only through the shared body of the emperor, 
otherwise retaining distinct organs and institutions. (Czechs had additional cause to be 
aggrieved, as the new electoral laws allowed Germans to be elected to the Bohemian and 
Moravian diets disproportionate to their numbers).53 With the neo-absolutist state 
disbanded, the representatives of the lands now faced a new battle to “defend” their 
historical right to juridical autonomy and thereby their “individuality.” In this struggle it 
was not only rights and privileges that were in question but also the existence the rights-
subjects themselves.  
This defense took a highly performative and ceremonial form, with the new diets, 
convening in April 1861 after hastily organized elections, issuing elaborate formal 
declarations of their historical rights, especially in Bohemia but also Moravia. On April 9, 
the estates of the Moravian diet tabled a “Rechtsverwahrung” intended to defend the 
constitutional “existence” of Moravia. They sought to preserve (wahren) the 
“constitutional independence” (verfassungsmäßige Selbstständigkeit) and freedoms of the 
Margravate of Moravia “against all provisions, clauses and resolutions” that prejudicially 
harmed “this independence, these rights and these freedoms.” Moravia’s continued 
existence was “staatsrechtlich-guaranteed and inviolable” thanks to a long list of state 
acts and rituals that the Moravian diet enumerated in turn: the “renewed Land Ordinance” 
of 1627, the 1628 Majestätsbrief of Ferdinand II, the coronation of the King of Bohemia 
as the Markgraf of Moravia down until His Majesty Ferdinand I (in Hungary and 
Bohemia V), the Pragmatic Sanction, the emperor-constituting patent of 1804, and not 
																																																								
53 See Stanley Z. Pech, “Passive Resistance of the Czechs, 1863-1879,” Slavonic and East European 
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least the October Diploma of 1860.54 The declaration thereby traced formal imperial 
deference to the old privileges and freedoms of Moravia, stretching back into the early-
modern past as an unbroken legal chain: the ritualized acknowledgement of those 
traditional rights secured their safe passage into the present constitutional struggle. A 
similar Bohemian declaration, tabled at the Bohemian diet on April 10, was even more 
explicit on this point, declaring that their participation in the problematic new imperial 
order in no way interrupted the “continuity” of Bohemia’s rightful constitutional standing 
as guaranteed “through an unbroken row of acts of state.”55 These were not old rights in 
the sense of past rights: they were rights from history that had been periodically re-
affirmed in their continued validity — periodically re-anchored in the present. 
What of the subject who carried those rights through history? The situation forced 
the delegates to articulate what kind of rights-subject they understood a land and its diet 
to be. If the estates of the present day (as represented in the diet) were ostensibly the 
same estates that had historically held the ageless medieval privileges they claimed, the 
diet delegates of 1861 also renovated that legal self to accord more with an age of 
parliamentary constitutionalism. It was because they “viewed the estates of the 
Margravate of Moravia not as owners of personal prerogatives and privileges, but rather 
in their entirety as the defenders and bearers of the rights of the land itself,” that they 
																																																								
54 Beschlüße des Landtages der Markgrafschaft Mähren in den Sessionen der Jahre 1861-1868 (Brünn: 
Breza, Winiker & Co, 1869), 310. 
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could not have wanted nor been able to prejudice the rights and freedoms of Moravia.56 
Old feudal-social rights were thereby re-cast as collective property: the “land” or polity 
as such now constituted the bearer of rights. The construction of this impersonal group 
subject in turn meant that rights could not be damaged by the isolated actions of some 
delegates in the present. The Bohemian declaration included similar phrasing. “[W]e 
view the estates of the kingdom not as owners of personal prerogatives and privileges, 
but rather as the depository of the rights of the land,” asserted the Bohemian delegates; 
for that reason, participation in the new diet could not be interpreted as a forfeiture of 
Bohemia’s historical rights and freedoms.57  
At a moment in which a new nineteenth-century constitutional order confronted 
the legal structures of an earlier age, Bohemian and Moravian delegates looked to 
abstract and consolidate the estates-based structure of rights, with its stench of private 
law, into something that looked much more like a state.58 They constructed the lands as 
general, shell-like legal persons, as “depositories” of rights: a bank, or storehouse, in 
which the mass of personal rights could deposited, de-personalized, and stored. 
Aggregated in this manner, the rights were safer and less vulnerable to current 
government policy than as a loosely-bound collection of feudal privileges of dispersed 
and unconsolidated estates.  
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58 This “renovation” of the legal subject accords to the broader nineteenth-century transformation in 
German-language jurisprudence, as the legal construction of the state was purged of the traces of its 
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If Otto Brunner later complained that nineteenth-century jurists projected 
backwards the abstract structure of the sovereign state onto a medieval order that knew 
only webs of far more personalized legal relationships,59 then this projection was 
sometimes a conscious project. Declarations like these allow us to observe it, and the 
intellectual labor it required, in slow motion. A new constitutional order in Central 
Europe prompted claim-makers to construct arguments and theories about the way rights 
could survive despite deep, even tectonic, shifts in the legal imagination, as the pluralism 
and feudalism of the pre-modern order was replaced by the “modern” order of states. 
Those with vested interests needed to explicitly articulate just how rights and rights-
subjects might be transferred between legal orders, with the legal “goods” of one age 
converted into equivalencies for a new one, without losing their core identity or 
continuous operation. 
The vulnerability of the legal personality of the lands came through more strongly 
in a subsequent Czech declaration issued later the same month. Under the new 
constitutional laws, delegates to the imperial parliament were to be elected from the diets 
(and not from the populace directly). As Bohemia’s unequal electoral laws had artificially 
produced a Czech minority in the Bohemian diet, that minority status would inevitably be 
reproduced amongst the Bohemian delegates sent to the central parliament, too. As a 
result, some Czech representatives in the diet, including Palacký and Rieger, advocated a 
boycott of the Reichsrat elections. Loath to forfeit the chance to argue their case on the 
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larger stage of the imperial parliament, the majority of Czech delegates disagreed.60 
Bowing to the majority sentiment, Palacký, Rieger, and their likeminded colleagues 
agreed to participate in the elections, but first issued a declaration that was debated in the 
diet on April 18, and signed in the end by some 82 Czech delegates. They complained of 
the unjust electoral laws, and asserted that they would only participate in the parliament 
elections if no injury was thereby inflicted on Bohemian Staatsrecht. They also 
articulated a striking understanding of the mutual implication of Bohemia’s historic rights 
and Bohemia’s status as a legal subject itself: 
 
We, the duly elected deputies of the Bohemian diet, proceed from the 
assumption that the Kingdom of Bohemia, our beloved fatherland, is 
undeniably a legal-individuum [ein Rechts-Individuum], that it has 
imperishable rights, which are recognized as the foundation of our future 
constitution through the glorious diploma of the most exalted Emperor and 
King from 20 October 1860.61 
 
What abstract legal name did one ascribe to a kingdom subsumed within an empire in an 
era of constitutional codification? In the ungainly if effective vocabulary of “legal-
individuum,” we see traces of the struggle to make space in the world of legal concepts 
for the juridical survival of “states” without sovereignty. Strikingly, this survival lent 
heavily on the survival of rights. Through the October diploma, the delegates continued, 
the kingdom of Bohemia did not receive “the particular degree of autonomy which it is 
owed, [and] which it cannot do without, lest it become exposed to the danger that its 
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character as an undeniable legal-individuum be lost entirely.”62 If Bohemia’s rights to 
juridical autonomy were not respected, if they lost their tangibility, then Bohemia itself 
would legally evaporate. The rights-subject existed only in the exercise of its rights. 
No remedy was forthcoming for the Czechs: in fact, things grew worse as efforts 
to have the emperor crowned as king of Bohemia floundered. These dire circumstances 
only provoked Czech politicians into ever more explicit elaborations of their historical 
rights, the legal standing of Bohemia, and the nature of the imperial legal order. 
Especially frustrated at their failure to have the unjust electoral laws amended, the Czechs 
decided to boycott the imperial parliament in 1863 (the year of the next sitting of the diet) 
— a passive protest that would last into the mid-1870s. Representatives from the National 
Party including František Ladislav Rieger, František August Brauner	and others signed an 
“abstinence explanation” that laid out the reasons for their withdrawal. Dated June 17, 
1863, the memorandum was presented to the Bohemian diet as well as to the imperial 
parliament eight days later. They began by forcefully recalling the emperor’s 
commitment to legal pluralism and the historical rights of the lands, as annunciated in the 
October Diploma as a foundational law of the empire. The diploma sought to modify the 
constitutional circumstances of the empire, argued the Czechs, but certainly not “to 
abolish all historical rights of the individual kingdoms and lands and establish itself as the 
singular source of all state and constitutional law in Austria.”63 The old, pre-imperial 
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sources of law survived — explicitly so. In the diploma, the emperor had committed 
himself to respect (achten) the “memories, legal perspectives, and legal claims of his 
lands and peoples”; he had given his guarantee “for the historical right and the autonomy 
of our land.”64 Yet these “invaluable goods” were now endangered. The February Patent 
of 1861 ignored the “historical rights and staatsrechtliche relationships” of the Bohemian 
lands and established an electoral order that made the fair representation of the 
“Bohemian-slavic ethnicity” impossible. Now the danger lay close that the autonomy of 
the kingdom, preserved in “its positive Staatsrecht and its traditions, and recognized in 
the highest diploma,” would be diminished in profound and permanent ways, which must 
lead to the kingdom being “stripped [of its] particular staatsrechtliche individuality.”65 In 
the denial of Bohemia’s autonomy lay a direct attack on Bohemia’s legal existence in 
general. The kingdom was losing its own law — law that had been absorbed into and 
protected within the empire — and thereby losing itself. 
To ignore these legal “goods” and traditions was to play a dangerous game of 
historical judgment. As a compromise with the Hungarians seemed ever more likely in 
1867, the Bohemian diet addressed the emperor in a protest against the further 
consolidation of the western half of the monarchy — the non-Hungarian lands — into a 
single juridical unit that ignored the individuality of each land it comprised. The kingdom 
of Bohemia protested vehemently against having  
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its existence dissolved in a “western imperial-half,” a state formation that 
lacks every staatsrechtlichen foundation, and whose formation would be 
irreconcilable with the incontestable legal and factual standing of the crown of 
Bohemia, with the succession of performed coronations of the glorious 
predecessors of your Majesty as King of Bohemia, stretching through the legal 
meaning of the centuries and surviving down to our time, and with the 
staatsrechtlichen significance of the diet of the kingdom uncontested until 
recent times.66 
 
Perhaps the most powerful statement of the legal individuality of the kingdom of 
Bohemia, and its deep intertwining with Bohemia’s historical rights, was provoked by the 
Ausgleich of 1867 through which Hungary secured its independence and the empire was 
rearranged into a resolutely dualist structure. Needless to say, this new constitutional 
dispensation represented a political catastrophe for the Czechs. The challenge forced 
them to return to first principles. In a landmark declaration dated August 22, 1868,67 they 
laid out their understanding of the history and working of the imperial legal order in 
general. This programmatic statement, in which they argued for tripartite rather than 
dualist constitutional structure for the monarchy, became the most important articulation 
of Czech Staatsrecht arguments in the 1860s (and probably beyond).68  
																																																								
66 V. Sitzung der ersten Session des böhmischen Landtages vom Jahre 1867, am 25 Februar 1867, 
Stenographische Berichte des böhmischen Landtages (Prague: Statthalterei-Buchdruckerei, 1867), 7. 
67 “Declaration der böhmischen Abgeordneten vom 22 August 1868.” Reproduced in Gustav Kolmer, 
Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, vol. 1 1848-1869 (Vienna and Leipzig: K. u. k. Hof-
Buchdruckerei und Hof-Verlags-Buchhandlung Carl Fromme, 1902), 347-350; in Bernatzik, Die 
österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, 1087-1091; and in Helfert, Die Böhmische Frage in ihrer jüngsten 
Phase, Urkunde 18, 67-76 (second pagination). As Helfert includes the long preamble in addition to the 
Declaration’s programmatic 10 points, I cite henceforth his edition for the German translation. 
68 Valentin Urfus, “Die Ausprägung der Idee des historischen böhmischen Staatsrechtes in den sechziger 
Jahren des 19. Jahrhundert und der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus,” in Ľudovít Holotík ed., Der 
österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich 1867: Materialien (Referate und Diskussion) der internationalen 
Konferenz in Bratislava 28.8-1.9 1967 (Bratislava: Verlag der Slowakischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1971), 545, 553-554; Urban, “Der Böhmische Landtag,” 2014; Karel Schelle and Renata 
Veselá, “On the Traditions of Czech State Right Thinking: Parliamentarianism and the Struggle for Czech 
	
	 226	
“Until the year 1848, the lands of the house of Austria did not form a unified 
state, but rather particular states with varying relationships to the dynasty,” argued the 
Czech delegates. These particular states were collected into an empire only through that 
dynasty. The crown of Bohemia had never entered into a real union with the other lands, 
and always preserved its “particular historical and staatsrechtlichen individuality” 
untarnished.69 This body of historical Bohemian law was threatened by the new 
institutions. The Ausgleich with Hungary uprooted not only the 1861 February Patent but 
also the 1860 October Diploma, which had at least guaranteed the non-Hungarian lands 
“their autonomy and their historical rights.”70 The new dualist order, by contrast, looked 
to melt the non-Hungarian lands down into a common but artificial state form. 
 
Yes, the glorious historical Kingdom of Bohemia, which until now had never 
ceased to constitute an independent staatsrechtliche individuality, should now 
be robbed of this personality, it should become a mere province of the 
illegitimate Cisleithanian state, it should enter into a real union with the latter 
although it had had until this time […] no other staatsrechtliche connection 
with the remaining Austrian lands beyond that which existed in its common 
hereditary dynasty. In this way, all our Staatsrecht should be factually 
obliterated, the kingdom of Bohemia and the Bohemian crown as 
staatsrechtliche individuals exterminated from the political world forever.71  
 
 
In riding roughshod over old Bohemian Staatsrecht — as both state rights and 
constitutional law — the imperial government threatened a brutish political execution of 
the juridical “person” of Bohemia: to rob Bohemia of its particular legal personality and 
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identity was to erase it from the world of states, to effect its legal death. If those rights 
were not respected, the legal individuum behind them expired, too. Hungarian 
representatives had in fact used similar constructions when they protested the 1860 
October Diploma with its assertion of a unified constitution and parliament for the empire 
as a whole. Hungarians, declared the Ferenc von Deák in a famous speech before the 
Hungarian diet, could not undersign “the political extermination of the land as an 
independent land.” If Vienna denied Hungary’s right to regulate its own taxation, military 
service and so on, then “Hungary may cease to be an independent, autonomous Hungary 
[and] become an Austrian constitutional province.”72 To meddle with historical rights and 
jurisdiction could obliterate the subject’s legal identity. 
Here the right did not so much produce its subject, as in the interwar examples 
cited in the introduction to Part Two, but it did preserve the existence of its bearer. Rights 
represented its outward facing defenses, its emissaries in the world — messengers that 
referred back to a subject or source that must then be held to exist, if only by inference. 
Diminished by centralization, that legal person had shrunk only to the size and scope of 
the rights it could defend, and nothing more: if it lost them, it lost its reality, as well. In 
serving as the annunciation of their subject in the world, these historical state rights were 
not unlike the light of a star that reaches us long after the star itself had expired, gesturing 
back to its source, but incapable on its own terms of proving the star’s survival. 
In many respects, the Czech declarations of the 1860s reflected theories of legal 
personality in circulation in late nineteenth-century German-language jurisprudence. 
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From the 1860s, these theories focused centrally on the concept of Rechtsfähigkeit — that 
is, legal capacity, a capacity for rights, meaning that a Gemeinschaft (as distinct from one 
of its members) had the capacity to enter into legal agreements, be the protagonist of 
rights and duties, and possessed the kind of “will” or intention necessary for such 
undertakings. The concept of personality said nothing about the content of rights; it 
consisted exclusively in that readiness for rights.73 As the prominent German jurist Paul 
Laband defined it in 1873: “The legal concept of the person consists solely and 
exclusively in legal capacity [Rechtsfähigkeit]; the person in the sense of law has no other 
qualities than the one that constitutes its whole essence, namely, being a rights subject.”74  
Edmund Bernatzik, the stalwart Austrian jurist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, cited Laband approvingly. “One is a ‘person’ as far as the law for which one has 
capacity extends,” he wrote, “and with an association, legal personality extends exactly 
as far as capacity for rights is granted to it by the legal order.”75 One was a subject as far 
as one’s law, one’s rights, extended, but no further. Wielding rights were not secondary 
to the existence of the subject, but rather constitutive. The person existed where and how 
its rights did, and nowhere else. In this sense Bohemia was simply and only its 
Staatsrecht, its historical rights: only if they lived did it live, too. 
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The mutually constitutive relationship of rights and their subject thus possessed a 
certain circularity. The present-day scholar of international law Jan Klabbers has captured 
something of this cyclic quality in writing that “the very exercise of a legal right may 
constitute subject status while simultaneously being evidence of it.”76 In fact, Hans 
Kelsen pushed this line of thinking to its logical conclusion his 1925 work Allgemeine 
Staatslehre, arguing against a conception of rights that held them aloof from their subject: 
precisely that simultaneity indicated that they were one and the same. To preserve a clear 
distinction between the two was to construct a false dualism. The legal person (juristische 
Person), he maintained, was nothing other than “the personification of part of a legal 
order,” the personification of a “complex of norms.”77 Yet when it came to the legal 
subject (Rechtssubjekt), one tended to think of a “carrier” or “bearer” (Träger) of 
subjective law, presuming that there must be something that “has” the subjective rights. 
That is, one thought in terms of a subject and predicate, mimicking the structure of 
language. So although this subject was only a symbol for the “unified relationship” of the 
predicate, one constructed a free-standing “thing,” separate from the predicate, and set it 
to one side.  
 
The thing that has qualities is turned from a mere embodiment of these 
qualities into their substantive double. We do not have a page and then, next 
to it, the qualities: green, smooth, round, etc., instead the page that has these 
qualities, the bearer or the subject, is just their unified aggregation.78 
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Kelsen dissolved the subject into its rights, its legal attributes. With apologies to Musil, 
the great narrator of this place and time, there was no subject — no man — without 
qualities: the subject was its qualities. 
 
In truth, the legal subject is only the doubling of subjective rights, and to the 
extent that this is also directed back to objective rights, its substantive 
reproduction: the right as object faces — just like a reflection — the right as 
subject.79 
 
In this juridical mirror hall, rights were multiplied into their subjects, when in fact the 
objective and subjective side of rights merely represented two sides of the same coin. In 
Kelsen’s telling, the rights-subject was subsumed entirely into its rights: or more 
accurately, it had never existed in the first place. The multiplying mirror hall was simply 
a product of our muddled thinking: burdened with a weak capacity for abstract thought, 
we required “thought tools” (Denkbehelf), techniques of “visualization,” to aid our 
comprehension of the way in which norms and rights clustered and hung together.80 In 
fact, the legal order did not stand as against the legal community, “but rather exists in 
it.”81 
 
Shopping Rights Vocabularies: The Czech Staatsrecht Tradition and the Rights-
Subject Behind It 
 
The evolution of Czech claims further reveals the difficulties of resurrecting medieval 
rights subject in an era of national mobilization. Rights reflected back on the nature of 
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their bearer: if historical rights “belonged” to the pan-ethnic historical lands, should not 
the modern Czech national movement jettison archaic rights languages of this persuasion 
and embrace an alternative rights idiom based on ethnic nationalism proper? From the 
1870s onward, the relationship between different social groups and political alliances, on 
the one hand, and sorts and styles of rights, on the other required continual redefinition.  
The declarations of the 1860s represented the high point of Bohemian invocations 
of their historical rights and constitutional law. If all national activity had been forced 
underground during the punitive and sedition-wary absolutism of the Bach era (1849-
1859), then the 1860s proved the most fertile terrain for this mode of rights talk — and 
for a number of reasons. While the return to constitutionalism had made space for the 
possibility of claim-making in the first place, the terms of that return — riding on the 
people’s “historical legal consciousness” as the October Diploma announced — 
ostensibly made historical-legal considerations the bedrock of the new constitutional 
order. At the same time, the constitution was and seemed unsettled. The October Diploma 
gave way to the February Patent in mere months; protesting Hungarians, Bohemians and 
others withdrew their participation from the parliament in turn; parts of the patent were 
suspended and, over the course of the 1860s, Hungarian lobbying drew the Ausgleich 
slowly into being. In all this flux there seemed every chance for a new and more 
advantageous settlement. That open-endedness changed slowly in the 1870s as the 
constitutional order of 1867, structured around the Ausgleich, hardened into the lasting 
legal form of the empire. This was especially the case after Czech efforts towards an 
analogous compromise collapsed in 1871. From then on, the creeping unlikelihood of 
achieving a systematic restructuring on the basis of historical Bohemian state law and 
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state rights directed national energies in other directions, and especially towards the 
language question as Czechs sought to secure official language equality with the German 
neighbors within the pre-existing constitutional structure.82 Assertions of historic state 
rights did not fade, but they sidled closer to national slogans than live projects of 
constitutional reform.83 
Interwoven with these changes in the broader imperial structure was an internal 
struggle — along both philosophical and sociological axes — regarding the subject of 
Czech nationalist claims more generally. From its inception, the “Czech” national 
movement had evolved, two-headed, with dual and dueling “selves.” On the one hand, it 
took early and lasting inspiration from the form and precedent of the historic kingdom of 
Bohemia, seeking to restore the constitutional independence and political and legislative 
autonomy of the medieval polity, as we have seen.84 Some proponents of this 
Landespatriotismus emphasized its pan-ethnic character: as a political unit, Bohemia 
included Czechs and Germans alike. On the other hand, rival ethnic conceptualizations of 
the nation looked to linguistic-cultural revival and understood self-determination along 
ethnic rather than political lines. Commentators then and subsequently tended to 
characterize these different variants as historical-constitutional (“historisch-
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staatsrechtlich”) and natural law/liberal traditions, respectively. The two strands 
competed for the identity of the national movement, and mapped onto social and 
generational divides.  
As we might expect, the historical-federalist position was aligned with the high 
nobility; it was, after all, their aristocratic rights and privileges that had been re-imagined 
as the common patrimony of the nation (though not re-imagined dramatically enough to 
mean that the nobles themselves did not stand to gain substantially in a historical-
federalist settlement). Also unsurprisingly, the ethnic-national position became associated 
with the Young Czechs, who broke away from the National Party in the early 1870s, 
rejecting the inflexible, passive program of their elders, who had unwaveringly held to 
their Staatsrecht position and their boycott of the imperial parliament.85  
Yet these affiliations were not hardened certainties, and rights languages 
seesawed as tactics and persuasions shifted. In the 1860s, there had been a broad 
consensus across the Czech political spectrum that appealing to Bohemia’s historical 
Staatsrecht represented the smartest strategy given the government’s deep antipathy 
towards anything resembling an ethnic nationalist claim. Central figures in the National 
Party like Palacký and Rieger were conscious of the weakness of the Czech position, and 
knew that any majority in the diet would require the support of the aristocratic “large 
landowners” (Grossgrundbesitz). Their crucial alliance with the high aristocrat Clam-
Martinic shaped the course of Czech politics. Together, they forged a dominant political 
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platform founded on the basic principles of Czech Staatsrecht, including the historical 
continuity of Bohemia’s constitutional rights and the capacity of diet to elect king should 
the Habsburg dynasty die out. The political resonance of Austroslavism (so prominent, 
yet so unsuccessful, in 1848-49) had faded, and the October Diploma itself practically 
invited rights claims in historicist terms. In this context, the vocabulary of “historical 
right” — as a more neutral and abstract phrasing of the aristocratic project of the full 
restitution of the traditional “estates constitution” — afforded the conceptual space in 
which internal Czech political differences could be reconciled.86 “Historical rights” really 
did consolidate, if not produce, a rights subject that might otherwise break apart into 
competing class and political interests.  
In short, appealing to Bohemia’s historical-political individuality seemed the most 
likely route to winning greater autonomy within the imperial structure, and politicians of 
all political persuasions embraced the cause with gusto.87 In Robert Kann’s phrasing, the 
failure of the 1848 revolutions and the revival of absolutism in the Habsburg Monarchy 
led the protagonists of the liberal-national Czech program to seek “political shelter” in an 
“unofficial alliance” with the traditional territorial federalism of the nobility, as only they 
were allowed to pursue some kind of national program, however limited.88 The 
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movement of rights-claims had often involved tactical “shelters” as different political 
projects shopped for the litigious language most likely to balance their goals with the 
odds of success. (We recall Szécsen’s masterful selection of “historical-political 
individuality” as a political keyword in 1860). Certainly, the logic of shelters, casks, and 
shells featured in A. J. P. Taylor’s characteristically sniffy account of the broader 
interaction of nationalism and provincial autonomy in the Habsburg monarchy. Calls for 
the latter had reemerged under Metternich’s influence, Taylor argued, even if Metternich 
envisioned the provinces as benign historical charades rather than sites of real power. 
“Yet this political antiquarianism made a deep mark in Austria’s history”: “[t]he 
moribund provinces became the old bottles into which the new wine of nationalism was 
poured.”89  
Yet the old cask and the new wine could part ways once more. After the failure of 
the historic claims and constitutional formalism of the 1860s, many Young Czechs and 
others abandoned conservative federalism once more, and the coalition splintered in 
different directions. The trajectory of (Old Czech and moderate liberal) Palacký’s 
political thinking offers one central illustration of this meandering history of rights. His 
landmark history of Bohemia had generally taken “the people” (rather than a political 
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unit) as its subject; though he had dealt in Staatsrecht arguments in the Vormärz period, 
as well. In his national-federal proposals of 1848-49, as we remember, he wholly 
embraced an ethnic conception of imperial organization that abandoned the basis of 
historical rights altogether. In the changed conditions of the 1860s, he turned back to 
historical-legal arguments, laboring to generate a broad consensus on the subject. In the 
mid-1860s, he reflected on the changing contours of his thinking. Many have wondered, 
he mused, how an historian like himself could repudiate “all historical elementary laws” 
and advise “an openly revolutionary act” like the “configuration of Austria according to 
nationality,” as he did in 1848-49. “Admittedly, my proposal was connected to the 
revolution,” he conceded; it was only possible in that storm that had shaken Austria to its 
foundations.90 Indeed, there had been so many revolutionary or at least “historical right-
negating” (historische Recht negirende [sic]) ideas in circulation at the time. But he 
recognized that since then, because 
 
the geographical historical foundations of our empire have been consolidated 
and the theory of Baron Eötvös of the historical-political individualities found 
appeal not only with the government but also with the people, my proposal 
from the year 1849 is now not only unpractical but also impossible.91 
 
In the 1860s, it was the ethnic-national platform that carried an air of improbable 
unreality; it had been superseded by the old-new historical-juridical view of imperial 
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rights. This program, too, proved largely ineffective for the Czechs, and later in his life 
Palacký shifted yet again, rocking back towards a national, pan-Slav program.92 
The tension between these two rights program and the subject behind them would 
outlive the empire and the constitutional context of its incubation. In 1919, Allied 
peacemakers were confronted with claims of both historical right and self-determination. 
Theoretically, the different rights languages implied different subjects, with historical 
rights as the prerogative of the historic states, and self-determination that of “peoples,” 
yet rights and their subjects floated in a promiscuous cross-pollination, just as they did in 
the empire. From the outset, the wartime Czech government in exile declared the Czech 
people’s natural right to self-determination, as well as the right of the Lands of the 
Bohemian crown to reclaim their historic independence. While the former clearly 
expressed the national-liberal-democratic worldview of many of the leading Czech 
statesmen, the latter (successfully) allowed them to claim the frontiers of historic 
Bohemia with its large German population against the Sudeten Germans’ explicit desire 
to join Germany under the star of “self-determination.” Czech claim-makers managed to 
mash up subjects and objects to their greatest advantage (to the chagrin of every 
Hungarian): they took the ethnic nation as the rights subject, and the object of the 
historical right — that is, greater Bohemia. Their Declaration of Independence, neatly 
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tying together a whole stream of imperial constitutional history, summarized their debt to 
twin legal idols, invoking their “natural and historic right” to independence. 
 
The Scholarship of Historical Rights: Reconstructing the Legal Continuity of the 
Bohemian State  
 
The academic world moves slowly. If historical claims failed to achieve the 
reorganization of dualism into trialism in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the main 
discussions of historical law then moved from the diets and parliaments to the academy, 
as scholars caught up with the major political dramas of the age. The struggle over 
Bohemian Staatsrecht in fact drove an upswing in the legal sciences in the Bohemian 
lands in the 1860s, especially legal history, as politicians and the public alike looked to 
jurists for arguments and evidence.93 A series of more scholarly studies, presenting 
careful and elaborate arguments about the nature of imperial law and Bohemian 
Staatsrecht within it, were published from the 1870s onwards. The most important of 
these monographs were written by the Czech historian Josef Kalousek (1838-1915), a 
professor in Prague, and lawyer Hugo Toman (1838-1898).94 At the heart of this new 
academic literature on Bohemian historical rights lay the reconstruction of the continuous 
survival Bohemian “state” through the long centuries of Habsburg rule. In tracing its 
course, these scholars worked like handmaidens or midwives ushering rights from the 
past into the present. 
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Kalousek and Toman explicitly designed their constitutional histories to feed and 
inform contemporary political struggles. In the preface to his 1872 monograph Das 
böhmische Staatsrecht und die Entwicklung der österreichischen Reichsidee, Toman, an 
extraordinary member of the Royal Bohemian Society of the Sciences, explained his 
intention to ground current constitutional problems and institutions in those of historical 
Bohemian law: 
 
In the current moment, where the question of the standing of the Bohemian crown 
to the whole monarchy should be directed toward its final solution, and the points 
of attachment with historical Staatsrecht must be sought and found, the present 
text, as a survey of the historical development of Bohemian Staatsrecht under the 
influence of the Austrian state idea, may not be entirely superfluous.95 
 
The contemporary resonance of historical Bohemian law was obscure to no one. But what 
kind of law was it? Dragged to the political surface out of the shadows of a deep past, not 
only the content but also the genre of this law required determination, and both scholars 
labored to describe it. Kalousek, in his 1871 Einige Grundlagen des böhmischen 
Staatsrechtes, sketched it thus: 
 
Bohemian constitutional law has developed in the first instance as customary 
law inherited onwards from generation to generation, which gradually 
extended to written records in the form of princely concessions, privileges, 
Majestätsbriefen, diet resolutions and land ordinances, yet was never brought 
together in its entirety as a unified codex. So a constitutional charter in the 
modern sense exists in Bohemia as little as in England.96 
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One could not take any single one of the land ordinances, Kalousek argued — whether 
that of 1500, 1549, 1564, 1627, or so on — as the complete expression of Bohemian 
Staatsrecht, but needed rather to consider their totality. Listing the contributing land 
ordinances in this way, Kalousek’s survey of Bohemian constitutional law began well 
before Habsburg rule (1526), and posited the ongoing development of that tradition over 
the marker of the Habsburg ascent to the crown. This body of law had pre-imperial 
origins as well as a chronology of its own. Interestingly, Kalousek argued that the first 
impulses towards the codification (Fixirung) this customary “native public law” 
(heimischen öffentlichen Rechtes) arose when a “foreigner” was called to the Bohemian 
throne for the first time (Johann of Luxemburg in the fourteenth century).97 Here, too, 
from the perspective of Bohemian law, the Habsburgs were implicitly just one in a line of 
foreign kings for whom the indigenous law needed to be translated from customary 
knowledge into something “readable” to an outsider. 
The central animating thrust of both Kalousek and Toman’s studies consisted in 
the demonstration of the survival of Bohemian Recht — as both law and rights — over 
the more significant “ruptures” caused by Habsburg rule. As might be expected, both 
traced in detail the precise terms of the original transfer of the Bohemian crown to the 
Habsburg archduke Ferdinand I in 1526. Ferdinand’s right to the crown on the basis of 
his consort Anna — who was the sister of the late Jagiellonian Bohemian king, as we 
remember — was not recognized by the Bohemian estates, argued Kalousek. Rather, the 
estates chose Ferdinand in a free election, exercising their rightful capacity to elect the 
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king of their choice. The throne was his by their grace and according to their laws.98 
Toman, for his part, emphasized that although the different lands thereby entered an 
ongoing union under the same ruler, each was “governed in a totally independent way,” 
as they had been before. The idea of a closer “amalgamation” of the lands occurred to no 
one.99 
At the heart of these arguments about the survival of Bohemian law lay the 
survival of the Kingdom of Bohemia as the Kingdom of Bohemia; just like the 
declarations and diet resolutions of the 1860s, the survival of this law and its subject 
amounted to virtually the same question. Constructing a narrative of juridical continuity 
encountered its gravest stumbling block in the Battle of the White Mountain of 1620 and 
the “renewed land ordinance,” imposed by Ferdinand II, which followed on its heels in 
1627. If the persistence of the Bohemian kingdom as an independent polity for the first 
hundred years of Habsburg rule remained generally uncontroversial, the new order of 
1627 seriously altered the relationship between Bohemia and the dynasty. That Bohemia 
suffered a comprehensive defeat after having rebelled against the Habsburgs cleared the 
legal and political space for Ferdinand II to unilaterally assert the new terms of his rule. 
The “hardest strike” of the land ordinance, its gravest injury to Bohemian constitutional 
law, was its withdrawal of legislative capacities (Recht der Gesetzgebung) from the 
Bohemian diet. Henceforth, only the king would have the right to make legislation.100 
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Establishing what exactly remained of traditional Bohemian Staatsrecht despite these 
body blows thus became the key question for scholars like Kalousek.  
The renewed land ordinance did defer in part — if obliquely — to preexisting 
traditions and conventions. By incorporating certain key traditions, especially the 
coronation oath (which prevented the king from alienating any part of the kingdom’s 
patrimony) and the “Carolingen and Georgian incorporation laws,” the ordinance itself 
testified to the fundamental juridical survival of the state. The “integrity and state 
individuality of the sovereign Bohemian crown” was thereby guaranteed, Kalousek 
argued. “A staatsrechtliche or administrative blending of the Bohemian state with the 
other states and possessions of the common ruler was neither intended nor effected by the 
renewed land ordinance.”101 In many respects, the ordinance marked “a violent step 
towards absolutism, but not to the obliteration of the state individuality of the Bohemian 
crown, or to its blending with other crowns and hereditary states.”102 In drawing out the 
thread of legal continuity, Kalousek showed how the same Bohemian state that had 
enjoyed full independence prior to 1526 had survived as such when brought under 
Habsburg rule, and again through the legal-political earthquake of 1627, and again in the 
Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, and so on. The kingdom never went missing from history, 
never lost its juridical shape. In this way, the same rights-subject — the same state 
individuality, to use their vocabulary — moved forward in time through different 
constitutional relationships, but preserved ceaselessly its legal identity, dragging its rights 
and entitlements into the modern age like the long and ornate train of a ceremonial gown.  
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Kalousek made an intriguing distinction between the “constitutional law” 
(Verfassungsrecht) of Bohemia that was, undeniably, much reduced by the land 
ordinance, and Bohemian state law (Staatsrecht), implicitly the more fundamental body 
of law that regulated the existence and legitimacy of the state, which was not.103 He 
thereby established different juridical “planes” on which foundational public law 
developments could occur. For example, he relied the distinction between 
Verfassungsrecht and Staatsrecht to argue that the right of the representatives of the lands 
of Bohemia to participate in law making on the fundamental matters of state had not been 
abolished in 1627 or subsequently, whatever the mere “letters” of that law had said, and 
in spite of scant evidence of such participation in recent centuries. “The objection that the 
Bohemian diet has not exercised the customary legislative rights [Gesetzgebungsrecht] 
for a long time is relevant for Bohemian constitutional law, not, alternatively, its state law 
[Staatsrecht].”104 If, materially, the diet had rarely exercised this right (especially in the 
last 120 years), then it was all the more urgent to reinstate this right entirely, to restore it 
to “reality.”105 
Perhaps the most famous exponent and explicator of Bohemian Staatsrecht was 
the Czech politician Karel Kramář (1860-1937), who would later become 
Czechoslovakia’s first prime minister. Kramář’s career bridged worlds. At the level of 
political activity, as well as through his renovation of ideas, Kramář trajectory tied the 
constitutional struggles of Austria-Hungary to the post-imperial order, especially as 
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member of the Czech delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and as a founding father 
of the new state. A lawyer from a wealthy middle class family, Kramář married a Russian 
heiress, and his financial independence, combined with political talent and prodigious 
command of Russian, German, French and English, helped launch an influential political 
career that included leadership of the Young Czechs. While pro-Slav and pro-Russian in 
orientation, Kramář was considered a “realist” alongside Josef Kaizl and T. G. Masaryk 
— though he and Masaryk increasingly disagreed on many fronts — and had a moderate 
disposition towards the central government, advocating a federal settlement under the 
auspices of the Habsburg Monarchy until the outbreak of the First World War.106 
“For more than thirty years, the political life of Austria has been filled with the 
struggle over Bohemian Staatsrecht,”107 he wrote in his 1896 work, Das böhmische 
Staatsrecht. If he thereby drew together the projects of the 1860s and 70s forward into his 
late-century moment, the context in which he wrote and reasoned was nevertheless quite 
different to that of Kalousek and Toman. While the latter two had worked to ascertain, in 
the first instance, the nature and content of historical Bohemian law, and gift it the 
gravity of academic respectability, Kramář faced more trying circumstances, as Czech 
political work towards a new constitutional settlement or even basic concessions on the 
basis of Bohemian Staatsrecht had come to naught, and the cross-class coalition that 
underpinned that program had fallen apart. His monograph recast Bohemian historical 
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law for a new century, pitching its uses for a more open-ended and positive political 
platform than the stubborn boycott politics of the 1860s and 70s. Most revealingly, his 
history looked to cleave apart the tight association (both conceptually and historically) 
between the historical-constitutional tradition and the aristocracy. Bohemian Staatsrecht, 
in Kramář’s telling, had nothing to do with class, and everything to do with the “state” 
and its sovereignty.  
This significant renovation of tradition looked to rescue the language and 
platform of state law and state rights from an association with any political ideology and 
in particular from any sort of aristocratic conservatism. The Czech people had always 
remained liberal, he argued; they had allied with the aristocracy and forgiven them their 
clericalism solely because the latter had fought to defend Bohemian historical rights. 
“But Staatsrecht in itself has in itself nothing to do with the question of liberalism, of 
democracy. Bohemian Staatsrecht [...] is and remains only the question of the 
relationship of the lands of the Bohemian crown to the Habsburg dynasty and to its other 
lands.”108 Like all constitutions, it was an evolving rather than static body of law, one that 
would have gradually become more democratic as a natural part of its development — 
more democratic, even, than the Austro-Hungarian constitution of 1867! — save for the 
violent, centralist interventions of Maria Theresa that disrupted the natural development 
of this law. Thus one could not reproach it on the grounds of any social content: the 
democratic talents of the Czech people, that would have otherwise inevitably come into 
full legal articulation in constitutional law, had been stifled by the meddling absolutism 
of the Habsburgs. 
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This line of argumentation allowed Kramář to make several key distinctions. 
Because historical Bohemian law could not be judged on the basis of its social content, he 
announced that he would not linger further on social or “internal” issues but rather 
“survey the history of Bohemian Staatsrecht from the standpoint of the outward-facing 
[nach außen] right to independence and autonomy.”109 In thereby exploring the 
“external” rather than the apparently internal dimensions of Bohemian Staatsrecht, 
Kramář turned the latter into a body of precedents concerning Bohemia’s relations with 
other states and lands — that is, into a kind of international law.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the nineteenth-century keyword “sovereignty” assumed a 
central place in his history. It lay at the heart of this genre of law: Bohemian Staatsrecht, 
most fundamentally, regulated “the relationship of the independent, sovereign lands of 
the Bohemian crown in their unity to the other lands of their king and to the other 
states.”110 As such, sovereignty was an analytical category as well as a key attribute in 
this history, a status that the Bohemian lands had possessed as an historical fact: 
“Ferdinand I took over Bohemia and Hungary as fully sovereign, independent states, he 
exercised the right of legislation and administration as King of Bohemia in Bohemia, as 
King of Hungary in Hungarian lands.”111 Bohemian Staatsrecht, in Kramář’s telling, was 
a discourse on sovereignty. 
The distinction between internal and external, and its elevation of the concept of 
sovereignty, equipped Kramář with the conceptual tools to construct a startling new 
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history of the crisis of 1627. The basic principles of the “complete independence, the total 
sovereignty” of the lands of the Bohemian crown under the auspices of the Habsburg 
dynasty were so “self-evident,” Kramář argued, that they were never questioned in the 
great struggle that culminated in the battle of the White Mountain. That struggle “turned 
not on the independence of the lands of the Bohemian crown, but on the power of the 
nobility as against the dynasty.”112 It was the nobility, Kramář emphasized, that was 
conquered — not the polity as such. Such a defeat need not provoke sorrow or 
sentimentality: the nobility were oppressing the people anyway. They were destroyed, 
“but the kingdom, its independence and autonomy remained unaffected. It was an 
internal revolution, where the king remained the victor, as to the external standing of the 
state nothing was to be changed and nothing could be changed.”113 The king’s own 
legitimacy as king of Bohemia was bound up with the preservation of the “independence 
and sovereignty” of the kingdom, and these he swore to protect in the renewed land 
ordinance of 1627.114 For all its changes, the ordinance therefore changed only the “inner 
life of the state” (innere Staatsleben): the face Bohemia presented to the outside world 
was not altered in the slightest.115 Kramář thus interpreted the struggle between the 
rebellious Bohemian nobility and the dynasty as a domestic struggle, virtually a class or 
civil war, one in which Ferdinand II acted exclusively in the guise of king of Bohemia. 
The consequences of such a struggle could only register on the level of social relations 
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and the internal distribution of power, which indeed changed dramatically, as a new and 
foreign nobility was brought in to replace the conquered Bohemian landholders. 
Kramář thereby constructed a Staatsrecht that pertained exclusively to “the state,” 
abstracted from the social-feudal nexus of the rights and privileges that had formed the 
original content of the estates constitution — precisely the sort of late nineteenth-century 
juridical ahistoricism to which Otto Brunner objected so caustically. To be sure, 
Kramář’s Staatsrecht was perfectly suited to nineteenth-century preoccupations: in 
separating the ostensibly “internal” from the ostensibly “external,” and social relations 
from sovereign relations, Kramář projected backwards a modern understanding of the 
structure of international as opposed to domestic law. This simultaneously allowed him to 
“domesticate” the changes of 1627, to digest them into an internal social struggle and 
thereby allow the external, political sovereign rights of the kingdom as a legal 
individuum to continue forward in time without rupture. A storm may have raged on the 
inside but the sovereign structure stood firm. 
Until the age of absolutism, that is. Kramář devoted many pages and much 
invective to the changes wrought by Maria Theresa from the mid-eighteenth century. 
Some centralization, he conceded, formed a normal part of the course of history: the 
gradual coordination of finances across the Habsburg domain, for example, appeared to 
him entirely natural and in no way contradictory with the status and rights of the lands. 
But Maria Theresa’s absolutist program of centralization, by contrast, constituted a gross 
violation of the natural and just order of things. She exhibited scant regard for delicate 
juridical status quo: “The old vested rights of the until-now independent states were no 
impediment to her.” She “destroyed” the independence of the Austrian and Bohemian 
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lands and forged them into a centralized empire, though ran out of strength to tackle 
Hungary in the same way, thus laying the foundations of dualism.116 Her centralization 
amounted to a grave “Rechtsbruch,” a rupture of the law — “a legal rupture of such 
violence and recklessness that the changes that followed the Battle of the White 
Mountain can hardly approximate.” The estates may have lost their social hegemony after 
1627, but under the auspices of Maria Theresa’s absolutism “the autonomy of the until-
then independent, autonomous states was taken from them.”117  
These changes, however, remained a violation of the rightful legal order, Kramář 
argued. A long list of fundamental legal documents — from the “contract” of 1526 
through to the renewed land ordinance of 1627 and the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 — 
established that the rights of the Bohemian crown could not be altered unilaterally: the 
participation and consent of the legal representatives of the Bohemian lands (that is, the 
diet) formed a necessary component of any fundamental constitutional change. Thus, 
“formally and materially she was in the wrong.”118 Bohemian Staatsrecht could only be 
changed according to its own stipulations, according to its own legal mechanisms. As a 
result, the centralization of the era of absolutism altered the material form of the empire, 
but never reached down to genuinely dissolve fundamental Bohemian law; the latter was 
effectively put on ice and preserved as it stood on the eve of these ruptures: “Bohemian 
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Staatsrecht is today that which was the public law of Bohemia before the illegitimate and 
violent intervention of Maria Theresa.”119  
Kramář thus posited the deep, subterranean survival of Bohemian state law. The 
true legal situation of the Bohemian lands had not been altered over the last 150 years. 
This meant that the current constitution of 1867 was  
 
legally invalid. It is a piece of legislation, it has the force of a piece of 
legislation, one can promise to treat it as a piece of legislation, but for the 
Bohemian people it has only a legislative [gesetzliche] force, no legal 
[rechtliche] authority, because here representatives of other lands have 
decided over the fundamental rights of the Bohemian crown, which have 
absolutely no right to meddle in the legal sphere of the Bohemian crown.120  
 
With its common parliament, the constitution of 1867 fundamentally disrespected the 
juridical integrity, and the historical jurisdiction, of the Bohemian lands. It was clearly a 
law in the sense of a legislative act promulgated by the government, but it could never 
command the genuine power, authority, and mystique of the rightful law: “it is, as 
already said, a piece of legislation [ein Gesetz], to which one must hold, with which one 
must comply, but it is not the law [das Recht] to which the lands of the Bohemian crown 
are entitled.”121 
Ten years later, in his 1906 work Anmerkungen zur Böhmischen Politik, Kramář 
restated his understanding of the deep survival of rightful law while	expressing some 
distance from his earlier positions. Here again, residual legalities that had never been 
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overridden in legitimate ways continued to shine through as the only reliable foundations 
of imperial law. In this early twentieth-century formulation, though, another familiar 
keyword took its place alongside that of sovereignty: self-determination. Our “final 
goal,” he asserted, was the “renewal of the legislative and administrative right of self-
determination of the lands of the Bohemian crown within the framework of a federalized 
Austria.”122  
The campaign for the restoration of historical Bohemian law segued here 
seamlessly into the vocabulary of self-determination, so central to the broader twentieth-
century story of empire and decolonization. Yet, in Kramář’s deployment, it was 
integrally bound up with Austro-Hungarian law and politics, and not only because self-
determination found its ideal realization within an imperial union. More still, “self-
determination” did not float as some free-standing abstract ideal. It had a crucial 
adjective: Bohemian striving and seeking, wrote Kramář, found its “idealization” in “the 
struggle for the staatsrechtliche right of self-determination of the lands of the Bohemian 
crown” within the imperial frame.123 That is, this self-determination was of the 
Staatsrecht variety: it concerned the resurrection of historical rights rather than the 
invocation of new ones; it represented a continuity with imperial constitutional struggles 
rather than a departure from them. 
 
The goal of our politics can be no other than that the Bohemian people again 
become the bearers of the state-tradition [Träger des Staatsgedankens] in the 
lands of the Bohemian crown, that they are given back their old 
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staatsrechtliche independence, in a manner, to be sure, that accords with 
modern requirements and those of the whole empire, and with just 
consideration of the Germans who inhabit these lands with us.124 
 
Kramář explicitly contrasted this kind of self-determination with that based on “mere” 
abstract, natural law premises, and in so doing argued stridently for the residual force and 
survival of historical law: 
 
This is no romantic historicism, as is so often charged, but rather a very 
realistic policy, that is, [a policy of] not forsaking the legal fundaments on 
which we all must stand, whether we want to or not. Precisely because our 
Staatsrecht is a timeless, legitimate right. Every natural law theory is enough 
to motivate national independence — but not the right of self-determination of 
the lands of the Bohemian crown.125  
  
 
Any appeal to natural law, to universal principles, could support some sort of national 
autonomy — so much was easy, if pedestrian, Kramář suggested diffidently. But 
Bohemian goals were different: they sought the self-determination of the Bohemian 
polity, which of course included Germans alongside Czechs. Here, a generic or abstract 
legal foundation did not suffice, nor was it needed: Bohemia already possessed the deep 
legal foundations for an order based on self-determination — legal foundations that were 
realer and more resilient anyway, shining, agelessly, from the depths of the historical 
past. At the same time, their permanence preserved the legal identity, the juridical 
subjecthood, of Bohemia: “Staatsrecht is nothing other than the legal content of the state 
sovereignty of the lands of the Bohemian crown, their indivisibility, unity, and 
																																																								
124 Kramář, Anmerkungen zur Böhmischen Politik, 72. 
125 Kramář, Anmerkungen zur Böhmischen Politik, 74. 
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staatsrechtliche individuality.”126 Bohemian state rights were not a problem “but rather 
an always-existing legal situation [immer bestehender Rechtszustand] upon which the 
rule of the monarch in the Bohemian lands is solely based.”127  
*  *  * 
 In 1917, the Czech statesman Edvard Beneš would lay out the Czech case for 
independence in language that almost reproduced Kramář’s formulations verbatim, 
importing the vocabulary and imaginary of imperial constitutional law into the 
propaganda campaigns of the First World War. The Battle of the White Mountain, he 
recounted for an international audience, dramatically strengthened the Habsburg position. 
“But from the constitutional point of view the principle of the independence of the 
Bohemian State remained in tact.” He explained the logic of composite monarchies: “The 
King of Bohemia became a more absolute sovereign, but he always remained King of 
Bohemia. Legally the Czech State never ceased to exist. The Diet preserved its ancient 
constitutional rights, somewhat curtailed, yet in the main the same as before.”128 Like 
Kramář, he argued that the true, deep legality of Bohemian historical rights had been 
affected neither by the centralization of Maria Theresa nor the equally illegitimate 
Ausgleich of 1867: 
 
Up to the present day they [the Czechs] consider all the constitutional 
measures taken by Maria Theresa as illegal and non-existing. They have never 
renounced the rights of their country […]. Even when the era of the modern 
Constitution commenced (in 1848 and again in 1867) they persisted in 
																																																								
126 (“…weil das Staatsrecht nichts anderes ist als der rechtliche Inhalt der Staatssouveränität der Länder der 
böhmischen Krone, deren Unteilbarkeit, Einheit und staatsrechtliche Individualität”). Kramář, 
Anmerkungen zur Böhmischen Politik, 136. 
127 Kramář, Anmerkungen zur Böhmischen Politik, 137. 
128 Edouard Beneš, Bohemia’s Case for Independence (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917), 18. 
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claiming their ancient Constitution of the kingdom of Bohemia, and with it, 
their independence.129  
 
 
Beneš drew not only on the literature on Bohemian rights, but on the tropes of the 
constitutional debate more broadly. His conclusions ventriloquised the Hungarian legal 
arguments that followed the Ausgleich: “Austria has never existed de jure for the 
Czechs.”130 
																																																								
129 Beneš, Bohemia’s Case for Independence, 23. 





Rights Cultures under Imperial Rule: 
Legal Fictions and Legal Continuity 
 
 
The scholarship of historical rights presents us with legal history in a fantastical key. The 
legal-political discourse constructed by figures like Kramář, Kalousek, and Toman 
sketched an otherworldly domain of ageless rights and residual statehood, one that played 
out in an almost meta-historical register and that stood in stark contrast to more realist or 
materialist assessments of the expiration of historic statehood. How should we understand 
these rights histories? In what sort of truth did they trade? In Chapter Four I step back to 
consider imperial “rights culture” in more epistemological terms, exploring the kind of 
legal knowledge in play and at stake in claims of historical right. 
As presented by Kramář and his compatriots, historical rights clearly represented 
legal myths of a sort. We might appropriate Paul Veyne’s question of the Greeks: did the 
Czechs believe their myths? “The content of myth,” Veyne answered himself, “was 
situated in a noble or platonic temporality, as foreign to individual experience and 
individual interests as are government proclamations or esoteric theories learned at 
school and accepted at face value.”1 Such myths existed in time and space quite separate 
from experiential sorts of truth; they were not “made out” by the same sorts of evidence, 
yet they still permeated the world of the living. Apt as such an approach might be to the 
																																																								
1 Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination, trans. 
Paula Wissing (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1988), 27. 
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case at hand, we need not travel so far afield to gain further purchase on the 
epistemological status of these legal claims and traditions.  
For these legal myths are perhaps most accurately understood as legal fictions — 
the thought tools of legal reasoning that, while fictitious or “presumed” in a certain sense, 
often propped up whole legal orders, like the man on the Clapham omnibus in British 
civil law (that is, the hypothetical reasonable man). Legal fictions might not be simple 
“truths,” but nor were they necessarily lies, errors, delusions, or decoys.2 In the 1850s, 
Gustav Demelius (1831-1891), a German-born jurist whose later career was spent in 
Prague, Krakow, and finally Vienna, observed pertinently that legal fictions were not 
fictions in the normal sense. They were not intended to describe reality; they were 
normative rather than descriptive.3 In a 1913 article in the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 
Carl Schmitt likewise maintained that every discipline was saturated in its own fictions, 
although there was nothing objectionable in this state of affairs. “The purpose and limit 
of the legitimation of a fiction does not lie in its approximation of reality,” wrote Schmitt, 
“but rather in the use it has for cognition [das Erkennen]. […] The fiction is a conscious 
arbitrary or false perception that nevertheless furthers knowledge [die Erkenntnis] and 
can lead to valuable results.”4 
																																																								
2 For one overview, see L. L. Fuller, “Legal Fictions,” Illinois Law Review 25, no. 4 (1930): 363-399. As 
Fuller writes, if statements never perfectly replicate reality, the cases at hand involve “an inadequacy which 
is outstanding or unusual.” A fiction is “frequently a metaphorical way of explaining a truth,” leading to 
possible difficulty in determining whether something is in fact a fiction or not  (pages 370, 371).  
3 Gustav Demelius, Die Rechtsfiktion in ihrer geschichtlichen und dogmatischen Bedeutung: Eine 
juristische Untersuchung (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1858). 
4 Carl Schmitt, “Juristische Fiktionen,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 18, no. 12 (1913): 805. 
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The historical rights of the lands — brought into imperial law with the 
incorporation of the lands themselves, and ostensibly preserved from that period of 
medieval “statehood” onwards — might have been a poor reflection of the empire’s 
nineteenth-century “reality,” but they propped up a whole world of constitutional debate 
and reasoning, and structured the formal composition of the empire. The name of the 
western (that is, non-Hungarian) half of the empire preserved this “fictional” order of 
amassed mini-states until the very end of the empire’s life: as we recall, it was formally 
known as The Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Parliament. Such a name 
officially held to the presence of multiple state subjectivities, even as the real power and 
legislative weight had been long since accumulated by a central government. As Szécsen 
had emphasized, Bohemia remained a kingdom, Moravia a margraviate: immortalized in 
the title of the state itself, they retained their own specific legal name and identity despite 
centuries of Viennese imperial rule. In the mid-1920s, Hans Kelsen would argue that 
through this strange, convoluted state name one clung to the mere “appearance [Schein] 
of the state-like or state-approximate character of these component communities.”5 If 
Kelsen, unsympathetic to the historical rights claims of these small polities, thereby 
characterized the state’s official name as an historical charade — the expression of a little 
solar system of state fictions — then it was a charade that persisted in law, at least in 
some very general sense.  
But what was this sense in which the historical stateness of the lands had 
survived? Skeptics like Kelsen could point all too easily to a world of hard facts under 
whose cold light the historic polities disintegrated almost into dust: surely, after centuries 
																																																								
5 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1925), 191. Emphasis added. 
	
	 258	
of rule from Vienna, their independent legal life had expired long ago. The state-like 
“appearance” of the lands, he wrote, “obviously contradicted the positive legal 
situation.”6 Yet claim-makers themselves were hardly oblivious to the discrepancy. In 
many cases, it even structured the way they wrote and spoke about rights. Their 
arguments responded directly to the challenge of asserting the survival of legal 
individuality of the lands — and their rights — despite this universe of “positive facts.” 
The tension drove them to develop a mode of telling the legal history of the empire that 
lifted rights and law out of the factual fray and into a historical temporality of their own. 
Accordingly, in treatments of historical Staatsrecht spanning the empire’s last five 
decades, we can observe the construction of a particular culture of imperial rights that 
relied upon a clear epistemological distinction between law and facts. In this rights 
culture, the survival of rights and old law could not be disproved or abolished by mere 
facts: it could only be changed or rendered obsolete by a similarly legitimate law. 
Kramář’s 1896 account of Maria Theresa’s centralist reforms exemplified this style of 
reasoning: 
 
And because she was formally and materially in the wrong, she could only 
produce a fact, but not a law, and for that reason the rights of the Bohemian 
crown, the Bohemian Staatsrecht, the right to the unity and inseparability of the 
three lands of the Bohemian crown, to their legislative and administrative 
independence and autonomy is not abrogated, but rather persists wholly and 
completely in law, because a law, though it may be effectively withdrawn from 
practice, can never ever be abrogated by a fact, even if it [the fact] is a piece of 
legislation. That is the immovable legal basis of Bohemian Staatsrecht.7 
 
																																																								
6 Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 191. 
7 Karel Kramář, Das böhmische Staatsrecht (Vienna: Verlag “Die Zeit”, 1896), 20. Emphasis added. 
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The empress could make facts but not real law: the latter would have required the 
participation of the Bohemian estates. In this juridical imaginary, laws retained their force 
unless they had been directly overridden within their own structures of logic and 
legitimacy. This proposition remained true even if they were set aside, ignored, or 
contradicted. Under siege in the age of absolutism, the true historic laws huddled together 
in a kind of epistemological bunker well insulated from the cut and thrust of material 
facts restlessly in motion atop the surface of things.  
Kramář traced this subterranean stream of law running beneath a changeable 
world of government policy through the course of the empire’s history. The patent of 
1804, which established the title Emperor of Austria, exhibited “precisely the discrepancy 
between law and the actual order of internal relations,”8 because administration and the 
legislature were centralized, but the patent also formally recognized the rights of the 
crowns of Bohemia and Hungary that traditionally included the diets’ competence across 
a range of domains, including taxation. “From the legal perspective of the Bohemian 
people,” Bohemian Staatsrecht remained the only true law to which they owed 
allegiance: “Since Maria Theresa, facts and pieces of legislation may have been 
introduced against its legal validity, yet nothing that could abrogate the law as law, least 
of all the current constitution.”9 
																																																								
8 Kramář, Das böhmische Staatsrecht, 22. 
9 Kramář, Das böhmische Staatsrecht, 34. 
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Kalousek and Toman10 used similar formulations. The Kingdom of Bohemia, 
opined Kalousek, possessed its own body of law that could only be altered with its 
agreement.11  
 
What was introduced over a hundred years contrary to and against the will of 
the land in the sphere of state and constitutional law […] exists, from the point 
of view of the [Bohemian] coronation oath, not legally, but rather merely 
factually, something like the consequences of natural accidents 
[Elementarereignissen].12   
 
The facts that contradicted the survival of Bohemian state rights were facts without 
reason or legal significance, likened to the capriciousness of the natural world. Such 
arrangements could be “legalized” — facts transmuted into laws — only with the 
participation and agreement of the land’s genuine representatives.  
The ritualized distinction between legitimate law and political fact was far from a 
Czech or Bohemian idiosyncrasy. This rights culture, with its particular style of reasoning 
about the relationship between legal history and political history, extended across the 
empire. Hungarian accounts of the empire’s past, and analyses of the imperial present, 
brimmed with similar assumptions about legitimate law and its capacity to survive 
contradictions in fact. In his landmark account of the Hungarian constitution, the 
																																																								
10 For example, in Toman, we read: “Aus dieser Darstellung ist zu ersehen, dass seit dem J. 1795 durch den 
Absolutismus faktisch ein einheitlicher Staatsorganismus in den ausserungarischen Ländern hergestellt war. 
Trotzdem musste bis zum J. 1848 ununterbrochen das Bewusstsein der staatlichen Individualität der 
einzelnen Länder und Ländergruppen bestehen, wenn auch der Gedanke der Zusammengehörigkeit mit 
dem Fortschritte gleichartiger Institutionen natürlicherweise immer an Bedeutung gewann.” Hugo Toman, 
Das böhmische Staatsrecht und die Entwicklung der österreichischen Reichsidee vom Jahre 1527 bis 1848: 
Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Studie (Prague: J. G. Calve’sche k. k. Univers.-Buchhandlung, 1872), 226; see 
also 218. Emphasis added. 
11 Josef Kalousek, Einige Grundlagen des böhmischen Staatsrechtes (Prague: Verlag der J.S. 
Skrejšovský’schen Buchdruckerei, 1871), 65. 
12 Kalousek, Einige Grundlagen des böhmischen Staatsrechtes, 74. Emphasis added. 
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Hungarian historian Henrik Marczali discussed the enormous progress made by central 
institutions under the reign of Maria Theresa, as their activity extended across most 
aspects of public life. “But legally this activity [Wirksamkeit] was never recognized”; it 
always elicited resistance from the estates.13 The latter’s perspective won agreement in 
the laws of 1790/91 that deemed the Hungarian government legally independent, save for 
common state organs for war and diplomacy. “The state council and the state conference 
concerned themselves with Hungarian affairs, yet this factual activity was never viewed 
as lawful.”14  
The disjuncture between factual activity and ostensible legality was not proof of 
law’s erroneousness, nor was it embarrassing. Far from it: the estates’ protests had clearly 
preserved the correct legal measure and norm. This understanding of the nature of 
imperial law featured in more directly political representations, too. The prominent 
Hungarian politician Albert Apponyi — erstwhile minister of education, and future 
member of the Hungarian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, who we recall from 
chapter two — recounted Hungary’s original standing as an independent state within a 
personal union for an international audience in 1904. In various struggles since then, he 
argued, “the contrary tendencies of the dynasty sometimes prevailed in fact, though never 
in right, a protest made in due form always maintaining the legal continuity of our 
independence and constitutional freedom.”15 Here, too, the lodged protest flagged the 
persistence of the underlying legitimate status quo — in this case, Hungary’s right to 
																																																								
13 Heinrich [Henrik] Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), 175. 
14 Marczali, Ungarisches Verfassungsrecht, 175. 
15 Albert Apponyi, “The Army Question in Austria and Hungary,” Monthly Review 16 (July 1904): 7.  
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independence — its normativity uninjured by dynastic machinations. Legal continuity did 
not, apparently, require factual continuity.  
Apponyi employed a similar formulation in another 1911 lecture: “When our 
forefathers called the Hapsburg dynasty to the Hungarian throne it was not with the 
intention of melting down the Hungarian independence into any sort of broader empire,” 
he explained. Brokered for common defense, the union left Hungarian independence in 
tact, and the Austrians had generally adhered to this. “It was in practice often evaded, but 
never did the country recognize the juridical value of any of these evasions, and always, 
after more or less protracted time of trial, we came back to the principle and the theory, 
which legally had never been abandoned.”16 Like Kalousek’s formulation, the facts that 
contradicted historic rights lacked legal meaning; as the changeable and changing 
products of government policy, erratic like the weather, they were devoid of “juridical 
value.” These laws and rights laced smoothly through the centuries as an unbroken 
thread, unaffected by political storms overhead.  
This Central European rights culture thus relied heavily on what we can term the 
non-synchrony of law. Theorists of different stripes have long puzzled over the sort of 
disjuncture that cleaves off legal history from political history. In his rich essay 
“Geschichte, Recht, und Gerechtigkeit,” Reinhart Koselleck sketched the different 
structures of duration that were appropriate to legal history, reflecting the way law 
subsumed changing political events into general recurring categories. Within the logic of 
law itself, laws were not individual events, reducible to the particular context of their 
																																																								
16 Albert Apponyi, Lectures on the Peace Problem and on the Constitutional Growth of Hungary delivered 
in the United States and Canada (Budapest: St. Stephen’s Printing Press, 1911), 56-57. Emphasis added. 
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drafting or to any particular moment of actualization, but rather structurally predicated 
upon the possibility of their repetition and repeated application. The legal significance of 
the law in question comprised the whole span of that “ongoing applicability” (dauerhafte 
Anwendbarkeit), meaning that change in legal history unfolded in a far slower and less 
linear way than political history, traditionally conceived.17 In another postwar treatment, 
the legal scholar Gerhart Husserl — son of Edmund — argued that legal concepts form 
part of an abstract “objective time,” meaning that they were not synchronic with the 
actual behaviors to which they were variously applied.18 Both accounts capture 
something of the invulnerability or robustness that the late-imperial scholars and 
statesmen attributed to law vis-à-vis the flightier timescales of political life. 
Of course, from a materialist perspective, this non-synchrony could easily be 
interpreted as a sign of law’s secondary or diminished importance. In a 1906 study of the 
monarchy’s political predicament, Karl Renner — future father of the post-imperial 
Austrian state — took precisely this line, writing in more general terms about the 
relationship between law and political life. Material relations of power and their paths of 
development — “the earth (Boden), the population, its national and economic structure” 
— constituted “political facts of the first order.” Law merely adapted itself to these 
elementary facts, “jerkily, anticipative, and lagging behind [ruckweise, vorgreifend und 
nachhinkend]”: “law does not draw on the balance of developments daily but rather from 
generation to generation, from century to century and thus the day after its codification 
																																																								
17 Reinhart Koselleck, “Geschichte, Recht und Gerechtigkeit,” in Dieter Simon, ed., Akten des 26. 
Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages: Frankfurt am Main, 22. bis 26. September 1986 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 143-149. 
18 Gerhart Husserl, Recht und Zeit: Fünf rechtsphilosophische Essays (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1955), 31-32. 
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the legal state of affairs is already from yesterday.” As a result, “law is a fact of the 
second order.”19 Law’s long-drawn, non-synchronous structures of duration, in Renner’s 
view, made it merely a pale and late supplement to political reality.  
Perhaps the most apposite rendering of the particular temporality of this legal 
culture came from one of its sharpest contemporary observers, Friedrich Tezner. Tezner 
himself remained unconvinced of the legal plausibility of claims of historical right, and 
wrote of the anachronisms involved in their construction. Such rights claims 
misunderstood the legal nature of the early modern “absolutist estates state” (ständisch-
absolutistischen Staates), he argued. The privileges acknowledged in a document like the 
Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627, so central to the canon of Bohemian Staatsrecht, were 
not rights or law in the modern sense. In that kind of polity, the right of the prince 
“extends as far as his power”: “he swears to privileges, breaks them if he can, makes 
temporary constitutional concessions when he needs money from the estates, in order to 
withdraw them in more favorable circumstances.” This changeability did not entail some 
malevolent deception, as it would in today’s world. Rather, “all this is carried out with a 
naïve cordiality untroubled by consciousness of the injustice.”20 Resurrecting shifting 
legal concessions of this sort as sacred legal pacts — and expecting them to serve as the 
foundation of good title centuries later — transported a contemporary understanding of 
law back into the past. 
																																																								
19 Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen 
Monarchie: Politische Studie über den Zusammenbruch der Privilegienparlamente und die Wahlreform in 
beiden Staaten, über die Reichsidee und ihre Zukunft (Vienna and Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1906), 140. 
Emphasis in original. 
20 Friedrich Tenzer, “Böhmisches Staatsrecht,” Die Zeit 12, no. 148 (1897): 65. 
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Moreover, the intervening centuries could not but alter the basis of those rights 
and privileges, he opined in a later article written during the world war. “The jurist 
characterizes the fate befallen Bohemian Staatsrecht with the expression nova causa 
superveniens, and thereby means that each law stands and falls with the facts on which it 
is grounded, [the facts] that form its supports.” Since the battle of the White Mountain, 
Bohemia’s “actual relationships” had changed so fundamentally that the resurrection of 
historical Bohemian law now seemed impossible.21 Tezner thereby presented a different 
understanding of the relationship between law and fact: the former’s sense and validity 
crumbled if the historical-material context of its emergence changed beyond recognition.  
Yet it was Tezner’s observations about the “technique and spirit” of constitutional 
law in an estates-centered polity that — inadvertently, perhaps — captured a fundamental 
temporal characteristic of the nineteenth-century claims of historical right. In his 1901 
book Technik und Geist des Ständisch-Monarchischen Staatsrechts, Tezner parsed the 
nature of constitutional law in the medieval and early-modern estates-based polities of 
continental Europe. He described a legal world that generally lacked stable and self-
functioning mechanisms for the defence of formally existing rights, meaning that the 
legal order possessed a high degree of precarity.22 In this world, the guarantee of a legal 
norm could be distinguished from a guarantee for its material and substantive efficacy — 
the horizon of legal possibilities functioned differently. The legal rhythm of this world 
thus involved constant “renovation and repetition” as the estates ritualistically and 
																																																								
21 Friedrich Tezner, “Zum neusten böhmischen Staatsrecht,” Österreichische Rundschau 53 (1917): 246-
247. 
22 Friedrich Tezner, Technik und Geist des Ständisch-Monarchischen Staatsrechts (Leipzig: Verlag von 
Duncker und Humblot, 1901), 51, 53. 
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periodically appealed “for the recognition or renewal of formally existing rights.”23 
Rights, then, were permanently ripe for renewal: their absence or presence in any given 
moment said little about their ongoing validity, as each of those moments alone could not 
capture their more cyclic rhythms of renovation.  
Tezner’s portrayal of the nature of estates rights claims in centuries past bore 
more than a passing resemblance to the renovation of these (originally estates-based) 
rights in the second half of the nineteenth century. The sense that rights remained ever-
ready for reactivation, and that their loose tethering to factual observance in no way 
undermined their force, underpinned the logic of historical rights claims in the age of 
constitutionalism. Norms could survive as norms, irrespective of material efficacy in any 
given moment, constituting an entire architecture of formal legitimacy beneath the 
surface of things, like a platonic or hypothetical version of the empire. The statehood of 
the lands was a sleeping norm, a legal symbol with fluctuating patterns of actualization. 
Ostensibly, the timescale of renewal now simply spanned centuries and not only decades 
or years.  
The liberal politician and former education minister Joseph von Helfert 
understood this much in his account of the return to constitutionalism in 1860-61, with its 
resurrection of the historic title of the kingdoms and lands. From the perspective of the 
defenders of the “indigenous law” of the lands, what was offered in 1860 represented 
“the perpetuation of that which earlier and in its first beginnings had existed legitimately 
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for centuries, and which had legally never ceased to exist.”24 Speaking before the 
enlarged Reichsrat in 1860, Szécsen presented this perspective most stridently. The 
recent years of neo-absolutism had misunderstood the “true character” of the monarchy, 
he asserted. This true character instructed that “the Austrian monarchy is not a unified 
state [Einheitsstaat] in the modern sense” but rather a state formed out of “diverse 
elements” that all held fast to their “historical individuality”: 
 
It would be a dangerous self-deception to believe that the elements upon which 
this character rests, [the elements] out of which it [the monarchy] has 
developed, are obliterated or dissolved because their staatsrechtlicher 
expression is suspended; they live and function onwards, but they become 
delinquent and a subversive poison if one denies them recognition,— which is 
the precondition for their lawful and regular action.25  
 
Those “elements,” the historical legal individualities, did not die or disappear merely 
because their full force was suspended or muted. On the contrary, Szécsen warned, the 
government had to decide if it would allow that lifeforce to be channeled along 
productive, legitimate lines, or whether it would be forced underground, entering the 
empire’s bloodstream like a disease. The new constitution of 1860 that followed thus re-
exposed the secret life of law, submerged but not dissolved in the absolutist and neo-
absolutist eras.26  
																																																								
24 Joseph Alexander von Helfert, Die Böhmische Frage in ihrer jüngsten Phase (Prague: Verlag von F. 
Tempsky, 1873), 21. Emphasis added. 
25 Verhandlungen des österreichischen verstärkten Reichsrates 1860, nach den stenographischen 
Berichten, vol. 2 (Vienna: Verlag von Friedrich Manz, 1860), 46 (per Szécsen). Emphasis added. 
26 The historian of the Hungarian constitution, László Péter, more recently offered a balanced appraisal of 
these sorts of claims within the frame of Hungarian law, and especially the central drama of alleged 
continuity. One could argue that 1848 and 1867 represented significant departures, he wrote, with the 
infiltration and deployment of a new nineteenth-century field of vocabulary (“Gesetzgebung”, “bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft,” responsible government) working upon and even transforming older legal content. There 
was clearly a strong sense in which the central Hungarian position of this period - that the kingdom had 
formed an independent state since the middle ages, in law if not always in fact - represented a projection of 
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Thus, while Tezner disputed one sort of continuity, he is useful for the 
identification of a different sort. Contemporaries may have debated whether or not the 
rights themselves possessed legal continuity with past entitlements, but the meaningful or 
interesting continuity from our perspective might lie elsewhere, namely, in the 
persistence of certain styles of reasoning about rights — in understandings of the way 
they worked and their relationship with time. The temporal plurality of nineteenth-
century constitutionalism did not solely involve the divergent historical origins of the 
various rights and rights-subjects in play: the very ways of reasoning about rights also 
drew older customary rights cultures into the modern fray. Modern constitution-writing 
was thereby incorporated into longer patterns of cyclic repetition and renewal. In again 
asserting rights’ readiness for reactivation at the Paris Peace Conference, this imperial 
rights culture was renovated one step further into the new world order. 
 
Is Law Ever Vulnerable to Fact? Rechtsverwirkung versus Rechtskontinuität 
So how could legal continuity be disproved? Were there any kinds of facts that could 
break law and crush rights? This equation lay at the heart of a tense debate concerning the 
legal ramifications of the Hungarian rebellion of 1848-49. In waging revolutionary war, 
one particular line of thinking ran, the Hungarians had forfeited their historical rights and 
the standing of their historic constitution. A version of this view was articulated already 
																																																								
nineteenth-century understandings onto the material of the old constitution. Yet, at the same time, it was 
hard to deny the longstanding Hungarian emphasis on legal continuity, coupled with a resistance to any 
legal provisions imposed by the monarch. In this tradition, he conceded, 1848 and 1867 have characteristics 
of the resurrection or reaffirmation of the old. See László Péter, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn,” 
in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. 7 Verfassung und Parlamentarismus, part 1, 
Verfassungsrecht, Verfassungswirklichkeit, Zentrale Repräsentativkörperschaften, ed. Helmut Rumpler and 
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in the 1849 Kremsier parliamentary debates. Adolf Maria Pinkas, the delegate from 
Bohemia, opined on March 4 that “the Magyar people are the conquered, their former 
constitution is broken by treason and rebellion. As against this, the crown is the victor 
and justified in imposing [laws].”27 Unsurprisingly, the Hungarians saw things 
differently. In two memoranda submitted to Minister of the Interior Alexander von Bach, 
Emil Desswffy and others argued that Hungary had in no way forfeited its pre-1848 
constitution: after all, the rule of the Habsburgs relied on historical right, too, and the 
King of Hungary could never let this foundation be swept away. As conqueror, the 
monarch could impose order, but as lawmaker (Gesetzgeber), he must reckon with 
history.28 
The government ministries responded to these memoranda directly. “Through 
their insurrection,” instructed the Gesamtministerium in June 1849, and especially 
through the Hungarian declaration of independence of April 1849, “the Magyars have 
themselves destroyed the historical right of the Kingdom of Hungary.” Such a land, with 
Kossuth provocatively installed as a “usurper” governor-president, needed to be re-
captured by its “legitimate sovereign” — “and the law of the victor is his right.”29 
According to Heinrich Friedjung, an important late-imperial historian (and student of von 
Ranke’s), the principle of legal forfeiture was here for the first time deployed to counter a 
																																																								
27 Protokolle des Verfassungs-Ausschusses im Österreichischen Reichstag 1848-1849, ed. Anton Springer 
(Leipzig: G. Hirzel, 1885), 361. 
28 See Heinrich Friedjung, Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2nd ed. vol. 1 (Stuttgart and Berlin: J. G. 
Cotta’sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1908), 372. 
29 Vortrag of the Gesamtministeriums, June 1849, Akten des Ministeriums des Innern von 1849, Nr. 4022, 
quoted in Friedjung, Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 1, 373. 
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claim of historical right.30 The jurist Edmund Bernatzik instead identified a repeating 
pattern: “the same ‘theory of legal forfeiture’ was applied to Bohemia after the Battle of 
the White Mountain (see the Renewed Land Ordinance of 1627), only with more 
success.”31 Bohemia and Hungary had both brought rich bodies of law into the empire in 
1526: if the rebellion of the former in 1627 gravely damaged Bohemian rights, it 
remained an open question in the 1850s whether the mid-nineteenth-century rebellion of 
the latter had done the same to Hungarian rights.  
The Hungarian statesman József Eötvös contested this thesis of legal forfeiture — 
known as Rechtsverwirkung or the Verwirkungstheorie — in terms that recalled Edmund 
Burke’s ancient constitution.32 “In my opinion it is unwise to advance the principle that 
rights, which do not belong to a [particular] generation, can be forfeited forever through 
their mistakes or wrongdoing.”33 As the accumulated heritage of centuries, law did not 
belong to a single generation, and could not be destroyed by it, either: ownership was 
collective and trans-temporal. Its cross-generational validity could not be considered 
																																																								
30 Friedjung, Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 1, 374. As Friedjung noted, the government did not 
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31 Edmund Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterung, 2nd ed. (Vienna: 
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Growth of Hungary, 55. 
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vulnerable to momentary misfortunes or failures. “I do not believe that the general legal 
feeling of the civilized world can endorse the principle according to which all the rights 
of a people can be viewed as extinguished by an act of theirs,” Eötvös maintained.34 Acts 
and deeds — the regular facts of history — had no power to affect deeper structures of 
legality, which transpired on a timescale beyond the agency of individual actors. Rights 
were not an economy, mineral, or medium that could be traded, offset, or destroyed by 
regular interactions.  
These more philosophical considerations converged directly with questions of 
policy as the era of neo-absolutism wound down to its end in the late 1850s. If the 
government was to recognize the historical particularity of the lands once more, did that 
imply its affirmation of the continuity of historical rights? The influential former 
ambassador in Paris, Joseph Alexander Hübner, named police minister in August 1859, 
composed a report for the emperor on the situation across the monarchy in October of the 
same year. Circumstances were especially volatile and sensitive in Hungary. Whatever 
concessions the emperor eventually granted Hungary, Hübner cautioned, “I am persuaded 
that it must appear as an act of imperial grace and not as a forced return to historical 
rights.”35 As it played out, the government attempted to walk what Bernatzik deemed a 
muddled middle line, re-establishing the Hungarian constitution but persisting in their 
view that the Hungarian estates had “forfeited” their rights in 1848.36 “These two 
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des Österreichischen Ministerrates, 1848-1867, Abteilung IV, Das Ministerium Rechberg, vol. 1, 19. Mai 
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principles ‘theory of forfeiture’ and ‘legal continuity’ cancel each other out. Nonetheless, 
the government believed it could combine the two of them together.”37 
Naturally, Hungarian leaders rejected any pretence that the partial resurrection of 
the Hungarian constitution in 1860/61 was an act of kingly grace: they maintained that 
their historic constitution had never ceased to be the only legitimate law. They protested 
its reappearance as part of a constitution that applied to the whole empire, including an 
imperial parliament that would have competence over the Hungarian lands. When the 
Hungarian diet re-opened for the first time in the new constitutional era in April 1861, 
they refused to elect representatives for the imperial parliament, not unlike the 
Bohemians. “One wants to give us a constitution,” asserted the Hungarian leader Franz 
Deák and future mastermind of the 1867 Compromise in his famous speech before the 
new Hungarian diet, “but not the one taken from us with force, but rather another, new, 
foreign, a part of an overall constitution [Gesamtverfassung] that is drawn up for the 
whole empire.”38 Hungary did not need this imposed constitution: they wanted their own 
one, which was not a “gift,” but rather the result of mutual contracts, and that had 
evolved out of the life of the nation:  
 
that constitution which we ourselves have adapted relative to the needs of the 
time, and want to adapt ourselves in the future, that constitution whose 
principles have been sanctioned by the centuries. On our side stands justice 
and law and the sanctity of contracts— and against us, material force.39 
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ungarischen Landtages (Vienna: Friedrich Förster & Brüder, n.d. [1861]), 1. 





The government’s military victory in 1849, and subsequent attempts to incorporate 
Hungary into a singular imperial polity, represented the products of mere force, mere 
material facts, as against a body of law that had emerged through history and in 
conversation with it, sanctioned and sanctified by time. 
Over the course of the 1860s, the Hungarian interpretation seemingly won out. In 
Bernatzik’s view, the government’s attempt to both reintroduce parts of the Hungarian 
constitution and insist that Hungarians had forfeited their historic rights through rebellion 
was doomed to fail. A sense of inevitability connected 1860/61 to the thoroughgoing 
Hungarian independence of the 1867 Compromise: “It is but clear, that after the principle 
of legal continuity was recognized once, the result could only be the complete restoration 
of Hungarian Staatsrecht.”40 The emperor had dissolved the rebellious Hungarian diet in 
October 1861; by the time he recalled it again in December 1865, he had already 
suspended the 1860/61 constitution three months earlier. Gradually, he abandoned the 
theory of legal forfeiture, inching closer to that of legal continuity, “that is, to adopt an 
attitude as if the unified state of 1848-1867 had never existed.”41  
Had historical law in fact survived continuously not only through the decades of 
eighteenth-century absolutism but through the decade of neo-absolutism in the nineteenth 
as well? Writing the entry for “constitutional history” in the landmark public law 
compendium Österreichisches Staatswörterbuch (this volume published 1909),	the jurist 
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Franz Hauke (1852-1915) suggested as much. Hauke, professor of Austrian constitutional 
law at Czernowitz and	then Graz, wrote that Hungary had lost its staatsrechtlichen 
independence in the constitution of 1849 (the implication that it had survived until then is 
striking on its own terms):	
	
Through the application of a theory of legal forfeiture, Hungary was considered 
a conquered country that had to accept its legal standing from the hands of the 
conquering force. Only gradually did the legal truth break through that a people 
cannot “forfeit” its law, that it has a right to the preservation or correct 
development of its constitutional circumstances.42	
 
Since then, Hauke observed, the discussion no longer concerned forfeited rights, but how 
the legal status of Hungary could be brought into harmony with the imperial constitution. 
So Hungary’s pre-imperial body of public law was now accepted as an untouchable 
component of the law of the imperial polity? Historical rights were immovable, immune 
to the vicissitudes of political and military history? The aforementioned jurist 
Gumplowicz seemed to agree that Hungarian historical rights were entirely resistant to 
political power and military defeat. He mocked the government’s ambition and 
pretension to transform the monarchy into a unified state through the constitution of 
1849. They had failed to reckon with historical relationships that had not “died but rather 
remained strong”; as a result, “historical development […] threw the March [1849] 
constitution in its waste paper basket.”43 “What is interesting in all this is also the 
following,” Gumplowicz mused: 
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Alfred Hölder, 1909), 729. Emphasis added. 
43 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Einleitung in das Staatsrecht (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1889), 213. 




The Schwarzenberg-Stadion ministry confiscated so to speak the [Kremsier] 
parliament’s proposal, ostensibly because it didn’t incorporate Hungary in the 
constitution. But history confiscated the March constitution for precisely that 
reason — because it incorporated Hungary. For Hungary can no doubt be 
beaten on the battlefield, it can be tormented and martyred by material 
superiority, but as a powerful, historically great nationality it can never ever be 
robbed of its independence. At any rate, this insight dawned in Austria only two 
decades later; before then, still more state experiments were set into motion, as 
we will see.44  
 
Despite Hungary’s military defeat in 1849, the government’s attempts to absorb it into 
the general imperial polity had little chance of success: Hungary’s independence, 
invulnerable to material superiority, had history on its side. 
Propositions like these — that Hungary’s autonomous status and constitutional 
law remained somehow pristine and unbroken by imperial realities — made Karl Renner 
scoff. The Hungarian constitutional tradition was built out of “juridical and political 
fictions,” he protested; it was always already endangered as soon as it was brought to life, 
and lived as it died, with only more fictions to offer the hangman.45 The time-honoured 
Hungarian estates constitution in fact represented a “fiction” that had deceived Europe 
and the Hungarians themselves. Anything but continuous, it had been violently 
interrupted repeatedly over the centuries: “There is perhaps no second constitution in the 
world that so chronically suffers from constitutional ruptures as the Hungarian.”46 Again 
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46 [Renner], Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, 100. 
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and again the Hungarians cry out against interference with their untouchable constitution, 
against Viennese centralism — “what self-deception, what unconscious mystification!”47 
Therein lay the rub: legal discourses rife with fictions, projections, and 
mythmaking nevertheless played out in “real” ways across the juridical face of the 
empire. When, in the Ausgleich of 1867, Hungarian claims to independence were 
endorsed by the government, the line between myth and reality blurred to the point of 
insignificance. In his 1911 history of Hungarian constitutional law, Marczali voiced the 
general understanding of his compatriots in his assessment that the Ausgleich 
“established legal continuity.”48 The mythical temporality of Rechtskontinuität merged 
with the imperial present. In his classic 1904 study of the Ausgleich, the historian Louis 
Eisenmann remarked that, “for centuries, Hungary has led a double existence: one in 
reality, another in its laws.” These laws had preserved the “legal fiction of its 
sovereignty. It is on this legal fiction that the laws of 1848 were based and it is this legal 
fiction which the laws of 1867 have turned into a reality.”49 In this rights culture, legal 
fictions were less fictions than slumbering or suspended realities. As the empire was 
disintegrating, the Hungarian historian and writer André de Hevesy in fact employed 
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precisely this metaphor in memorializing Hungarian preservation of their ancient 
liberties: 
The articles of the constitution of the sovereign kingdom of Saint-Stephen still 
subsisted. Generation followed upon generation within this sleeping palace, 
content to take for realities the texts of the written law. Thoroughly imbued 
with these abstractions, Austro-Hungary found in them its strength and none 
the less a source of weakness.50 
 
 
As a technique of imperial rule, allowing old sovereignties to slumber (rather than 
destroying them entirely) had distinct advantages. After all, empires around the world 
were, in the same moment, turning “back” to fictional sovereignty precisely because of 
its practical utility in leaving certain difficult questions unresolved.51 The comparison 
between empires suggests the typological breadth of late nineteenth-century fictional 
imperial sovereignty, used not only to project a veneer of legitimacy in new, extra-
European spheres of interest, but also to conceptualize and codify imperial relations at the 
heart of the old European continent itself.  
It was not only Hungary that led a double life. The Bohemians had toiled 
fruitlessly to convert their legal fictions into legal facts in the 1860s: that the Hungarians 
succeeded where they had failed never ceased to be a source of acute frustration. As the 
Bohemian representatives complained in the famous (aforementioned) declaration of 
August 1868, their “historical right to self-determination in their state and constitutional 
affairs” was “of the same sort and just as old” as the Hungarian version.52 But their rights 
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remained stranded in that platonic version of the empire — the submerged empire of 
surviving norms and residual laws that only intermittently broke through to the surface of 
material and political life. 
 
States and Angels: The Temporal Pretensions of Legal Personality 
In Eisenmann’s account, Hungary’s sovereignty was transformed from a legal fiction into 
a reality in 1867. Such a formulation captures contemporary understandings of the 
capacity of old legal fictions and myths to be reconverted or renovated into full-bodied 
factual life once more. Yet this neat emplotment of the relationship between legal fiction 
and fact perhaps obscures a more fundamental way in which juridical fictions coloured 
and structured this imperial rights culture, namely in their constitutive relationship to 
conceptions of state and corporation more generally. The intellectual construction of a 
collective rights-subject itself relies on a pivotal legal fiction - and one with very 
particular temporal characteristics at that. The art of having rights has a history, but also 
perhaps even a philosophy of history of its own. 
Within the world of legal theory, perhaps the most archetypal of all legal fictions 
is that of the capacity of collectives to possess a singular legal personality, to form 
fictional persons in the eyes of the law and thereby to accrue rights and duties of their 
own. Termed persona ficta, nomina juris, corporations, or (originally in Roman law) 
universitas, these legal persons were usually known in German as “juristische Personen” 
or, until the nineteenth century “moralische Personen” or “mystische Personen.” (We 
recall Palacký aspirationally referring to nations as mystical persons in this sense in the 
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opening sections of chapter three). A classic nineteenth-century definition was penned by 
the German scholar of Roman law, Eduard Böcking: 
 
As juridical (fictitious, also moral or mystical) persons we identify those bearers 
of personality, legal capacity and subjectivity that have unified will that is valid 
(only) in law, without it having been supplied to them by nature; or legal 
subjects without the corporeal individuality of a human.53 
 
These persons possessed a single body and common intention from law rather than nature 
— therein lay their “fictionality.” As the Austrian lawyer Joseph Winiwarter — a 
professor of law at the University of Vienna — stated most simply in 1831, multiple 
people could come together and appear “as a legal-subject,” where they are thought of as 
one person, and known as a moral or juridical person. Such a moral person had but one 
“pronounced will.”54 Often associated with private law, its centrality to public law was 
clearly established as a matter of both fact and theory by the late nineteenth century.55 
The nature of corporate legal personality is especially instructive of the analytic 
slipperiness of the “fictional” part of legal fictions. In wielding rights and bearing duties, 
the (fictitious) legal person clearly acquires a legal “reality.” Precisely for that reason, in 
his classic 1908 study of juridical personality, the German jurist Otto Mayer opined that 
the term fiction was somewhat poorly chosen. The theory of fictions was undeniably 
important for that of legal personality. Yet it could also be misleading. If, in any 
																																																								
53 Eduard Böcking, Pandekten des römischen Privatrechts aus dem Standpuncte unseres heutigen 
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55 See footnotes 31-36 in chapter three. 
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particular instance, it should seem as if a real person was present, when in fact none was 
there, then that would be a fiction, “because the legal order is not master over nature”: 
 
Yet it is master to determine what should count for it as a legal subject. When it 
says: that should be treated as if it was one, then that has the same value as if it 
said: that is one. To this extent the juridical person is a reality for the jurists: for 
others too, they just don’t see them.56  
 
Within the law’s own logic, the line between legal fiction and “reality” was conceptually 
inconsequential, or even invisible. As articulated in more recent research on the making 
and unmaking of legal persons, in constituting abstract or “fictional” persons as full-
blooded juridical subjects, law “usurps” nature,57 thereby wielding “a power that was 
limitless and magical.”58 The philosopher Miguel Tamen expressed the same point with 
less melodrama: legal persons “are fictional only in the sense of being formed and indeed 
granted, that is, of having historical origin.”59 They were not products of nature, but 
products of history. The “condition for their specific bodiliness is dependent on a 
foundational act that institutes such bodiliness as a historical product (and only in this 
sense as a fiction).”60 
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Yet the historicity of corporate legal personality possessed unusual features. 
Juridical persons may be of and from history, but implicit in their very construction was a 
resistance or immunity to history as a transformative medium. That is, legal persons do 
not die. This characteristic lay at the heart of Ernst Kantorowicz’s classic study of the 
intellectual origins of modern European conceptions of the state. Kantorowicz recovered 
a medieval world in which jurists “borrowed abundantly from the vocabulary of 
scholastic philosophy” and “moved freely in the borderlands of theology, philosophy, and 
jurisprudence.”61 Crucially, the collective element of the universitas came to be 
understood not only as a plurality of members in any one given moment but also their 
successiveness over time: the legal persons “were that ‘plurality’ in succession, braced by 
Time and through the medium of Time.”62 The corporation’s “mystical body” comprised 
not only a “horizontal” plurality of contemporaneous men living together in a 
community, but also a “vertical” plurality in the successiveness of its members trailing in 
a line through history. This smooth vertical succession formed “the essential factor 
knitting the universitas into continuity.”63 In persisting through time, the legal person 
defied death or extinction: “the most significant feature of the personified collectives and 
corporate bodies was that they projected into past and future, that they preserved their 
identity despite changes, and that therefore they were legally immortal.”64 In 
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Kantorowicz’s account, these juridical inventions represented the intellectual embryos of 
European understandings of the state with its perpetuity and stable legal identity. Over 
time, he argued, “the findings of the jurists — the identity in succession and the legal 
immortality of the corporation — began to sink in and to be combined with the idea of 
the state as an ever-living organism or with the emotional concept of patria.”65 As 
Frederic William Maitland phrased it in a classic essay, “theories of the State and theories 
of the Corporation must be closely connected.”66 
The state, like other collective legal persons, was a time-collapsing subject, 
carrying a stable self through history. It was precisely this temporality, this capacity for 
continuity, which was claimed for the historic polities of the empire. Underneath changes 
in power and scope, the legal body of the rights-subject survived in its identity and 
individuality. In this sense, the historical lands aped the temporality of a state in deep and 
structural ways. Take Kalousek on the legal ramifications of the Renewed Land 
Ordinance of 1627: “The constitution was curtailed, but the Bohemian state remained as 
such, and its individuality and own existence [Eigenexistenz] suffered a rupture as little as 
France had ceased to be an independent state through the simultaneous inauguration of 
absolutism.”67 No one doubted the continuity of France’s legal personality through its 
changes in government, so why doubt Bohemia’s? State identity persisted through 
political upheaval: this legal body never went missing in history.68 
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The Hungarian statesman Antal Szécsen had captured this characteristic, this 
possession of a unique and unending legal personhood, in his catchcry of 1860, 
“historical-political individuality.” The Austrian jurists adopted similar terminology. 
Hungary, Ludwig Gumplowicz explained, formed the most powerful of the historical-
political individualities in the territory of the monarchy because its “autonomous 
historical life” had continued virtually “unbroken” over more than a thousand years and 
survived “undamaged” into the present.69 Joseph Alexander von Helfert, the liberal 
politician and historian who served as education minister in 1860/61, portrayed Bohemia 
in similar terms, while also hinting at the tension between the general personality of the 
state and the more personal logic of estate rights. The Bohemian estates representatives 
had never given up the traditions of administration, legislative capacity, and historical 
independence, he recounted. Even if the estates were thinking of their own prerogatives 
and privileges, “in the process the staatsrechtliche particularity of the Bohemian crown 
as something self-evident was always presumed, that did not first need to be asserted and 
proven.”70 The legal individuality of the Bohemian polity was preserved through the 
rights claims of the estates, but also pre-presumed by those rights claims: its place, and 
standing, and permanence in this rights culture was self-evident. 
The prominent Austrian jurist Rudolf von Herrnritt (1865-1945) cast a synoptic 
gaze over these legal relationships when asked, during the First World War, to reflect on 
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the normative status of the historic lands. As we all know, he reasoned, the particular 
state organization found in Austria-Hungary needed to be explained historically. “It is a 
hallmark of the current political standing of the lands that they have retained and 
developed their historical individuality, indeed without consideration of the duration of 
their unification under the common dynasty.”71 The long centuries of rule from Vienna 
had not dissolved their status as distinct protagonists in law and history. Crucially, and 
most importantly for current politics, they had preserved this individuality “irrespective” 
of their nationally-mixed, “non-homogenous population.”72 The rise of nationalism and 
its challenge to the formal composition of the empire had not succeeded in displacing the 
form and particularity of the historical lands. Herrnritt could not have known the new 
legal resonance this individuality would acquire when the empire dissolved a mere two 
years later. Apparently, and remarkably, these historical-legal subjects had entered the 
empire centuries earlier and, notwithstanding imperial centralization or nationalism’s 
reordering of the political imagination, were about to come out the other side, their 
unique personhood in tact. 
So much for the pretensions to legal immortality that lay at the heart of the state’s 
corporate legal structure. What of the paradox or tension inherent in the construction of a 
subject that was both a product of history, as discussed above, and ostensibly immortal at 
the same time? These two propositions represented the dual meaning of “fiction” in 
																																																								
71 Rudolf von Herrnritt, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer im Gefüge der österreichischen 
Verfassung: Eine Rundfrage,” in Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, Heinrich 
Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, eds., Länderautonomie, Sonderheft of the Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1916), 37. 
Emphasis in original.  
72 Rudolf von Herrnritt, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer,” 38. Emphasis in original.  
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persona ficta: that is, the artificial creation of a singular subject where nature had not 
provided it, and the perpetuation of that singular subjecthood despite a plurality of 
members over time. How could subjects with worldly historical origins have the ambition 
to defy history itself? By necessity, they emerged only in time, yet were constructed to 
outlast time, too. Miguel Tamen phrased the temporal idiosyncrasies of collective legal 
persons in the following terms: “Fiction is therefore the production of an ahistorical body, 
which however has inscribed in itself its very historical origin.” As a result, “corporations 
as persons are potentially eternal products, indeed one of the very few eternal productions 
possible.”73 
Kantorowicz excavated the political-theological origins of this peculiar 
comportment to (and in) history. It did not amount to a secularization of God’s eternal, 
divine time, he argued: the aeternitas of the Divine Being was timeless, motionless, 
without past or future, where all times were present simultaneously. Yet neither did it 
correspond with the finite, ever-flowing, perishable tempus of mortal man. Kantorowicz 
recounted the revival of a category between these two temporal binaries: namely, the 
aevum, signifying “a kind of infiniteness and duration which had motion and therefore 
past and future, a sempiternity” — that is, a different, embedded sort of endlessness.74 
“Whose” time was it? If aeternitas belonged to God, and tempus to man, aevum 
represented the time of the angels, hovering between man and God. “The angels, like 
man, were created; but man’s transitory tempus could not be theirs, since angels were 
eternal beings, bodiless, immortal, and outlasting the Last Day. On the other hand, being 
																																																								
73 Tamen, “Kinds of Persons, Kinds of Rights, Kinds of Bodies,” 15. 
74 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 279. 
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created they could not be coeternal with the Creator.”75 Created yet perpetual, they 
owned a share in terrestrial time as well as God’s eternity. This status accorded them a 
unique position in and for history: “If God in his Eternity was the Immutable beyond and 
without Time, and if man in his tempus was the Mutable within a mutable and changing 
finite Time, then the angels were the Immutable within a changing, though infinite, 
aevum.”76 
The time of the angels became the time of states.77 States, like angels, were not 
synchronous with the regular, shifting time of man, and with the rise and fall of his 
political projects or representations. “We know of people that they must die,” wrote 
Gerhart Husserl in his study of law and time: “The existence of people has a particular 
rhythm: he is born, he becomes old, he dies. We do not know the laws of the life rhythms 
of states, nations, supranational organizations and other political bodies that are admitted 
to a legal order.”78 Their unmoving legal perpetuity, embedded in historical time but 
fundamentally untouched by the regular (political, social, “factual”) travails of any of its 
particular members or moments, lay at the heart of the ability to carry rights and duties 
																																																								
75 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 280. 
76 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 281. 
77 See Kantorowicz: “In the center of the corporational doctrines of the jurists were the collective 
abstractions, or immortal and immutable species, in comparison with which the mortal, and ever 
replaceable, individual components appeared of lesser importance and in many respects negligible. The de-
individualized fictitious persons of the lawyers, therefore, necessarily resembled the angles, and the jurists 
themselves recognized that there was some similarity between their abstractions and the angelic beings. In 
this respect, then, it may be said that the political and legal world of thought of the later Middle Ages began 
to be populated by immaterial angelic bodies, large and small: they were invisible, ageless, sempiternal, 
immortal, and sometimes even ubiquitous; and they were endowed with a corpus intellectuale or mysticum 
which could stand any comparison with the ‘spiritual bodies’ of the celestial beings.” Kantorowicz, The 
King’s Two Bodies, 282-283. 
78 Husserl, Recht und Zeit, 11. 
	
	 287	
through time, to be conduits of (a stable) law in (changing) history. The historian 
Christopher Clark has recently called states “history machines,”79 and to the extent that 
his depiction holds, that capacity is enabled by these temporal characteristics. States were 
historical rather than natural or organic products, firmly webbed into its changing times, 
yet possessed of a particular talent to serve as its actors because of their transtemporal 
longevity. Once founded and unleashed by history, it was actually very hard to kill this 
legal personality and the rights it carried with it.  
This was certainly the case with the empire’s historic lands. The nonsynchrony of 
imperial law had nurtured a culture of rights heavily reliant on the transtemporal 
projections of any claim to statehood. It was precisely because they had lost most of their 
material life that these historical Länder made those transtemporal projections so visible. 
Reduced to their legal personality alone, the Länder drew attention to the historical 
metaphysics involved in the legal construction of statehood — that is, the legal fiction of 
the juridical immortality states. 
																																																								






Nations as Juridical Persons between Imperial and International Law 
 
What of the legal fate of those other non-sovereign collectives, the empire’s nationalities, 
discussed at the opening of Chapter Three? The problem of the legal personality of 
nations not only raised fundamental questions concerning the relationship of rights and 
statehood to territory, but also darted promiscuously over the line between imperial and 
international law. As the empire gave way to a new international order at the end of the 
First World War, both the protagonists and concepts from the imperial jurisprudence on 
national rights migrated into a new conversation on minority protection under the 
auspices of the League of Nations.  
We recall Palacký’s advocacy of nations as legal corporations capable of bearing 
rights, and the skepticism of jurists like Gumplowicz, Exner, and Jellinek about the same. 
Certainly, such skepticism never abated.1 It was clearly on display when, in 1916, the 
editors of the Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (which included our friend 
Edmund Bernatzik) took stock of expert opinion on the juridical re-formation of the 
																																																								
1 Gerhard Stourzh has argued that although nations were never organized into legal persons, the rights 
granted under section 19 of the constitution did have meaning and affect, because collective claims were 
brought by municipal organizations or voluntary associations, for example, that represented national 
interests in a particular area even if they did not represent the totality of members of that national group. 
Thus the binary between individual citizens and organized nationalities fitted out with representative organs 
does not capture the political reality of old Austria. See Gerald Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtigung der 
Volkstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848-1918,” in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die 
Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. 3., Die Völker des Reiches, part 2 (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 1149-1157. We could say that these were surrogate 
legal personalities, that could treat the issues in a piecemeal fashion, local case by local case, rather than 
dealing with the question more structural legal terms for the empire as a whole. 
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empire. They circulated a survey among those teaching constitutional and administrative 
law in Austrian universities that asked respondents to critically evaluate “the current 
effectiveness of the Länder, especially with regard to the solution of the nationality 
problem.” In particular, they should address the question: “whether the autonomy of the 
Länder as historical individualities develops forwards or backwards [fort- oder 
rückbildet], or whether it should be discarded entirely and what change of the 
organization should be proposed.”2 Was the autonomy of the historical lands progressive 
or regressive, and where did nationalism fit into this legal equation? In his response, the 
jurist Hans von Frisch — then professor of law at the lively University of Czernowitz — 
described the combination of national politics and administrative measures as the 
“cancer” of Austria’s whole administration. The tasks of the state did not extend to 
national affairs: “One cannot govern with nationalities, because ‘nation’ is not a legal 
concept; one needs to finally recognize this in Austria.”3 
“Nation” was no legal concept: for others, this perception constituted both the 
problem and the task at hand. As is well known, Austria-Hungary’s last decades brimmed 
with a range of schemes aimed at spinning “nations” into legal subjects. Right up until 
the empire’s end, calls for a new national organization of the empire had to square their 
vision against the current historical organization of the empire, as rival versions of the 
																																																								
2 Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, Heinrich Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, 
Editorial, “Die Stellung der Krönländer im Gefüge der österreichischen Verfassung: Eine Rundfrage,” in 
Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, Heinrich Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, eds., 
Länderautonomie, Sonderheft of the Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche 
k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1916), 1. 
3 Hans von Frisch, [n. t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer im Gefüge der österreichischen 
Verfassung: Eine Rundfrage,” in Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, Heinrich 
Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, eds., Länderautonomie, Sonderheft of the Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1916), 36. 
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empire’s juridical “individualities.” Naturally, those “non-historical” peoples without a 
historical Land of their “own,” shut out of the empire’s governing structures, had a 
particular interest in proposals that looked to replace or augment the historical lands with 
collectives founded on nationality. Take, for example, another of the respondents to the 
1916 survey, Stanislaus Dnistriańskyj (also Dniestrzański), who, like von Frisch, taught 
law in what is today the Ukraine (at this point he was an außerordentlicher professor at 
the university in Lemberg, now Lviv). The Ruthenian/ Ukrainian Dnistriańskyj had also 
served as a representative of Galicia in the lower house of the imperial parliament. In his 
text, he cast the autonomy of the historical lands — still enshrined in the constitution — 
as grossly out of step with the broad arc of developments elsewhere in Europe, where 
constitutional orders based on estates or aristocratic models had been cast aside. “Yet the 
supporters of the autonomy of the lands still appeal today to the ‘historical’ rights of the 
lands, although ‘historical’ foundations in Europe have fallen so strongly into disrepute.”4 
“Modern state tasks,” he counseled, “require modern means and ways.”5 
More than untimely, the historical order relied on misrepresentations. Contrary to 
perceptions, not all the Austrian lands were genuine “historical units.” His view from 
Galicia — outside the Bohemian and Hungarian discourses that so dominated these 
questions — was hardly incidental here. Galicia never formed an historical entity, he 
reminded his readers; it was restructured into an administrative unit only in the 1860s. 
																																																								
4 Stanislaus Dnistriańskyj, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer im Gefüge der 
österreichischen Verfassung: Eine Rundfrage,” in Edmund Bernatzik, Max Freiherr Hussaek von Heinlein, 
Heinrich Lammasch and Adolf Menzel, eds., Länderautonomie, Sonderheft of the Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 
1916), 21. 
5 Dnistriańskyj, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer,” 23. 
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Until then, west and east Galicia had remained clearly distinct: the former had constituted 
an integral part of the Polish kingdom since its inception, while the latter was originally 
“a part of the old Ukrainian state of Kiev and its borderland against Poland.”6 (The stakes 
here were hardly obscure). The invention of “Galicia” only testified further to the 
irrationality of an imperial politics founded on historical principles. 
If the central government had proved too weak to tame the lands in the 1860s, a 
victorious war promised to recast the empire’s political structures. The war would be won 
neither by the crownlands nor the diets, neither by the estates nor the parties, but by the 
peoples (die Völker), Dnistriańskyj declared. The state apparatus would then need to bend 
to the latter, not to the former. All that had not proved successful must be abrogated and 
washed away. War had the capacity to melt down forms and stand new ones in their 
place, not least because the historic forms would prove useless in such a struggle.7 New 
“peoples territories” (Volksgebiete) would rise where the crownlands had once stood. If 
the representative organs of these territories would necessarily bear the character of the 
majority population in each area respectively, “national sections” should also be 
developed in each territory, through which nationalities would constitute an “independent 
legal subject” so as to articulate and defend their interests against the majority: “national 
sections should be created and recognized as organs of the nationalities in their 
individuality as corporations of public law.”8 A solution to the national question would 
																																																								
6 Dnistriańskyj, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer,” 22. 
7 Dnistriańskyj, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer,” 23. 
8 Dnistriańskyj, [n.t.], contribution to “Die Stellung der Krönländer,” 28. 
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require the construction of novel public law corporations that were not states: legal 
personality, not sovereignty, held the key.  
If Dnistriańskyj’s vision remained tethered to territory (and thus to the logic of 
majorities and minorities), the most famous proposals for the national reorganization of 
the empire boldly envisioned an imperial political structure that superseded territory 
altogether. In their respective works Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie 
(1907) and Staat und Nation (1899), the Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner 
famously elaborated a federal vision for the empire built around the so-called 
“personality principle.” They argued that national collectives could be constituted non-
territorially among co-nationals, wherever they happened to live, through a curia system 
analogous to church membership. If their vision proved phenomenally influential — not 
least to the east where Lenin and Stalin were developing a communist position on the 
national question — it also attracted various counter arguments, especially from those 
alive to the potentially revolutionary consequences “personal autonomy” could have for 
theories of the state. In its demotion of the significance of territory, for example, it 
clashed with the ascendant discipline of geography. Robert Sieger, at that point professor 
of geography at the University of Graz, critiqued the dramatic implications of Renner’s 
plan in precisely these terms. Renner’s program  
 
would lead directly to a complete or near complete separation of the “national 
federal state” from territorial foundations; but one has legitimately doubted 
whether “personal states” are capable of life in a period in which the life of 
intercourse [Verkehrsleben] increasingly accentuates spatial contexts.9  
																																																								
9 Robert Sieger, Der österreichische Staatsgedanke und seine geographischen Grundlagen (Vienna and 
Leipzig: Carl Fromme, 1918), 19. Sieger would serve as a geographical advisor for the Austrian delegation 




In distributing law according to demography rather than geography, the Austro-Marxist 
program introduced the specter of states without territory. Law may determine the 
subjects of its order, but Springer doubted its capacity to entirely overrule hard spatial-
physical realities and still produce polities robust enough to survive. What were rights 
without land? 
Such skepticism notwithstanding, the Austro-Marxist program served and serves 
as a multidirectional axis upon which so many of the major political currents of the early 
twentieth century pivot: here Marxist, communist, and Bundist understandings of nations 
and nationalism intersected with the global catch-cry of self-determination and its 
precarious relationship to sovereignty. The creativity and legal dexterity required to solve 
Austria-Hungary’s constitutional conundrum emerged as a highly exportable commodity 
with clear resonance and applicability to multiethnic polities the world over: imperial 
constitutional law acquired a properly international stage. More than discrete unit ideas 
traveling between different contexts, Renner conceived the autonomy program as hybrid 
blend of domestic and international law — a means of inviting supranational law into the 
imperial fold. As he put it in The Self-Determination of Nations with Particular 
Application to Austria, perhaps the most complete articulation of his program, published 
in 1918 (with a preface dated December 1917):  
 
Incontestably, this country, despite its objectionable constitutional 
backwardness in all other things, has made in this area the first and most 
interesting attempts at an internal international law [innerstaatlichen 
Völkerrechtes], it can count as a field of experimentation for internal 
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internationalism, and therefore has a high interest for legal research as well as 
political praxis.10 
 
It was the international law of the empire. Palacký’s prophesy — that a theory of the 
international rights of nations would most obviously originate in a polity like Austria-
Hungary — had come true. 
Yet how could nations hold rights? For all its thickness and scope, the literature 
on Austro-Marxist cultural autonomy has focused less on its place within an imperial 
(and subsequently international) jurisprudence of legal personality. At its core, the 
personality principle in fact constituted a discourse on the art of having rights, on making 
nations “visible” in law. “As is well known,” Renner wrote, “the nations in Austria do not 
have juridical personality, nor any other sort of legally graspable collective presence. 
Current law does not know the nation, but rather only nationality as a distinctive 
characteristic of the individual.”11 The judge remained blind to the nation and its 
aspirations, otherwise he left the domain of law and entered that of politics. Yet Renner, 
like his colleagues, eschewed the most obvious way of making a nation visible in law — 
that is, through a sovereign nation-state. They viewed an “international legal order” based 
on “national autonomy” to be a far superior model.12 To achieve this, he elaborated the 
legal idea of a nation within a Nationalitätenstaat. New legal forms and formations 
(Rechtsformen) needed to be constructed for this new “internal supranational legal order 
																																																								
10 Karl Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Oesterreich 
(Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1918), unpaginated Preface (Vorrede). This text was a much revised 
and re-titled second edition of his earlier work Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], Der Kampf der 
österreichischen Nationen um den Staat (Leipzig: Deuticke, 1902). 
11 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen. 
12 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 29ff. 
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[innerstaatliche übernationale Rechtsordnung].”13 In short, the whole program relied on 
rebirthing nations as legal subjects. 
Few models were available for the craftsmen of these new juristische Formen. 
Existing jurisprudence, too focused on positive law, proved little help. Scholars in the 
field should have been far more inquisitive about the wide variety of forms that state and 
nation might take. It was time, Renner announced, for a new constitutional work.14 
Crucially, this new work required moving beyond a liberal paradigm in which national 
particularities belonged only to the individual.15 Any solution based on individual rights 
was insufficient. “The national problem is not just and not in the first instance an 
economic-social or a language question, but a constitutional-political question that seizes 
the whole state organization.”16 Nations sought a portion of the state’s functions, they 
wanted power. Nations must be “state legal factors [staatliche Rechtsfaktoren], 
constitutional potencies or, to utter the dreaded phrase, states within states, if peace and 
progress is to return to Austria.”17 Yet these states within states could not be built upon 
territorial foundations, not only because language groups did not inhabit discreet, 
hermetic areas, but also because such an approach misunderstood the nature of 
nationality: an individual did not “leave” the nation when he or she left the territory, nor 
																																																								
13 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 36. 
14 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 38-39. 
15 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 40-41. 
16 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 67. 
17 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 69. 
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did he or she “enter” it upon traversing a certain geographic domain.18 A far more fluid 
solution was required, in which law attached to people rather than land — the proposition 
that Eötvös had viewed as reactionary and pre-modern, as we recall. (Indeed, other 
scholars such as Josef Lukas, who also taught law in Czernowitz between 1904 and 1909, 
continued to liken the personality principle to a reformulated, modernized version of an 
original “Germanic” conception in which law attached to the Stamm, to ethnicity, rather 
than to territory).19  
How were dispersed, mobile people to mimic the legal fixity of territory as a 
jurisdiction? The Austro-Marxists thus had need of the special alchemic illusion of the 
legal fiction of collective personality discussed above: individuals needed to be grouped 
together in such a way that the law could posit a single, unified will and intention where 
nature had granted none. A nation must be transformed into an “autonomous body, into a 
juridical person with its own actionable, judicially-protected subjective rights.” In other 
words, it was to be become a “private and public law person, capable of acting in law, 
entitled to claim and to have claims [brought] against it.”20  
It represented a revolutionary idea. The politician and erstwhile trade minister 
Joseph Maria Baernreither was quick to identify it as such. Bauer and his colleagues, 
Baernreither observed in 1910, wanted to construe nationality as a “personal union” 
(Personalverband) rather than a “territorial body” (Gebietskörperschaft). If “the nation 
																																																								
18 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 74. 
19 See Josef Lukas, “Territorialitäts- und Personalitätsprinzip im österreichischen Nationalitätenrecht,” 
Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Recht der Gegenwart 2 (1908): 349 and passim. Lukas (1875-1929) was born in 
Graz; after his spell in Czernowitz he spent much of his career teaching public law in Münster. 
20 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 78. 
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must become a legal subject” in this way, then “a relationship must be established 
between the individual national-comrade [Volksgenossen] and the nation which is like 
that existing today between a citizen and the state.”21 What is more, “this new legal 
subject, the organized nation” must then possess organs so that it could make use of the 
rights granted to it; one would need judges who could preside over this new area of law. 
Such developments would amount to “a partial transvaluation of our state law 
[Staatsrecht] into a nations law [Nationsrecht].”22 The whole basis of constitutional law 
would shift. They would be states within the state — if not against the state, 
Baerenreither warned. 
Renner viewed such subjecthood as the only method of making national rights 
meaningful. Like so many other Habsburg jurists before him, Renner critiqued the legal 
construction of section 19 of the constitution that granted national rights without having 
organized “nations” as legal subjects. Rights without subjects were unenforceable and 
thus meaningless. This basic truth had been obscured in the Habsburg monarchy, Renner 
explained, because of the ambiguous interaction of nationalist politics with the pre-
existing legal structure of the empire: it was self-evident that “national rights can only be 
the rights of nations. But with us one never understands the self-evident as self-evident. 
With a bewildering persistence, our protagonists of the national idea struggle for fifty 
years now for the rights of the — crownlands.”23 
																																																								
21 Joseph Maria Baernreither, Zur böhmischen Frage: Eine politische Studie (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. 
Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1910), 13-14. 
22 Baernreither, Zur böhmischen Frage, 13-14. In Baerenreither’s assessment, this idea possessed utility for 
administrative law, even if it was not possible to implement it fully. 
23	Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 115. 
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The empire’s old individualities were not substitutes for its projected new ones. 
The wires running between rights and their subject had become crossed, tangled, and 
ultimately misdirected: 
 
If one wants to make a law for the nations, then one first has to make the 
nations. Because that is a difficult and not at all joyful process, one used the 
lands — that, to be sure, one inherited historically only as a result of a most 
unhappy oversight of Maria Theresa’s — as the pack-carriers of national rights, 
and overburdened the decrepit donkey’s back with rights that were meant for 
the nations.24 
 
The process of making new legal persons was fraught: as a result one had fallen back on 
the legal subjects already at hand — that is, the Länder. Through an accident of history, 
the lands had been loaded up with rights intended for the nations, and this structural case 
of mistaken identity had cost the peace of the empire. In Renner’s analysis, then, it was 
the conceptual and practical difficulties of constituting nations as juridical persons that 
had inadvertently kept the old historical lands at the forefront of the imperial debate about 
rights. It was a different — and, I think, more prescient — version of Taylor’s metaphor 
that portrayed the lands as the old casks into which the new wine of nationalism was 
poured. In Renner’s version, the historical lands became the convenient (but lazy) mules 
for rights that otherwise, lacking a fixed delivery address, would have floated around 
indefinitely in search of a subject to embody and use them. In his words, the “question of 
the bearer of rights” lay at the core.25 It marked a strikingly legalistic prescription for 
																																																								
24 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 118. 
25 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen,	118. As he summed up on 136: “die Nation als freie 
Einheit, als juristische Person des privaten und als Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechtes organisiert 
werden muss, wenn ihr in Wahrheit die Rechte zukommen sollen, die ihr vermeint sind.”  
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imperial health, not least for someone who had, in an earlier work, described law as a 
second order fact, as we remember. “Only law will bring order and peace,” he now 
asserted; “the legal organization of nations and legal federalism are the only remedies.”26    
Renner conceded that any feared the notion of states within states. As the interests 
of these legal persons diverged, would they not threaten the unity of the state? Not if the 
state cleverly managed their rights and took care of their common interests, Renner felt: 
“If Britain, Australia and Canada next to India etc. can form a political unity, should the 
rounded-off [abgegrundeten]	Habsburg lands not be able to do it?”27 Other objections 
pointed to the dogma of sovereignty. As he described it, his plan involved the creation of 
a single legal order in which sovereignty was shared with nations as well as individuals. 
This constituted, he admitted, an “architectonic work,” resulting in an internal 
international law, that rubbed up against old pieties: “this dogma, constructed by Bodin 
and Hobbes, of the indivisibility of the state force, of the absolute unity of a highest 
power, was abused from the beginning as the rationale and support of absolutism.”28 
Having dismissed traditional doctrines of sovereignty as the handmaidens of absolutism, 
he cleared space for nations, as juridical persons in private and public law, to form organs 
of the state in their own right, with their own sphere of autonomy guaranteed within the 
state — that is, their “right of self-determination.”29 
 
																																																								
26 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 245. 
27 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 123. 
28 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 146. 
29 Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, 150. 
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* * * 
Like Josef Redlich’s thousand-page history of the constitutional question that finally 
appeared in 1920, Renner’s text quickly became a classic within a constitutional tradition 
whose whole premise was superseded at the point of its highest creativity. Unbeknownst 
to Renner (and most everyone else), that premise — the existence of Habsburg monarchy 
itself — was about to disappear out the back door of world history. Events were moving 
fast. As Renner deployed “self-determination” as a touchstone for keeping the Austro-
Hungarian empire together, others dispersed widely across the surface of international 
politics were pinning hopes on its utility for prying other empires apart. From Woodrow 
Wilson’s liberal internationalism to Lenin’s appeal for world revolution to Sa’d 
Zunghlul’s anti-colonial nationalism in Egypt and beyond, “self-determination” as a 
semantic marker raced erratically between political projects and ideologies as though 
suffering from acute attention deficit disorder.30 As an intersection point between orders, 
it offered the semblance of convergence (and of a unified “moment,” as Erez Manela 
famously phrased it) even as it documented their antagonism. Renner’s blithe invocation 
of the “international law” involved in his proposals for the Habsburg lands turned out to 
be “truer” or more literal than he could have foreseen: if the former Habsburg lands now 
became the only region in which “self-determination” was ostensibly actualized, the term 
now served to legitimate the individual sovereignties of numerous small states rather than 
																																																								
30 See Arno Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: The Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (Cleveland, 
Ohio: World, 1964); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International 
Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Eric Weitz, “Self-
Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a 
Human Right,” American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (2015): 462-496.  
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to distribute imperial sovereignty equitably among the monarchy’s resident nations as the 
newborn “persons” of an empire remade. 
Yet self-determination was not the only political-legal concept through which the 
empire’s constitutional order melted messily into the “new world order.” The imperial 
jurisprudence on the rights of nations acquired a new vocation in the postwar settlement 
thanks to the experimental minorities treaties forced upon the new states of Central and 
Eastern Europe and guaranteed by the League of Nations. If important conceptual 
differences distinguished the rights of “minorities” from those of “nationalities” (not least 
the normatively-homogenous nation-state as a conceptual prerequisite for the idea of a 
“minority” in the first place), the legal stakes were remarkably similar: at the heart of 
debates about both regimes stood the possibility (and desirability) of according non-
sovereign ethnic groups a collective legal personality, and the question of how their rights 
and personality related to sovereignty.  
The projection of Habsburg nationality law onto the world stage began already 
during the war, when the emergence of an international system of minorities protection 
remained a hypothetical proposition. In 1916, the Central Organization for a Durable 
Peace, formed in the Hague a year earlier, produced an influential “minimum program” 
of nine points, and established nine study commissions to further explore and develop 
each of the points. The second commission, chaired by the Norwegian historian (and 
future Norwegian foreign minister) Halvdan Koht, tasked with exploring the question of 
national minorities,31 solicited submissions from a range of international experts, which 
																																																								
31 Point two of the “Programme-minimum” ran: “Les Etats garantiront aux nationalités comprises dans leur 
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reproduced in full in the frontispiece of each of the Recueil de Rapports cited in the following footnote. 
	
	 302	
the Central Organization published progressively between 1916 and 1918.32 Among the 
contributors on the question of national minorities were Rudolf Laun and Eugen Ehrlich 
from Austria and Oskar Jaszi from Hungary, as well as the German sociologist Franz 
Oppenheimer (who drew extensively and principally on the Habsburg jurisprudence, 
especially from Renner and Bernatzik, in his response).33 A smaller group — Laun 
among them — then met in person in Christiania (Oslo), where Koht taught, in July 1917. 
Strikingly, Koht’s concluding report essentially presented the Nationalitätenrecht in 
place in Austria (though not Hungary) as a model that could be profitably adopted around 
the world.34 
Austria had “more or less” solved the problem of nationality, Koht reported. He 
explicitly modeled the first of his proposals on section 19 of the Austrian constitution, 
guaranteeing the “inviolable” rights of ethnicities. He drew on Austrian electoral laws, 
the Moravian compromise of 1905, and Karl Renner’s conceptualization of national 
autonomy.35 This ringing endorsement did not go unnoticed in Austria. Heinrich 
																																																								
32 Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, Recueil de Rapports sur les différents points du 
programme-minimum, 4 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1916-1918). 
33 Franz Oppenheimer, “Nationale Autonomie,” in Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, ed. 
Recueil de Rapports sur les différents points du programme-minimum, vol. 4 (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1918), 74-103. Oppenheimer’s sociological work was also deeply influenced by Ludwig 
Gumplowicz. 
34 Halvdan Koht, Avant-project d’un traité général relatif aux droits des minorités nationales (The Hague: 
Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, 1917), 20 and passim. Koht was not the only foreigner to 
come to this conclusion. See for example the work of French diplomat Jacques Fouques-Duparc, La 
protection des minorités de race, de langue et de religion: Étude de droit des gens (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 
1922). 
35 Koht, Avant-project d’un traité général, 20-28 (with section 19 on page 28). Erwin Viefhaus places this 
moment within the context of the broader development towards international minority protection in his Die 
Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitenschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 
1919: eine Studie zur Geschichte des Nationalitätenproblems im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am 
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Lammasch (1853-1920), the Austrian jurist who would serve briefly as the empire’s last 
Ministerpräsident the following year, took the report as evidence of a slow shift in 
perspectives on the very nature of state legitimacy. Gradually it was dawning on people 
that it was impossible to replace the monarchy with nationally homogenous states, not 
least without damaging the vital interests of the nationalities themselves, Lammasch 
wrote in 1917. Nationality was an important factor in the formation of states — but not 
the only one, nor even the most important. “In [certain] circumstances the nationalities-
state is just as justified as the nation-state.” In fact, in the future, the former may be 
regarded as “a higher form for human development.”36  
Koht’s high praise for the Austrian model was all the more conspicuous in the 
context of struggles over the representation of Austria-Hungary in the Commission’s 
preparatory work as well as more generally in wartime propaganda and claim-making. In 
his submission for the Central Organisation’s Commission, for example, the British 
politician Charles Roden Buxton had depicted Austria-Hungary according to the familiar 
trope of a prison of nationalities.37 He had particularly incensed the Austrian jurists with 
a thought experiment intended to calculate whether a victory for the Allies or the Entente 
would achieve more for the oppressed nationalities of the world. An Allied victory, he 
reasoned, would likely satisfy the claims of Bohemians, Alsatians and Lorrainers, the 
Danes in north Germany, Italians in Austria, Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, as well as 
Roumanians, Greeks, and Armenians, numbering about thirty million in total. Against 
																																																								
36 Lammasch’s essay, “Das österreichische Nationalitätenrecht,” dated 1917, is included in: Heinrich 
Lammasch, Europas elfte Stunde (Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1919), 120. 
37 Charles Roden Buxton, “Nationality,” in Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, ed. Recueil de 




this formidable multitude, a mere handful of satisfied claims (the Bulgarians of 
Macedonia, perhaps) could be foreseen as the likely outcome if the Entente proved 
victorious.38  
Eugen Ehrlich — whom we recall from the introduction to Part One — took the 
bait. Why did Buxton restrict himself to European nationalities? “I do not consider the 
Arabs, Persians and Hindus to be so very backward, as that one cannot take them into 
account, being peoples of ancient lineage and venerable culture,” he countered; Mr. 
Buxton arrived at the figure of 30 million “by fully disregarding all the nations which the 
Allies enslave.”39 Ehrlich’s own mathematics — tallying “the Irish, Indians, Persians and 
Egyptians” among a long list of nationalities to be hypothetically liberated by the Entente 
— delivered him a figure of 600 million souls, a “record which could hardly be beaten by 
the Allies.” “Mr Buxton greatly underrates the extent of generosity we too could afford at 
the expense of other people,” Ehrlich quipped.40  
Koht’s endorsement thus filled the sails of those jurists, like a young Rudolf Laun 
(1882-1975), who were coming round to the view that the nationality principle could be 
Austria’s weapon in the war of ideas, rather than their Achilles heal. Britain’s 
propagandistic slogans — pacifism, democracy, the nationality principle — had stuck, 
pinning Austria as an autocratic, militaristic oppressor of nationalities. Yet Austria could 
be the accuser rather than the accused, Laun argued in his 1917 text Das 
																																																								
38 Charles Roden Buxton, “Nationality,” in Charles Roden Buxton, ed., Towards a Lasting Settlement (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1916), 55-56.  
39 Eugen Ehrlich, The National Problems in Austria, International Congress for the Study of the Principles 
of a Durable Peace (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917), 4, 6. 
40 Ehrlich, The National Problems in Austria, 7. 
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Nationalitätenrecht als internationales Problem. Austria must “turn the spear around, to 
reproach our opponents with their own political sins and weaknesses.”41 The world 
should be educated about Austrian nationality and language law: no other comparably 
large state had developed such ethical and practical postulates. Against their measure, 
others would be exposed: Austria need only adopt the claim and slogan of “the protection 
of national minorities.”42 After all, every large state included minorities: some in the 
motherland, others in colonies. Whatever political rights the oppressed majority in India 
possessed, Laun felt sure they fell well short of those belonging to the citizens of Austria. 
The question of “national minority protection” “would therefore hand us a political 
weapon” that could prove more useful at the peace negotiations and in the “spiritual 
struggle” than various victorious battles or economic triumphs.43 Laun’s text, like 
Ehrlich’s, documented the conceptual fluidity of the terms “nationality” and “minority” 
on the cusp of the new world order, especially when they served as the means for inter-
imperial comparison. Implicit in these exchanges lurked the structural ambiguity of 
Austria-Hungary’s place in the world of states and empires: was it most sensibly 
compared with the small unitary states of Western Europe or with global empires like the 
British commonwealth? Who decided on the line between “colonized,” “minority,” and 
“nationality,” and with what consequences? 
																																																								
41 (“den Spieß umzudrehen, den Gegnern ihre eigenen politischen Sünden und Schwächen vorzuhalten”). 
Rudolf Laun, Das Nationalitätenrecht als internationals Problem, Sonderabdruck aus der Österreichischen 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (Vienna: Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-, Verlags- und Universitäts-
Buchhandlung, 1917), 17. 
42 Laun, Das Nationalitätenrecht als internationals Problem, 19. 
43 Laun, Das Nationalitätenrecht als internationals Problem, 20. 
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But Koht’s report did not simply stoke debate about Austria’s place in the broader 
wartime contest over state (and imperial) legitimacy. More substantially and, juridically 
speaking, most audaciously, Koht’s report proposed an international treaty and 
international guarantee for the protection of minorities, grounded in an international court 
of arbitration. The general skepticism about such a treaty reminds us how improbable the 
League’s eventual minorities regime appeared even a few short years before its 
emergence.44 From the outset, Laun declared that such plans for an international 
“Kontrolkommission” and an international “Nationalitätsgerichthof” had little chance of 
success because they contradicted state sovereignty.45 Yet this base assessment did not 
prevent his analysis of the proposals along one line in particular — that of legal 
personality. In this area, the Austrian experience had much to offer any emergent general 
system, whether buttressed by an international court or not. 
Laun observed that the “legal subject” appeared variously in Koht’s report as the 
“race,” the “ethnicity,” and the “national minority.” As a result, any community 
sufficiently large to open a school or a church could appeal for protection. Practical 
difficulties arose in Austria, he counseled, because article 19 spoke of ethnicities “as 
legal subjects” although “these ethnicities were not organized as juridical persons.” For 
that reason, article 19 could not be applied directly, but only indirectly “as a general 
principle” helpful in the interpretation of other norms. The granting of rights “without the 
																																																								
44 On Koht’s plan for an international treaty and court of arbitration relating to minorities, Lammasch 
would only comment: “Es wäre verfrührt, auf diesen überaus kühnen, vielen gewiß utopisch erscheinenden 
Gedanken des näheren einzugehen, solange noch keine detailierten Vorschläge über die Art der 
Zusammensetzung und über die Funktionen dieses Schiedgerichtes vorliegen.” Lammasch, Europas elfte 
Stunde, 123. 
45 Laun, Das Nationalitätenrecht als internationals Problem, 6. 
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organization of the appropriate legal subjects would thus not have the desired 
significance in practice.”46 Be warned of the weakness of rights without subjects: Laun 
offered up the empire’s hard-won lessons for international consumption and application. 
This imperial expertise hinted at further difficulties. For if one instead  
 
wanted to explicitly propose the formation of such legal subjects, then one 
must expect that the proposal will encounter the greatest resistance. Because 
most states will avoid assuming an obligation according to which they had to 
organize their minorities as states within states.47  
 
Making them into legal persons — organized, unified, and with standing in public law — 
seemed too closely akin to making them into states. Still more fantastical was the idea of 
according these internal quasi-states a standing in international law:  
 
But it is entirely futile to want to make national minorities into the legal 
subjects not only of state law, but also of international law, who could appeal 
for the help of an international commission or court against their own state. 
This would suffer the sharpest repudiation as irreconcilable with the current 
concept of state sovereignty and shipwreck the whole project.48 
 
The migration between orders was twofold: imperial knowledge, it seemed, could be 
resettled from imperial into international law, but could the (potential or otherwise) 
juridical persons of state law cross the border into the international domain? Laun 
deemed it virtually impossible, and instead recommended that states be obliged to 
incorporate provisions for the protection of minorities into their own domestic law. 
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Extreme pacifists and others may accuse us of too great a deference to state sovereignty, 
Laun conceded. Yet even radical goals required slow and measured steps to achieve 
durable results, he argued. The longer-range, ultimate goal “is not for me the sovereign 
nation-state as an end in itself but rather a world state that includes the whole of 
humanity, in which the current individual ‘sovereign’ states would perhaps in some 
connections enjoy no more ‘sovereignty’ than a Swiss canton today.”49 Yet to propose 
outright and in the first instance that states voluntarily diminish their sovereignty and 
power would be utopian. Intellectual revolutions took time. Protecting nationalities under 
the auspices of state law might be today’s goal, but tomorrow they might also acquire 
rights under international law.50 
Laun’s own career runs like a red thread through the various orders and rights 
regimes of the first half of the twentieth century. Born in Prague in 1882, he studied law 
and philosophy at the University of Vienna, and had already taught for a few years as an 
außerordentlicher professor at the same university before serving in the First World War, 
an experience that turned him into a pacifist. He too responded to the aforementioned 
1916 survey on the rights of the historical lands: there, with his familiar gradualism, he 
cautiously recommended that any reform plans “attach themselves closely to the 
historically-given.” The very map of “this strange state formation” demonstrated that 
Austria was not well suited to being governed as a centralized, unified state, Laun 
reasoned.51 His interest in the empire’s nationalities law segued seamlessly into the 
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emergent international regime, and not only via the Central Organization for a Durable 
Peace. Having joined the foreign office as a consultant for nationalities policy in Karl 
Renner’s new government at the end of the war, Laun attended the Peace Conference as a 
member of the Austrian delegation. His own proposal for minorities protection — that 
drew much from Renner and Bauer’s cultural autonomy — was discussed at the Berne 
League of Nations conference in 1919.52 Already that same year he took up a chair in the 
law faculty in Hamburg, launching an influential career in Germany and beyond; in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, as an indefatigable advocate for the 
rights of the German expellees, he prominently accused the Allies of violating Germans’ 
human rights, placing him at the center of the tussle over the legal and political 
significance of the new regime of international human rights.53  
If this postwar involvement with individual rights has attracted recent scholarly 
attention as part of the exploding new field of human rights history, Laun in fact spent 
much of the 1920s and 1930s analyzing minority rights and, more generally, the status of 
the “nation” or a “people” in international law. As he noted at the meeting of the German 
Society of International Law in 1926, the protection of national minorities and the right 
of self-determination formed two sides of the same coin; both addressed the status of the 
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national question in international law. He thus returned repeatedly to that the theme we 
have traced out of the womb of imperial-constitutional law, namely, the possibility of 
ethnic collectives coming together to form a single legal personality: group rights without 
sovereignty. Like so many other jurists of the period, he critiqued the formal construction 
of the minorities treaties that spoke of minorities not as collective wholes but only as a 
sum individuals who belonged to a religious, racial, or linguistic minority. They were not 
legal subjects and not parties to their own disputes. This lack of legal status “sabotaged” 
the protection on offer, Laun wrote.54  
The wording of the treaties notwithstanding, this area of law had its own 
dynamism, especially after minorities from across Europe took matters into their own 
hands through the inauguration of the “nationalities congress” that began meeting 
annually in 1925. At that first meeting, the delegates, with widely varying agendas, found 
common ground in the idea of cultural autonomy, and announced as much in their 
resolutions. Cultural autonomy was in fact already becoming formal state law in 
countries like Estonia and Lithuania. This development pertained directly to the legal 
status of minorities, Laun reported to the German Society of International Law:  
 
because until now the most important and decisive argument that could 
always be set against the claims of national minorities was that they are only a 
sum of private persons who coincidentally speak a different language to the 
majority in their state, that they are not legally organized, are not legal 
subjects, and do not possess organs capable of their official representation. 
Through the granting of cultural autonomy they would fulfill all these 
requirements, they would become a self-administering body organized in state 
law, comparable with the member state of a federal state, and could then be 
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treated as a legal subject in international law just as much as, say, Prussia or 
Bavaria.55 
 
Here the application of cultural autonomy — itself part of the conceptual legacy of the 
imperial constitutional tradition — would (again) serve as the means of converting 
isolated individuals into corporate bodies, as it would require the establishment of formal 
institutions capable of legally representing the singular and unified will of the group. 
Strikingly, these new legal persons could then traverse the line between domestic and 
international law, endowed with the same ambiguous status as other non-sovereign states 
like Bavaria. 
*  *  * 
The nationality law of the empire cast a long shadow over the interwar minorities 
treaties. Imperial expertise found application in international law in both theory and 
practice. International civil servants in the minorities section at the League of Nations 
collected documentation from and conducted interviews with former imperial officials.56 
After a research trip to Vienna, the Swiss diplomat Edouard de Haller, then working at 
the League, penned a long study on Austrian nationality law intended to benefit the 
League’s minorities work; “After completing this study,” de Haller wrote, “I maintain 
that the legislation and jurisprudence of Austria before the war constitute useful sources 
for the study of minority problems in the States bound by minority treaties or declarations 
																																																								
55 Rudolf Laun at the Siebente Jahreversammlung of the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, in the 
discussion on 27 May 1926, following G[odehard J]. Ebers, “Sind im Völkerrecht allein die Staaten 
parteifähig?,” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 7 (1926): 33. 
56 See, for example, Jean André Eichhoff to Arthur Salter, 19 June 1926, League of Nations Archive, 
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and especially for the successor states of Austria-Hungary.”57 At a more theoretical level, 
the classics of Austrian jurisprudence became the secondary literature for theories of 
international minority rights; see, for example, the literature cited in the long, 
programmatic, 1932 article “Prolegomena zur einer allgemeinen Theorie des 
internationalen Rechtes nationaler Minderheiten”	by Austrian jurist Josef Kunz, 
published on the cusp of his emigration to the United States.58 (These theoretical and 
administrative spheres also overlapped: Kunz, acting on behalf of the Austrian League of 
Nations Society, submitted a memorandum on Austrian minorities protection to the 
League in 1921).59 
Even late into the 1930s, Austrian nationality law remained an important “place” 
from which to analyze and critique the minorities regime, especially on the question of 
legal personality.60 In his 1937 work Völkerrecht, Alfred Verdross — perhaps the most 
famous of the mid-century Austrian international lawyers61 — reminded his readers that 
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the minorities treaties did not define the concept of minority and referred only to its 
members. “The positive international law of minority rights is thereby constructed 
individualistically, rather than universally. Not them, but those belonging to the 
minorities are awarded rights.”62 The treaties thus required states to guard certain 
individual rights.63 Verdross argued that the premise of the treaties — that it was 
plausible (legally and otherwise) to understand minorities as a collected mass of 
individuals — may be well suited to West and Central Europe, but lacked a more general 
validity and applicability. Certainly, it was misconceived for the “belt of mixed peoples 
of the European east.” To “transfer” a provision rooted in “the ideology of the nation-
state” to areas of fundamentally mixed settlement appeared both irrational and 
contradictory.64 His prescription was specific:  
 
A pacification [Befriedung] of the European east can only be achieved if the 
principle of the equal rights of ethnicities [Gleichberechtigung der 
Volksstämme] laid down in article 19 of the old-Austrian constitution regarding 
the general rights of citizens (1867) is elevated to the Magna Carta of Eastern 
Europe.  
 
The peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups cohabiting in close proximity could be 
achieved only if each group possessed an equal right to the protection and cultivation of 
their ethnicity and language. “But because culture is only possible in the community, 
mere individual rights are not sufficient, it is far more necessary to recognize rights of the 
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63 Verdross, Völkerrecht, 230. 
64 Verdross, Völkerrecht, 230. 
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ethnic group [Volksgruppenrecht]. Pursuant to this, the rights of minorities must be 
rebuilt into the rights of ethnic groups.”65 In 1936, the nationalities congress had come to 
the same conclusion, declaring their impatience with individual rights and the necessity 
of new corporate legal bodies. “All cultural work is communal work, all national rights 
are communal rights,” the congress declared in its resolutions that year. “For that reason, 
a true nationalities law that does not recognize national minorities as collective unities 
and legal subjects is unthinkable.”66 
On the cusp of the Second World War, Eastern Europe cried out for the 
resurrection of imperial constitutional law — at least according to Verdross. The rights 
languages of the empire’s nationality law were far better adapted to the prose of life in 
this region than the misconceived platform of individual rights cooked up and imposed 
through the new international settlement. Yet even as Verdross remembered imperial 
Austria, he partook in some crucial forgetting, too. For article 19 of the imperial Austrian 
constitution may have theoretically recognized group rights but, as we now know only 
too well, it had failed to formally constitute group rights subjects to own and defend those 
rights. Those rights had floated like balloons without strings, unattached to legal 
personalities. With some regional exceptions (such as the Moravian compomise of 1905), 
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nationalities had never become “states within states” in the empire — that privilege had 
been reserved for the historical lands.  
*  *  * 
Clearly, there are multiple compelling pre-histories to the League’s minorities regime. 
The most prolific contemporary historian of the minorities regime, Carole Fink, has 
highlighted a broader arc of humanitarianism and concern for co-religionists, tracing 
projects of “defending the rights of others” in diplomatic practice from the Congress of 
Berlin forward.67 This arc presumes the gradual development of a more moral 
international order, and the shortcomings of historical actors are criticized against its 
values. We might identify an alternative pre-history that had less to do with sentiment 
and ethics in international affairs and more to do with law, and especially with the 
juridical foundations of rights in the first place: that is, with law’s confrontation with 
diverse populations and with different models of distributing sovereignty. At the center of 
this alternative emplotment lies the possibility and meaning of collective rights without 
sovereignty. Especially if one shifts the emphasis away from the drafting of the 
minorities treaties and towards the debate and analysis of the system on the ground in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, questions of legal personality surface 
repeatedly as fears, aspirations, and critiques. A wide spectrum of groups and individuals 
produced varied proposals to reform the regime so that minorities could be parties to 
proceedings and thereby have a standing and personality of their own.68 Politicians and 
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officials from the new states of East and Central Europe, for their part, proved equally 
keen to prevent such developments. “Care must be taken,” warned a grave Edvard Beneš 
at the League’s Sixth Committee in 1932, “not to give the impression that a minority 
constituted a personality in law.”69 Through the keyhole of this alternative pre-history, 
the history of international law need not necessarily start or end with international law 
(tracing progress, for example, between successive diplomatic congresses): other 
theories, bodies, and perceptions of law seeped messily between “domestic” and 
“international” domains as one supranational order in Central Europe was replaced with 
another. As Palacký and Renner had already suggested, the creation of ethnic/national 
corporate bodies in public law invited the international into the imperial fold, or opened 
the door for those new persons to exist on the threshold between the two. 
 As a narratological red thread, the story of the juridical subjectivity of nations has 
an unexpected and powerful sting in its tail. Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists may have 
disdained the “juridification” of the interwar order, but they too shared the crucial 
assumption that an ethnic group, quite apart from any correlation with the borders of a 
state, could and should be a legal subject. For them, it was the legal subject. 
Volkspersonlichkeit structured the territorial map and legal imaginary70; in rejecting the 
empty abstraction of the state, they “turned the folk-group into a collective legal entity.”71 
Before Germany left the League, the German diplomat Friedrich von Keller explained 
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their position before the League’s Sixth Committee in October 1933. Nations had “a 
natural and moral right,” he held, “to consider that all its members — even those 
separated from the mother country by State frontiers — constitute a moral and cultural 
whole.”72 (The similarity of his statements to Palacký’s sentiments, quoted in the opening 
of this chapter, is striking).73 All of a sudden, the state’s containment of legal personality 
— previously the bedbug of progressive projects one and all — seemed to be a 
comforting convention. 
 The following day, the British statesman William Ormsby-Gore — a man with 
paws all over the different facets of the interwar order — passionately refuted von 
Keller’s presentations, especially his sketch of an international relations founded on 
ethnic homogeneity, in which a state possessed the right and duty to concern itself with 
citizens of other states of the same ethnicity: 
 
That will carry us very far. I tremble to think of the responsibilities of my 
Government in respect of every citizen of the United States who claims decent 
from those who went over in the Mayflower — and there are millions — if 
this idea were put into operation. We reject absolutely this conception put 
forward by the German delegate regarding the racial homogeneity of political 
units and States. How could we do otherwise?74 
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Beneš readily agreed with Ormsby-Gore: “As I see it, this theory would, if carried to 
the extreme, overthrow all the legal conceptions upon which not only the Minorities 
Treaties, but also the international relations between States composed of two or more 
nationalities, are based.”75 Unlike his Bohemian forbears within the Austro-
Hungarian empire, Beneš already had sovereign rights, which seemed (at least until 
1938!) quite hard and real, unlike their fictional, mythic cousins in the nineteenth 
century. The Czechs had switched roles: his task was now to defend the traditional 
order of state relations, and the privileges of sovereignty, and certainly not to 
experiment with legal subjects floating fluidly beyond state and territory.
																																																								
75 Sixth Meeting (Oct 4 1933), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Records of the Fourteenth Ordinary 










1919 in the History of the Austro-Hungarian Empire		 	
	
	 320	
Introduction to Part Three 
 
Nationalism has long formed the central hook around which we narrate the collapse of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence of the new order that replaced it. 
Contemporary research has refined this picture, casting national independence as the 
result of “short-term, exogenous factors” rather than presuming its structural or moral 
inevitability.1 In Maureen Healy’s telling, the demands of total war and the government’s 
inability to provide basic services to civilian populations may have done more to erode 
loyalty to the dynastic state than nationalist passion.2 These accounts of the empire’s last 
years dovetail with a rich vein of scholarship that has recast our understanding of the 
place of nationalism in imperial politics more broadly. Discarding the hackneyed prison-
of-nationalities storybook, scholars like Tara Zahra, Pieter Judson, Gary Cohen, and 
Jeremy King have shown how nationalization itself formed a political process — a field 
of strategies and arguments — in which nationalists campaigned on two fronts, both to 
nationalize the people and to convince the imperial government of the political 
significance of that national identity.3 The most meaningful axis of historical change, 
Zahra suggests, may have pivoted less on some diametrical opposition between organic 
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“nations” and the empire, than on a shifting understanding of the role of the state itself — 
that is, along the line between the “public” and the “private” assumed in any conception 
of government. In her account, it was precisely because domains (like health, welfare, 
family policy) that were once deemed social rather than political — and delegated by 
central authorities to national associations in part because of their lack of political 
importance — eventually (if ironically) came to define state legitimacy. National 
movements, permanently struggling against national indifference, acquired political form 
and eventually statehood in no small measure because the empire had brought them into 
the state.4  
For all its brilliance and nuance, this field still invites us to follow “nations” out of 
the wreckage of empire and into the region’s new states. They may be constructed rather 
than organic, and hedged about with ambivalence, but nations remain the units or 
subjects around which most histories are built. Chapters Five and Six chart a different 
route between the political lifeworld of the empire and the one that followed, plotting the 
transition as a history of states rather than a history of nations. In so doing, they take up 
Holly Case’s recent suggestion that the salient conflicts of the period may be most 
fruitfully understood as contests over the legitimate grounds for statehood.5  
By pursuing the path of states rather than nations, this chapter recovers a history 
of the long, slow ending of empire, one at odds with more familiar portrayals of the years 
1918-1919 as a Central European year zero. “At the end of the war Austria-Hungary 
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vanished, leaving a great hole at the center of Europe,” narrates Margaret Macmillan in 
her landmark account of the Paris Peace Conference.6 Her blithe depiction of October 
1918 — a month “when Austria-Hungary sued for Peace and then vanished from 
history”7 — is hardly atypical for histories of the “new world order” in Europe, which 
generally begin with the American President Woodrow Wilson and the concept of self-
determination. As “self-determination” is implicitly (or explicitly) understood as the 
antithetical opposite of the empire, it is hardly surprising that Austria-Hungary is 
mentioned only in its absence, as the negation or blank space atop which a new order 
could be built.  
But what happens if the history of the new order begins with the empire instead: if 
we narrate 1919 out of the cradle of imperial law rather than pre-presume its absence? 
Thick, deep legal tentacles might tie the imperial constitution into the sovereign 
landscape that followed, shaping legal claims at every turn. Part Three of this dissertation 
argues that, at the level of ideas, large parts the new order were in fact constructed out of 
the building blocks of imperial law. For the Paris Peace Conference was a carnival of 
sovereignty, a circus of statehood, and as soon as claim-makers needed to justify the 
states they claimed, they (naturally enough) fell back on the languages of sovereignty and 
legal title they had long honed and relied upon within the frame of imperial law. Deep 
assumptions about the rights of states, and the styles of reasoning that gave them their 
shape, did not (could not) “vanish” from one month to the next. Working out of this 
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imperial bank of ideas, representatives of many of the “new” states of Central Europe 
imported the conceptual world of the Austro-Hungarian constitution into the new world 
order being thrashed out in the French capitol.  
They did so in part because the language of self-determination, on its own terms, 
was not enough. Though unquestionably an important intellectual resource, it could not 
carry the load of legitimation alone. It was insufficient for at least three reasons. Firstly, 
at heart it represented a revolutionary challenge to the basic structure of international 
order and the ostensible sanctity of state sovereignty. This challenge was political — in 
the sense that Allied statesmen were hardly in a hurry to explicitly endorse the principle 
that any rebellious national group or “minority” possessed an international right to break 
away and form their own state — as well as theoretical or methodological. Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, judge at the International Court of Justice, later deemed the theoretical flaws 
inherent in the idea of an international right of self-determination so grave as render the 
concept juridically unintelligible:  
 
The initial difficulty is that it is scarcely possible to refer to an entity as an 
entity unless it already is one, so that it makes little juridical sense to speak of 
a claim to become one, for in whom would the claim reside? By definition, 
“entities” seeking self-determination are not yet determined internationally, or 
the case would not arise. Can they therefore possess “rights” under 
international law, and in what way juridically could the corresponding 
obligations be postulated?8  
 
 
In other words, an international right to self-determination both required and denied a 
pre-existing international legal personality. Claim-makers, especially the Czech leaders 
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Beneš and Masaryk, were highly conscious of both the theoretical and political 
implications of conjuring new international legal persons. As a result, they emphasized 
that no such spooky juridical magic was necessary in the case at hand: the Czech state in 
fact already existed in law — it simply needed to be revived into full factual life. That is, 
they redeployed the precise tropes and claims that Czech politicians and jurists had 
developed in the struggle for Bohemian state rights within the Austro-Hungarian 
constitutional order. The drama of the renewal of old states and old rights cycled on, 
graduating from the dressing rooms of imperial law onto the broader stage of 
international order. 
The Czechs were not alone in appealing to the residual legality of historic states 
and their historical rights. Hungarians and others were also busy retrofitting constitutional 
concepts for new audiences. At the heart of these chapters, then, is the ostensible 
migration of the legal persons of the empire from one order to another. If invoking old 
rights came easily, these claims came with costs and conditions, for a continuity of legal 
personality implied not only the inheritance of rights but also of duties, as Fitzmaurice 
indicated. The question of debts and liabilities thus gave this abstract problem a sharp 
material edge: should the new Czechoslovak Republic, which had worked so hard to 
present itself as an ally of the Allies, inherit the debts of the old empire, just like the new 
rump Austrian state? Gripped by these problems, a thick jurisprudence on succession and 
the legal continuity of states unfolded gradually across interwar law journals and 
courtrooms alike. Ironically, perhaps, the one state that uniformly insisted that it lacked 
all history, precedent, and continuity was Austria itself. 
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Secondly, self-determination was inadequate because representatives of the 
successor states rarely confined their aspirations to territory inhabited by their co-
nationals. Their reasons were various, ranging from questions of industry and security to 
the sheer impossibility of cleanly dividing intermingled language groups from one 
another. In this context, historical rights often promised a greater utility than a claim of 
self-determination based on ethnic demography or numerical precision. In the process, 
the idiom of “historical rights” underwent a significant renovation: previously concerned 
with jurisdiction in the sense of the extent of rights and privileges, claim-makers now re-
cast the jurisdictional imaginary of historical rights in emphatically territorial terms. 
Geographical borders had rarely been at issue within imperial debate; now historic 
frontiers formed the key bones of contention across the region, and rights were redirected 
accordingly. A style of reasoning developed out of formerly-feudal prerogatives and 
privileges acquired a new, and very literal spatiality, one that was adapted to its new post-
imperial vocation. 
Thirdly, it remained uncertain, to put it mildly, what “self-determination” really 
meant. Commentators then and ever since have not hesitated to point out that the Peace 
Conference “failed to define the right of self-determination, or to provide rules for its 
practical application.”9 Of course, the peacemakers implicitly offered something of an 
explication by way of omission: its non-application in the extra-European world signaled 
clearly that it could not be construed as a threat the integrity of the Allies’ empires. But 
even in Europe, where self-determination ostensibly “happened,” the yardstick for and 
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meaning of its application aroused endless controversy. If only because the Allies won 
the war and designed the peace, it came to be associated with the values of “the West,” 
taken as the by-word for a settlement rebuked as “nineteenth-century liberal moralising, a 
combination of British utilitarianism and American idealism,”10 rather than with its 
Leninist or Austro-Marxist incarnations, for example. But those caught up in its 
“application” in Central Europe did not hesitate to offer their own interpretations. 
Hungarian claim-makers in particular enthusiastically embraced the task of explication, 
demonstrating its logical affinity with their claims of historical state rights and 
appropriating rather than resisting its currency. Self-determination took on the colors of 
its surroundings. By beginning in Central Europe itself rather than, say, the Princeton 
office where Wilson’s liberal internationalism took shape, we see how easily self-
determination was absorbed into a pre-existing legal world that had been shaped by 
decades of imperial constitutional debate. 
* * *  
Chapters Five and Six thus explore the unwinding of imperial law into the new 
international order: with the casing of imperial sovereignty unzipped, the legal persons 
and conceptual touchstones of Austro-Hungarian constitutional law spilled out across the 
face of a new Europe. Imperial law mingled unselfconsciously with international law — 
an unabashed and fecund sociability. I take the concerns of the preceding chapters — 
especially the ways states travel through time, and the relationship between history and 
rights — forward into a post-Habsburg world. If my subject is the afterlives of empire, I 
am not concerned, as many have been before, with imperial nostalgia or with explicit 
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attempts at prolonging or reviving Habsburg sovereignty, like the legitimist movement, 
for example. Nor do I cover the literal continuing validity of particular statutes and codes, 
the subject of an excellent short study by Helmut Slapnicka.11 Rather, I trace lines of 
legal continuity at the level of ideas and legal reasoning. As such, I draw (an otherwise 
absent) Austria-Hungary into the new field of intellectual histories exploring the 
conceptual relationship (even dependency) between various imperial and international 
orders, a nexus that has born much historiographical fruit especially in relation the British 
Empire.12  
Interwar jurists were themselves preoccupied with the relationship between 
constitutional and international law, if in more theoretical or normative terms. They 
studied the porous line between the two,13 in the sense of the interdependence of the two 
systems of law,14 as well as through plans for the reconceptualization of international law 
according to constitutional models.15 Were they two different levels of one unified legal 
order? Hans Kelsen’s followers argued as much. Either way, as the Australian legal 
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scholar J. G. Starke — then working in the legal section in the League Secretariat — put 
it, a “theoretical treatment of the relation between international law and municipal law is 
to-day of the utmost practical importance.”16 
The problem appeared pressing in no small part because radical changes in the 
sovereign landscape had dramatically undermined international law’s theoretical pretence 
to be blind to all matters beyond the formal legal relations of equal, sovereign states. The 
collapse of the continental empires, drawing not only Europe but parts of Africa and the 
Pacific into its sovereign drama, threw up so many new problems and so many new 
would-be states that international law could hardly remain aloof (even theoretically) from 
the messy legal interactions whereby states expired, broke apart, and came into being, 
with “internal” affairs — populations, territories, finances, industries, resources, and so 
on — exposed to the gaze of international peace- and law makers. It was no surprise, 
then, that the interwar years also gave rise to a lively and creative jurisprudence 
concerning the capacity of non-states to serve as subjects or persons in international law. 
As Quincy Wright put it,  
 
The traditional treatment of international law has almost if not wholly 
dissociated it from constitutional law. International law has been conceived as 
concerned only with the abstractions known as states — Platonic ideas, as it 
were, which could not be seen or felt but had their existence in a world apart, 
inhabited only by other abstractions such as sovereignty, independence and 
equality. The extent of a state’s territory, the character of its people, or its 




16 J. G. Starke, “Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law,” British Yearbook of 
International Law (1936): 66-81. When Starke died in 2006, he was, apparently, the last surviving member 
of the Secretariat, where he worked between 1935 and 1940: Michael Kirby, “Obituary: Professor Joseph 
Gabriel Starke QC,” Australian Law Journal 80 (2006): 331-332. 
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Some inevitable exceptions had only proven the rule.17 But international law could no 
longer avert its eyes: platonic abstractions were of little help in a new world in which 
many of the commonplaces of the international system — such as states that had existed 
for centuries — had been wiped away in one fell world-war-shaped swoop.  
 Chapters Five and Six both explore the uses of Habsburg constitutional law in 
post-Habsburg Central Europe, tracing the utility of imperial knowledge in the new world 
order. They are loosely structured around two different (but intersecting) kinds of transfer 
between orders: Chapter Five follows states as they (ostensibly) migrated from the 
empire into international law. Was Czechoslovakia a new state or an old one? What about 
Austria? According to what criteria — and from what vantage point — could one identify 
a continuity in the legal personality of a state? Claim-makers and Allied peacemakers 
alike explored the proposition that, in legal terms, the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire 
involved a “reversion” to the situation of 1526. The making and unmaking of empires 
could be coded into a common legal narrative or transaction, and decolonization emerged 
as temporal or historical-philosophical proposition as much as a political one.  
If legal persons could move between orders with their legal identity in tact, they 
could presumably import their rights with them. Chapter Six explores the survival of the 
historical rights of these historical subjects. It charts the transformation of historical 
rights from one jurisdictional imaginary that stressed the robustness of rights vis-à-vis the 
sovereign, to a more familiar jurisdictional imaginary focused on the territorial extent of 
the state. In other words, it explores the territorialization of historical rights in the claims 
tabled by Hungary and Czechoslovakia to their historical borders and frontiers. In the 
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process, it shows how self-determination was swallowed up into the pre-existing 
landscape of legal concepts and assumptions. The new map of Central Europe continued 
to be understood and critiqued according to the conceptual architecture inherited from 
imperial law into the late 1930s. 
In her monograph Law and Colonial Cultures, the legal historian Lauren Benton 
argued that, within imperial formations, “the internal dynamics of challenges to legal 
authority and changing political schemes to craft a stable plural legal order were crucial 
in moulding the character and reach of political authority and in making it intelligible to 
outsiders.”18 This observation was never more true than in Habsburg Central Europe, 
both before and after imperial collapse. If the energetic debate over the imperial 
constitution shaped the contours of rule in the empire’s last six decades, that legal “diary” 
or “archive” also proved profoundly useful to those “outsiders,” the peacemakers, who 
had to sort through the wreckage of empire. As a conceptual-legal map of the empire, 
constitutional history made postwar Central Europe intelligible, and both external 
commentators and local residents alike drew deeply on the narratives and assumptions of 
imperial law to make sense of the new order around them. 
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The Storytelling of Sovereignty: States in Theory 
In the dying weeks of the war, the young emperor Karl I famously issued a 
Völkermanifest, promising his peoples an empire reborn, rebuilt as a federation of nations 
under the banner of self-determination. His very presence on the throne embodied much 
of the empire’s fateful last years: the old emperor Franz Josef had died in 1916 after 68 
long years on the throne that reached back to the very beginning of the constitutional era 
in the revolutions of 1848; the assassination of his nephew and heir, Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo in 1914 had triggered the outbreak of the great conflagration that now looked 
like it might swallow the empire whole. The assassination had occurred precisely over the 
faultline between imperial, constitutional, and international law. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
been occupied by the Habsburg Empire in 1878 on the basis of a “mandate of Europe” 
granted by the Congress of Berlin.1 It remained formally under Ottoman sovereignty, a 
semi-tethered “international subject,”2 until the Young Turk revolution threatened to 
actualize nominal Ottoman sovereignty through the inclusion of representatives from the 
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territory in a newly-constituted parliament in 1908. The constitutional orders of the two 
empires tangled together ominously; Austria-Hungary took no chances and announced 
outright annexation. Scooped up into the delicately-balanced structure of the Dual 
Monarchy, it belonged neither to Austria nor to Hungary but fell awkwardly under the 
jurisdiction of a common minister of finance. No one ever really agreed on its precise 
constitutional standing.3 Serbian nationalism only further irritated the rash of sovereign 
uncertainty, and the emperor risked war to pin down the fraying edges of his patrimony. 
Karl’s manifesto suffered from all the same ambiguities that had plagued imperial 
constitutional law since the Kremsier debates of 1849. Ostensibly promising a federation 
of nations, it also, in an attempt to secure the support of Hungarian elites, guaranteed the 
integrity of historic Hungary, which clearly ran counter to the national autonomy of the 
numerous ethnic groups long chaffing under Hungarian policies of magyarization.4 Were 
the historic states or the ethnic nations the prime units of the empire? The question 
remained unanswered until the very end — and indeed beyond the very end. The tension 
between (historic) states and nations structured the legal representations of those working 
to properly dissolve the bonds of imperial sovereignty, not least the Czechs. By the time 
of the emperor’s last-ditch pitch to the empire’s nations, the frenetic and effective 
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political work of Czech leaders in exile, especially Masaryk and Beneš, had already won 
their Paris-based national council international recognition as the provisional government 
of a future Czechoslovak state. International law was already playing out deep within the 
“internal” structure of the empire — or that was the point: it wasn’t internal anymore. 
Masaryk had left Austria-Hungary in 1914, pausing first in Switzerland before 
assuming a peripatetic life largely between Paris and London. Like so many others, the 
outbreak of the war radicalized his political agenda: full independence, rather than a 
brand of autonomy within the imperial frame, now constituted the goal. Beneš, an able 
scholar from a Bohemian peasant family and a former student of Masaryk’s, followed the 
latter into exile in 1915.5 Together they worked energetically to both educate and 
influence Allied governments and publics on the question of Czech independence, openly 
challenging the legitimacy of the empire — “treasonous” behaivor that certainly did not 
go unnoticed in Vienna.6 In London, the newly-established journal The New Europe 
served as a mouthpiece, and friends like R. W. Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed 
organized talks and introductions. Paris, meanwhile, had become a global center of 
nationalist agitation. Its prolific émigré press included journals peddling national 
independence movements everywhere from Cuba to Poland.7 The official journal of the 
																																																								
5 For neat sketches of Beneš’s and Masaryk’s backgrounds and personalities, see Robert J. Kerner, “Two 
Architects of New Europe: Masaryk and Beneš,” Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (1921): 27-
43; and Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25-42. 
6 See the catalogue of their crimes published after the war: Deutschnationalen Geschäftsstelle, ed., Das 
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7 See Pascale Cassanova, The World Republic of Letters, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), esp. 30-32. For a new account that integrates the international 
revolutionary spirit with that of the local radical social history of Paris, see Tyler Stoval, Paris and the 
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Czech resistance, La Nation Tchèque (later replaced by L’Indépendance Tchèque), 
published its first issue on May 1, 1915, announcing the Czech program as nothing less 
than the independence of Bohemia.8 With Masaryk as its president and Beneš its 
secretary-general, a Czechoslovak “national council” was formally constituted in 1916 
with Paris as its headquarters.9  
The arguments employed by the Czech national council and its successor, the 
provisional government established the framework for the legitimacy of the new 
Czechoslovak state at the Paris Peace Conference and beyond. Their arguments mattered, 
in the first instance, because the Allied governments generally favored the preservation of 
the Austro-Hungarian empire right up until the end of the war. The recognition they 
granted to the Czech provisional government in mid-1918 was hard won. In the 
circumstances, then, it is less than surprising that the Czech campaigners attached their 
claims to pre-existing structures of legality and legitimacy rather than advocate naked 
revolution. They didn’t need to: they could rely on the world of legal concepts cultivated 
in imperial constitutional debate. They reasoned out of and from the logic of the imperial 
legal order. The establishment of an independent Czech state could in fact be construed 
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8 E. Denis, “Notre Programme,” La Nation Tchèque 1, no. 1 (1 May 1915): 3. 
9 Josef Dürich (a deputy in the imperial parliament for the Agrarian party, who had joined Masaryk in 
Paris) and Milan Rastislav Štefánik (a Slovak serving in the French army) were named vice presidents. 
There is a complex story, less relevant for our purposes, about the different national committees and 
councils: the more pro-Russian Dürich established one in Kiev in 1916 in opposition to the Paris, though 
the Russian Revolution cut short its life. See Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories 
and Observations, 1914-1918 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 88-89; Edvard Beneš, Der Aufstand 
der Nationen: Der Weltkrieg und die Tschechoslowakische Revolution (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 
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as a particular kind of continuity with the legal framework already in existence, rather 
than its rupture or negation. The juridical stories they told tied the pre- and post-war 
worlds into one common legal tapestry. 
In November 1915, La Nation Tchèque published an appeal to Czech “action 
committees” abroad that took its cues from the empire’s constitutional history. Ferdinand 
I, they recounted, had been freely elected by the Bohemian estates and swore to preserve 
Bohemian law and rights. Yet the Habsburgs disrespected these commitments from day 
one. Bohemians rose in defence of their rights; their defeat in the battle of the White 
Mountain destroyed their elites and left them exhausted for two centuries. Only once their 
wounds had healed did they reappear on the political stage in 1848 to resume their rights 
struggle.10 Current activities were thereby subsumed within a series of legal interactions 
unfolding over centuries: the juridical context was long and deep. As another 1915 
declaration put it, “the Czech people are fully conscious of their historical rights.”11 For 
obvious reasons (Kramář was imprisoned for treason in 1915), Czech and Slovak 
politicians at home in the Habsburg lands professed their loyalty to the dynasty far 
longer. Only in January 1918, in their so-called Three Kings Declaration, did Czech 
Reichsrat delegates from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia announce independence as their 
goal, “based on our historic Staatsrecht.”12  
																																																								
10 “Manifeste du Comité d’action tchèque à l’étranger,” La Nation Tchèque 1, no. 14 (15 November 1915): 
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11 “Erste Pariser Proklamation” (1915), in Leo Epstein, Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der 
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The Czechoslovak proclamation of independence of October 18, 1918 developed 
this mode of legal storytelling into a fully-fledged account of the legitimacy of the old-
new state. The Czechoslovak National Council, recognized gradually by the Allied 
governments over the preceding summer as “the provisional government of the 
Czechoslovak State and Nation” declared they could not prosper under a “Habsburg 
mock-federation.”13 “We make this declaration on the basis of our historic and natural 
right,” they explained:  
 
We have been an independent State since the seventh Century; and, in 1526, 
as an independent State, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, we 
joined with Austria and Hungary in a defensive union against the Turkish 
danger. We have never voluntarily surrendered our rights as an independent 
State in this confederation. The Hapsburgs broke their compact with our 
nation by illegally transgressing our rights and violating the Constitution of 
our State, which they had pledged themselves to uphold, and we therefore 
refuse longer to remain a part of Austria-Hungary in any form.14 
 
To understand 1918, one needed to understand 1526, or so the Czechoslovaks argued: 
their independence merely vindicated the rightful status quo that the Habsburgs 
themselves had sworn to protect. The long-term struggle over these dynastic legal 
contracts demonstrated the justice of the present declaration: “The world knows the 
history of our claims, which the Hapsburgs themselves dared not deny. Francis Joseph, in 
																																																								
13 Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government (New York: 
Marchbanks Press for the Czechoslovak Arts Club of New York City, 1918), 3. For the German text, see 
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relationship of the Declaration of October 18 to that of October 28 in Prague (that formally announced the 
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the most solemn manner repeatedly recognized the sovereign rights of our nation.”15 
Only German and Magyar opposition had prevented the full flowering of this recognition. 
Fascinatingly, the Czechs thus claimed to be leaving the imperial union by the same legal 
mechanisms through which they had joined it: “Our nation elected the Habsburgs to the 
throne of Bohemia of its own free will, and by the same right deposes them.”16 They 
thereby denied all further Habsburg claims to the crown of Bohemia. Far from washing 
away the legality of the old empire, Czechoslovak independence, as a legal proposition, 
was framed as a vindication of the juridical structures that had underpinned the empire 
itself.  
Needless to say, the legalism of these declarations represented a conscious 
strategy. Their tone and tenor was actually at odds with Masaryk’s general distaste for 
arguments based on historical rights (in great contrast to Kramář); the former had a 
resolutely democratic and liberal political vision focused on the nation rather than the 
state. Yet he was keenly aware of the legal and diplomatic difficulties of bringing brand 
new states into being. In his memoir of the war years, Masaryk reflected candidly on his 
intentions. In a section titled “de facto and de jure,” he examined the emergence of the 
Czechoslovak state “de facto” as well as the circumstances which “gave it de jure, lawful, 
formal existence, that is to say, how our historical and natural right to an independent 
State was recognized by the Allies and afterwards by the Central Powers, and how our 
revolution abroad and at home was legalized.”17 The new state could not be burdened 
																																																								
15 Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation, 5. 
16 Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation, 6. 
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with an illegitimate birth. Masaryk knew legal accounts would need to be settled at a 
future peace conference, and he would not be caught with a deficit at the bank of 
legitimacy. “In my work abroad,” Masaryk explained,  
 
I was always careful to cast our political programme into a juridical form, 
since I had in mind the legal and international problems that would arise at the 
Peace Conference. Our right to independence I endeavored to define as 
exactly as possible so that foreign public opinion might become familiar with 
it. This was, indeed, the kernel of our propaganda. Starting from the historical 
rights of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, which entitled us to the complete 
restoration of our State, I explained that, de jure, our State had never ceased to 
exist, and I invoked also our national right to independence and unit with 
special reference to Slovakia.18  
 
 
This particular discourse of juridical states — a legal tradition developed in the second 
half of the nineteenth century to legally explain the constitutional nature of the Austrian 
empire — thus found enormous new utility on the international stage. The legal 
personality of the Bohemian state may have lain dormant through the latter centuries of 
Habsburg rule, but it had never been formally dissolved, and could now be reactivated. 
As he asserted in another 1918 memorandum: “Our State, in fact, has never lost its 
continuity of rights.”19 
The residual, juridical existence of the old Bohemian state formed a central 
feature of the Czechoslovak submissions to the Paris Peace Conference. In addition to 
Beneš and Kramář, the Czechslovak delegation included the legal historian Jan Kapras 
																																																								
18 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 340. Emphasis added. 
19 President Masaryk, “The Germans in the Czechoslovak Lands, Especially in Bohemia,” 9 December, 
1918, Archives of the School for Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London 
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and the international lawyer Jaroslav Kallab. They submitted a series of elaborate 
memoranda to the conference that carefully laid out the juridical foundations of the new 
state.20 Strikingly, this task essentially involved explaining the legal history and nature of 
the Habsburg Empire to the world, as assembled at the conference. They needed to 
decode and explain one legal order so that it could be understood and recognized by 
another, recognized by outsiders — not unlike the original impetus for codification of 
customary Bohemian Staatsrecht that, in Kalousek’s argument, arose because of the 
ascension of the first foreign ruler to the Bohemian crown. This time they translated the 
peculiar status of their rights on the world stage. The Czechoslovak “Mémoire No. 2,” 
focused on territorial claims, explained that the Bohemian state was essentially destroyed 
through their grave loss to the Habsburgs in the Battle of the White Mountain in the 
seventeenth century:  
 
“Theoretically, however, the different Monarchs of the House of Habsburg 
immediately succeeding the Ferdinands and Marie-Thérese were forced to 
recognize, - at least implicitly, in their (official) acts, the legal existence of the 
Czech State and the independence of the Crown of Bohemia, the latter being 
considered as forming a separate State.”21  
 
 
The state had preserved its “theoretical” existence — its platonic, abstract, juridical life. 
Even the Habsburgs had not dared touch this. Thus, the Bohemian state no longer existed 
“practically though it still existed legally.” This juridical survival in turn meant that rights 
																																																								
20 The memoranda were drawn up hastily by Beneš, largely without resources at hand. They were then 
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to the whole of the historical territories had survived into the present.22 Presenting the 
Czechoslovak case before the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference on 
February 5, 1919, Beneš similarly emphasized the residual theoretical statehood of the 
Czech lands. Interestingly (and in keeping with disagreements that had featured in 
constitutional debate), he dated the disappearance of factual Czech independence 
somewhat later than the Battle of the White Mountain.  
 
In 1526, the Hapsburgs had been elected Kings of Bohemia, and, though, up 
to the present time they had de jure recognised Czech institutions, they had 
begun from that date to centralize power. Czech independence might be said 
to have lasted until 1747. Since then, though the juridical existence of the 
State continued to be acknowledged, it had no practical significance.23 
 
 
Through these formal presentations, a whole imperial-constitutional legal imaginary was 
transported into the new world order. Like the late-nineteenth century treatises of 
Kramář, Kalousek, and Toman, the delegation drew a clear distinction between factual 
survival and legal survival. We can only make sense of this set of distinctions and 
assumptions, laid out before the peacemakers in Paris, in light of the legal culture of the 
(now-fallen) empire, whose constitutional debate had driven jurists to theorize the status 
of the historic Länder as residual, but slumbering, states. States may be invisible but that 
did not mean they did not exist. Far from a juridical tabula rasa in Central Europe, the 
Paris system moved into a landscape already populated with the ghosts of imperial orders 
past. If we narrate the inauguration of the successor states purely within the narrow tracks 
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of nationalist history — as the self-actualization of free-standing national units — we risk 
obscuring the extent to which their modes of self-presentation and self-understanding 
might originate not with “the nation” but with the empire they ostensibly shucked off. 
Legacies of this sort require a less heavy-handed (and less literal) understanding of the 
threads of continuity that tied the world of Austria-Hungary to the new world order that 
followed.  
  Of course, invocations of historical right coexisted with other genres of right, 
particularly when it came to the determination of borders. Crucially, historical right 
claims could not support the inclusion of Slovakia alongside the lands of the Bohemian 
crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), as Slovakia had long formed part of historic 
Hungary. Slovakia was claimed instead on the grounds of ethnic-linguistic affinity, that 
is, a “natural right” in the parlance of the time, leading to the bifurcated appeal to 
“historical and natural rights” that we see in the declaration of independence and the 
Masaryk quotations above. (The nature and implications of these twinned rights 
paradigms will be treated in more detail below). Moreover, the Czechoslovak delegation 
appealed to economic and security factors — as well as democratic credentials and 
promises of minority protection — in making out their claims for a state that included 
significant “minority” populations. 
The language of historical right had performed crucial work for Czechoslovak 
claim-makers, however, especially during the war. It had allowed them to circumnavigate 
what would emerge, over the course of the twentieth century, as a key theoretical 
quagmire concerning international law and the creation of states more generally. 
Traditionally, international legal thought experienced great conceptual trouble with the 
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creation of states. It regulated the interactions of sovereign states that were, within its 
own logical order, always already existing. They constituted its premise and precondition, 
its a priori.24 Historically, the “figure of the sovereign state occupied such a central 
position within the discipline of international law,” Matthew Craven has recently argued, 
“that its presence or absence was not something that could be adequately conceptualized 
internally within the same framework.” Without states, there was no international law; 
thus “their existence or demise could only be presupposed, or appreciated at some 
distance from the everyday discourse of an otherwise relational conception of law.”25 The 
creation of states, it was thought, constituted a “factual” matter always prior to the 
operation of law. As Alfred Verdross summarized the traditional view in 1927, “law 
attaches only to the finished fact of the state” (Erst an die fertige Tatsache des Staates 
knüpfe das Recht an).26  
Accordingly, the notion of an international right of self-determination clawed 
away right at the epistemological frontiers of the international legal order. From a 
formalist perspective, as Nathaniel Berman has observed, “the process of determination, 
the attainment of the indica of statehood, has always already occurred; if it has not, the 
entity in question does not exist in the eyes of the law.”27 As a result, any such right 
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suffered from a conceptual impasse: “How can international law recognize a right 
accruing to an entity which, by its own admission, lacks international legal existence?”28 
The legal analysis of self-determination, then, necessarily if indirectly exposed 
international law’s inability to see or contemplate its structural history: to conceptualize a 
moment prior to statehood would be to conceptualize a moment prior to its own 
coherence as a body of thought. The leap into the world of international legal personality 
involved something like a suspension of disbelief. 
It was precisely this gap, the murky, legally amorphous space through which 
would-be states pass on their way into the light of international law, that Masaryk and 
others circumnavigated with their appeal to historic rights. For Czechs as well as 
Hungarians, as we will see, the legal fiction of historic rights bridged the paradox of self-
determination: historic sovereignty mediated the application of the right. To phrase it 
anachronistically, we might say that historical rights represented nothing other than a 
regionally-specific discourse of residual international legal personality. The new 
sovereignty of these successor states did not require the metaphysical chemistry of an 
extralegal entity being birthed into new legal life: instead, it was the reawakening of a 
prior status, preserving the illusion of the uninterrupted operation of the law, and 
flattering the law’s distrust of novelty.  
 
What is a New State? Paris as the Clearing House of Austro-Hungarian Sovereignty 
In 1919, old states, like new ones, found themselves in an extremely fluid sovereign 
landscape. Wildly varying proposals and visions of a region reborn were concocted and 
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pitched in all directions as states were chopped up and recombined: federations and 
economic unions, protectorates and mandates, zones of neutrality or demilitarization, 
autonomous provinces, “loose confederations of neutral republics.” Together, we might 
take this field of possibilities as the state dreamscape of 1919. General Smuts, sent to 
Hungary by the Allied governments, deemed the region’s new governments weak and 
inexperienced: his report recommended a “Mandatory of the Great Powers for Austria-
Hungary.”29 Or perhaps Ruthenian territories should be a Czech mandate state?30 Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, meanwhile, ostensibly wrote to Balfour pointing out the “advisability of 
establishing an English Protectorate over German Austria in order to check the spreading 
of anarchy and to separate German Austria from Germany.”31 A particularly creative 
Heinrich Lammasch, acting as something of a maverick in these months, sketched out 
proposals for an independent and neutral “Alpine Republic” that would include not only 
the Voralberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, the Austrian duchies, and parts of Styria and Carinthia, 
but also certain western districts of Hungary, southern parts of Moravia and Bohemia, 
and even portions of southern Bavaria.32 Dreams were matched with nightmares; the 
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tumult in Hungary inspired especially apocalyptic language. Grave Hungarian territorial 
losses amounted to sowing “seeds of eternal warfare — an ever-springing harvest of 
blood.”33 Andrassy warned that a coalition against Bolshevism must be formed or else 
Lenin would emerge as the man of the future, with the “very great danger that Eastern 
and Central-Europe will hurl itself against Western Europe, like a new Mongolian 
invasion under the leadership of Lenin.”34  
In many ways, the state that would arise around the old imperial capital of Vienna 
remained the most formless of all. As is well known, the Allied governments vetoed 
attempts to have the largely German provinces of the old empire attached to Germany 
proper.35 If it was to stand alone, what was “it”? The various names in circulation 
included Republik Südostdeutschland, Ostalpenland, and Deutsche Alpenland. With the 
name Austria — Österreich — so deeply bound up with the old monarchy, and no 
indigenous republican tradition to call upon, it was hard to re-imagine the state out from 
behind its nomenclature.36 Surely, the same name could not simply be reapplied to this 
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small remaining piece of territory that seemingly bore no connection to the old grand 
polity? The provisional Nationalversammlung clutched initially at Deutschösterreich, 
which at least communicated that the new unit simply brought together the German parts 
of the old monarchy. That a “Republic of Austria” eventually emerged was largely a 
result of the Allies, who contracted with a “Republique d’Autriche.” Even the name 
appeared the dictate of the victors, and it was disliked all the more because of it.37 
“German Austria,” wrote Otto Bauer in 1923, “is not an organically-grown 
formation. It is nothing but the remainder that was left over from the old empire when the 
other nations fell away from it. It stayed behind as a loose bundle of lands reaching away 
from one another,” devoid of the economic foundations of their common existence.38 No 
one, he reported, thought it capable of independent life; its form could only be 
provisional. Some sort of “connection in international law or constitutional law” would 
be required as a new foundation for life.39 Looking back on 1919 from 1948, Renner 
painted a similar portrait of a historyless, unviable new polity, a wastepaper basket of 
empire, defined only by what it was not: 
 
What remained of the Dual Monarchy were the German-speaking parts of the 
eastern Alps, a population of about 6,500,000, and the capital city of Vienna, 
with a population of about 2,000,000. It was a mountainous country with little 
arable land, without a sufficient domestic market for its industries, no outlet to 
the sea, and surrounded on three sides by hostile neighbors. It was, indeed, a 
land without a name — for this area had never been a separate state. It was 
treated as a vanquished enemy, and had to take over the name of Austria and 
the inheritance of the House of Hapsburg, with all its glory and also its ill 
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repute. It likewise gathered in an unfortunate heritage of passé Hapsburg 
officers and monarchists from all quarters of the old empire.40 
 
 
“No sensible person,” Renner continued, “believed that this new state named Austria 
could exist without aid, or that it could withstand any shocks.” Only credits from the 
League of Nations made it viable in the first instance. As a member of the peace 
delegation at St. Germain, Renner recounted, he had returned to Vienna in September 
1919 and recommended to parliament the acceptance of the peace treaty. “I did so in 
express reliance upon the League of Nations as the guarantor of our independence, and 
described Austria as ‘an autonomous province of the League.’”41 Like a mandated state 
with only the League as a mandatory (or the province of an empire that did not exist), the 
new state was born under the care and the sign of the new order, perhaps more than any 
other.42 For many, the reversal in fortunes proved hard to take. In his theological-mystical 
1921 text Austria erit in orbe ultima, the Catholic sociologist and politician Ernst Karl 
Winter communicated a sense in which the true life of the state must simply be 
suspended: “Austria is only sleeping. It is not dead… Austria is the Son of Man 
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[Menschensohn] of Europe.”43 Previously, Bohemia and Hungary had been the sleeping 
states at the heart of Europe — suspended, theoretical notions as against the harder 
“realities” of the central imperial government. Now the signs had been reversed, and old 
the empire slept while they had awoken into full sovereign life. 
Representatives of the new Austria were quick to claim that no legal continuity 
existed between the new state and the old empire. The peace conference may have only 
just begun, but one of the vanquished parties had already legally disappeared, or so they 
argued. The actors were in motion. The “German-Austrian Government is not requesting 
the establishment of direct relations between the Entente Governments and the old 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy but between those Governments and the German-Austrian 
Republic,” they submitted in February 1919. The republic should not inherit the juridical 
identity, the legal individuality, of the latter. On what basis could this legal personality be 
grafted onto the new alpine republic rather than any other of the new states built atop the 
fallen empire? “The state of war which existed in the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
has no more devolved upon German-Austria than on Czecho-Slovakia or any other 
national State which has arisen on Austrian-Hungarian soil.”44 There was no reason why 
they would take up the old monarchy’s attitudes towards or relationships with other 
powers. “Still less true is the contention that the international position of any one of these 
newly constituted States, as opposed to that of any other, is identical with that of the late 
Empire.” They therefore claimed “the position of a friendly Power towards all countries 
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in the world.”45 The British Foreign Office responded skeptically. “The gist of the 
argument in this note is that the German-Austrian Republic is not the successor of the 
Austrian Empire, but one of the new states arising out of that Empire’s ruins,” noted a 
quick-witted A. W. A. Leeper. The question appeared to him unsettled, as it was with 
Hungary. “They are at present enemies,” replied a cautious Sir Eyre Crowe.46 
Responding to the peace stipulations before the Paris Conference on June 2, Karl 
Renner, now Staatskanzler, made the case still more emphatically. “The Danube 
Monarchy,” he declared, “ceased to exist on 12. November, 1918.” From that day 
forward, there existed neither a monarch nor a great power, “nor the disastrous dualism, 
nor an Austrian or Hungarian government or army, nor any other kind of recognized state 
institution.” Overnight, eight nations created their own parliaments and armies and their 
own state life. The young Austrian republic came into being just like the rest of them, no 
more the empire’s successor than any other.47 The German Austrian delegation produced 
a special “Note on the International Legal Personality of German Austria” drawing 
attention to the ambiguity of the legal subject “Austria” that appeared in the treaty drafted 
by the Allies.48 Before the collapse of the monarchy, the delegation explained, such a 
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legal subject was unimaginable, as only the dualist “Austro-Hungarian” monarchy had 
the legal capacity for international dealings.  
 
To appreciate more exactly the legal nature of the former state, the Peace 
Conference may refer to the excellent work of the French author Louis 
Eisenmann “Le Compromis austro-hongrois” (Paris, 1902) and they will 
discover: de jure, an “Austria” has never existed — thus we cannot succeed 
such [a state] nor represent it here.49 
 
 
Austro-Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence may have emerged to explain and codify 
the empire’s order, but now it had a new vocation in regulating the terms of the empire’s 
dissolution. The postulates of the empire’s life configured those of its death. “The state in 
question,” the delegation explained further, “in its formally constituted fundamental laws, 
was called nothing other than ‘The Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial 
Parliament.’” The law listed these as Bohemia, Galicia, Dalmatia, and so on. “It was 
these lands that — together with the lands of the Hungarian crown — waged the war, that 
is, de jure and de facto Bohemia, Galicia, Dalmatia etc. collectively.”50 The statehood of 
the Länder had rarely been as “real” as it was right now. Legally, this collection of small 
medieval mini-quasi-states — not greater than the sum of their parts — had fought a war 
against the Allied and Associated Powers, the delegation argued. The name “Austria” had 
been connected to the dynasty, not to a particular territory. While it was used more 
casually to refer to something more, this “something more” always included the 
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Bohemians and the South Slavs. On what basis, then, was the empire’s legal personality 
ascribed to this new small republic? On national grounds? This reasoning hardly made 
sense: those representing the empire, for example, had mostly been Hungarians, and 
Germans had been a minority in the parliament since 1907. Or was it the fact that Vienna 
was the capitol? A city this large was the product of the economic power of the whole 
empire; now cut off from that, it would actually prove a burden to this small country.51 
According to what logic or evidentiary basis could one establish the “newness” or 
the “oldness” of a state? A dense debate broke out among members of the British 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference on the question of whether Austria was in fact a 
new state or an old one. This argument travelled widely and deeply through the 
constitutional history of the Habsburg Empire, turning the back rooms of the Peace 
Conference into a kind of clearing house of Austro-Hungarian sovereignty. Trust the 
historians: it was resident classicist James Headlam-Morley who set the cat among the 
pigeons with a ruminative “Note on the Draft Austrian Treaty” in May 1919. He had been 
looking over the draft treaty “with the object of considering the problems which come up 
with regard to the New States.” The whole basis of the treaty seemed to him  
 
open to very serious criticism. So far as I can understand, the theory 
underlying it is that what we may call the New Austria is juridically identical 
with the old Austria. This seems to me to be wrong in fact and dangerous in 
principle. Surely New Austria is as much a new State as Czecho-Slovakia. 
What happened during the course of the Revolution was that the Old Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy completely broke up; certain portions, Bohemia, 
Moravia, etc. formed themselves into one State; other portions, Croatia, 
Dalmatia, etc. united themselves with Serbia; other portions, Upper and 
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Austria had been composed of various Länder, the atoms of the empire: they broke apart, 
moved about, and re-combined; there was no way of tracking “the empire” as a stable 
value through the mutations of this sovereign chemistry. 
Far from a dry technicality, the (dis)continuity of the empire’s legal personality 
appeared to him a highly portentous issue. If the German-Austrian representatives had 
looked to discard the legal identity of the empire so as to shuck off the (negative) legal 
baggage it carried, Headlam-Morley was alternatively worried about the (positive) legal 
baggage attached to the legal person of the empire — that is, its rights. The question of 
the continuous legal personality of states was simultaneous the question of whether they 
could carry old rights through time and between orders, just as it had been within the 
frame of imperial constitutional debate. For this reason, Headlam-Morley thought the 
principle of discontinuity needed to be clearly articulated, or else a kind of platonic 
version of the empire could be left legally intact beneath the surface of the new states: 
 
By adopting the principle on which the draft Treaty is drawn up, we are driven 
to recognise that the New Austria, being identical with the Old Austria, 
inherits from the Old Austria all the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction 
which the Hapsburgs exercised over the seventeen territories comprised 
within the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. It is no doubt the case that the 
Treaty provides for the renunciation of these rights, but the very fact that we 
ask Austria to renounce these rights means that we recognise that she has 
them. Suppose now — an improbable but not impossible contingency — that 
owing to some unforeseen accident the Treaty was never signed, we should be 
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left in the situation that the Allied and Associated Powers had definitely 
recognized the continued existence of these rights.53  
 
 
Like Masaryk, he was deeply concerned with the sound legal stitching of the new order in 
Europe. Old imperial rights needed to be definitely decapitated and not allowed to linger 
in a legal twilight zone, pending possible revival. For example, German-Austria 
presented itself as the advocate of the rights of Bohemian Germans. As a new state with 
clearly limited frontiers, no such status could be claimed; the threads that tied a former 
state to its former subjects would be cut. Yet if it constituted the inheritor of the empire, 
then it would be “difficult to deny that she has now a legal right to be heard on the matter 
[of the German Bohemians], and even if the legal right were to be renounced, it would be 
very difficult to get rid of a vague moral right.” The danger of residual legalities would 
only grow sharper if the monarchy was restored, which was “not outside the range of 
possibility.” To properly destroy rights, one needed to destroy their subject, the legal 
person to which they were attached.  
Disposing of the old legal architecture of Central Europe in fact required serious 
work (contra MacMillan). The legal liquidation of a grand old empire had fallen to the 
peacemakers; according to Headlam-Morley, this solemn, even world-historical task 
demanded both care and ceremony. The treaty with Austria could not simply be a slightly 
amended version of the one presented to Germany: 
 
In the case of Austria we have not only to put an end to the state of war, but to 
deal with one of the greatest events which have [sic] ever taken place in 
European history, the dissolution of one of the oldest, the greatest and most 
extensive States on the Continent of Europe. I should venture to suggest that it 
																																																								




is incumbent on us to recognise this and to find appropriate and dignified 
language in which we can place on record what has happened. What we have 




Making peace involved a kind of legal storytelling, too, one that wrote the peacemakers 
into the sweep of a grand historical epic. Old dynastic contracts actually required explicit 
undoing. Headlam-Morley recommended an article for the treaty that not only recognized 
Hungary’s independence, but declared null and void the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723, the 
constitution of 1867, “and all other laws, decrees or treaties determining the relations 
between Hungary and other portions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.”55 The 
constitutional law of the empire needed to be written into the peace, even if only in its 
negation.  
Headlam-Morley had demonstrated an impressive knowledge of Austro-
Hungarian constitutional law, but other Foreign Office mandarins were not to be so easily 
outdone. The following week, the Polish-born historian and fellow member of the 
delegation, Lewis Namier, who had in fact studied in Austrian Lemberg before migrating 
to the United Kingdom, circulated a long and erudite critique of Headlam-Morley’s 
arguments. He took the opposite view, and no prisoners: “If the question whether German 
Austria is the legal heir to the personality of the late Austrian State were to be determined 
on a judicial basis, there can hardly be any doubt but that it would be answered in the 
affirmative,” he declared categorically in opening. In outlining his reasons, he set 
Habsburg sovereignty, and its undoing, in time:  
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(a) The Habsburg Monarchy has grown out of the provinces to which German 
Austria is now being reduced. It is returning more or less to its frontiers of 
1526.  
(b) The Austrian Germans were always strongly conscious of standing in a 
different relation to the Austrian State than did the other nationalities. […] The 
Austrian Germans were invariably ‘die Träger des Österreichischen 
Staatsgedankens’ […] They cannot suddenly change their ground because it suits 
them to do so. 
(c) It would be wrong to say that any of the new States starts an absolutely 
new political existence. They merely resume an existence broken by the action 
of the Habsburgs who had therein the support of the German Austrians. Were 
German Austria to be allowed to refuse the personality of the old Austrian 
State, it would indeed be the only one among the new States without an 
historical past.56 
 
Namier’s arguments are noteworthy for a number reasons. In the first instance, he 
constructed German Austrians as an imperial people, and the original Austrian duchies as 
an imperial metropole, meaning “the empire” could survive even if it lost all the 
territories it acquired in 1526 and after. As such, he took a position in an older legal 
debate,57 as well as an ongoing historiographical one.58 Secondly, and crucially for our 
study of sovereignty and time, he painted the making and unmaking of composite 
monarchies as a sort of historical game of snakes and ladders. Dynastic contracts broken, 
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constituent states — the Austrian crownlands as much as Bohemia or Hungary — simply 
slid back down the snake through time, “resum[ing] an existence broken by the action of 
the Habsburgs.” Reverting to their old legal status and identity, they picked up legally 
where they had left off — in 1526. This was not a Central European pathology, tied to 
some proclivity for history. On the contrary, Namier drew an analogy to Ireland, which, if 
the union dissolved, “would no doubt effect a return to 1799 or to Gratton’s 
Parliament.”59 Sovereignty could play with history, lapsing back to an old status quo, 
even if that involved time travel across multiple centuries. The temporal logics of 
sovereignty were not bound into a one-way historical progression: composite crowns 
contained triggers for the clock to be re-set, if not reversed.  
This blithe criss-crossing of centuries had a direct bearing on the name of the old-
new imperial state. Headlam-Morley had expressed doubts about the name “Austria” with 
its historical ambiguity and multi-valence. Namier saw things differently. 
 
I do not consider the name “German Austria” (Deutsch Österreich) an 
improvement on “Austria” pure and simple. On the contrary the qualification 
of “German” implies the continued existence of another, wider Austria, 
whereas the use of ‘Austria’ plain and simple would mean that it had returned 




59 “…and though the United Kingdom eo ipso [sic] would cease to exist, no one could deny that Great 
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possible succession. See Anthony Caty and Mairianna Clyde, “Scotland and England from a Union of 
Parliaments to Two Independent Kingdoms,” London Review of International Law 2, no. 2 (2014): 299-
328. 
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Namier’s memorandum thus tied the new order of 1919 being forged in Paris to the 
fateful 1526 death of Ludwig — the poor Jagiellonian king drowned in a swamp as he 
fled the Battle of Mohacs — and the passing of his two crowns into hungry Habsburg 
hands. Josef Redlich had identified the death of the young king as the origin point of the 
polity that became the Austro-Hungarian empire, and thus the starting point of the legal 
order whose development he traced. Around the same time, Lewis Namier took the same 
moment as the foundation of a radically different legal order. 1919 inherited the order of 
1526 and reversed the course Habsburg sovereignty: the latter’s empire-building entailed 
the mere suspension of other legal realities, waiting to reemerge in their wake. Namier’s 
new world order was a temporal pastiche, a medieval mash up. The legal arc required to 
explain 1919 stretched less from Vienna 1815, than from the coronations of 1526.  
Far from an idiosyncratic legal reverie, Namier’s assumptions presciently marked 
out the terrain of post-World War Two debate on the legal status of decolonization. In a 
dissenting opinion on a case involving Portuguese rights of passage through Indian 
territory, heard before the International Court of Justice in 1960, the Argentine judge 
Lucio Moreno Quintana proffered a striking thesis on the nature of India’s sovereign 
independence. “We must not forget,” he held,  
 
that India, as the territorial successor, was not acquiring the territory for the 
first time, but was recovering an independence (sovereignty) lost long since. 
Its legal position at once reverted to what it had been more than a hundred 
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In the discussions of UN Assembly’s Sixth Committee in 1968, a representative from 
Ceylon similarly queried the terminology of “new states” for the 
decolonized/decolonizing world. Why not “old state” or “original state”? Like many 
others, Ceylon was an ancient state that lost independence before returning to it. The end 
of imperial domination represented a return to this original status, not some novelty or 
innovation. In the late 1960s, the professor and lawyer Charles Alexandrowicz would 
pick up this theme and develop a highly influential thesis generally termed “reversion to 
sovereignty.” Alexandrowicz (1902-1974), born in Austria, in fact (and aptly) studied at 
the Jagiellonian University in Krakow before moving to Paris and then London; his 
trajectory subsequently deviated from more well-trodden paths when he took up a chair 
in Madras, and later in Sydney. He argued that perhaps “not only the immediate pre-
independence phase of a country’s past but also the period of independence prior to 
colonial rule” was relevant in determining the legal nature of state succession. On 
regaining independence, states like Ceylon in fact “reverted to sovereignty rather than 
joined the Family of Nations as newcomers.”62 New states were not new states, and the 
nature of world order looked different because of it: their sovereignty was not a qualified 
gift or concession from Western powers, but the restitution of a dignity, equality, and 
standing they had enjoyed in the past.  
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To make out such a case, Alexandrowicz needed to address the question “whether 
it was possible for Asian (or African) States to have legally existed in the past.” Positivist 
jurists of the nineteenth century had obviously denied such a possibility, restricting the 
community of international law to those inside the magic circle of “civilization.”63 
Alexandrowicz argued that, prior to the European hegemony and legal positivism of the 
nineteenth century, the family of nations had understood itself quite differently: it had 
been a “multi-ideological,” “universal and non-discriminatory system of law.” This more 
pluralist and tolerant order could be seen in theory — in classical writers like Freitas, 
Grotius, Wolff, Vattel — as well as in practice: dense networks of treaty making with 
non-European states demonstrated the respect and personality they enjoyed.64 Like Czech 
and other claim-makers who asserted the “sovereignty” of their sixteenth-century 
kingdoms, Alexandrowicz needed to recover (or discover) international law in periods 
and spaces that presumably possessed quite different understandings of the nature of 
statehood and sovereignty. The reversion thesis turned decolonization into a more 
philosophical referendum on what, in principle, came before imperialism, and further 
turned that kind of historical-hypothetical reasoning into legal content. The reversion 
thesis also expressed a particular understanding of the nature of imperial sovereignty in 
(legal) time. As in Namier’s memorandum, imperial sovereignty was not necessarily 
legally transformative, or only in ways that could be reversed. The identity of states had 
the capacity withstand centuries of colonization to re-emerge, unchanged, into the 
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domain of international law, as though returning to the spotlight after an uneventful 
sojourn offstage. Imperialism was a legal game played outside the strictures of linear 
historical time. 
So what, then, was a new state? Headlam-Morley identified this as the real issue 
when he responded to Namier in turn. If he was chastened by Namier’s rebuke, it only 
showed in his more equivocal tone. “I think there is some confusion in regard to the 
meaning of the words ‘New State,’” he ventured.  
 
In using this expression I have been thinking throughout of international 
relations: for instance when I speak of Czecho-Slovakia as a New State, I am 
not in the least disputing the fact that there is an historic continuity in internal 
matters and that the new Republic is the direct successor of the old Bohemian 
Kingdom. On the other hand, from the international point of view, there has 
been no Bohemian State for 300 years and therefore Czecho-Slovakia has to 
receive recognition as a new State and its whole position in international 
affairs has to be definitely regulated. In doing this we take the view, which I 
think is clearly the right one, that it starts quite afresh and in no way hampered 
by any of the obligations of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and not 
inheriting any rights which the Monarchy possessed. I would treat Austria in 
precisely the same way.65  
 
 
Headlam-Morley thereby suggested that the question depended on whether one viewed 
matters from “inside” the states concerned or from the vantage point of the international 
system more broadly. He reproduced something of the distinction between internal and 
external sovereignty: each state, on its own terms, may be seen as continuous and thus 
not “new.” Yet if surveyed from a higher perch, taking in the whole of international 
relations, its 300 absence was real: the world had changed in the meantime, and its 
position in the international order would necessarily differ dramatically as a result. Its 
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standing and status needed to be re-regulated: for all intents and purposes, it was a new 
state (even if this was because the international order, and not the state itself, had legally 
moved during the period of the latter’s absence). International law did not have a so 
prodigious a memory; it could not hold states in suspense for so long. It was not a static 
storehouse for history’s countless legal personalities and minor sovereignties; it moved 
and changed with history and forgot its former residents. The Austrian government of 
1919 may well be the successor the “old Government of Upper and Lower Austria and 
the other territories which go with it. But this has nothing whatever to do with its 
international obligations,” Headlam-Morley maintained, “and my whole point is that I see 
no reason why, from the international point of view, Austria should be treated on 
different principles to Czecho-Slovakia.”66 
 
Rechtskontinuität Redux: Temporal Frontiers as International Ones 
If Namier’s position on “new states” precipitated subsequent legal debates, Headlam-
Morley’s did, too. His memorandum implied that one could not adequately “see” the 
state, legally understood, from an internal perspective: only an international viewpoint 
afforded purchase on the legal survival and demise of states. From “where” could one 
make out the contours of the legal personality of the state? What premise(s) rendered its 
endpoints and birthdates visible? While this question had clear material implications for 
international politics and policy in the era of peacemaking, it was also, at the same time, 
an epistemological or methodological problem. Here the drama of the Paris Peace 
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Conference bled into the rarefied world of legal theory. Coincident with the end of the 
war and the birth of the new Europe, a group of young jurists in Vienna developed a new 
jurisprudence on legal continuity, one that tied the imperial constitutional tradition to 
post-imperial Austria and the peace treaties to some of the central theoretical precepts of 
Kelsen’s Vienna school. 
When Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) taught his first course at the University of Vienna 
in 1911, one of those in attendance was Adolf Julius Merkl (1890-1970), who would 
become the closest of disciples and an original member of what we now call the Vienna 
school. After finishing his degree in 1913 (having studied with Edmund Bernatzik as well 
as Kelsen), Merkl spent the war working in the Vienna city administration before he 
replaced Rudolf Laun as außerordentlicher professor at the University of Vienna when 
the latter left for Hamburg in 1921 (and would later replace Kelsen himself as full 
professor after the latter left for Cologne).67 His major contribution to the Vienna school, 
and one that Kelsen adopted entirely, was the theory of the “Stufenbau der 
Rechtsordnung,” which he sketched out initially in a series of articles written during the 
First World War. According to the Stufenbaulehre, norms did not exist haphazardly side 
by side, but in fact formed a single hierarchical, pyramid-like order with the Grundnorm 
at its apex. The smallest legal norm was thereby connected to the largest in a logical legal 
chain. Any given legal act had a Janus-faced dual character, in that it both implemented a 
higher norm and created lower norms in turn. In this way, law produced itself, or 
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(1973): 492. Not to be confused with the criminal law scholar Adolf Merkel (1836-1896). 
	
	 363	
governed its own production (Selbsterzeugung des Rechts).68 A rupture to one norm 
affected all those further down the chain. 
These assumptions shaped an article Merkl published in 1918 on the legal identity 
of the Austrian state. “Die Rechtseinheit des österreichischen Staates” argued that a 
rupture to the fundamental legal continuity of the state entailed a rupture in its legal 
personality. The text appeared before the collapse of the empire: the continuities and 
discontinuities in question were those of the empire’s nineteenth-century constitutional 
history. In many ways, his research continued forward older attempts, born of the 
imperatives of the new constitutional era, to identify the legal birth date of the current 
Austro-Hungarian state — a project not yet superseded, even in the year of the empire’s 
death. He began by distinguishing “state individualities” in their historical-political sense 
from their juridical sense. States might possess a continuous historical-political identity 
over many centuries (especially where they bore the same name) but a discontinuous 
legal identity (or vice versa): “different conditions of knowledge exist for jurisprudence 
than for history or politics.”69  
As the constitution (the state’s highest norm) secured the legal identity of the state 
and the unity of its legal order, a fundamental rupture in the legal continuity of the 
constitution occasioned the expiration of the state, legally understood. Naturally, not all 
constitutional change affected the identity of the state, even if those changes involved 
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shifting state forms: the transition from absolutism to constitutional monarchy, for 
example, did not necessarily disrupt the identity of the state. But in such cases, legal-
conceptual coherence was required: “Different constitutional forms that are logically tied 
together, that are conceptually deducible from one another, represent in the legal sense a 
single state despite their plurality.”70 The picture looked different if the logical chain was 
broken: “Only where a conceptual leap is required to comprehend a unity, where a hole is 
torn open in the legal system […], [only there] begins the possibility of perceiving a 
plurality of states [in time].”71 The legal identity of the state was a logical problem: if 
different iterations could be conceptually connected without contradiction, then the state 
personality persisted. But if ideas failed to adhere together, the state identity could only 
break apart, too: one state would end and another would begin. 
Merkl applied this theory to the constitutional history of the Habsburg Empire 
with surprising results. Despite the fact that “Austria” had existed in a historical-political 
sense for many hundreds of years, juridically speaking there had been not one Austria 
through history, but many: “the bridge of legal unity” had suffered repeated ruptures.72 In 
limiting the monarch’s previously unrestricted lawmaking power through the legislative 
participation of a representative assembly, the empire’s first constitution, the Pillersdorf 
constitution (April 1848), may have represented a political novum, but it did not disrupt 
the legal identity of the state. It was entirely consistent with the prerogatives of the 
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monarch in an absolutist state to relinquish some of his legislative powers, and thereby 
turn the state into a constitutional one. (If a revolutionary party, rather than the emperor, 
had declared the transition to constitutionalism, the identity of the old absolutist state 
would have been ruptured and a new state born: such an act could not have been legal 
within the order of the old state). Yet when the emperor wheeled around the very next 
month and called a constituent assembly (that would become the Kremsier parliament), 
he acted unilaterally and did not respect the already-binding norms of the Pillersdorf 
constitution.73 This legally inexplicable act sliced open the chain of legal logic, and 
juridically, a new state was born.  
Merkl’s counter-intuitive history of state discontinuity proceeded in this vein 
through the years of constitutional experimentation, culminating not in 1867, but in 1865. 
In the latter year, the monarch again suspended a constitutional order (that of the 
1860/1861 October Diploma and February Patent) by decree, violating the legal identity 
of the state. As he was again within his (absolutist) rights to return to constitutionalism in 
1867, it was 1865 that in fact marked the birth of the state that was still in existence as 
Merkl wrote his article in 1918. Merkl thus arranged Austro-Hungarian sovereignty 
differently in time. If he wrote from the center of the imperial state, conceptually and 
otherwise (Merkl was born in Vienna and would die there, too), he nevertheless shared 
some of the assumptions of the Bohemian and Hungarian claim-makers who sought to 
challenge the empire’s constitutional order. Like them, he presumed legal history could 
be clearly distinguished from political history, and that the former possessed its own 
logics, rhythms, and patterns of duration. 
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What is more: Merkl offered a different account of the relationship between legal 
pluralism and temporal pluralism, as well as, more obliquely, that between imperial and 
international law. 1865 cut off the current state from those that had preceded it: “Back 
beyond that, extending into the past, lies (in the legal sense) foreign countries [darüber 
hinaus in die Vergangenheit zurück im Rechtssinn Fremdland, Ausland liegt].”74 Legally, 
pre-1865 Austria, just like pre-1848 Austria, amounted to an external state — “abroad.” 
The past was a foreign country — literally. Strikingly, the state thus had juridical 
frontiers in time as well as in space. Behind the political designation “Austria-Hungary” 
lay a plurality of legal persons: if that juridical plurality possessed a clear temporal 
structure, its logic was successive or linear rather than synchronous, as different versions 
of the state superseded each other in time.  
For Merkl, the legal foreigness of the past was not simply a pretty phrase, but 
rather a challenging legal problem for the present. It meant that legislation made in 
previous versions of the state (that appeared as the same state in political-historical terms, 
just not in legal ones) likewise possessed a “foreign” character: 
 
If the part absolutist, part constitutional eras of the past represent foreign 
states in relation to the current state — we won’t speak of “abroad” just 
because linguistic convention restricts this expression to foreign states with a 
different territory — [that is,] if it is a matter of foreign states, then it is also a 
matter of foreign law, so far as their law comes into question.75 
 
 
The use and application of law created in these superseded constitutional eras raised the 
same problems as the use and application of other sorts of foreign law. Such law, Merkl 
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argued, needed to be explicitly “made present” and inducted into the order of the new 
state in order to have full legitimacy. 
Merkl’s article thus mapped out the “legal time” of the state in quite literal terms. 
Legally speaking, the state acquired another dimension, its norms and jurisdiction 
extending over clearly-defined territory and clearly-defined time. If he thereby made the 
period since 1865 into one long legal present — the timeless present of sovereign time — 
then his model also implicitly sketched a kind of international domain not only “above” 
current states but “behind” or “beneath” them historically, an international domain that, 
when viewed from the present, “began” in 1865 and extended backwards in time. This 
international domain — in the sense of a zone of relationships between foreign states — 
was populated by previous versions of oneself, now legal strangers.  
In his 1925 work Allgemeine Staatslehre, Hans Kelsen would turn this line of 
thinking into a more general theoretical principle in a section titled “Der zeitliche 
Geltungsbereich der Staatsordnung.” Dominant theories of the state, he observed, 
included space (Raum) among the basic elements of the state, but not time. The latter had 
not received any attention, while long excurses into the territorial aspects of the state 
abounded. Yet the temporal dimension was clearly fundamental. The standard view that 
the state was impenetrable (undurchdringlich) could “clearly only mean that two states 
cannot exist in the same space at the same time.”76 The state’s exclusive jurisdiction for 
one and the same space must also mean its exclusive jurisdiction for one and the same 
time. Because in successive time periods, on the contrary, “different states could exist in 
																																																								




the same space.”77 The frontiers of the state’s Geltung, its legitimacy and efficacy, were 
temporal as much as geographic. Kelsen speculated that we remained far more conscious 
of the state’s territorial frontiers as against its temporal ones because the state imagined 
no limits looking forward: it always appeared on the world stage with the intention of 
lasting forever.78 
Yet scholarship need not reproduce the state’s projection of temporal open-
endedness. Not least because there were legal precepts that governed the beginnings and 
ends of state legitimacy, Kelsen argued: these came from international law.79 The role of 
international law at the state’s temporal frontiers in fact formed the central line of critique 
in the broader debate provoked by Merkl’s article. Fritz Sander (1889-1938), another of 
Kelsen’s students who subsequently distanced himself from his teacher, was the first to 
make this critique.80 In a philosophically dense article published a year after Merkl’s, 
Sander argued that Merkl failed to follow his own idea of the Stufenbau der 
Rechtsordnung through to its logical conclusions: because above the Stufenbau of state 
law rose the Stufenbau of international law.81 It was only from the perspective of this 
higher “level” that one had any epistemological purchase on the legal continuity of the 
state: “Whether continuity prevails between two (empirical) constitutions cannot be 
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determined through a comparison of both constitutions, but rather only through seeking 
out a higher rung [Stufe].”82 Analyzing the legal identity of the state required a “position” 
outside the state’s own order. It was international law that recorded and contained such 
continuities and discontinuities; it was international law, we might say, that archived the 
lives of states (just as the imperial constitutional had done before). Like an underlying 
sedimentary layer, its patterns of continuity, its time-rhythms (in Koselleck’s phrase) 
differed to those of state law. Worlds may have separated Fritz Sander and Headlam-
Morley, but at the same moment they both argued the same point, namely, that the 
obscurity of state birth and state death could only be clarified from afar — from the 
hilltop of international law. Sander borrowed the words of Constantin Franz in calling 
international law “the crown of all law, from which all other law first receives its full 
light.”83 
This view had widespread implications, both within the methodological frame of 
the Vienna school and for subsequent scholarship on the birth and death of states. 
Staatsrecht, according to Sander, was epistemologically opaque and nonsensical if carved 
off from international law. Rather than representing the stable legal measure against 
which continuity and discontinuity could be ascertained, as Merkl had presumed, 
individual state constitutions merely amounted to particular steps within a larger legal 
pyramid leading up towards international law at the top. As we know, the unity of the 
legal order — including international law — became a central precept of the Vienna 
school’s so-called pure theory of law. Alfred Verdross, born the same year as Merkl, and 
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another of Kelsen’s students circulating in this heady Viennese milieu, is generally 
credited with emphasizing the place of international law within this unified system.84 As 
Sander already laid out in 1919, the theory of the unity of all law in fact circumnavigated 
the traditional legal-theoretical difficulty of accounting for the birth of states (discussed 
in the previous section). The creation of states could not be a matter of mere given “fact” 
outside law’s purview: on the contrary, the totality of the order meant there were no 
legally-relevant “facts” outside it.85  
As abstract as these precepts might sound, members of the Vienna school applied 
them to the concrete legal quagmires of post-imperial Central Europe. When the 
provisional National Assembly of “German Austria” constituted an independent German 
Austria, Kelsen reported in 1923, its actions could not be admitted under the old 
constitution, so it in effect enacted a revolution. “From a juridical perspective, revolution 
is nothing else than a rupture to legal continuity,” he wrote, sounding very much like 
Merkl; “and such a rupture remains a revolution when it is carried out without external 
battle, without the spilling of blood, like in German Austria.”86 Because this revolution 
opened up “an unbridgeable chasm, because old Austria and German Austria were “two 
completely different states,” one could not be the general legal successor (allgemeinen 
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Rechtsnachfolge) of the other.87 But Kelsen then stepped back: such an analysis, he 
observed, was the necessary consequence of a worldview within which the state 
represented the highest, non-derivable and thus sovereign legal order. When applied to 
the case at hand, the “hypothesis of the primacy of the state legal order” led to “the 
supposition of a discontinuity in relation to the state order [Staatsordnung] of Austria.”88 
That German Austria immediately adopted this view was understandable, he proffered, 
not only for “psychological” reasons — that is, wanting to draw a line under the difficult 
experiences of the late empire and “begin a new page of history.” But also, and primarily, 
because “if legal continuity with old Austria and thus identity of state personality was 
adopted for German Austria alone, then German Austria alone could have been viewed 
as bearer of all old Austria’s liabilities.”89 
Indeed, most of Austria’s jurists argued for the juridical discontinuity of the new 
Austria with the fallen empire.90 The identification of German Austria with old Austria 
was a “fiction,” asserted Josef Kunz, just like the portrayal of many new states as 
“Allied” ones.91 Alfred Verdross reached the same conclusion, despite his 
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methodological emphasis on viewing Staatsrecht from the perspective of Völkerrecht.92 
An argument for “völkerrechtlichen Nichtidentität” (that is, discontinuity) could not be 
substantiated, he conceded, by mere reference to the revolutionary rupture between the 
old constitution and the new: like Merkl, he held that revolutionary constitutions do not 
exclude the possibility of a continuous state identity in international law.93 Yet: “in our 
case there exists not merely an interruption to the constitutional continuity, but 
additionally the factor that multiple new revolutionary constitutions were placed next to 
one another.”94 In circumstances of revolutionary constitutional change, international 
customary law only preserved state identity insofar as the new constitution was asserted 
for “fundamentally the same collection of people [Personenverband] that were also under 
the authority of the old constitution.” As a result, when the “former human collective was 
distributed between multiple new constitutions,” it amounted to the “destruction of the 
state.” Without further guidance from international law, it would be impossible to know 
within which of the new constitutional communities the old state “lived on.”95 On this 
reading, the new Czech constitution could have housed the legal spirit of the old empire 
just as much as any other, and there was no juridical test that might safely identify the 
one true successor. Dissolved into so many new states — limbs and organs parceled out 
across the region — the old empire had surely suffered its juridical death. 
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Assertions of the thorough “newness” of republican Austria aside,96 the 
“Viennese” conceptualization of these questions outlived the particular context of its 
formulation. If so many of the Central European jurists were (unsurprisingly) drawn to 
the legal continuity and succession of states, their methodological framing the subject 
strongly influenced the contemporary field. Hersch Lauterpacht, who was likewise in 
Vienna in these years, studying with Kelsen between 1919 and 1923 before he left for 
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London, adopted (and cited) the Kelsen/Verdross/Sander line.97 Perhaps the first serious 
English-language monograph on the question — Identity and Continuity of States in 
Public International Law — was written in 1954 by Krystyna Marek, a Polish exile in 
Geneva (who, like Alexandrowicz, had studied at the Jagiellonian University). Her 
conversation partners in the footnotes were Kelsen, Verdross and the rest of the crew, and 
she imported their approach.98 To be sure, the birth and death of states represented 
metajuridical facts if treated from the perspective of municipal law. Yet clearly the 
question must be investigated from a place beyond the states themselves, Marek argued, 
closely echoing Sander and co. It could only be assessed “by reference to a legal order 
which is both higher than State law and yet belongs to the same system of norms” — a 
monist legal order based on the primacy of international law. State birth and state death 
became analytically available by means of “a higher legal system whose norms have 
existed before the formation, an continue to exist after the extinction, of the state in 
question.”99 The analytical co-implication of international and constitutional law was 
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deep as well as sequential/temporal: international law needed to be both before and after 
the state to give us any chance of seeing the latter clearly. But more than that, Marek, like 
members of the Viennese school before her, suggested that some topics only emerged as 
such through the looking glass of certain methodological assumptions. The analysis of 
state life depended upon the assumed existence of a broader legal order. If this “broader 
order” was now international law, we could say that the imperial legal order had served 
the same function in the nineteenth century, embalming historic states and providing an 
external “place” from which their life was legally visible. States were the subjects of 
particular legal orders as well as of particular knowledge orders. 
 
*  *  * 
Old state or new? The question did not only affect Austria or Czechoslovakia; it spilled 
out across the belt of small states now populating that “international frontier,” to use H. 
Duncan Hall’s memorable phrase, between the former continental imperial centers in 
Germany, Russia, Turkey and Austria.100 Bulgaria and Austria should count as new 
states, Kunz argued, but Hungary was identical with pre-war Hungary both “legally and 
in the psyche.”101 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were new states, Verdross explained; “in 
contrast it is contestable whether the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are to be considered 
new subjects in international law or the continuation of Russia and Serbia.”102  
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Indeed, the state that became Yugoslavia proved one of the thorniest cases: it 
married together “non-historical peoples” (like the Slovenes) with suspended/slumbering 
states (like Croatia) and with already sovereign ones (like Serbia), producing the most 
diverse temporal-legal conglomerate. The categorization of old and new states mattered: 
in this case, it mattered especially because of the minorities treaties that were fastened to 
the new states like dog collars, broadcasting their junior status to all the world. Such 
indignity seemed intolerable to representatives of the “Serb-Croat-Slovene Government” 
at the Paris Peace Conference. Before the war, Serbia had possessed full sovereignty. As 
such, there was no basis on which the Allied peacemakers could interfere in that pre-
existing sovereignty through the imposition of a minorities treaty. The delegation 
explained that, at the most, the they could countenance such provisions only for those 
parts of the state territory that had not been sovereign before the war, for the “new” bits 
of the state. As Nicolas Pachitch (Nikola Pašić) wrote on behalf of the delegation on July 
24, 1919, the minorities obligations presented by the peacemakers were unacceptable 
“because the conditions in question appear to be also applicable to the territories of the 
Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, which would amount to our renunciation, an 
advance, of certain incontestable rights of sovereignty.”103 As he reaffirmed on August 1, 
they would only consider “proposals which do not concern the former territory of the 
Kingdom of Serbia and of Montenegro.”104 If the new minorities treaties were the test, 
																																																								
103 M. Pachitch to M. Clemenceau, July 24, 1919, Annex C to the Thirty-ninth Meeting of the New States 
Committee, La Paix de Versailles: Commission des nouveaux États et des Minorités (Paris: Les Éditions 
Internationales, 1932), 245. 
104 Pachitch to the President of the Committee on New States, August 1, 1919, Annex G to the Forty-first 
Meeting of the New States Committee, La Paix de Versailles: Commission des nouveaux États et des 
Minorités, 262. The New States Committee, for its part, would not be drawn into these sorts of arguments. 
In their report for the Supreme Council, they explained that “no distinction is drawn between the old and 
new provinces.” “While it does not seem necessary to discuss the technical legal point whether the new 
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then Yugoslavia could at most register as half-new and half-old. In the model presented 
by the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, the internal “sequence” of the state’s sovereignty 
would have been coded into its international obligations, the history of its state formation 
coded into law — not unlike the old empire itself. 
																																																								
Kingdom is legally identical with the old Kingdom of Serbia,” the transformation of the last six years was 
so great (especially through a huge increase in population) that it was now a very different state. See Report 
to the Supreme Council from the Committee on New States Enclosing the Treaty for Presentation to the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, August 29, 1919, Forty-seventh Meeting, La Paix de Versailles: 





Old Rights and New World Orders 
 
Imperial Knowledge After Empire  
On January 16, 1920, Count Albert Apponyi appeared before the Supreme Council of the 
Peace Conference to explain Austro-Hungarian constitutional history to the world.1 The 
Count was well prepared for the task: he had been explaining the idiosyncratic 
constitutional standing of his beloved Hungary to international audiences for years. A 
conservative of the most impeccable aristocratic lineage, Apponyi made his first trip to 
the United States in 1904, where, among other engagements, he lectured in St. Louis on 
“The Juridical Nature of the Relations Between Austria and Hungary.”2 In many ways, 
the style and substance of Hungarian claim-making changed little for the collapse of the 
empire: in 1904, like 1920, he stressed the anteriority and survival of Hungarian 
statehood. Arguments honed for rights within the imperial constitution proved just as 
useful in the absence of the empire itself.  
																																																								
1 “Verbal exposé of Count Albert Apponyi, president of the Hungarian Delegation at the Peace Conference, 
addressed to the Supreme Council at the sitting of January 16, 1920 at Paris,” The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations: An Account of the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S, from January to 
March, 1920, vol. 1 (Budapest: Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1921), 310-317. 
2 While in St. Louis for a meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union — where he was described as “one of 
the foremost statesmen in Europe” — Apponyi gave the lecture at the Congress of Arts and Sciences, an 
extensive international symposium organized alongside the World’s Fair held that year in the same city. 
For the latter quotation, see: “Proceedings of the Interparliamentary Conference at St. Louis,” The Advocate 
of Peace 66, no. 10 (1904): 188. 
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It was an error to view the Habsburg Empire as the “primordial fact,” he lectured 
in 1904, as a single polity that included Hungary and granted the latter pet concessions as 
a province. On the contrary: 
 
the primordial fact is an independent kingdom of Hungary, which has allied 
itself for certain purposes and under certain conditions to the equally 
independent and distinct empire of Austria, by an act of sovereign free will, 
without having ever abdicated the smallest particle of its sovereignty as an 
independent nation, though it has consented to exercise a small part of its 
governmental functions through executive organs common with Austria.3 
 
  
In 1920, the case for rights leant similarly on the anteriority and survival of Hungarian 
statehood. “We wish first of all,” submitted the Hungarian delegation, 
 
to establish the fact that Hungary is no new State born of the dismemberment 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so cannot be compared from this 
point of view to German-Austria, to the Czecho-Slovak, nor to the Yougoslav 
State. As far as public law the Hungary of to-day is the same State she has 
been through her past of a thousand years. She kept her position as an 
independent State on entering into a union with Austria and during the whole 




What had changed between 1904 and 1920 was the stakes of such arguments. Borders, 
territories, populations: there was a lot to win, or more accurately, to lose. If the 
anteriority of Hungarian statehood mattered then, it mattered more now, as the delegation 
																																																								
3 Albert Apponyi, The Juridical Nature of the Relations Between Austria and Hungary (Budapest: St.-
Stephens-Printing Press, 1907), 4. A number of different versions of the address were published; see for 
example the shorter version: Albert Apponyi, “The Juridical Nature of the Relations Between Austria and 
Hungary,” North American Review 180, no. 582 (1905): 735-745. Both publications identify the text as the 
address delivered at the 1904 Arts and Science Congress of St. Louis. 
4 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 34. 
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sought the dignity — and the rights — of a sovereign state. After all, already-existing 
states had the right to territorial integrity: had not Britain gone to war for Belgium’s?5 
The legal subject did not need to be reconstituted, and only subsequently ascribed legal 
properties: rather, the state was a ready-made object with its rights in tact, carried over 
from one order into another.   
Making out the case required some specialized knowledge of Austro-Hungarian 
constitutional history, and the Hungarian delegation set about educating the Allies. 
Invited to join the conference only on December 1, 1919,6 a Hungarian delegation — 
with Apponyi as its head and Pál Teleki and István Bethlen among its members — left 
Budapest for Paris on January 5 the following year.7 Before receiving the terms of the 
peace, they submitted several memoranda to the conference: two of them have a special 
claim on our attention. The first, titled “Memorandum concerning the evolution of 
																																																								
5 Ernő Ludwigh made this precise comparison: E. Ludwigh, A Plea in Support of Hungary's Territorial 
Integrity (Budapest: Hungarian Territorial Integrity League, 1919).  
6 The late date had much to do with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic under Bela Kun (March- 
August, 1919) which the Allies did not recognize. See Alfred D. Low, “The Soviet Hungarian Republic and 
the Paris Peace Conference,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 53, no. 10 (1963): 1-91; 
and for a general overview of diplomatic efforts in this period, see Peter Pastor, “Major Trends in 
Hungarian Foreign Policy from the Collapse of the Monarchy to the Peace Treaty of Trianon,” Hungarian 
Studies 17, no. 1 (2003): 3-11; Gyula Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919-1945 (Budapest: Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1979), 7-67. 
7 Teleki and Bethlen did the majority of the work. A geography professor in Budapest, Teleki’s knowledge 
of history, geography, and demography formed the backbone of the delegation’s work. Both were relative 
“newcomers” (though Teleki had served as minister of foreign affairs in the provisional Hungarian 
government set up in Szeged in 1919 to combat Bela Kun’s regime), but both would go on to serve as 
Hungarian prime ministers in the 1920s. Francis Deák, Hungary at the Peace Conference: The Diplomatic 
History of the Treaty of Trianon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 173-182. Apponyi’s 
appointment as head of delegation was deemed imprudent by the British (who thought he could not be 
trusted to “abstain from monarchist and imperialist intrigues”) and downright outrageous by the Czechs 
(who threatened to bar him subsequently from the new state of Czechoslovakia, where he held considerable 
property). See: “Proposed Appointment of Count Albert Apponyi as Hungarian Delegate at Paris,” Eyre A 
Crowe to George Clerk, 6 November 1919, The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), FO 608/26/8; 
and “Czecho-Slovak attitude towards Count Apponyi,” Mr. Gosling [in Prague] to Foreign Office, 6 
December 1919, TNA FO 608/26/8, respectively. 
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relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” carefully 
traced the empire’s legal history and Hungary’s place within it. The leitmotif of this 
history was the legal survival of Hungary’s statehood: like the Czechs, they sought to 
show just how much juridical statehood mattered. The second one, bearing the title “The 
relationship of Hungary and Austria in public law till the dissolution of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy,” offered a more technical analysis of the legal nature of the empire 
on the cusp of its demise. It laid out all the specific forms of quasi-sovereignty that had 
been the intellectual products of long years of constitutional debate. Lucid and rich, the 
two memoranda appear as classic summations of the Austro-Hungarian jurisprudence of 
empire. Strikingly, the questions and conundrums of that jurisprudence were still “live” 
in 1920. Bodies of knowledge concerned with understanding and codifying the empire 
became resources for managing its absence. 
Everyone in Hungary knew, declared the first, historical memorandum, “that 
Hungary had not fusioned with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, resigning her existence 
as an independent State.”8 The legal history of empire began well before the empire itself 
(just as it extended well beyond its death): Hungary’s membership of the family of 
nations pre-dated that of the fledgling Habsburg principalities: 
 
Much before the permanent connection was formed between Hungary and the 
Habsburg dynasty in 1526, Hungary had taken part as an independent State in 
the international life of Europe, had done so, indeed, for 500 years. Her part as 
a sovereign State had even been an important one, her territory was unaltered 
																																																								
8 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 34. 
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till recent events, and belongs to her still by right. The State formation named 
Austria later on did not even exist at that time.9  
 
 
Back then, history knew only a house of Austria ruling a small feudal principality within 
the Holy Roman Empire. The dynasty gradually increased their holdings through pacts, 
marriages, purchases, and exchanges. Their ascension to the throne of Hungary exerted 
“a great influence on the subsequent events of European history still, from a juridical 
point of view it had no effect on the independence of Hungary.”10 “From the point of 
view of public law,” the Hungarian delegation explained, their independence survived the 
absolutist years in tact. This account of juridical statehood thus relied, in familiar terms, 
on a clear distinction between political history and legal history. 
Gradually “effaced” (as though shrouded) by the Pragmatic Sanction and then the 
creation of the imperial title in 1804, Hungary’s independence was renegotiated in the 
Compromise of 1867, which established “a basis on which the independence of Hungary 
as a distinct state could be established in legal form” without harming the empire’s status 
as a great power, through collective defence arrangements, for example.11 The delegation 
explained the contrasting interpretations of the 1867 settlement, especially as the laws 
themselves differed in the two imperial halves. According to Austrian law, the provinces 
																																																								
9 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 34. 
10 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 34. 
11 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 35. 
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together formed a single state, with “one single, common sovereignty,” within which 
“there could be two parts distinguished only.” Hungarian law, on the contrary, 
“recognised only two autonomous states, not allowing of a common State, with a 
sovereignty of its own, being superposed to them.”12 
Most telling was the way in which the delegation “applied” this legal history to 
the situation currently before the conference. “It is apparent from the above mentioned 
facts,” they submitted,  
 
that now the community implied in the appellation “Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy” has ceased, Hungary cannot be considered as a new state formed 
upon the ruins of the Monarchy, but as a state disposing independently and 
without restrictions in the questions which she could not dispose of formerly 
without the concurrence of Austria.13  
 
 
Austria appeared here as a temporary limitation on Hungarian sovereignty, a kind of 
impermanent but persistent handicap that had lasted five centuries but was now at long 
last removed. The meaningful historical arc for understanding the state formations of 
1920 stretched back to 1526: after a litany of incursions and violations, Hungarian 
sovereignty was now properly collected together once more. Decolonization did not 
violently produce political novelties, but harmoniously restored the status quo: “The 
severance of the bonds of the ancient Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or, to put it more 
precisely, the severance of the bonds connecting the two states which the Monarchy was 
																																																								
12 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 35. 
13 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 35. 
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composed of, was quite a natural process.”14 The Paris Peace Conference stood at the end 
of long history of sovereignty, rather than at its beginning. 
The second memorandum delved into the details of late imperial sovereignty, 
offering the Allies a textbook or crash course in Austro-Hungarian constitutional law. As 
many Hungarians had argued before, especially in the years since 1867, the memorandum 
instructed its readers that the empire, as such, had no legal existence at all. They patiently 
initiated their audience into its modes of juridical non-being. The designation “Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy,” they explained, was incorrect insofar as 
 
the word monarchy denotes the rule of one person. Both the Hungarian 
Kingdom and the Austrian Empire were separate monarchies. But the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy was not a third political formation — comprising 
Austria and Hungary and rising above both. It was simply the name of the 
relationship between the two States. Therefore it was incorrect to speak of the 
territory, population and citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, because 
the Monarchy had neither territory, nor population, nor citizens, as only 




This was the “empire as alliance” version of imperial law. The empire was not a fact or a 
thing, but a relationship. There was no “third state” comprising the two, only legal glue or 
stitching binding two otherwise separate entities. To be sure, the delegation was not 
wrong that many of those key indicators of sovereignty, like citizenship, supported this 
view. The Austrians had turned up at the conference and argued that the empire was 
																																																								
14 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex I: “Memorandum concerning the 
evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary, from the point of view of public law,” The Hungarian 
Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 36. 
15 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex 26, “The relationship of Hungary and 
Austria in public law till the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,” The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations, vol. 1, 68. 
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legally dead: the Hungarians argued it did not legally exist in the first place. While 
Czechs and even Hungarians had been defending and analyzing their non-existent states 
for decades, the signs were now reversed: now the empire itself was portrayed as legal 
myth or illusion. 
The memorandum offered a subtle account of the particularities of sovereignty 
under such circumstances. Was the Ausgleich a juridical formation in imperial or 
international law? The delegation explained its hybridity: the connection between the two 
states had an “external as well as an internal bearing.” When contracting in common 
affairs with other states, the two states did so conjointly: 
 
In matters of private interest, however, both states were free agents. In such 
cases — as it actually happened more than once — the two states were 
entitled to contract with other states through the common Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. An instance of this is the international contract concerning publishers 
right concluded with the U.S. of America in January 30, 1912, in Budapest, by 
Hungary alone (Act LXI, 1912).16 
 
 
It was not simply a matter of a quasi-international border between Cisleitania and 
Transleitania: the jagged line between internal and external, between the inside and 
outside of the state, also folded along the distinction between public and private affairs. 
These careful expositions of the peculiarities of late imperial sovereignty in 
Central Europe all stressed one thing: that the Hungarian state had come through the 
maze of imperial law untarnished, its particular state identity in tact. The Magyars had 
established a state in the basin of the Middle Danube where none had existed before, and 
																																																								
16 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, Annex 26, “The relationship of Hungary and 
Austria in public law till the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,” The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations, vol. 1, 68. 
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“that State has maintained an unbroken legal continuity as Hungary, and has existed since 
the year 1000 A. D. as the Hungarian Kingdom.”17 International law already knew the 
Hungarian state: it preceded the empire, had partially remerged on the world stage 
through the Ausgleich, and now fully resumed its rightful place among sovereigns. Far 
from a legal vacuum, Central Europe was already populated by states that were not 
newcomers to international law, but perhaps some of its original members.  
Interestingly, the Sixth Committee of the League of Nations seemed to broadly 
agree when it considered Hungary’s application for League membership in 1922. The 
Sixth Committee appointed a seven-member subcommittee to consider the question (that 
included Beneš, which must have been especially galling for the Hungarians). Members 
of the subcommittee unanimously recommended that Hungary be admitted, and “they 
concurred in the opinion expressed by one member that the Hungarian State had for a 
long time been a member of the ‘International Family.’”18 
 
Self -Determination and Pre-Figuration 
																																																								
17 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations: An 
Account of the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S, from January to March, 1920, vol. 
1, 4. James T. Shotwell took the Hungarian line entirely on these questions: Magyar state, he explained to 
an American audience, dates from the early eleventh century, “when St. Stephen established his 
sovereignty on the rocky cliff of Buda.” The “Magyars preserved a continuity of history which has left an 
ineradicable impress upon them to the present.” (vii-viii). “This consciousness was not impaired even by a 
long affiliation with the Germanic empire of the Habsburgs”: the two centers of power “never coalesced.” 
James T. Shotwell, “Forward,” in Francis Deák, Hungary at the Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History 
of the Treaty of Trianon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), vii-viii. 
18 Application by Hungary, Report of the First Sub-Committee of the Sixth Committee: Admission of new 
Members to the League of Nations, September 14th, 1922. League of Nations, Records of the Third 
Assembly, Minutes of the Sixth Committee (Geneva, 1922), 55 (Annex 4). Josef Kunz also argued for 
Hungarian state continuity: “Ungarn hängt leidenschaftlich an seiner Vergangenheit. Das heutige Ungarn is 
mit dem Vorkriegsungarn juristisch und in der Psyche der Ungarn identisch,” even if it is also a 
“Rumpfungarn.” Josef L. Kunz, Der Revision der Pariser Friedensverträge: Eine Völkerrechtliche 
Untersuchung (Vienna: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1932), 35. 
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How did this pre-existing legal landscape affect the conceptual contours of the new order 
in Europe? The anteriority and survival of Hungarian statehood mattered for a number of 
reasons, but especially because it shaped the claims of right that followed. As we know, 
rights claims could not easily be disentangled from the nature of their ostensible bearer. 
In this case, Hungary’s ready-made statehood featured centrally in the territorial disputes 
that engulfed the region, where Hungary’s claims of “historical right” depended on a 
continuous rights subject capable of dragging old rights into the new world order (as we 
will see in the next section). But it also shaped Hungarian interpretations of the right to 
self-determination.  
A keyword then and a keyword now, “self-determination” has moved sponge-like 
across the surface of twentieth-century international order, capable of soaking up an 
extremely broad range of agendas and legal values. Its difficult relationship with 
individual human rights in the context of post-World War Two decolonization, for 
example, is at the cutting edge of new research in international history.19 Its place in the 
conceptual-legal history of the 1919 settlement in Central Europe, however, is largely 
narrated in the simple terms of Wilsonian liberal internationalism. Yet the notion of “self-
determination” worked for more complex ends, then, too: as in subsequent decades, it 
served as a conceptual bridging device, a kind of mixing pot within which imperial and 
international orders were mixed up and renegotiated. Notoriously ambiguous, the idea of 
“self-determination” lay permanently in waiting for actors to fill it with particular legal 
																																																								
19 See for example, Bradley R. Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 
1970s,” Humanity 4, no. 2 (2013): 239-260; Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Talbot C. Imlay, “International Socialism and 
Decolonization during the 1950s: Competing Rights and the Postcolonial Order,” American Historical 
Review (2013): 1105-1132; Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human 
Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 
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and political meaning. One of the less-told chapters in its history involves its deployment 
by those who “lost” the Versailles settlement. In spite (or because) of losing two thirds of 
their pre-state territory to the new “national” states, Hungarian statesmen wrote long and 
careful analyses of the concept. They, too, supported it, they claimed: it simply needed to 
be applied in a “legal” way. In pinning down its capaciousness into clear legal principles, 
they drew on a pre-existing horizon of legal assumptions and structures. Counter-
intuitively, then, the “right to self-determination” became the sign under which much of 
the imperial legal imaginary bled through into the new world order. 
In a pamphlet dated December 1918, Apponyi declared Hungary’s commitment to 
an “American peace” based on Wilson’s ideas, citing the latter’s advocacy for the 
“autonomy” of the nations of Austria-Hungary. How would this take effect in the case of 
Hungary? He surveyed the facts: one the one hand, Hungary, in its present borders, had 
been “a political unit for more than a thousand years”; profound geographic and 
economic cohesiveness underpinned its integrity. On the other hand, numerous racial 
communities dwelt in Hungary, leading to the suggestion that it should “be divided 
according to the racial principle, disregarding history, geography and political economy.” 
This contrast led to a clash between “the principles upon which nations are built up”20 — 
a battle for the grounds of legitimate statehood. Was one principle paramount? Could a 
compromise be found?  
Yes, it could, Apponyi argued. “To begin with: the autonomy of the ‘nations’ let 
us even say: races, dwelling in Hungary is not synonimous [sic] with the annexation of 
																																																								
20 Albert Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 2nd ed. (Budapest: Hungarian Territorial Integrity 
League, 1919), 4-5. 
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their territories to a neighbouring state.” The claims of neighboring states to Hungary’s 
territory were not Wilsonian, but rather imperialistic, 
 
because it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the supplementary principle, 
the right of self-determination belonging to every nation, involves a right to 
secession as vested in every part of a nation. America did not think so when 
she coerced in a bloody war the southern States, who had most decidedly and 
formally declared their will to secede from the union. Is President Wilson’s 
meaning then to be derived from Jefferson Davis or from Abraham Lincoln?21 
 
 
The first task, then, was conceptual clarity: the semantic field of decolonization — 
succession, annexation, autonomy — needed to be carefully parsed and weighed: 
 
Let us therefore in theory and on principle clearly distinguish between 
autonomy and secession, and still more between autonomy and annexation; 
and having fixed this point let us consider what the secessions and 




Did self-determination really mean that various “parts of nations” had the right to break 
up states? The implications of an idea like self-determination must be carefully plotted 
out. Apponyi presented all the statistics and tables of an inextricably intermingled 
population across the territory of historic Hungary, a mix that left no possibility of a clean 
national unmixing. Was it not then “the height of absurdity” to carve up a robust political 
unit, proven over centuries, in order to create “national” states which would be as racially 
diverse as the state from which they seceded? Especially when the new states also lacked 
																																																								
21 Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 5-6. 
22 Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 6. 
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the geographic and economic advantages of the original state?23 Apponyi suggested a 
compromise solution that reconciled “the laws of geographic and political economy and 
the deep-rooted result of history with the just demands of race.” It involved “giving to 
every race a representation of its own elected by all the members of the race irrespective 
of territorial continuity, which cannot be obtained,” and granting “to these racial 
representations a fair amount of self-government in every matter that concerns the race as 
such” within the bounds of the Hungarian state.24 He thus embraced the kind of de-
territorialized autonomy advocated most famously by Renner and Bauer. He maintained 
that previous Hungarian policy had not been oppressive: it had recognized “the right of 
the individual to his native language in church, school, vestry and county government 
[…]. But it did not admit race as self-governing bodies. Now we are ready to do this.” As 
ever, the creation of group legal subject represented the genuinely radical concession; 
these new collective subjects would form the basis of a new federal order. “It is certainly 
a great deviation from old traditions to do so, it is the most radical reform of a nation’s 
constitution known to history. But we do it in perfect good faith,” and in accordance with 
Wilson’s principles.25 Post-imperial Hungary would pick up old plans out of the waste 
																																																								
23 Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 8-9. 
24 Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 12. Emphasis added. 
25 Apponyi, The American Peace and Hungary, 13. Emphasis added. Apponyi was not the only one to 
suggest a de-territorialized federal solution to the national problem in order to preserve Hungary’s historic 
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paper basked of imperial constitutional law. And crucially, self-determination meant 
corporate autonomy rather than succession.  
It was the jurist and politician Gyula Wlassics, though, who really attempted a 
systematic analysis of the term. A professor of criminal law at the University of Budapest 
and president of the Hungarian administrative court, Wlassics (1852-1936) had presided 
over widespread reform as Hungarian Minister of Religion and Education between 1896 
and 1903, championing the free exercise of religion, public schools, and the entry of 
women into the academy. He served as speaker of the Hungarian Upper House in 1918 
and again later in the interwar years. As the new order was taking shape across the 
region, he turned to tackle directly “the exceedingly difficult problem of international 
Self-determining Right.”26 What was meant by a “people” with a right to self-
determination? What qualifications must such a people possess? 
Because of its importance and its capaciousness, the “laws of self-determination” 
must be defined with “scientific accuracy.” The idea was far older than Wilson. 
 
That the political Self-determining Right has, fundamentally, a sovereign 
appearance, follows from the fact that the question is about the right of a 
group of peoples who have the right to dispose of their own territory and their 
political future. If that be so, then this Right is of the same nature as hitherto 
was the Right of the State, which we called the Constitution. In the inner life 
of the State there was always and is now also a domain for Self-determination, 
but when we speak here of the right of individual groups, then the natural 




26 Julius Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination. The Protection of the National Minorities: Reply Given 
in 1919 to the Questions of the “Central Organisation for Durable Peace” (Budapest: Ferdinand Pfeifer 
(Zeidler Brothers), 1922), 3. 
27 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 4-5. 
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Self-determination, historically understood, had been the right of states. While particular 
groups of peoples could also enjoy a right to self-determination within the “internal 
domain” of the state, this right flowed from the latter and was regulated by it. What could 
self-determination mean outside the juridical authority of the state? It is very difficult, 
“perhaps even impossible,” he warned,  
 
to determine the laws according to which a State or a group of people may 
dispose of their own destiny; whether they can, on the principle of Right, 
separate themselves from their own State, or form themselves into a new 




Yet despite this great difficulty, such rules must be sought, Wlassics maintained: it was 
necessary to prevent arbitrariness, encroachment, and chaos. Only if science laid down 
clear rules to be followed in every case, only then “could we assert that Self-
determination is not the adulator of self-seeking or of imperialism, but the universally 
acknowledged international Right, recognized by all.”29 The new order needed to be 
codified: only through universality and consistency could it acquire a genuine legitimacy. 
All the more so, because the idea already wielded such enormous political force — 
Wlassics traced its history through Locke, Rousseau, the French Revolution, Napoleon — 
yet still lacked serious juridical foundations “as a people-regulating dogma, as an 
international measure.”30 That is, it lacked a basis in international law. 
																																																								
28 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 7. 
29 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 7. 
30 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 12. 
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Amid all the difficulties of such a project of codification, Wlassics felt sure that 
there was only one logical place to start. “[B]eyond doubt, the very first condition for the 
exercise of any Right is to know who is justified in exercising it.” Any jurisprudence of 
this right must begin with the rights subject. Wlassics thus regurgitated the pattern of 
imperial constitutional jurisprudence on rights, focusing on the problem of constructing 
subjects to wield them. A set of rules was required   
 
especially to determine the minimum limit within which a group of peoples can 
dispose of their own destiny by Right. In drawing up a universal rule great care 
must be taken, for if we do not determine the contour of Self-determination with 
the greatest precision, then a great danger is apt to arise.31   
 
 
Without clear minimums, limits, and checks, self-determination could prove a destructive 
menace, tearing apart all sorts of rational state formations to the detriment of all 
concerned. Obviously, not every community was capable of independent life. “Is it 
possible to grant every village, every little isolated group, the Right of Self-
determination? And if it be possible, then to what extent is this Right to be granted to 
them?” As Wlassics pursued this line of argumentation, his discussion grew less abstract. 
And “is it possible,” he continued,  
 
on a legal basis, to sever a territory where mixed nationalities are, if these 
different-speaking nationalities have been welded together into one whole 
State through centuries, and live scattered throughout the territory in question? 
Is there ground for the Right of Self-determination even then, when, under the 
title of Self-determination, an already accomplished rupture from the old State 
causes millions to come again under foreign rule? And what are the culture, 
dynamic, economic, geographic, and geological laws, which must 
undoubtedly be taken into account?32  
																																																								
31 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 13. 





Self-determination must be weighed against other claims of right and balanced with other 
imperatives. One person’s self-determination might mean another’s enslavement. Under 
specific conditions, candidates to be the subject of a right to self-determination included 
sovereign states, nationalities, and peoples who had developed into a separate whole 
through their own endeavours, despite sharing a language with a mother state (like the 
United States). But such typologies raised more questions than they answered, Wlassics 
observed: “And now comes the knotty point. Where shall we draw the line, to ensure that 
the Self-disposing Right may not become the toy of malcontents?”33  
History, ancestry, nationality, and ethnographical data “all lend a hand in settling 
the claim,” Wlassics reflected. Only “inductive research” would allow the drafting of 
regulations. Among “the different grounds of Right” to be considered, “historical Rights 
and ancestral Rights” clearly had their place.34 Race, too, though “in science, nationality 
is no longer bound up with the category of Race, for then no State in the world could 
retain its present boundaries.”35 In fact, when it came to contemporary nationality, race 
really meant history rather than biology. Nations developed gradually through history, 
gaining cohesiveness through mutual struggles and memories. Similarity of language 
may be one tool of unification, but shared “independent development” represented a 
																																																								
33 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 14. 
34 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 14. 
35 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 20. 
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stronger force.36 Undoubtedly, these various factors sometimes justified the creation of a 
new state — but only if the new state was genuinely capable of independent, unassisted 
existence. The greatest “security for the natural development of mental and business life” 
of the people must be paramount;37 the new formation must actually remove the grounds 
of the discontent; higher cultures should not be subject to the rule of lower ones; and the 
claims should not be imperialistic in motivation. Otherwise, the new formation would be 
“just a caricature of that self-determining Right which originally floated before Wilson’s 
eyes, and which we desire to work out in the sense of a universal rule.”38 Wlassics 
constructed his own self-determination manual, a guidebook navigating the questions of 
legitimacy it raised. 
Unsurprisingly, he felt the case of Hungary threw “a glaring light on the rigid 
formula of science as it appears on paper.” The large historic state at Europe’s center 
proved the perfect test case. The politicians “who wish to carve up Hungary set up the 
idea of absolute and relative majority as a legal title to the counties,” Wlassics 
complained, and “as if that were not enough, they declare quite openly that strategic 
principle which is incompatible with Wilson’s points.” Strategic considerations and raw 
demographics commanded only meager force within the hierarchy of norms. Nationality 
questions would not be solved by present irridentisms. A settlement built on such 
foundations could not produce peace: “when it seeks to effect a cure it causes new 
																																																								
36 “The assertion that only a people speaking the same language can build nation States, is just as false as 
the assertion that Peoples speaking the same language can form, under all conditions, only one State. 
Natural development may lead to both results.” Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 20. 
37 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 20-21. 
38 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 25. 
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wounds.”39 It might be technically possible “to cut up arbitrarily a living organism like 
Hungary, which forms a geographical unit, but the international right to cut it up will 
never be acknowledged.”40 The legal foundations were lacking. 
 
What a logical train of thought it is, that every small territory is adapted for 
Self-Determination, while the historically and geographically formed 
Hungary, where Hungarians are in absolute majority, and where thousands 
and thousands of people of foreign tongue feel themselves one with the 
Hungarian people, is not regarded as adapted to exercise the Right of Self-
Determination!41   
																																																								
39 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 28. 
40 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 29.  
41 Wlassics, The Right of Self-Determination, 29-30. Hungarian politicians and publicists of this period 
routinely contrasted the contours of the settlement with what Wilson had ostensibly intended. See, for 
example, Emeric Radványi, “Ungarn und Trianon,” in Emeric Radványi, ed., Die tragödie Ungarns: Die 
grösste Ungerechtigkeit der Weltgeschichte (Budapest: Druckerei Viktor Hornyánszky A.-G., 1920?), [no 
page numbers; third page]; Louis [Lajos] Steier, There is no Czech Culture in Upper Hungary, illustrations 
by Joseph de Makoldy (Budapest: printed by Wodianer & Sons, 1920), 78; and later: Hungarian Frontier 
Readjustment League, Facts (Budapest: Victor Hornyánszky Co., 1928); Albert Apponyi, Albert 
Berzeviczy, Oliver Eöttevenyi, Francis Fodor, Béla Földes, Eugene Horváth, George Lukács, Emil Nagy, 
Baron Julius Wlassics, Justice for Hungary: Review and Criticism of the Effect of the Treaty of Trianon 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), esp. page 133: “We protest, in the first place, the deceptive 
axiom that the principle of nationality must always be given precedence as against historical tradition, 
economic prosperity and the interests of moral and intellectual progress. History itself is a living refutation 
of the rigid application of such a principle.” Hungarian jurists also pursued this line of argumentation 
through the interwar years. See, for example, the richly argued pamphlet put out by the Society of 
Hungarian Lawyers in 1931: “if the right of self-determination should be applied not only to a nation as a 
whole, but also to each of its parts or the fragmentary races composing that nation, then all racial minorities 
of any State would be entitled to have the territory inhabited by them transferred at any moment to a 
foreign state; but this is how the so-called Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of peoples has been 
interpreted in the Peace-Treaty.” Magyar Jogászegylet, Budapest [The Society of Hungarian Lawyers], The 
Peace-Treaty of Trianon from the View-point of International Peace, Security and the Co-operation of 
Nations: An Appeal by the Lawyers, Judges, and Professors of Law of Hungary to the Lawyers of all 
Civilised Nations (Budapest: Printed by Stephaneum Co. Ltd, 1931), 19-20. On Hungarian propaganda in 
this period more generally, see Cintia Gunda, “The Hungarian Nation: Post-World War I Propaganda 
Abroad for Protecting Hungary’s Territorial Integrity,” Hungarian Studies Review 40, no. 2 (2013): 97-122. 
This interpretation of self-determination also appeared in activism abroad; see, for example, the publication 
Chains, intended to be the “Organ of the Oxford League for Hungarian Self-Determination,” edited by R. 
Denne Waterhouse and J. R. Adams. While trying to appropriate the rights idiom for Hungarian use, 
contributors also used it as a byword for all that was wrong with the Versailles settlement, so “self-
determination” flitted between different meanings. See, for example, D. D. A. Lockhart, “Transylvania and 
the Roumanian Blight,” Chains, March 16 (1922): 14-15: “The end of the war provided our ‘Self-
determinationists’ with a unique opportunity and opened to them vast fields for the employment of their 
activities; for was not the corpse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire lying stretched upon their operating-
table, ready for dissection? Nevertheless, the result of their labours, embodied in the terms of the Trianon 





Who was adapted to the prose of self-determination? Wlassics’ answer was clear. If strict 
racial boundaries were neither possible nor especially desirable, and if the anarchy of 
each tiny village lodging a separate claim was to be avoided, then the right of self-
determination could only logically attach to those pre-existing legal persons, that is, 
historic states like Hungary. The enormous difficulty of fashioning dispersed and 
intermingled national groups into new legal subjects led to a presumption for the already 
existing legal persons — that is, the historic states (appearing again like mules over-
burdened with rights intended for others, as Renner’s metaphor had it). Insisting that 
questions of self-determination and nationality be treated together, the Hungarian 
submissions the Peace Conference concurred with this interpretation entirely: “The right 
of self-determination was — and still is— a guarantee of the territorial integrity of our 
country.”42 Self-determination, in other words, was refracted through the prism of an 
older legal order: legal persons constituted in one legal lifeworld slid onwards into a new 
world order, ready to wield new rights. It was a question, we might say, of pre-figuration: 
what was to be presumed in the working out of the new order, prior to the application of 
principles, prior to the enunciation of rights? Surely the new order could not build all its 
subjects from scratch. 
What is more, international law recognized no properly legitimate way of splitting 
those states apart. As Wlassics wrote in another text from the same period, it would 
																																																								
the theory.” Chains viewed at the Archives of the School for Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL 
(hereafter SSEES), SEW 11/1/1.	
42 Note XXII (“Concerning the frontiers of Hungary”), [Neuilly, 12 February 1920], The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations, vol. 2, 12. 
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offend all “international ethics, if Hungary’s territory, geographically and economically a 
united state, were considered an [sic] common prey.”43 Of course, this line of 
argumentation relied on Hungary possessing a continuous state identity — on Hungary 
already being a clearly established state in 1918. Precisely this equation — of the rights 
and standing of principalities emerging out of the pen of empire— lay at the heart of the 
first significant international “case” on self-determination, namely, the dispute between 
Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands. In its bones, and stripped of its particular 
advocacy for Hungary, Wlassics’ interpretation did not differ substantially from that 
given by the League’s different organs. In that dispute, the Aaland Islands sought to 
“leave” Finland, then in the process of gaining independence from Russia, and join 
Sweden. Two League commissions — one composed of jurists, another of rapporteurs — 
considered the question. The jurists rejected the notion of self-determination as a 
principle in international law, stating that “positive International Law does not recognize 
the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they 
form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of 
other States to claim such a separation.” The right to refuse such a wish formed “an 
attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitely constituted.”44 But therein 
lay the catch: the jurists held that Finland was not, in fact, “definitely constituted”: it 
remained in the process of formation. If states were not yet clearly established, where 
territorial sovereignty was lacking, self-determination could play a role in shaping the 
																																																								
43 Julius [Gyula] Wlassics, The Territorial Integrity of Hungary and the League of Nations (Budapest: 
Hungarian Territorial Integrity League, 1919), 11. 
44 Report of Commission of Jurists (Larnaude, Huber, Struycken), League of Nations Official Journal, 
Special Supplement No. 3 (October 1920), 5-6; quoted at length in James Crawford, The Creation of States 
in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 109-110. 
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settlement. Self-determination loomed as a factor where fixed rights subjects did not yet 
exist.  
The committee of rapporteurs, for their part, agreed that self-determination could 
not be viewed as a principle of international law,45 but disagreed on the status on Finland, 
holding that it was not a new state still in the process of formation. They emphasized 
Soviet recognition of Finish autonomy within the bounds of the empire, and the 
continuity of Finland’s legal personality over the cusp of 1917.46 Whether or not Finland 
emerged out of the Russian empire as Finland, as a hermetic and pre-formed legal unit, 
would thus determine whether it was vulnerable to its citizens’ secessionist appeals to 
self-determination. In this sense, the application of “new” rights languages always 
already implied a referendum on what had survived from legal orders past. Wlassics and 
Apponyi understood this co-implication of world orders only too well. The imperial 
jurisprudence on the continuity of the Hungarian state thereby acquired a new and urgent 
vocation. 
The Hungarians were not alone in presuming that “self-determination” should 
bend to the shape of the empire’s historic principalities. In July 1919, the legal historian 
Josef Redlich met with Masaryk at chateau Koloděje, Masaryk’s summer residence 
outside of Prague. There Masaryk reflected that Wilson’s catchcry was all too easily 
misconstrued; Wilson had, after all, presumed the Austria would stay together in some 
																																																								
45 “To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fraction of the population the right of 
withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their good wish or their good 
pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international 
life.” Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs (Beyens, Calonder, Elkens), April 16, 1921: League of 
Nations Council Doct. B7/2I/68/106 [VII], 22-23; quoted in Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law, 111. 
46 See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 59-60. 
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form, though that was now impossible. Wilson, Masaryk was sure, “never understood the 
self-determination of peoples in the sense that all historical formations must be 
systematically destroyed: e.g., that Bohemia should be partitioned along national lines.”47 
The jurisdictional imaginary of the empire — littered with quasi-states like Bohemia — 
marked out the field of assumptions within which one could most meaningfully interpret 
Wilson’s precept. “Self-determination” was not a self-evident or stable marker, arriving 
fully-formed in 1918, nor did it arrive in a legal wasteland: seen from the ground in 
Central Europe, it intermingled with older understandings of legitimacy and legal 
personality, translated and rephrased in regional idiom.  
 
History Speaks Geography: The New Space of Historical Rights 
The survival of pre-1918 languages of legitimacy was perhaps most conspicuous in 
appeals to “historical rights.” If claims voiced in this idiom surfaced throughout the 
region, few were as insistent or as fraught as Hungary’s invocation of its historical right 
to the territory of the historic Hungarian state.48 On one level, the language of “historical 
																																																								
47 (“Wilson hat des Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker nie in dem Sinne aufgefaßt, daß die historischen 
Bildungen systematisch vernichtet werden müssen: z. B. Böhmen national geteilt werden sollte”). Josef 
Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1908-1919: Das Politische Tagebuch Josef Redlich, vol. 2, ed. Fritz 
Fellner (Graz-Cologne: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus, 1954), 345-346.  
48 As an example from the pamphlet literature, see János Karácsonyi’s account of the Magyars as the state-
founding and state-maintaining people in historic Hungary, whose status in this respect had never been 
challenged by others, and who had thus preserved their state-bearing rights into the present: “It is a clear 
and undoubted historical truth therefore that in Hungary the state-maintaining-nation is the Hungarian. All 
the other nationalities are only foreigners who immigrated at least two centuries later. The fact that 
Hungary has received unfortunate, hungry tribes, has given them rights and land to live on, cannot be 
misconstrued as ground sufficient to deprive her of her historical rights, to tear her into pieces.” John 
[János] Karácsonyi, The Historical Right of the Hungarian Nation to its Territorial Integrity (Budapest: 
Ferdinand Pfeifer (Zeidler Brothers), 1920), 20. Historical rights thus blurred with civilizational 
credentials. In the formulation of legal historian Henrik Marczali: “Nur der Unger war imstande einen Staat 
zu bilden, der nunmehr seit über ein Jahrtausend lebt und nicht bloss mit dem Schwerte, sondern auch mit 
seinem grossen Organisationstalente und der Förderung der Zivilisation sich einen vornehmen Platz under 
den Völkern Europas sicherte.” Heinrich [Henrik] Marczali, “Die Geschichte Ungarns in der Nußschale,” 
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rights” tied imperial and post-imperial claim-making into a smooth continuum: 
Hungarian representatives continued to appeal to the residual rights of their historic state 
that had survived juridically through centuries of Habsburg rule. Only the audience had 
changed: where claims were previously tabled in Vienna, they now played out in the 
court of world opinion. On another level, however, an important substantive shift had 
occurred beneath the smooth surface of linguistic continuity. Where the object or goal of 
historic rights claims had previously concerned the extent of autonomy and authority — 
the thickness of rights, so to speak — in a post-1918 world they now concerned the extent 
of territory — that is, the space of rights. Embedded within the discursive history of 
historical rights, then, lies a history of jurisdiction. 
One legal scholar recently argued that jurisdiction can be understood less as a 
statement of the law or its discourse than as “a site or space of its enunciation.”49 It 
represented the imagined geography of legal voice prior to claims, rules, or sovereignty.50 
In this sense, the real discontinuity or transition of 1918 entailed the recalibration of those 
sites of enunciation, the recasting of legal “space” itself. In the frame of imperial 
constitutional law, the contested frontiers of the kingdoms and lands effectively meant 
the robustness of residual powers and prerogatives, quite removed from any sense of 
physical geography. The post-imperial game, by contrast, revolved around the territorial 
frontiers of the new states of Central Europe. The “ground” of normative contestation had 
																																																								
in Emeric Radványi, ed., Die tragödie Ungarns: Die grösste Ungerechtigkeit der Weltgeschichte 
(Budapest: Druckerei Viktor Hornyánszky A.-G., 1920?), [no page numbers; first and second page].   
49 Peter Rush, “An Altered Jurisdiction: Corporeal Traces of Law,” Griffith Law Review 6 (1997): 150. 
50 On taking jurisdiction as prior to sovereignty, see Sundhya Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional 
Account of International Law,” London Review of International Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 68-71. 
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shifted, quite literally. In this way, the feudal/aristocratic “historic lands” paradigm, 
developed within an imperial conversation regarding what we can (anachronistically) call 
legal pluralism, ironically became an ostensible principle for border-drawing in the 
empire’s wake: that is, a tool for drawing lines around exclusive jurisdictions. 
Jurisdiction grew geographical and rights territorial, even as the appeal to an historical 
body of law remained.  
At the risk of veering too far into the speculative, we might push this line a little 
further. A more genealogical account of the rights claims of 1919 opens up the contingent 
conceptual path of legal authority and the state in Central Europe. While the Länder and 
their diets represented legal forms forged in a medieval world that knew no distinction 
between private and public law, nineteenth-century jurists and claim-makers, as we 
know, had attempted to de-personalize rights and legal relationships so that their mini-
polities looked more like (“modern”) states. Yet because of the nature of the imperial 
constitutional debate, they had not really needed to entirely transform the basic model of 
jurisdiction in play: it remained structurally similar to an older princely/aristocratic 
pattern in which jurisdiction extended as far as (princely) power did, following shifting 
relationships and negotiations rather than territory. The constitutional debate continued to 
revolve around the strength of rights in a quasi-contractual mode vis-à-vis the crown.51 
The postwar “flattening out” of historical rights more uniformly onto geographic space 
mashed older jurisdictional landscapes into new ones. Jurisdiction might have become 
																																																								
51 In very broad brushstrokes, I think this remains true even for Hungary, where a strong emphasis on the 
integrity of the lands of St Stephen’s crown had long formed a key component of the constitutional 
tradition: the debates about Hungary’s rights to its Nebenländer continued to unfold in the idiom of 
dynastic contracts, elective kings, and so forth, even as the public prominence of geographical thinking 
began to grow. See László Péter, “The Holy Crown of Hungary, Visible and Invisible,” Slavonic and East 
European Review 81, no. 3 (2003), 453-461.  
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less literal and more abstract in the sense of being depersonalized (no more contracts 
between estates and monarchs), but it was literalized anew in the image of mountain 
ranges, natural resources, and river systems. This is not to suggest that geography became 
important overnight — far from it. As Deborah Coen has shown, climatographers and 
other geographers had been busy, at least since the turn of the century, indexing the 
empire’s political viability to geographic “naturalness” (whether subliminally or not).52 
We might say that if constitutional law and claims of historical right had engaged far less 
with geography prior to World War One, their fusion acquired a real exigency — 
especially for Hungary — as the empire began to break apart. 
The tension of this transition can be felt as a sort of discursive disturbance in the 
Hungarian submissions to the Peace Conference as they sought to tie the different 
jurisdictional worlds together. On the one hand, the drafters clearly refer to historical 
rights in their traditional (imperial-constitutional) sense, particularly as they recounted 
the legal history of the empire. They did so in very familiar terms: the dynasty had tried 
again and again (and ultimately failed) to “deprive the country entirely of her ancestral 
rights.”53 These rights in turn received repeated formal recognition: through the 
Compromise, for example, the “independence of Hungary was once more re-established 
on paper.”54 This old idiom, however, quickly slipped into a geographic one. As a 
																																																								
52 Deborah R. Coen, “Climate and Circulation in Imperial Austria,” Journal of Modern History 82, no. 4 
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53 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 4. 
54 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 5. 
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perfectly unified natural unit marked out by all the facets of the landscape, Hungary had 
inevitably formed a political unit: 
 
The whole history of man and land, the surface, the geomorphological 
structure, […] the course taken by the waters and the valleys of the mountains 
skirting the country which all widen out towards the interior, […] the natural 
covering of flora …  the fauna accommodated to the climate… ; in a word, 
every factor of the formation of life is a proof of unity.55 
 
 
The Carpathians were a climate boundary — “The climatic boundary is that of the 
manner of living, of the nature of the historical, political and economic development too” 
— and the history of Hungary proved this, as those boundaries had scarcely changed 
since the original Magyar occupation of the country. All endeavours to extend dominion 
beyond these natural frontiers contradicted the laws of nature (geography against 
imperialism): “It is true that the Hungarians kings too more than once made the mistake, 
at all times fatal, of attempting to acquire dominions beyond the natural frontier bulwarks 
of the Carpathians. But the possession of such dominions never lasted long.”56 Any and 
all attempts to pit politics against nature must inevitably fail, as political science was 
slowly recognizing57: “the natural course of life cannot be checked” — “to force 
solutions in opposition to the same is equivalent to putting obstacles in the way of 
evolution and cannot result in anything but backwardness and revolutionary upheavals.” 
Any plan to carve up historic Hungary hopelessly attempted to circumnavigate the 
																																																								
55 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 5. 
56 Note II (“Presentation Note”), Neuilly, January 14, 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 1, 5. 
57 “In a word, Hungary is an organic unit; and what we see to-day is that, in the policy of great nations, the 
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metahistorical laws of evolution itself.58 Veritably, claims against this millennial political 
formation ran against the warp and woof of the earth’s crust. 
Most striking was the manner in which the Hungarian delegation tied the historic 
to the geographic. Apponyi did so especially lucidly in his oral presentation before the 
Supreme Council: “You may refuse to recognize history as a principle in the building up 
of a juridical construction, but you cannot refuse her as a witness when she repeats the 
same evidence for ten centuries. It is no chance, it is the voice of nature speaking here.”59 
History spoke the language of geography, and gave nature voice: history confirmed 
geography as irrepressible fact. Even if you did not accept history as a foundation for 
law, you could not deny her as such when she communicated the deep truths of the 
natural world. Formulations like these — and there are many of them in these years — 
expressed some anxiety about the receivability of historic arguments. In this context, 
geography gifted history a valuable scientism and universality. Apponyi had used a 
similar formulation in a 1919 pamphlet: “History has been the interpreter of nature, when 
she created and preserved the political union of Hungary’s present territory.”60 Or, again, 
in the words of an anonymous piece of Peace Conference propaganda: “What geography 
																																																								
58 See also Peter Treitz and Charles de Papp’s account of Hungary as a natural unit. Beyond its frontiers, 
the environment changed dramatically, they argued: “Hungary’s political frontiers are in perfect accord 
with the morphological formation of the Hungarian basin.” There was a sharp divide noticeable through 
both climate and vegetation. “It is therefore safe to conclude that the forces of nature formed the Hungarian 
geological basin and not the will of man nor accidental retention of conquest determined Hungary’s 
political limits. Any forced change which is contrary to the natural conditions would not only be of no 
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interests in their possibilities of existence.” Peter Treitz and Charles de Papp Geographical Unity of 
Hungary (Budapest: Ferd. Pfeifer (Zeidler Brothers), 1920), 5. 
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shows us already to bee [sic] of unparalleled strength and unity, has obtained the sanction 
of history.”61 History spoke, translated, and sanctified geography; history was geography 
at work through time. 
This winding story of rights languages has an ironic postscript, however, in the 
Hungarian “Reply Notes” of February 1920. As mentioned, the original set of 
memoranda had been prepared before the Hungarian delegation had seen the terms of the 
peace. After receiving the terms in mid-January, the delegation returned to Budapest to 
review them carefully and formulate responses. When they returned to Paris on February 
12, they filed 18 notes setting out their objections. They complained bitterly of departures 
from the ethnic principle, and demanded plebiscites all the territories to be separated from 
Hungary to assess the desires of the population and thereby respect the principles of a 
Wilsonian peace.62 Fascinatingly, though, the language of historical right also returned 
with a vengeance. In their “Introduction Note,” the delegation appeared shocked that so 
many other claims of historical right had been admitted by the peacemakers: perhaps 
their hesitancy to rely on their tried and tested historical rights represented a profound 
tactical error. They were being beaten at a game they should have won: 
 
																																																								
61 [No author], La Hongrie; cartes et notions géographiques, historiques, etnographiques, économiques et 
intellectuelles (Paris?: n.p., 1919?), 5. (Like most of these pamphlets from around the time of the Peace 
Conference, I viewed this pamphlet at the Hoover Institute, with its remarkable collection of propaganda 
from the period). The quotation continues: For the past thousand years Hungary has had the same frontiers. 
[…] For a thousand years the same boundaries! Hungary stands in this respect unrivalled in Europe and 
outside Europe the only country that may be compared with it is Japan.” See also Lajos Steier’s 
formulation: “A country torn to pieces, the nations and territorial parts of which have lived interwoven and 
in perfect unity for a thousand years, craves the understanding attention of all those who have been misled 
by false information and the perversion of the data of history.” Louis [Lajos] Steier, There is no Czech 
Culture in Upper Hungary, illustrations by Joseph de Makoldy (Budapest: printed by Wodianer & Sons, 
1920), 41. 
62 See Deák, Hungary at the Peace Conference, 206ff. The final terms, barely altered, were handed to 
Hungarian representatives on May 5. 
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The historic right of Hungary to all her territory is incontestable and we are 
sure that the Allied and Associated Powers appreciate this right at its proper 
value. We have proof thereof in their reply to the Austrian delegation when, in 
the name of the principle of nationality, they demanded that the German part 
of Bohemia should be detached from the Czecho-Slovakian State. Here is the 
text of that reply (Note II of 2nd September 1919, II Part):  
 
“Therefore they (the Allied Powers) have agreed to preserve as far as possible 
to the old Czech provinces of the Crown of Bohemia their historic frontiers. 
They think that the German-speaking populations inhabiting the borders of 
those provinces ought to remain associated with the Czech inhabitants in 
order to cooperate with them in the development of the national unity to which 
history has rendered them jointly and severally answerable.” 
 
It could not be better put.63  
 
 
The Allies had perfectly articulated the logic of historical rights — but only (and 
shockingly) to the advantage of the Czechs! These words, the delegation purred, “so 
precisely express the confession of faith of the Allied Powers on the subject of the 
supremacy of historic ties binding into a political community populations of different 
races.” Having admitted the legitimacy of such claims, surely the Allies could only 
decide similarly for Hungary, especially once they fully understood the particulars of the 
case.  
The Allied Powers ignore our historical rights, the delegation complained, due to 
the mere fact of defeat, and instead consider only the claims of our neighbours. “We 
recognise their right to separate from us, if they wish; we only insist on our historic titles 
if they are confirmed by the new right, founded on the principle of the freedom of 
																																																								
63 Note C (“Introductory Note”), Neuilly, 12 February 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 2, 2. 




peoples in its widest application.”64 In this way, the delegation posited a different rights 
equation, or rights chemistry: the historical right only retained its full legitimacy if 
confirmed by free plebiscite, by self-determination. In the span of the Hungarian 
submissions, these different orders of legitimacy and entitlement — historic, geographic, 
demographic — were stacked up and placed in the same (semantic or force) field, 
confirming, balancing, or triggering each other. 
In a separate note “Concerning the frontiers of Hungary,” they claimed their share 
of the widespread vindication of historical rights. The terrible injustice of partitioning 
Hungary on the basis of “nationality” only appeared more nonsensical in light of the 
principles relied upon elsewhere. The delegation observed 
 
that the decisions of the Peace Conference are influenced considerably by 
historical rights. The re-establishment of ancient Poland and Bohemia has 
been effected on the basis of historical rights. Poland is to receive almost the 
whole of Eastern Galicia, which is entirely a Ruthenian language area, with 
Polish language islands of varied size consisting mostly of towns and landed 
estates. This situation is absolutely analogous to Transylvania.65 
 
 
When it came to the western frontier of Poland, the Allies stuck to the Polish frontier of 
1772, rather than insisting on language frontier. Bohemia proper had everywhere retained 
its historical boundaries; historical rights also found application in the de-annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine. But not for Hungary: “The new frontier now placed before us is not 
based on historical rights — is indeed in every respect a contradiction of the same; nor is 
																																																								
64 Note C (“Introductory Note”), Neuilly, 12 February 1920, The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. 2, 2. 
65 The quotation continues: “…with the difference, however, that we have a still better ethnographical, 
historical, economic and cultural title to Transylvania than the Poles have to Eastern Galicia: but in both 
cases a minority possessing a higher standard of culture is living side by side with an uncultured majority.” 
Note XXII (“Concerning the frontiers of Hungary”), [Neuilly, 12 February 1920], The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations, vol. 2, 13. 
	
	 409	
it demarcated on an ethnographical basis.” No, they had felt the sharp edge of a different 
principle altogether: “this frontier is that of conquering peoples.”66 
 
Conceptual Frontiers 
They were not wrong. The frontiers of the Hungarian state were largely fixed long before 
any of the Hungarian submissions changed hands in Paris. They had been decided in 
reverse, as it were: the Peace Conference had appointed territorial committees for each of 
the smaller “Allied” states, and “Hungary” emerged as the negative space remaining 
between all the newly sculpted sovereigns.67 They were latecomers to the party in Paris: 
Beneš and Kramář had stepped out in front of the Great Powers on February 5, 1919 — 
almost eleven months before the Hungarians had the same chance. That day, the two 
Czechs sought “to shape the Czecho-Slovak State.”68 Their submissions, as we know, 
forcefully argued for the legal survival of the “Czech” state through the vicissitudes of 
imperial rule. Having avoided legal death, it also served as the mule for historical rights, 
carrying them forward into the new world order. The connection between the survival of 
subjects and the survival of rights was nowhere quite so clear.  
																																																								
66 Note XXII (“Concerning the frontiers of Hungary”), [Neuilly, 12 February 1920], The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations, vol. 2, 15. See also page 18: “The Supreme Council, which lays great stress on historical 
arguments and rights, and therefore has certainly every respect for a historical past, has determined the fate 
of Hungary altogether without the last regard for the historical past of that country, which is probably 
unknown to it except through the interpretation of our enemies.”  
67 Following the work of the committees, Hungary’s frontiers were essentially decided in a single meeting 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 8. For an account of the unfolding of the determination of 
Hungary’s frontiers, see Deák, Hungary at the Peace Conference, 27-90. 
68 Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on 
Wednesday, 5th February, 1919, at 3:00pm, in David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, 
With Documents, vol. 14, Minutes of the Supreme Council (New York: Appeal Printing Company, 1924), 
212 (per Beneš). 
	
	 410	
The Czech memorandum itself drew a direct line of continuity between the 
imperial constitutional struggle for rights and the present moment of state formation. It 
was the survival of the state in law, if not in fact, that enabled and drove this struggle: 
 
This singular situation gave the Czechs power when they commenced, in the 
course of the 19th century, to vindicate the right of liberating their own ancient 
provinces. The legal existence of the State of the Czechs, composed of 
Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia was a historic tradition living in the memory of 
every Czech. The Czechs had never ceased, even long before the outbreak of 
the Great War to proclaim this fact: ‘We are legally independent and our 
Country is formed of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.’69 
 
 
Dormant legalities could be revived and resurrected, in the mid-nineteenth century, just 
like in 1918. Their claims at the Peace Conference were not new, they emphasized, but 
simply the same ones they had tabled in Vienna amid the wrangle over the imperial 
constitution. Only now, of course, the jurisdictional imaginary of historical rights was to 
be hardened into territorial borders, just like the Hungarian case:  
 
The Czechs, therefore, in claiming as theirs the territories of Bohemia, 
Moravia and Silesia are only acting in accordance with a classic right, 
consecrated by a past History dating twelve centuries back. The frontiers of 
those provinces are historical frontiers; no Czech would allow of their being 
changed. Integral Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, must then constitute the very 
basis of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.70  
 
 
As they summarized in conclusion, making sure no one missed the deep historical 
legality in play: 
 
																																																								
69 Czechoslovak Delegation, Peace Conference, Mémoires, Mémoire No. 2: Territorial claims of the 
Czecho-Slovak Republic (n.p., n.d. [1919]), 7 (viewed at the Hoover Institution Library, Stanford 
University). 
70 Czechoslovak Delegation, Peace Conference, Mémoires, Mémoire No. 2, 7-8. 
	
	 411	
The Czecho-Slovaks now formulate their territorial claims — claims based on 
historic traditions, and consider that the Czech State (composed of their three 
provinces) has never ceased to exist, legally speaking. In virtue, therefore of 
these historic traditions Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (along with Slovakia) 
are considered as constituting the main basis of the national territory claimed 
by the Czecho-Slovak Republic.71 
 
 
The Czechs were famously successful in virtually all the territorial claims they made, 
despite, equally famously, the presence of substantial “minority” populations within the 
bounds of these historic Länder.72 Controversy raged regarding regions like Teschen 
(Těšín/Cieszyn) — which had a Polish majority but fell within historical Silesia — and 
especially regarding the fate of the large German population within historic Bohemia. In 
his verbal presentation, Beneš highlighted economic and geographic unity, too, but 
history certainly rang out above other languages of justification. As Masaryk reflected, 
“Our claim that the German minority should remain with us is based on our historical 
right and on the fact that the Germans of Bohemia never attached value to union with 
Germany while they were under Austrian rule, or even in the time of the Bohemian 
Kingdom.”73 
																																																								
71 Czechoslovak Delegation, Peace Conference, Mémoires, Mémoire No. 2, 8. 
72 See, generally, D. Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: Diplomatic History of the Boundaries 
of Czechoslovakia, 1914-1920 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962); Robert Luft, “‘Alte Grenzen’ und 
Kulturgeographie: Zur historischen Konstanz der Grenzen Böhmens und der böhmischen Länder,” in Hans 
Lemberg, ed., Grenzen in Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert: Aktuelle Forschungsprobleme 
(Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2000), 95-135. 
73 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918 (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 385. Masaryk noted further that there was a Czech proposal considered at 
the conference to cede part of Bohemia to Germany on ethnic grounds. Yet on “mature reflection” the 
discontinuity of the German areas and economic interests “told in favour of our historic right; and, at the 
Peace Conference, these considerations prevailed,” 385-386. See also his argument in a December 1918 
memorandum: “It is the Czechs who founded the state, developed it, bled for it and preserved it; the 
Germans came to us, first, as guests, enjoying the hospitality of our kings — whose legitimate and only 
successors we are, having therefore the same rights they enjoyed — and then, as colonists; in both cases 
abusing the hospitality of our country as they were wont to do in every country wherever they set their foot, 
as was abundantly demonstrated especially in the course of the present war. Our State, in fact, has never 
lost its continuity of rights. Therefore the Germans have neither a legal nor a moral right to be detached 
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Naturally enough, these borders and their intellectual scaffolds provoked fierce 
protest and controversy. The German Bohemian politician Rudolf Lodgman von Auen 
(1877-1962), who had served as a representative in both the imperial parliament and the 
Bohemian diet, was especially vocal. In November 1918, the German Bohemian 
delegates to the imperial parliament had met together in Vienna and elected von Auen 
“Landeshauptmann” of German Bohemia; he subsequently represented their interests as 
part of the Austrian delegation to the Peace Conference, where his attempts to have the 
German areas of Bohemia included in the new Austrian republic floundered. In a 
December 1918 speech, he expressed incredulity that the Czechs could make claims in 
the old style: the world of those old rights, he averred, had been washed away. Now one 
had to refer to the will of the people! The speech was published under the title “For the 
Self-determination of German Bohemia.”74 Outlining their case in a memorandum for the 
international audience in Paris, von Auen and his colleague Robert Freissler submitted 
that there were two different principles in play: it was a case of “historical juridical 
events” versus “national autonomy.” The only rational path was clear. The state planned 
by the Czechs would “represent a deteriorated new edition of collapsed Austria.” With 
																																																								
from our State. The Germans after 1871 colonized Alsace Lorraine; but would anyone sanction the German 
claim that that land belongs to Germany and not to France? And let me recall that in the middle of the 18th 
century the German colonists in the state of Pennsylvania claimed the right of self-determination, but it was 
refused them, and justly so; for the Germans had the right of self-determination at home, in their 
autochtonous [sic.] state, and there they can claim it. Furthermore, the United States itself resisted, in 1860, 
the south and defended its own unity.” President Masaryk, “The Germans in the Czechoslovak Lands, 
Especially in Bohemia,” December 9, 1918, SSEES, SEW 6/1/2. 
74 Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, Für die Selbstbestimmung Deutschböhmens, Flugblätter für 
Deutschösterreichs Recht, No. 7 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1919). The publication identifies the text as a 




such frontiers, it could only become a center of discontent and unrest: “a hearth of 
contagion will be created for the further peace of Europe.”75 
Jurists like Rudolf Laun also launched critiques. In a 1919 pamphlet titled 
“Czechoslovak Claims to German Land,” he rehearsed the declared foundations of a 
Wilsonian peace. The latter ostensibly forbade conquest, annexation, and the occupation 
of territories inhabited by other nationalities. “It seems all the stranger that precisely one 
of Europe’s newly formed states, despite being introduced into the society of states as an 
ally of the United States of America, will only admit the validity of Wilson’s principles 
where they are of benefit to it.” At the same time, they blithely applied entirely 
contradictory principles in other directions.76 On November 14, 1918, Laun recounted, 
the new Czechoslovak Republic, through the mouth of its first minister-president Dr. 
Kramář, insisted “firmly and steadfastly that the union of the Bohemian lands, sanctified 
by a history of many centuries, survives uninjured.” The Germans, apparently, would not 
be disadvantaged if they were loyal to the Czech state, but the Czechs would never allow 
a “disruption to their Bohemian lands, not only because of their historical rights but also 
because of the right of their minority to a free national life.” The Czech statesman, Laun 
argued, had thereby declared that “historical rights weigh more heavily than national self-
determination.”77 Yet how could this be reconciled with the new world order? “Surely the 
																																																								
75 “Information Concerning the Situation of the Germans in the Czecho-Slovak State,” Memorandum 
submitted to (Prof) Herron [intended for Peace Conference] by Rudolf Ritter Lodgman von Auen, 
Landeshauptmann in Deutschböhmen, and Robert Freissler, Landeshauptmann der Provinz Sudetenland, 
February 17, 1919, TNA, FO 608/5/16. 
76 Rudolf Laun, Die tschechoslowakischen Ansprüche auf deutsches Land, Flugblätter für 
Deutschösterreichs Recht, No. 4 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1919), 6. 
77 Laun, Die tschechoslowakischen Ansprüche auf deutsches Land, 6. 
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Peace Conference, which should introduce a democratic age and realize the self-
determination of peoples, cannot work with historical arguments.”78 Had it wanted to do 
that, it should not be granting Tyrol to the Italians. “German Sudetenland wants to 
determine its own destiny!” howled another pamphlet (or, in the wordplay of the German 
original — “to self determine its destiny”).79 No, the cartography of principles did not 
align with the new map of states, not even close. That great twentieth-century challenge 
of “reconciling boundaries with ideas” had begun.80 
Fending off German claims to self-determination involved Czech statesmen in the 
kind of distinctions and qualifications that the Hungarians had cultivated. Germans in our 
state, Masaryk observed, appealed to the authority of President Wilson and the right of 
self-determination.  
 
Before the war our people, too, proclaimed it; but in point of fact, it has never 
been clearly defined. Does it apply only to a whole people or is it valid also 
for sections of a people? A minority, even a big minority, is not a nation. Nor 





78 Laun, Die tschechoslowakischen Ansprüche auf deutsches Land, 10. 
79 (“Das deutsche Sudetenland will sein Schicksal selbst bestimmen”). Erwin Barta, Die Ansprüche der 
Tschechen auf das Sudetenland, Flugblätter für Deutschösterreichs Recht, No. 9 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 
1919), 6. See also [no author], Deutschsüdmähren an Wilson, Flugblätter für Deutschösterreichs Recht, No. 
21 (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1919). 
80 Holly Case, Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea During World War II 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 11. See also, for the case at hand, Kurt Rabl, “‘Historisches 
Staatsrecht’ und Selbstbestimmungsrecht bei der Staatsgründung der Tschechoslowakei 1918/19,” in Ernst 
Birke und Kurt Oberdorffer, ed., Das böhmische Staatsrecht in den deutsch-tschechische 
Auseinandersetzungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. (Marburg/Lahn: N. G. Elwert-Verlag, 1960), 79-
99.  
81 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 386. 
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The subject of a right to self-determination was amorphous: it could splinter unendingly, 
damaging the credibility of the right itself, or at least frustrating any easy presumption for 
its widespread application. Besides, the Czechs themselves were self-determining — they 
simply asserted the right to do so within their historic frontiers.82 
But the Czechs also leveraged the fact that they were far from the only ones 
invested in notions of historical right. Faced with Polish invocations of the right of self-
determination in the region of Teschen, the Czechs stuck to their guns in a January 1919 
memorandum: 
 
The Czechoslovak Nation bases their claim to Tesin-Silesia on their historic 
right. For centuries this Silesian territory has belonged to the Czechoslovak 
State. The Czechoslovak State being recognized internationally it is 
understood that it was recognized within its historical boundaries. That there 
cannot be the least doubt of this interpretation can be seen from the 
Declaration of the French Government delivered to the Budapest Government 
on the 10th of January 1919, and from the British Note which was just 
delivered to the German-Austrian Government in Vienna by the Swedish 
Ambassador.  
 
On the question of historic right the Polish Government is not of a different 
opinion. It is in the interest of both nations that they should guard this 




82 The use of both paradigms grated with many. In his notes on a meeting of the Ministerrat on November 
1, 1918, Josef Redlich recounted the words of Vlastimil Tusar (who would become Czechoslovak prime 
minister the following year): “Tusar, der schließlich bei der Frage des ‘deutschböhmischen’ Staates 
ankommt und der, wie alle Tschechen, mit wenig Logik das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen sorglos 
mit dem historischen Staatsrecht verknüpft…” Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, vol. 2, 312.  
83 Czecho-Slovak Government, Memorandum on the Affairs in Silesia, January 21, 1919 [signed by Svehla, 
m.p., Minister of the Interior, for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs], transmitted in 
Prague Dispatch No. 8 [from Gosling in Prague to Curzon?], January 26, 1919, TNA, FO 608/6/7. 
Emphasis added. As the memorandum continued in “Appendix A,” the government in Warsaw had 
proceeded “paying not the least regard to the sovereign rights of the Czechoslovak Republic within the 
historical boundaries of the crown of St. Wenceslaus.” 
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The Czech statement was both a wink and a warning — it silently invoked the deep 
shared, historical-legal landscape within which both new states swam. If the Poles wanted 
to ride roughshod over historical rights, they would harm their own interests, too. Not 
that the Poles took the hint. As the conflict over Teschen rolled on, and the Poles insisted 
on a plebiscite, Beneš remarked in a letter to Kramář that the Poles “declare our state 
rights [Staatsrecht] position to be an official fiction.”84 That imperial-constitutional 
discourse of the fictionality of historical rights — a kind of open, accepted fictionality — 
now ran along the seems of the new map of Europe. 
The residual legality of these historical units, and their integrity as such, sparked 
revealing reflections behind the scenes in Paris. Beneš reported American reservations 
even before the conference opened: if Bohemia’s historic boundaries were recognized, 
would the Conference not have to concede the same to the Poles? (Beneš responded, a 
little cattily, that the situation was entirely different, as it was necessary that order be 
established in these particular territories, and while the Czechs could do that, the Poles 
could not).85 But the initial terms of Allied recognition had referred to Czech 
independence in their historic frontiers, as the Czechs reminded the world in the Silesia 
memorandum above.  
Busy at work in the Political Intelligence Department, Namier reflected on this 
memorandum in mid-February, 1919. These historic frontiers had been challenged by 
Germans as well as Poles, he noted. “In the case of Bohemia,” he reflected, “we are faced 
																																																								
84 Beneš to Kramář, August 5, 1919, Masaryk Institute and Archives of the ASCR, Prague (hereafter 
MUA), EBIII, 652, k. 136. 
85 Edvard Beneš, Rapport sur la situation generale, December 24, 1918, MUA, EB1, 549, k. 114.  
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by these two extremely difficult problems: is a partition of Bohemia at all admissible? 
And if so, what parts are German and which of them can be separated from the Czecho-
Slovak State?” If one were to disrupt the formation for the Poles, a strong presumption in 
favor of the German claims would be established, too. As it stood, no presumptions had 
been established in either direction: “We have merely accepted the existing 
administrative divisions because they existed.”86 (Others in the department scribbled their 
general agreement with Namier’s reasoning on the document docket). If historic frontiers 
of the Czech provinces were abandoned in one direction, a path was opened for many 
more: the more neutral track — keeping the worms snugly sealed in their can — was to 
leave the historical unit in tact. The Czechs had thus been successful in establishing their 
historic state as a kind of neutral status quo, a pre-supposed unit whose “partition” would 
prove messy and unpredictable: exactly the presumption the Hungarians had fruitlessly 
sought for their own historic polity. Namier and Headlam-Morley seemed more of one 
mind on this point. Already a month earlier, the latter had written of Bohemia: “if as is to 
be hoped, the new State bases itself upon the historical Staatsrecht of the old Bohemian 
minority, the onus probandi of separating any portion of it lies with those who desire such 
separation.”87 Historical continuity represented the rebuttable presumption: the onus of 
proof and legitimation fell to those who wished to remodel history’s formations. Here the 
old order really did pre-figure the new.88 
																																																								
86 Political Intelligence Department [P.I.D.], Minute by Lewis Namier, February 15, 1919, TNA, FO 
608/7/1. On American reservations, see also Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed 
the World (New York: Random House, 2001), 236-237. 
87 Headlam-Morley, Minute on German Territories in the Tyrol and Northern Bohemia, January 21, 1919, 
TNA, FO 608/6/8. 
88 See also the formulation of the Peace Conference committees dealing with the Teschen question: “The 
inhabitants of this area, Tschechs, Germans and Poles, are very conscious of their historic unity and 
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And yet — Czechoslovakia suffered from serious “rights trouble.” Historical 
rights were not and could not be enough to justify the borders of the new state, because 
those borders reached beyond Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and deep into historic 
Hungary: that is, they leapt over the frontiers of history to scoop up the Slovaks. The 
Czech statesmen claimed a common “Czecho-Slovak” state on the basis of ethnic and 
linguistic kinship: or, as their Peace Conference memorandum had it, “in the name of the 
right of Nations to choose their own Government.”89 This demographic argument for 
national self-determination involved Czech claim-makers in permanently bifurcated 
discourse of legitimacy. As their Declaration of Independence phrased it: “We make this 
declaration on the basis of our historic and natural right.”90 As they had been in the 
imperial period, rights based on ethnicity were coded as “natural” as against the historic 
rights of the Länder. The new state at the heart of Europe asserted the prerogative to rely 
both idioms simultaneously. “Political men and theorists have long busied themselves 
with a constitutional definition of the union of Slovakia with our State,” Masaryk 
reflected gingerly: “Theoretically it is a question of distinguishing more precisely 
																																																								
anxious to remain together as Silesians. The frontier suggested endeavors to meet this by keeping three 
political districts together and securing for them the largest possible measure of local self-government 
under the Tchecho-Slovak State. While this proposal assigns a considerable number of Poles to Tschecho-
Slovakia, it secures for them the preservation of their historic rights as Silesians.” Note presented to the 
Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Committee on Tschecho-
Slovak Questions, Frontier between Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia, April 6, 1919 (collected under the 
docket heading: Frontiers between Polish and Czecho-Slovak States), TNA, FO 608/6/7. On the unfolding 
of the Teschen question, see MacMillan, Paris 1919, 225ff. 
89 Czechoslovak Delegation, Peace Conference, Mémoires, Mémoire No. 2, 1. 
90 Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government (New York: 
Marchbanks Press for the Czechoslovak Arts Club of New York City, 1918), 4. 
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between ‘historical’ and ‘natural’ right. We invoked both of them during the war; and in 
view of Slovakia, I had long endeavored to harmonize them.”91   
Not coincidentally, many Czechs and Slovaks themselves remained sceptical 
about the union. Among the Slovak national movement, a strong consensus obtained for 
autonomy of some sort: but opinion then diverged as to whether this should be occur 
under the umbrella of Czech sovereignty (or even under Hungarian sovereignty), or 
whether complete independence was preferable.92 Different autonomist movements 
proliferated; some Slovak politicians, like Viktor Dvorčák (Dvortsák), approached the 
Peace Conference independently, and complained that the non-existent “Czecho-Slovak” 
nation was only the illegitimate invention of Masaryk and Kramář.93 Many on the Czech 
side, too, expressed ambivalence about this bold departure from history. “I know only too 
well that it was no easy matter for us to provide for the inclusion of Slovakia. The 
Slovaks were unknown,” Masaryk explained.94 Numerous public figures, including some 
historians, remained tethered to a particular interpretation of the historical rights of the 
Bohemian lands (and their statements were “exploited” by “the pro-Austrians and the 
																																																								
91 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 361. 
92 On this union, its ambivalences, and its consequences, see Nadya Nedelsky, Defining the Sovereign 
Community: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 65ff; 
Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Alexander Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, 
the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 166ff; Hugh 
LeCaine Agnew, “New States, Old Identities?: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Historical 
Understandings of Statehood,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 4 (2000): 620-629. 
93 Aide-Memoir by Victor Dworcak [inexplicably, the docket reads: Victor Wborcadki], Président du 
Conseil National Slovaque, August 21, 1919, forwarded by Percy Wyndham (British legation, Warsaw) to 
Curzon (FO), September 6, 1919, TNA, FO 608/8/2. 
94 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 338. 
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pro-Magyars”95), ignoring “our natural right to union with Slovakia.” Masaryk mediated: 
“though I admitted historical right, I always upheld natural right alongside of it.”96  
If doubts persisted on the home front, they could hardly compete with the 
incredulity that the union provoked elsewhere. “The Czech claim concerning the 
annexation of 16 Hungarian counties is founded on no historical, no legal, and no 
geographical basis,” protested Ernő Ludwigh, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Cleveland, 
Ohio (which was home to a large Hungarian population).97  
 
It is true, that strictly speaking Czech jurists have never advanced historical 
claims to these counties, as they could not have been substantiated by facts. 
Merely in the most recent years, however, have they worked out a new state 
rights theory with two applications; one for the German-Bohemian districts, 
based on history, and the other for the Slovak counties, based on the 
nationality principle.  
 
 
Even if one presumed (incorrectly) that the Czech and Slovak peoples are one and the 
same, the numbers did not support their case, he insisted. The contradictions in Czech 
policy could only be explained by their imperialistic aims: “German Bohemians are not 
allowed the exercise of any rights of self-determination; the Slovaks are, provided they 
cooperate for union with the Czechs.”98 It was this direct contradiction, this rights 
																																																								
95 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 338. 
96 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 361. 
97 Nicole M. Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty 
Transformed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 163. 
98 E. Ludwigh, A Plea in Support of Hungary’s Territorial Integrity (Budapest: Hungarian Territorial 
Integrity League, 1919), 15. Emphasis added. The lack of precedent for such a union was repeatedly cited 
as evidence for its legitimacy; see for example the account of the Austro-Hungarian diplomat (of Hungarian 
origin) Baron Julius von Szilassy: “Die Geschichte kennt aber keinen einzigen Fall, daß der böhmische 
Herrscher aus ethnologischen Gründen Anspruch auf die slowakischen Teile Ungarns erhoben hätte!” 
Baron J. von Szilassy, Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie: Diplomatische Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag 
Neues Vaterland, 1921), 364-365. 
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dualism, that rankled the most.99 While historical rights apparently trumped self-
determination in the Bohemian lands, Rudolf Laun observed, in Slovakia the reverse was 
true: “in the east, as against Hungary, the same state claims that the right of national self-
determination is stronger than historical right.”100 As Austrian civil servant and journalist 
Friedrich Kleinwaechter put it in his 1920 history of the collapse of the monarchy: “For 
the state-forming principle [staatenbildendes Prinzip] of the Czechoslovak state, the 
historical borders are made effective as against the Germans, and the ethnic borders as 
against the Magyars.”101 For Kleinwaechter, this showed that no single principle, in the 
end, was viable across the board: “A Czech state without the Bohemian, Moravian and 
Silesian Germans is a formation incapable of life. With the Germans — as the future will 
show — actually, too.”102 
Of course, the debate as to whether territory should be carved into political units 
on the basis of history or of ethnicity stretched back to the Kremsier parliament of 1849. 
In the landmark Kremsier constitutional proposal, the delegates had agreed on a novel 
solution that tried to implement both understandings of legal-political community 
simultaneously: the historical units remained as the constitution’s fundamental persons, 
																																																								
99 Some were reminded of dualism in the more literal sense: “‘Czecho-Slovak unit’— a phrase similar to 
the former national state idea of Austria!” wrote Lajos Steier, who agitated for the Slovak cause throughout 
the interwar period. Louis [Lajos] Steier, There is no Czech Culture in Upper Hungary, illustrations by 
Joseph de Makoldy (Budapest: printed by Wodianer & Sons, 1920), 45. 
100 Laun, Die tschechoslowakischen Ansprüche auf deutsches Land, 7. 
101 Friedrich F. G. Kleinwaechter, Der Untergang der Oesterrichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (Leipzig: K. 
F. Koehler, 1920), 55. 
102 (“Kein Prinzip erwies sich als konsequent durchführbar. Ein tschechischer Staat ohne die böhmischen, 
mährischen und schlesischen Deutschen ist ein lebensunfähiges Gebilde. Mit den Deutschen - das wird die 
Zukunft lehren - übrigens auch”). Kleinwaechter, Der Untergang der Oesterrichisch-Ungarischen 
Monarchie, 54-55. Emphasis added (for clarity). 
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but one level beneath them, the state would be carved up into smaller Kreise that 
conformed as much as possible to ethnic-linguistic settlement. Different understandings 
of right and jurisdiction were stacked up atop one another, allowing different versions of 
the empire (so I argued) to exist simultaneously, with the constitution as a kind of 
imperial time machine. Discarded by a militarily-ascendant imperial government in 
March 1849, the Kremsier constitutional draft nevertheless became the semantic-legal 
field in which other proposals and plans circulated for the remainder of the empire’s life. 
One strand of those proposals — stretching from the Rumanian delegation of 1849 to the 
Austro-Marxists and beyond into the jurisprudence of international minority rights — 
advocated abandoning territory altogether and attaching jurisdiction to human bodies 
instead.  
The new Czech state took another route through the rival rights discourses of 
imperial law. It imported both the natural and historical conceptions but arranged them 
differently. Those jurisdictions that had be stacked atop one another in the Kremsier draft 
were un-stacked and laid out side by side: the historical (multiethnic) conception of the 
political community triumphed in the state’s west, while next to it, in the east, the ethnic 
conception did. As in the Kremsier draft, both conceptions were deemed legitimate: but 
unlike the Kremsier draft, they were not valid in the one and the same territory. Ideas 
coexisted horizontally, but not vertically — at the same time but not in the same space. If 
it was legal pluralism, then only of a certain sense, because the two conceptions of legal 
order were in fact kept distinct, quarantined from one another in space. After all, taken 




These two different idioms of sovereign justification affected the legal texture and 
“timing” of the territories to which they applied. The empire’s legal pluralism, I argued in 
chapter two, can also be seen as a kind of temporal pluralism, where multiple histories 
were kept legally “live.” In a slightly different sense, the bifurcated languages of 
legitimacy mapped onto a bifurcated timeline for the legal birth of the new Czechoslovak 
state. In a number of cases in the early 1920s, Czechoslovak courts were required to 
determine the precise start date of Czechoslovak sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, the 
Supreme Administrative Court held that the Czechoslovak state did not come into 
existence as a result of the treaties of peace but rather as a result of the revolution of 
October 28, 1918 — “not by virtue of the international treaties which took for granted the 
existence of a State which was a signatory to them.”103 But what of the territorial extent 
of sovereignty, especially between October 28 and the final determination of the state’s 
boundaries? The 1921 Payment of War Tax (Czechoslovakia) Case involved a plaintiff 
from Liberec (Reichenberg, Bohemia) who claimed that Austria had effectively declared 
the district of Liberec, as component of Deutschböhmen, to be part of the Austrian state, 
and that Czechoslovak sovereignty did not take affect there until the subsequent military 
occupation. In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court demonstrated just how 
inextricably the advent of Czechoslovak sovereignty, as a legal proposition, was bound 
up with the imperial constitution.  
According to the imperial constitution, the court recounted, the Kingdom of 
Bohemia had formed a distinct and autonomous unit in both administrative and 
																																																								
103 Establishment of Czechoslovak State Case, Supreme Administrative Court of Czechoslovakia, No. 
11224, 29 May 1925, Case 8, Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, Years 1925-1926, ed. 
Arnold D. McNair and Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 13-14. 
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constitutional law. The authority and jurisdiction of Bohemia’s diet, judicial system, and 
administration extended over the whole kingdom. This situation persisted until the 
revolution of October 28, 1918. The concept of Deutschböhmen, of the German portions 
of Bohemia, was entirely unknown in the empire’s constitutional law and public 
administration alike. Thus, when the National Committee took control of all these central 
authorities on October 28, they also assumed power over the full extent of the territory 
belonging to the former Kingdom of Bohemia — including, of course, “German” areas 
like Liberec. As a result, the new authorities were not required to explicitly articulate the 
precise boundaries of the state on October 28.104 The jurisdictional imaginary of the 
empire was imported wholesale from the imperial constitution into the sovereign shell of 
the new state: the Kingdom of Bohemia was transferred between orders as a whole unit, 
as an integral legal person. It did not need to be reconstituted and re-described as the 
empire collapsed. For that reason, Czechoslovak sovereignty arrived instantaneously 
across the whole historical territory without any regard to the ethnic composition of the 
different regions: nations were not the basis of this sovereignty. The same transfer of old 
legal units and jurisdictions occurred for the other lands of the Bohemian crown — 
Moravia and Silesia — as well.105 
But how did the Slovak territories fit into this origin-of-sovereignty story? 
Without a previous legal existence of their own (as such), their inclusion could not be 
																																																								
104 Payment of War Tax (Czechoslovakia) Case, Czechoslovakia Supreme Administrative Court, 21 January 
1921 (No. 580), Case 4 in Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, Years 1919-1922, ed. John 
Fischer Williams and Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932), 11-12. 
105 See Foreign Bills Decree (Establishment of Czechoslovakia) Case, Supreme Administrative Court of 
Czechoslovakia, No. 5142, 14 May 1925, Case 9, Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, Years 
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construed as an unambiguous legal transfer, as an assumption that persisted over the 
rupture of the imperial collapse (or, if it could, this presumption would have been for 
their inclusion in Hungary). The Slovak territories really did require legal description — 
they needed to be hailed into the order of the new Czechoslovak state. On this question, 
the two highest Czechoslovak tribunals had different views. Consistent with the logic of 
the previous case, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the establishment of 
Czechoslovak sovereignty in Slovak and in Subcarpathian Russia (also formally part of 
Hungary) required a different mechanism: it did not take effect until the Czechoslovak 
state actually occupied the region, and Czechoslovak administration was established there 
via the appointment of župan (chief officer of the župa, or administrative district) and his 
assumption of duties. The Supreme Court of Justice, on the contrary, held that these 
regions comprised part of the Czechoslovak state already at the moment of its inception 
on October 28106 — perhaps by some more mystical leap of the jurisdictional 
imagination. Taking the former’s view, the different conceptual foundations of territorial 
rights had resulted in a different chronology of sovereignty, with different triggers and a 
different onus of proof. This sequence or timing of rights was simultaneously a sequence 
of their respective rights subjects: the ethnic Czechoslovak state arrived in the new order 
a little later than the historical one. The uneven temporality of the “beginning” of the 
sovereignty recorded the disjunctures of imperial law into the legal foundations of the 
old-new state. 
*  *  * 
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Over the course of the interwar years, the conceptual duality of the Czechoslovak state 
became a favored explanation for and symbol of the ills of the interwar settlement in 
Central and Eastern Europe more broadly. The pairing of the two rights paradigms 
appeared to many — especially those disgruntled with the settlement — as a kind of 
reckless miscegenation whose results could only introduce unnatural and corrupting 
elements into Europe’s bloodstream. This trope appeared simultaneously with the 
interwar order itself. “Too late,” warned the Hungarian diplomat Szilassy in 1921,  
 
will the Bohemian rulers arrive at the understanding that such annexations 
[i.e. Slovakia] in today’s world mean weakness more than strength, and that 
they have planted all the disadvantages of the old Hungary, without its 
traditions and historical and geographic and economic advantages, in their 
hybrid body politic [ihr hybrids Staatswesen].107 
 
 
In their memorandum “On Southern Hungary,” the Hungarian delegation to the Peace 
Conference likewise warned that, if Slovaks were incorporated into the Czech state, they 
would join the string of Hungarian and German factions already undermining the new 
polity: “Thus even now, at the very moment of its formation, the germ of contention and 
ultimate dissolution is hidden in the Czech State.”108  Like cancer cells — invisible now, 
but irresistibly strong — these germs would inevitably infect and spread throughout the 
international system. 
Hungarian revisionism never subsided, and neither did the question of the Sudeten 
Germans. The trope of Czechoslovakia’s juridical dualism as a kind of fatal flaw at the 
																																																								
107 Szilassy, Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie, 370. 
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heart of the Versailles settlement only sharpened as the political atmosphere did the same 
in the 1930s. After a long study trip (supported by the Social Science Research Council) 
through the successor states in 1934, the Hungarian émigré scholar Oszkár Jászi collected 
his impressions in a series of articles under the title “War Germs in the Danube Basin.” 
Jászi had briefly served as the first Hungarian “minister for national minorities” in the 
months immediately following the war’s end, before migrating to the United States in 
1925 and taking up a post at Oberlin College in Ohio. The tone of his 1934 reports — 
published across a number of issues of The Nation — was not upbeat. He recounted 
social dysfunction, economic weakness, and national strife. The Czechoslovak state 
received some rare praise: it represented a genuine western democracy, he felt, and its 
constitution was “not a show window but a reality.” “Unfortunately, however, the new 
state rests on unstable foundations,” he frowned: “It was built on two antagonistic 
principles — the ethnological principle by which Hungary was dismembered, and the 
historical principle by which the right of the German minority to unite with Germany was 
denied.” Under such conditions, the unity and loyalty of the population would inevitably 
prove difficult.109 The conceptual friction threatened, or even promised, real-world 
friction. The interwar order did not have its ideas in line, did not have its ideas straight; 
foundational principles were not only multiple, but antagonistic.  
A kind of prize-child of the interwar order, Czechoslovakia was also a (partially 
self-appointed) bellwether for its fortunes.110 As the Germans of Bohemia emerged, 
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through the Munich agreement, as the fulcrum and excuse for the messy end of the 
Versailles settlement, some thought that the deep roots of the crisis must be buried in the 
make up of the state itself. The German Bohemian sociologist and theorist of nationalism 
Eugen Lemberg was hardly a neutral observer — having studied in Prague, he 
campaigned actively for Sudeten German interests in the late 1930s — but he did take his 
subject seriously in a long and learned 1938 article on “The State in the Thought of the 
Czech People.” He described the reasons for his study: “The state that the Czech people 
obtained in 1918 has, after 20 years of its existence, fallen into such a crisis that the 
thought arises that a decisive defect must lie already in the state-idea, in the conceptual 
foundations of this state.” This impression required a closer examination of the state’s 
deep ideological architecture, and to understand the latter, one needed to survey at least 
the last one hundred years.111  
From the very beginning, Lemberg observed, the Czech national revival ran along 
two distinct lines, with a “historical-constitutional” strand alongside a “natural law-
ethnic” one (einer historisch-staatsrechtlichen und einer naturrechtlich-völkischen). He 
followed both traditions through the evolution of Czech thought and through the imperial 
constitutional struggles, tracing the way in which the lands of the Bohemian crown were 
acknowledged and preserved by the Habsburgs as a “historical individuality.” 
Increasingly sidelined in the era of absolutism, certain Bohemian aristocrats and 
intellectuals strove for the revival of this “constitutional [staatsrechtliche] individuality.” 
Placing this historical tradition alongside a linguistic and völkisch conception of the 
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nation, Lemberg argued that with the advent of the state in 1918, two alternative 
conceptions of the state were themselves united in the public law of the state. He called 
this the “dualism of Czech politics.”112 Those two strands had, of course, been 
fundamentally shaped by the Austro-Hungarian legal and political debate.113 The whole 
structural uncertainty of rights and rights-subjects in imperial law had been reinscribed 
anew into the architecture of the new little state at the heart of Europe. 
Around the same time, the Slovak campaigner Viktor Dvorčák, whom we 
encountered earlier sending autonomist missives to the Peace Conference, was actively 
reaching towards international public opinion once more as part of the “Slovak Council.” 
The title of their 1937 memorandum was clear enough: Should Great Britain Go to War 
— for Czechoslovakia? An Appeal to British Common Sense for the sake of World Peace. 
Dvorčák and his colleagues catalogued the apparent artificiality and illegitimacy of the 
Czech state. Again, the Sudetenland symbolized the conceptual bankruptcy of the 
Czechoslovak state: “By what right do the Czechs possess this territory? By historical 
right, they say. Yet the Czechs themselves have no respect for historical rights, since 
Slovakia was in the uninterrupted possession of Hungary for more than a thousand 
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years.”114 The equally dissatisfied Ruthenians argued similarly: Czechoslovakia is about 
to plunge the world into another world war.115 
 
*  *  * 
Needless to say, the arc of this discussion is not intended to suggest that Austro-
Hungarian constitutional law caused the Second World War. Rather, I am interested in 
the persistence of certain vocabularies of legitimacy, certain styles of rights, and the way 
in which they remained the conceptual tools for understanding huge changes in the order 
of states. The challenge of coding imperial order into constitutional law had driven the 
development of a number of conceptual propositions and ritualized contrasts including: 
the distinction between historical and natural/ethnic rights, the capacity of historical law 
and rights to survive in theory while not in fact, the tight co-implication of rights and 
their subject, the capacity of states to preserve their legal personality within imperial 
polities, and their capacity to carry rights with them between different legal orders. 
Together these components formed a Central European vision of legal pluralism, one that 
relied upon and produced a striking series of precepts on the relationship between law 
and time. Law recorded history, archived its path and sequence, and triumphed over it, 
preserving juridical forms and subjects through political storm after political storm. This 
dense and rich legal imaginary, fashioned through decades of heated imperial 
constitutional debate, remained the conceptual horizon within which many protagonists 
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and commentators understood the cataclysm of imperial collapse in 1918. Like a library 
of legal stories, it helped contemporaries connect an extremely fluid and unfamiliar 
political situation to deep structures and touchstones from the past; it allowed them to tie 
current chaos to strands of legitimacy and right that stretched back across the centuries, 
even to 1526. It was a way of conceptually mastering the nature and magnitude of a new 
international order in Central Europe. Strikingly, it also furnished resources for 
understanding the dissolution of that order. Narratives for the building and the 
dismantling of interwar Europe could be sourced from the songbook of imperial law. 
So imperial law bravely set off on a new post-imperial career. Along the way, its 
course through post-Habsburg Central Europe generated a set of conversations spanning 
decolonization and post-imperial sovereignty, self-determination and state legitimacy, 
populations and territory, minorities and majorities, rights and their subjects. This body 
of “case law” (broadly conceived) stands at the beginning of a twentieth century 
jurisprudence (and historiography) of the management of imperial collapse in 
international law and order. Fragments of this conversation splinter off in unexpected 
directions. When, in 1948, the Israeli Declaration of Independence invoked Israel’s 
“natural and historical right” to independence, it did not only repeat the formulation of 
the Czech equivalent, but also its meaning or implication. Like the Czechs, the nascent 
Israeli government took an ethnic collective as the relevant rights subject, but claimed a 
broad territory in which this ethnic group formed only a minority. The precedent of 
historic statehood stepped in to sure up legitimacy where demographic numbers failed.116 
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The notion of “historical rights” would later enjoy a third life (or was it a fourth or 
fifth?) as a means of articulating the rights of indigenous peoples in the extra-European 
world.117 There, too, rights could not rest upon the “liberal” logic of present numbers, but 
emerged only through reference to some prior state of affairs. As in imperial law, the 
recognition of such rights in the present required that some sort of stable rights subject 
could be identified through the course of time, some sort of rights mule for the transfer of 
rights through history. “Historical continuity” accordingly emerged as a key concept in 
the recognition of indigenous rights in settler colonial states like Australia and Canada.118 
If the full genealogy of these “non-liberal” historical rights still remains to be written, this 
dissertation has contributed its first movement. 
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